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THE AMERICAN ENGINEERS 
IN FRANCE 




LOADING LOCOMOTIVES FOR .SHIPMENT TO FRANCE IN CONDITION 
READY TO RUN 

[Paso 390] 



THE AMERICAN ENGINEERS 
IN FRANCE 



BY 

WILLIAM BARCLAY PARSONS, D.S.O. 

COLOXSL, ELETEXTH U. S. EXOINEEBS 




ILLUS TH LTED 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

NEW YORK LONDON 

1920 






COPTEIOHT, 1920, BT 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 



3EP 23 1320 



PBINTED IN THK UNITED STATES OF AKKRICil 



©CI.A597493 



TO THE MEMORY OF ALL THE AMERICAN ENGI- 
NEERS WHO FELL IN FRANCE, AND PARTICU- 
LARLY TO THE MEMORY OF THE OFFICERS 
AND MEN OF THE ELEVENTH ENGINEERS, 
AMONG WHOM WERE THE FIRST UNITED 
STATES SOLDIERS TO BE KILLED IN BATTLE 
IN EUROPE, THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED AS A 
SMALL TRIBUTE OF ADMIRATION AND RESPECT 



"The British attack at Cambrai is of special interest, since it 
was here that American troops (Eleventh Engineers) first partici- 
pated in active fighting." 

Extract from Final Report of 
Gen. John J. Pershing, 

Commander-in-Chief, 

American Expeditonary Forces, 



PEEFACE 

This book is not intended to be a history or detailed 
account of the work done by American Engineers in 
France. Their work was so extensive and so varied as to 
put the writing of its record beyond the powers of one 
man, for none could know it all. It is hoped that some 
day the record will be properly set forth in justice to the 
men and for the honor of the profession, but it will be of 
necessity the joint product of several collaborating 
authors. 

The first contribution that America made to the Allied 
cause was the raising of nine regiments of engineers, with 
one of which the author served. It is their work that is 
the motif of this book. In the writing, it has been neces- 
sary to touch on all the fields of engineer activity, because 
these regiments came in contact with every field, even if 
they did not invade each one, from constructing ports to 
digging and holding trenches, in all parts of France from 
the Atlantic to the Vosges, from the Mediterranean to 
Flanders. Consequently there results a brief outline of 
what all engineers did. Perhaps, it may serve to give 
those who did not go overseas a picture of what is meant 
by engineering in modern war. 

There will not be found any description of spectacular 
or dazzling pieces of construction like so many structures 
in civil works that arouse admiration. There was none 
such. Military engineering consists in doing things in 
the simplest and quickest way, where permanency in 
character and accuracy in execution yield to the imperi- 
ous demands for results that are immediately available 
regardless of all other considerations. The individual 
accomplishments that can be singled out with pride were 

ix 



X PEEFACE 

principally in tHe application of physics and chemistry. 
The achievement in engineering construction that was so 
yery noteworthy lay in a great whole. 

No reference will be made to the Italian campaign, 
because no unit of the original nine engineer regiments 
served there. Much of the work, however, that was done 
by the Italian engineers among the crags and precipices 
of the Alps was exceedingly brilliant. 

A few personal experiences of the author and others 
have been introduced, not because they are in any way 
remarkable, but rather because they are not remarkable. 
A narrative of the work of the engineer would not be 
complete if it were not accompanied by at least some sug- 
gestions of what entered into his daily life and what 
were his relations with the engineers of the Allied armies. 

In this book the words Allies and Allied Forces refer 
to the union of nations on the western front, to whom the 
designation Entente is very frequently, and perhaps with 
accuracy, applied. The opposing forces were also allied 
with each other, but by those serving in France they were 
always thought of as the enemy. To the American 
Engineers the word Allies meant friends only, and prin- 
cipally the French and British Armies with which they 
were associated. 

The thanks of the author are gratefully extended to 
Major General Black, Chief of Engineers, for permis- 
sion to obtain information from the reports on file in his 
office ; to Major General Langfitt, Chief Engineer Officer, 
A. E. F., for data contained in his full report ; to Colonel 
H. H. Maxfield, General Superintendent of Motive 
Power; to Lt. Col. J. P. Hogan, G. S.; to Lt. Col. H. W. 
Hudson, E. T. C; to Major N. A. Middleton, 23rd Engi- 
neers ; to Major W. A. Cattell, officer in charge of engi- 
neer historical documents ; to Captain Fenwick Beekman, 
M. C. ; to Captain E. G. Simons, 56th Engineers, to many 
officers of the original nine regiments, and to Mr. Frank- 



PREFACE xi 

lin D. Eoosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The 
statistics have been taken in large measure from 
"America's Munitions " and '^ The War With 
Germany. ' ' 

Wm. Baeclay Paksons, 

Colonel, 11th U. S. Engineers. 



CONTENTS 

Chapteb Pass 

I. The Nett Militaet Engineeb 3 

Militarj and civil engineering — Engineer troopg in 
France. 

H. The Fiest American Enqineees 11 

Engineer reserve — First regiments raised — Engineer 
oommisaion to France. 

III. America's Problem 20 

Franco-British engineering problem — America's prob- 
lem — American supplies and storage. 

IV. Engineer Organization 33 

Field force — Zone of the advance — Service of Sup- 
plies — Engineer control in armies, corps and divisions 
— Engineers in Service of Supplies. 

V. Ports 43 

Ports reported available — Port development — Ports 
developed — Port control. 

"VT. French Railways 67; 

Principal railway systems — Territories served by each, 
company — Meter gauge railways — Mileage and 
traffic — War control — Railways used by British — 
Railways used by Americans. 

VII. American Railway Operations in France • 691 

British railway operating organization — American 
railway requirements — American equipment — Trans- 
portation department organization — American lines 
of communication — American operating staff — Train 
control — French rolling stock — Accidents and ambu- 
lance trains — Railway transport officers. 

VIII. Storage Yards and Other Railway Construction 88 

Classification of storage — Base and intermediate 
depots — Regulating stations — Is-sur-Tille — St. Sul- 
pice, Montoir — Gievres, Montierchaume — Other stor- 
age yards — Storehouse construction — Railway con- 
struction. 

IX. American Locomotives and Cars 102 

French design — American repair troops -— Nevers 
shops — American locomotives — American cars — 
Ajnerioan control. 

3dil 



xiv CONTENTS 

Chaptbk Page 

IS. The Cambbai Offensive .- Ill 

Battle of the Somme — Campaign in spring, 1917 — 
Arriv-al of American engineers — Tanks — Military 
movement, Nov., 1917 — American engineer preparation 
for battle — Battle of Cambrai. 

XL The Cambbai Defensive 124 

Railway reconstruction — Battle of Gouzeaucourt. 

XII. The American " R. E.'s " 133 

Association of American and British Engineers — Ex- 
perience of one American regiment — Character of 
" Tommy " — British officers — Trench life on British 
Front. 

XIII. Relations with the French 143 

French calmness — ■ Armistice day — ■ German offensive, 
July 15, 1918 — Area of destruction — Children under 
fire — ■ Franco- American review. 

XIV. Foeestby 153 

French forests — British timber needs — American 
timber needs — French Forestry Organization — Acqui- 
sition of Forests — Prevention of waste and limit of 
cuts — American Forestry Force — Timber cut. 

XV. Wateb Supply 167 

French and British practice — Water, how supplied — - 
French Water Supply Organization — British Water 
Supply Organization — American Water Supply Organ- 
ization — Water purification — Water consumption — 
Ratio of disease to battle deaths. 

XVI. Chemical Engineers 182 

Hague conference on use of gases — Chlorine — Chlor- 
picrin and phosgene — Treatment of gas casualties — 
Lachrymator and other gases — Mustard gas — Gas 
masks and respirators — Gas waves — Gas shells — 
Gas output — Chemical Warfare Service. 

XVII. Camouflage and Other Fields of Engineering 198 

Work of Signal Corps — New alphabet — Listening in- 
struments — Derivation of camouflage — Application 
of — Manufacture of — Eleotro-mechanioal engineering 
— Engineer repair shops — Tunnelling — Salvage. 

XVIIL Maps 216 

Allied maps in 1914 — Photographic surveying — Map 
scales — American, British, French and German maps 
compared — Map projections — Bonne system — Lam- 
bert system — French maps — British maps — Inter- 
Allied maps — Different issues of maps — French topo- 



CONTENTS XV 

Chaptes Paob 

graphical organization — British and German organi- 
zation — American organization — Mobile and ba«e 
printing plants — American map production. 
XIX. Flash and Sound Ranging and Search Light I>etection 244 
Guns and targets hidden — " Archies " and airplanes 

— Photographic detection — Gun flash detection — 
Sound detection — Sound detector apparatus — Air- 
plane detectors — Air resistance. 

XX. Abtlllbby 263 

Indirect iire — Ammunition expended — American ar- 
tillery — Gun recoil — Tractors — Railway mounts — - 
Naval guns and mounts — Verdun defense. 

XXI. Light Railways * 277 

Previous use of light railways — Location — Rails — 
Rolling stock — Locomotives — Cars — Track — Gauge 
and function — Traffic — Transportation of wounded — 
American light railwaya — 'Administration — Organi- 
zation. 

XXII. Roads 296 

French roads — American road problems — American 
administration — ^St. Mihiel and Argonne-Meuse ofifen- 
■sives — Road department organization — Road con- 
struction — Plank roads — Traffic control — Material 
needed— "Corp'l Giles." 

XXIII. Tbenches and Teench Warfare 313 

Allied and German viewpoint in 1917 — March 21, 
1918, movements of engineers — Trench warfare — 
German system — French-British systems — Trench 
psychology — Principles of trench location in Front 
Support and Reserve — Communication trenches — • 
Trench trace — Trench dimensions — Water in trenches 

— Rampart trenches — Forest defense — Daily tasks 
in excavating — Dugouts — Wire entanglements — • 
Trench names. 

XXIV. Final Phase 347 

American sector — St. Mihiel salient and oflfensive — • 
Engineer work during oflfensive — Dannemorie Viaduct 

— Argonne-Meuse offensive — Beginning of battle — 
Engineer work during offensive — Water supply in St. 
Mihiel and Argonne-Meuse offensives — " Cease firing." 

XXV. Organization of Engineer Troops in the Field 364 

British railway troops — French railway troops — 
Work trains — American special engineer troops — 
Size of engineer regiments — Suggested organization) 
of engineer troops. 



XVI 



CONTENTS 



Chaptkb 
XXVI. 



XXVII. 



Engineer Organization and Engineer Work in the 
United States 

Organization in the United. States — Activities of Corps 
of Engineers — General engineer depot — Railway de- 
partment — Supplies purchased — Russian railway ser- 
vice — Bureau of Research — Manufacture of gases — 
Quartermaster Corps — Emergency construction of 
buildings — ConBtruction division — Shipping of loco- 
motives — Training of engineers. 

Statistics 

Size of army — Sources of the army — Results of 
physical examinations — Officers commissioned by ser- 
vices — Training of the army — Transportation of th« 
army — Transport fleet — CoSperation of Allies — 
Ports of embarkation and debarkation — Tonnage of 
army cargo — America's part in the actual fighting — 
Argonne-Meus© data — St. Mihiel data — American 
artillery in France — Toxic gases manufactured — 
Flying officers — Airplanes, number of — Battle deaths 
for all belligerents — American casualties — American; 
deaths in four wars compared — American deaths by 
dieease — War expenditures — War expenses of prin- 
cipal nations — Duration of war for various partici- 
pants — Ordnance production — ■ Extent of front held 
by United States and Allies — Rifle strength of Allied 
and German Armies — Guns in batteries — Battle air- 
planes — Comparative strength of American, French 
and British armies — Expenditures of ammunition — 
Merchant shipping lost for various nations — Merchant 
shipping before and after the war. 



Pags 



379 



305 



ILLUSTEATIONS 

FULL PAGE INSERTS 
Frontispiece PAOE 

An American Army Storage Depot in France Facing 92 

French Civilians Painting Canvas Covers in the American Cam- 
ouflage Shop at Dijon Facing 206 

American Engineers Repairing a Captured German Railway Yard 

Which Shows the Effect of Long Range Bombardment .. Facin^r 270 

United States Navy 14-Inch Gun on a Railway Mount Facing 272 

American Engineers Constructing a Light Railway Through a Forest 
Where It Could not be Discovered by Enemy Air Ob- 
servers Facing 278 

Dannemoire Viaduct Facing 354 

May 25, 1915, French Reconstruction Finished 
May 30, 19 15. Effect of German Artillery Fire 
American Engineers Replacing <a. Bridge at Grand Pr6, Three Times 

Destroyed by Shells Facing 360 



FIGURES 

1.— Inter- Allied System. Method of Lettering Fifty Kilometer 

Squares 230 

2. — Inter- Allied System. Ten Kilometer Squares Enlarged 230 

3. — Inter- Allied System. Kilometer Square Enlarged , 231 

4. — Old French System. Kilometer Square 231 

5. — Traversed Trench 330 

6.— Bastion Trench 331 

7.— Zig-Zag Trench 332 

8.— Wavy Trench 333 

9. — Cross Section of Trench 335 

10. — Front Line Dugout 335 

11. — Dugout for Battalion Headquarters 340 

12. — Dannemorie Viaduct before and after Bombardment 354 



MAPS 

For description see page 226 227 

Comparative Extent of German and Allied Trenches 322 



THE AMERICAN ENGINEERS 
IN FRANCE 



CHAPTER I 

THE NEW MILITARY ENGINEER 

Tlie effect of the war on the military engineer, or rather 
upon his relative importance and personal qualifications, 
has been completely revolutionary. There was a time 
when engineers were exclusively military men, when the 
great pieces of construction other than in architecture, 
or those which were beyond the limits of the art of ordi- 
nary builders, were fortifications ; while the only intricate 
types of machines, very crude affairs when measured by 
modern standards, were ^engines of war. There were no 
magnificent specimens of structural or mechanical con- 
struction, which are such an integral part of our daily 
life as to be accepted as matters of course, and scarcely 
draw forth momentary comment. Works of a civil char- 
acter which did exist, were on a very modest scale, and 
were; executed under the direction of military engineers 
who were described by the single word ** Engineer " — 
there being no other kind. 

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the military 
engineer covering the whole field of construction was 
Leonardo da Vinci, great artist, but greater constructor, 
whose life's work was the designing and building of 
crenelated walls, revolving canon, hoisting engines, canal 
locks, city improvements, and curious machines of all 
sorts for his illustrious patron, Duke Ludovico Sforza 
of Milan. For his amusement only, he snatched occa- 
sional moments from his arduous tasks of computing to 
place in color such creations as ** The Last Supper," or 
the elusive smile of " Mona Lisa." He fully expected to 
go down in history famous as an engineer, and never 
dreamed thai: his fortifications and canals were to be for- 

3 



4 :A.MERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

gotten and that his reputation was to rest finally on his 
brush. His survival as an artist is a good example of the 
instability of prominence in scientific achievement where 
each advance so completely obliterates previous efforts 
as almost to eliminate them from the records, leaving the 
latest word as the sole thing that men know and value. 
Perhaps, after all, it is only success in art that is endur- 
ing, because in art it seems possible to achieve results 
that other generations delight to remember. Science, the 
sister of art, is ever in a state of flux and unrest. 

The supremacy of the military engineer was chal- 
lenged in the 18th century, when canals, harbors, light- 
houses, roads, and other works, disassociated from any 
military connection, began to assume a more ambitious 
character, so as to approach in magnitude the works of 
national defense. Smeaton, the designer and constructor 
of the famous Eddystone lighthouse, assumed the desig- 
nation of ** Civil Engineer " to distinguish himself from 
his military confreres. iWith the application of steam 
as a source of power, the field of civil engineering 
broadened tremendously, and not only surpassed in 
extent that of military engineering, but became so large 
that by custom it has been found convenient to subdivide 
it into mechanical, mining, electrical, and other applica- 
tions of engineering science, leaving the original term 
** Civil Engineering ** to cover general construction only. 

As the civil engineer grew in importance, he not only 
invaded but took unto himself fields of activity hereto- 
fore considered as the exclusive property of his military 
brother and whilom superior. But contraction invari- 
ably leads to solidification. As the range of work of the 
military engineer became narrowed, so his experience 
led him to think more and more in terms of rigidity as 
shown in massive types of military defense, great forts 
with masonry walls as designed by Vauban and other 
masters. "When progress in creating new or developing 



THE NEW MILITARY ENGINEER 5 

previously known building materials gave him steel, 
beavy castings, modern concrete, lie was carried still 
further toward immobility with great guns permanently 
fixed on solid emplacements, mounted on intricate disap- 
pearing carriages or covered with shields capable of 
resisting any blow that could be imagined by him. The 
last word seemed to have been spoken. 

It had been spoken. Military engineering science had 
unconsciously reached an impasse. The old military engi- 
neer was, quite unknown to himself, moribund, and 
needed but the supreme test of experience to prove that 
his theories were dead. But in his death he was to have 
his revenge on his brother civil engineer, for his art was 
to have its resurrection into a new and bigger art, full of 
life and mobility, and he was to become again the great 
exponent of applied science. 

Progress is always made along spiral and not straight 
lines, so that after a lapse of time, we seem to come back 
to our original starting point, only it is on a higher level. 
It took but a few shots from the German 42 cm. guns 
early in the war to smash the great masonry and steel 
defenses of Belgium and northern France; defenses 
deemed impregnable and the very perfection of the mili- 
tary art. As they cracked and crumbled imder the 
pounding of these new monster engines of war, the whole 
science of military engineering, as the masters had con- 
ceived it, likewise crumbled and what had taken centuries 
to develop became obsolete in a twinkling. 

This did not mean that the military engineer had 
ceased to exist; quite the contrary. It soon was appar- 
ent that a new military engineering science had been bom 
enormously greater in extent and composition than the 
old that lay buried under the ruins of Namur and Mau- 
beuge. The new field included every form and applica- 
tion of civil engineering, using the term in its broadest 
fiignificance, and with it, electricity, chemistry, physics, 



6 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

metallurgy, geology, and bacteriology. While formerly 
the military engineer need only know about tenailles, 
bastions, glacis, counterscarps, and other details of per- 
manent fortification, together with only the rudiments of 
roads, bridges and surveying, to-day there is almost 
nothing in the whole range of applied science that he 
should not know something of, and in much of it he must 
be expert. Eailroads and roads, their construction and 
maintenance, bridges, locomotives, cars, engines of all 
types, buildings, tunnels, accurate mapping and range 
finding, water supply and its purification, photography, 
the laws and practical application of electricity, and the 
chemistry of gases, liquids and explosives, are part of 
his every-day work. Nor are these things to be known 
only in an elementary way. In the military text- 
books of not many years ago, instruction regarding 
bridges was confined to pontoon bridges or very simple 
structures, where perhaps the component members were 
held together by small ropes. Such structures could 
carry infantry, or at most, light artillery drawn by 
horses. Occasionally a bridge of this nature must stiU 
be erected, but the bridges with which the military engi- 
neer has to deal to-day must be strong and stiff enough 
to support locomotives weighing 100 tons each, drawing 
trains of cars, each car with its load weighing fifty tons. 
These weights in the late war were not the maxima, 
since after the failure of permanent gun emplacements, 
it was decided to mount the largest types of guns on rail- 
way cars, so as to provide the maximum of mobility. At 
the conclusion of the war, sixteen-inch guns, heretofore 
considered possible to use only on the most substantial of 
foundations, had been actually mounted on and fired from 
specially designed railway cars weighing 300 tons. 

Troops without equipment are worthless, and equally 
so would be a bridge that would carry the former, but 
not the latter. The infantry must have artillery and the 



THE NEW MILITARY ENGINEER 7 

greater part of artillery is now motor drawn by tractors 
weighing ten or more tons, the gun itself, speaking only 
of those that usually were moved on roads, weighing as 
much more. Tanks, which also had to be provided for, 
weighed as much as thirty-five tons. These few figures 
show that the bridges now to be built are vastly different 
in design and detail from what would have been erected 
to carry an army of previous wars. So it was with all 
the problems facing the engineer. 

The military engineer of the future must, therefore, 
know more of various kinds of engineering than any 
other engineer. At last he has emerged from the eclipse 
that began with Smeaton, and can claim to be again the 
leading type of engineer in that he supervises the highest 
and most varied apphcations of science. 

In our own. service, it has been the custom of the War 
Department to use the officers of the Corps of Engineers 
on work other than what was known as military engineer- 
ing, principally in the development and improvement of 
our rivers and harbors. This practise brought them in 
contact with many phases of engineering which they 
would not have met had they been confined to strictly 
military problems as they existed before 1914, and 
undoubtedly had great effect in preparing them to handle 
the unexpectedly new problems that were thrust upon 
them during the war. As the art of war now stands, mili- 
tary engineering is advanced civil engineering, with the 
application of every-day methods and engines to the 
requirements of war. The proper training of military 
engineers should, therefore, be largely along lines of civil 
practise and experience. It is to be hoped that the War 
Department will maintain its wise policy of the past and 
give the army engineers as wide and broad a connection 
as possible with all matter of public works. Whatever 
(the Government has to do in such matters should be given 
to the officers of the Corps of Engineers of the army, 



8 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

thereby training tliem during periods of peace for the 
very duties that they will be called on to perform should 
war again come. 

One measure of the importance of the engineer arm 
was the number of engineer troops engaged. In April, 
1917, when the United States declared war, the engineer 
forces of the regular army consisted of 256 officers and 
2,198 men, with but one general officer, the Chief of Engi- 
neers holding the rank of Brigadier-General. This 
force, small as it was, nevertheless had been increased 
greatly to meet the requirements arising out of the trou- 
bles with Mexico along the Rio Grande beginning in the 
previous summer. It was widely scattered in different 
parts of the United States and our overseas possessions. 
Nineteen months later, when the armistice was signed, 
there had been sent to Europe considerably more than 
11,000 commissioned engineer officers and 234,000 
enlisted engineer men, while there were in camps in the 
United States 15,000 more men ready and waiting sailing 
orders to join the expeditionary forces in France. 

These troops were distributed approximately as 
follows : 

With armies at the front 86,400 

Transportation Corps 60,000 

Construction 43,000 

Forestry 18,500 

Training schools, etc 18,500 

Supplies 7,600 



234,000 



But this total, great as it was, did not represent the 
whole of the engineer force. In addition to the units 
classified as engineers and the attached service bat- 
talions, there were twenty- four regiments known as 
Pioneer Infantry who went overseas. Although these 



THE NEW MILITARY ENGINEER 9 

regiments were organized, armed, and drilled as infantry, 
and equipped and trained to fight in an emergency, they 
were intended primarily to act as assisting forces to 
other arms. Nineteen of these regiments aggregating 
about 1,600 officers and 52,000 men, were assigned to the 
engineers and were used chiefly in constructing railways 
and roads in the advanced area. Besides the Pioneer 
Infantry, there were employed by the engineers prior to 
the conclusion of hostilities, 34,000 civilians and 15,000 
prisoners of war. 

The total aggregate of engineer troops, officers and 
men, actually in France can be put down as approximately 
347,600. This was a long step from the 2,454 officers 
and men who constituted the Corps of Engineers on the 
6th of April, 1917. Had the war continued another year, 
the above total would have been exceeded by a consider- 
able figure, because plans were already formed to 
increase the transportation corps alone to 150,000 men. 

To direct the work of this army of engineers, there 
were four major-generals, sixteen brigadier-generals and 
many colonels acting as brigadiers, most of whom would 
have been given that rank had not the armistice cut short 
operations and all promotions. 

It is frequently said that figures do not lie. Perhaps 
so, but at any rate, when stated thus baldly, they do not 
accurately convey the whole truth through failing to give 
a complete and perfect impression of their full meaning. 
As a measure of comparison, it may be convenient to 
recall that the combined federal and confederate forces 
under Meade and Lee at Gettysburg numbered less than 
160,000, while the whole of the great armies under 
[Wellington, Napoleon, and Bliicher at Waterloo, armies 
that represented the best part of the peoples of Europe, 
totalled about 345,000 officers and men. 

As the new military engineer had been created during 
and as the result of the war, so the engineer forces had. 



10 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

to be developed on a scale wholly out of proportion to 
those needed in any previous war. It was a great task 
that faced the American engineers ; it was a great force 
that was needed to cope with it. The force was raised 
and the task was accomplished. 



CHAPTER n 

THE FIRST AMERICAN ENGINEERS 

During the first two years of the war, the great 
majority of the American people deceived themselves 
with the comforting belief that the Atlantic Ocean sepa- 
rated them so effectually from European politics that, in 
no case, could the war be any affair of theirs beyond sell- 
ing to the belligerents supplies that temporarily they 
could not produce for themselves. The people could not 
see that mighty forces beyond their control and the con- 
trol of statesmen, no matter how wise, were slowly but 
inexorably drawing them into the conflict. 

The echoes of Louvain, of Charleroi, of Joffre's 
masterly retreat and victory on the Marne had scarcely 
ceased to sound before some American engineers realized 
that the war had already brought to the front not only 
new problems for the engineer to solve, but that, if the 
war were to continue beyond the stage of a short sharp 
campaign on which the Germans based their plans and 
hopes for victory, there would be a call for engineers and 
engineering science beyond even the most liberal esti- 
mates of military authorities. They also recognized, if 
the majority of their fellow-countrymen did not, that each 
day the war lasted, made our participation nearer the 
inevitable'. To the lay mind, the ocean might appear to 
be an insuperable barrier. As engineers these men could 
see in their trained imagination the possibilities of 
improvements already at hand, by which troops could be 
transported in large numbers, and to them there was 
needed but the demand to make the crossing of the ocean 
feasible not only by ships upon the surface, but by sub- 
marines beneath it and by airplanes or dirigible balloons 

II 



12 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

above it. They knew that their science recognized no 
limits that could not and would not be surpassed. 

As early as February, 1915, a small group of engineers 
met at a luncheon in New York to consider plans to 
prepare the members of the civil branch of the profession 
to meet the call that they saw coming. 

At that time there was no extensive machinery by 
which either engineers could receive military training or 
whereby the Government might call on them for service 
if needed. A very few engineers in some states could 
attach themselves to units of the National Guard. That 
was all. Some years previously, the United States Gov- 
ernment had organized the Medical Reserve in which doc- 
tors could be commissioned as offcers of the army in 
reserve, to be called to service when needed, and again 
to be released to the reserve when the emergency had 
passed. This group of engineers decided that there 
might well be organized an engineer reserve on precisely 
similar lines, because engineers, like doctors, were doing 
in peace time and in their ordinary occupation the very 
things that they would be required to do if called to war. 
As a result of this quite informal gathering, the five 
national engineering societies appointed committees to 
formulate a plan. In order to correlate efforts, a joint 
committee representing all the engineering institutions 
was organized, composed of the chairmen of the separate 
committees. This joint committee was instructed to lay 
the suggestion of an Engineer Officers' Reserve Corps 
before the War Department for consideration. The com- 
mittee was cordially, and the plan proposed sympa- 
thetically, received by the Secretary of War, Mr. Garri- 
son, th^ officers of the General Staff, and the Chief of 
Engineers, Brigadier-General Bixby. 

After a careful analysis, Brigadier-General (after- 
ward General) Tasker H. Bliss, assistant Chief of Staff, 



THE FIRST AMERICAN ENGINEERS 13 

remarked to the committee, * ' You have proved your case 
so far as it relates to the engineers, but why restrict it? 
"Why not ^extend it to include all arms of the service? " 
Fifteen months later, this plan became an actuality 
through clauses in the so-called National Defense Act of 
3rd June, 1916, whereby the Officers' Reserve Corps was 
authorized as part of the army of the United States. 
This reserve provided the highly valuable machinery for 
quickly commissioning officers during the spring follow- 
ing, when war was declared, without waiting for the 
complete legislation creating the National Army, the 
preparation of which necessarily involved considerable 
delay. The basic idea of the Reserve and the carrying of 
it into effect were the first and not the least important 
contribution by the engineering profession. 

In February, 1917, Brigadier-General (later Major- 
General) "William M. Black, Chief of Engineers, seeing 
that the storm was about to break and realizing the abso- 
lutely inadequate size of engineer troops at his disposal, 
took advantage of the Reserve Act and quietly gave 
orders for the organization of certain reserve regiments 
of engineers, and thus found himself in a position to com- 
ply with the first call made on the United States when 
war actually came — a call for engineers. 

Immediately following the declaration of war by the 
United States, the Governments of Great Britain and 
France appointed commissions known as the Balfour and 
Viviani-Joffre commissions, to discuss with the Ameri- 
can Government how and to what extent it could most 
effectively and quickly aid the common cause. These 
commissions arrived in Washington during the last week 
in April and after suggesting certain general principles 
of financial and military cooperation, they stated that 
the most pressing immediate need was for engineers. 
So, while our Government should create and send an 
army as quickly as possible, they requested that there 



14 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

be raised immediately some regiments of engineers. 
These men, while they must be equipped and made ready 
for any emergency, were to be used at first in transporta- 
tion, in the building and maintaining of railway lines 
from the coast ports to the front line trenches. 

The War Department acted promptly on the Anglo- 
French request for engineers, and ordered nine regi- 
ments raised. These regiments were known later as the 
Eleventh to Nineteenth Engineers, both numbers inclu- 
sive. As they were intended primarily for railway work, 
the word " railway '* was included in their designations, 
but in actual service, as their work broadened, and as 
they were called on for all classes of engineer duty, the 
word " railway " was soon omitted from their title. 

To raise them quickly, they were distributed as widely 
geographically as possible, but with headquarters at 
large railway centers, so as to reach more easily the class 
of men specially sought. The places of concentration 
with the numbers of the regiment were : 

New York Eleventh Regiment 

St. Louis Twelfth 

Chicago Thirteenth 

Boston. Fourteenth 

Pittsburg Fifteenth 

Detroit Sixteenth 

Atlanta Seventeenth 

Pacific Coast. . . .Eighteenth 
Philadelphia. . . . Nineteenth 

At first, they were spoken of as " reserve " regiments 
with numerical designations beginning with No. 1, but on 
the passage of the act authorizing the National Army, 
the term " reserve *' was dropped, and the numbers 
changed as above. Enlistment for the New York regi- 
ment was already well advanced when the Anglo-French 



THE FIBST AMEEICAN ENGINEERS 15 

call came, but its commanding officer, realizing that an 
opportunity was presented for the regiment to be sent 
immediately to France, accepted the offer that it become 
one of the first nine regiments. 

The men were secured for the most part by calling on 
the executives of the large railway systems for assistance 
and for permission to seek volunteers among the per- 
sonnel of their companies. As some of these regiments 
were intended originally for specific duties, for railway 
operation like the Thirteenth, for railway maintenance 
like the Fourteenth, and for locomotive and car repairs 
like the Nineteenth, care was exercised in selecting men 
and officers with corresponding experience. But in the 
construction regiments, no such nice distinction was nec- 
essary, and an intelligent recruiting officer judged appli- 
cants on general personal qualifications, so that a strong^ 
eager typist would be classed probably as a machinist, 
while a clear-eyed clerk without any mechanical experi- 
ence, but who was obviously of the right mental and 
physical character, would be set down as a carpenter if 
it could be shown that he had even once nailed up a pack- 
ing box. Later this gave the company commanders some 
bad moments with their consciences (at the beginning 
nearly every officer had such a handicap as a conscience) 
in their struggles to show that their several companies 
had the proper distribution of mechanical trades as 
required by the regulations. But the interesting thing 
is that it all came out right in the end; the typist, after 
short practice, could wield a pick in the trenches as well 
as anyone ; the dry goods clerk, whose knowledge of car- 
pentry was so limited, soon learned to lay the flooring 
on a bridge, while the college lad with no field experience 
of any kind would never fail to hit his mark with his 
rifle. 

One case that comes to mind was that of a quiet, 
reserved private classed as a ** miner," but who was 



16 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

found to have been in civil life a consulting engineer 
with an extensive and lucrative practice, and who, among 
other accomplisliments, was able to take charge of 
Hindoo laborers and direct them in their native tongue. 
Later he was advanced from the ranks to be a professor 
of geology at the staff college at General Headquarters. 
Then as an illustration of American versatility on a large 
and not an individual scale, the commanding officer of 
one of these engineer regiments was one day called on 
to send 200 picked men to complete a theatre with a seat- 
ing capacity of 5,000, the assisting unskilled labor to be 
furnished to any extent necessary by neighboring 
infantry. The large building was at the time under roof, 
but without sides or any interior fittings. The colonel 
made no selection other than to send one company whose 
captain could be depended on to do the best possible 
under the circumstances. In three weeks the building 
was enclosed, tarred paper on the roof to make it 
water-tight, seats, including private boxes for distin- 
guished guests, in place; electric lights, moving picture 
apparatus and colored spot lights for the stage wired and 
installed, and the scenery painted. 

The officers of the nine regiments were for the most 
part practicing engineers from civil life. Some had had 
National Guard experience or Spanish War service; 
some had attended training camps as at Plattsburg, and 
a few were graduates of the Military Academy at "West 
Point who had resigned from the army. In all cases but 
one, however, the colonel and adjutant were officers of 
the permanent establishment, the one exception being an 
officer who had commanded a regiment of engineers in 
1898 but who had resigned from the Corps of Engineers 
to follow a commercial career. 

At the time when these regiments were recruited, there 
were no provisions of law for a draft, so that all enlist- 
ments were voluntary, and an exceedingly high average 



THE FIRST AMERICAN ENGINEERS 17 

grade of man resulted. Many university graduates and 
engineers Bolding important positions, turned away 
from entering officers' training camps where their edu- 
cational advantages would have soon gained commission 
recognition, preferring to enlist as privates out of a high 
sense of patriotism and with the desire to be among the 
*' first to France." In consequence, every one of those 
regiments provided a large number of officers promoted 
from the ranks to fill vacancies in their own cadre or 
those of other units, or for stafif duty, or for return to 
the United States to officer and train new regiments being 
formed. Thus the Eleventh regiment created no fewer 
than sixty-eight new officers, and when it returned home, 
out of fifty-two engineer officers on duty, forty-one had 
entered the service as privates, including six of the seven 
company commanders. 

The regiments sailed as soon as their equipment had 
been received, men sufficiently trained and ships became 
available. They reached Europe either through English 
or French ports and were assigned to various commands 
as follows : 



REGIMENT 


DATE 
ARRIVAL, 


ASSIGNMENT 


15th 


20 July, 1917 
27 July, 1917 
31 July, 1917 
12 Aug. 1917 
12 Aug. 1917 
12 Aug. 1917 
23 Aug. 1917 
23 Aug. 1917 


American railways 
British forces 


11th 


13th 


French forces 


14th 


British forces 


12th 


British forces 


17th 


Port construction 


18th 


Port construction 


19th 


Repairs French cars 





Their work from the very beginning formed a part of 
nearly every phase of engineering activity in France 
from the heavy but highly important construction of 
docks and warehouses and terminal yards in southern or 



18 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

central France, where fortunately the devastating blight 
of war was never seen, to the culminating horrors of the 
final weeks in the Argonne, where no less than six of the 
original nine regiments served in unison. They con- 
structed and maintained railway lines all over France, 
they were charged with the responsibility for the highly 
important light railways that carried ammunition to the 
forward guns, they repaired cars and locomotives, they 
dug and held battle trenches, they built bridges, assisted 
in water supply and roads, and in short, no group of 
units was more closely identified and more intimately 
associated with the whole field of engineering work in 
France. 

.When the call for Engineers came so suddenly and so 
unexpectedly as the most pressing need to be first satis- 
fied, the War Department was without the requisite 
detailed knowledge of just how these first regiments 
should be equipped and constituted. To procure this 
information and to arrange for the assignment of the 
regiments on their arrival in France, a Commission was 
despatched immediately to Europe to confer with the 
British and French military authorities, and study the 
actual conditions in the field. The Commission, consist- 
ing of Majors Wm. Barclay Parsons and Wm. J. Wil- 
gus, E. 0. R. C; Capt. A. B. Barber, Corps of 
Engineers, and Messrs. W. A. Garrett and F. de St. 
Phalle, received their orders on May 10, 1917, and were 
thus the first military men except hospital units, to be 
sent overseas. The three officers became colonels during 
the war, the first in command of the Eleventh Engineers, 
thg second as Deputy Director-General of Transportation 
and the third on the General Staff. 

This commission, after a rapid inspection of the Brit- 
ish and French fronts, of the several ports in France 
through which Amrican troops could enter, and of the 
main lines of railway leading from the ports to such por- 
tions of the fighting line as might become the American 



THE FIRST AMERICAN ENGINEERS 19 

sector, reported to the War Department tHat the task 
which lay ahead was far bigger and more difficult than 
had been generally supposed, and then for the first time 
gave a picture of what American engineers and Ameri- 
can engineers only must do if victory were to be won. 
They pointed out that France could not be relied on for 
any assistance. Not only were the men constituting the 
army to be sent across the ocean, but also all their sup- 
plies of every nature, arms, ammunition, clothing, food. 
To permit the landing of the men and their supplies, 
there must be berthing places for the ships. But these 
berthing places did not exist and the material for them, 
the piles and timbers, were probably still standing in 
American forests. ?^hen the piles and stringers for the 
wharves had been felled and sawed to size, had been 
sent across the ocean and erected into wharves, there 
were no camps for the soldiers to move into or stor- 
age buildings to house the perishable supplies. After 
landing the men and supplies, they could not be moved 
from the base ports until locomotives and cars should be 
sent from America, because France no longer possessed 
enough rolling stock to meet its own needs. Nor could 
France equip the trains thus provided with the required 
crews, as there was no surplus of man power. Locomo- 
tive- and train-men, like the locomotives and cars, must 
come from overseas, and, finally, the very rails must be 
manufactured and sent abroad to permit the moving of 
the trains from the seaboard to the front. 

It was an appalling picture, but subsequent experience 
has shown that if the commission erred in judgment, it 
was in underestimating and not in overestimating the 
requirements. If, in the painting of the picture, they 
failed to make the blacks deep enough and the reds suf- 
ficiently lurid, they did succeed in making clear to Wash- 
ington that at least there was a great part for the engi- 
neers to take. 



CHAPTER in 

AMERICA'S PROBLEM 

The problem presented to the engineers of the armies 
of France, Great Britain and the United States was in 
principle substantially the same — the provision of ways 
of offense and defense, the maintaining of all lines of 
communication, the transportation of men, arms, ammu- 
nition, and supplies, the means for evacuating the 
wounded and ill men and provision of places for their 
care. But the conditions surrounding the problem for 
each separate nation were so lacking in similarity that 
the problems themselves differed so in detail as to become 
quite distinct one from the other. This was especially 
true of the American problem. 

If France had the misfortune to furnish the battle- 
fields, to meet directly the shock of war, and to be sub- 
jected to all the intense suffering and physical destruc- 
tion while her cities and towns and very fields were laid 
waste, her armies had at least the advantage of fighting 
on home ground. Many supplies had to be brought from 
abroad, but there were French ports and port facilities to 
receive them. The main lines of interior transportation, 
railways, canals, highroads, either belonged to the Grov- 
ernment or stood ready for Government use with their 
organizations as going concerns and their full comple- 
ment of trained employees. On these lines there might 
be needed from time to time some readjustment of 
details or connections to meet the changing conditions 
brought about by the war, but comparatively little in the 
way of the creation of new facilities. For France's own 
supplies that were produced at home, every farm, every 
farm building, every mine, every forest, every factory, 

20 



AMERICA'S PEOBLEM 21 

became a part of a great system of national storehouses. 
From the mines and forests could come the coal and ores 
and timber as needed ; in each little barn could be stored 
the crop raised on the adjacent farm and it could be kept 
there safely until called for. The output of the factories 
■was consumed as fast as it was turned out. There was, 
therefore, little or no need for new vast buildings for 
holding supplies. "When soldiers were allowed furlough, 
they could go home to rest or, better still, to work on 
their own farms — as was usually the case. When they 
were convalescing from wounds or illness, they were sent 
home for care. In either case, they not only ceased to 
be a burden on the authorities, but frequently became 
producers, for a time at any rate. 

France 's problem can be called a national rather than 
an engineers' problem. This does not in any way detract 
from or involve a lack of appreciation of what France, 
the French nation, and the French General Staff accom- 
plished. Their problem was a mighty one, and it was 
solved in a manner that will win increasing admiration 
the more it is studied as future ages roll by. Only it was 
a problem different from that presented to either Great 
Britain or the United States. 

For Great Britain the war was not one at home, but 
abroad. The British Government had to arrange to send 
an army overseas and there maintain it. For this army, 
England was the base, distant only 30 to 120 miles 
from the French coast, according to ports. It is true 
that a part of the army came from afar, from Canada, 
South Africa, India, New Zealand, Australia, her colonies 
who responded so nobly to the call for imperial defense, 
but the major portion came from the little islands that go 
to make Great Britain and Ireland. 

To Britain's army, aided by what remained of Bel- 
gium's, was assigned in general that portion of the front 
extending from the North Sea to a point east of Amiens, 



22 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

but varying from time to time at the latter end, according 
as the hne of division between the British right and 
French left was shifted. To provide gateways of access 
to this territory, the French turned over to the British 
and for their exclusive use, all ports north of and includ- 
ing Le Havre; that is, Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, 
Calais, Dunkerque and, in part, Rouen. A glance at the 
map of France shows these ports to be in a line, and 
roughly spealdng, parallel with the battle front, distant 
in a straight line only fifty miles at Calais to 125 
miles at Havre. The important arteries of railways 
as well as some 3,500 miles of highways, were under 
British control for maintenance and operation. In this 
area, all through railway traffic was suspended, except 
coal from such of the French mines north of Arras as 
still remained out of German hands. Furthermore, thej 
civilian population, especially toward the front, had 
been evacuated to a great extent, thus relieving the rail- 
ways of a large part of pressing local commercial traffic, 
and permitting them to be devoted almost exclusively to 
military purposes. This minimum of civilian interfer- 
ence and the shortness of the haul, rendered the problem 
of military transportation in the north as simple as war 
conditions permitted. 

Before the 'era of railways there was constructed in 
France an extensive and well designed system of canals 
covering nearly the whole country. In fact, in time of 
peace it was possible to go by boat through the canals 
or canalized rivers from the Rhine in Germany to the 
Atlantic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea. These canals are 
of two classes in size. On the first class boats 126 feet 
long drawing six and one-half feet and with a burden 
of 300 tons can be operated, while on the smaller canals 
the size of boat is reduced to one of seventy-five tons. 
Ae French industrial life had, to a great extent, adjusted 
itself to these highly useful waterways, in fact, the only 



AMERICA'S PEOBLEM 23 

main lines of transport prior to the introduction of steam 
railways, the whole canal system had been maintained 
in excellent physical and operating condition np to th.^. 
commencement of the war. In the British sector, the 
canals which reached several of the ports, including 
Calais, were of the first class, and proved of enormous 
benefit to the British army by reheving the railways of 
a burden of heavy cumbersome freight for which fast 
transport was not essential, of the evacuation of some of 
the wounded who were moved more comfortably on a 
slow moving canal boat than on a noisy jarring train, and 
of much materiel that could be sent direct from English 
ports in barges and towed through the canals to points 
of consumption without breaking bulk or rehandling. 
The amount of materiel thus handled monthly exceeded 
300,000 tons. 

Great Britain could not rely on France for any sup- 
plies except some lumber; all had to be transported. 
Such portion of the supplies as came from overseas was 
stored in England, and moved from there as needed, 
together with the output of her own mines, mills, farms, 
and factories. For the British army, England was, there- 
fore, the depot and, although cut off by water, her large 
and efficient navy, operating from its own bases, was able! 
to afford reasonably satisfactory protection. 

Great Britain's men who were wounded, ill, or on 
leave, could be and were taken or allowed to go home 
almost as conveniently as were the French. Although 
this was not true of the colonial troops, nevertheless they 
could go, if not to their own homes, at least to those of 
their own people, and be removed from a foreign even 
though friendly country and the atmosphere of war. 

To carry men and materials across the narrow water- 
way between England and France, any type of boat could 
be used, in fact, the moderately small vessel was the most 
convenient. They were easily manoeuvered, quickly loaded 



24 AMEEICAN ENGINEEBS IN FEANCE 

and discharged, less subject to attack, and if lost, tlie loss 
was comparatively small, while French ports, especially 
the northern ones, were by original construction, adapted 
to such vessels. These smaller cargo carriers provided a 
steady, continuous inflow of men and freight, and when 
traffic is thus delivered, there is needed but the minimum 
of facilities and labor. 

On account of the nearness of the base, the many and 
short lines of communication in France by rail, canal 
and water, it was not necessary for Great Britain 
to keep on hand an extraordinary amount of supplies in 
the former country. In fact, enough ammunition and 
food to supply the army for two or at most three weeks 
was deemed to be sufficiently generous. 

The difference between the French and British prob- 
lems lay chiefly in the separation of the latter 's base 
from the actual theatre of operations and thereby intro- 
ducing some water transport for men and all materials. 

The American problem resembled the British in 
theory in that the base lay across the water, but having 
stated that, further resemblance ceased. The details 
were so dissimilar, the distances so vastly greater, that 
the American problem was in a class quite by itself. 

The first Commission, as explained in the previous 
chapter, reported fully to Washington. The French mili- 
tary authorities were very frank in stating that the 
American army must provide itself with every require- 
ment, that to France it could look for nothing. It was 
the same as if an army were planning to wage war in a 
distant and desert country without sufficient ports, with 
no adequate lines of communication and with absolutely 
no supplies of any one of the articles needed by a great 
army in a modern war. 

The conditions thus laid down were fixed by thg very 
necessities of the situation and not by any arbitrary deci- 
sion of the French. As a matter of fact, before the war 



AMERICA'S PROBLEM 25 

ended, France gave the world a number of surprising 
examples of her latent potentiality, did many things and 
furnished many supplies, including such articles as guns, 
ammunition, tanks, and airplanes which, in 1917, were 
deemed to be absolutely out of the question. 

When the Commission of engineers arrived in Europe, 
the British were using, to their full capacity, all ports 
north of and including those on the River Seine. Brest, 
the French insisted, must be reserved as a French naval 
base. Marseille on the Mediterranean, could not be con- 
sidered available on account of exposure of approaching 
vessels to submarine attack in the straights of Gibraltar 
and nearby waters. For crcean-going vessels, this left 
only Nantes and St. Nazaire on the Loire, Bordeaux on 
the Gironde and the small port of LaRochelle midway 
between the two. Although the import and export traf- 
fic of France had been curtailed tremendously by the 
war, the portion that remained was concentrated at these 
places, congesting them to their full capacity, and if there 
were to be any substantial increment in ocean traffic, the 
facilities for berthing and discharging the ships simply 
did not exist. 

The construction of wharves and piers for the accom- 
modation of vessels is not the simple matter along the 
French Atlantic coast that it is for the ordinary Ameri- 
can port, where some piles, heavy timbers for floor beams 
and stout planks for decking suffice and can be put in 
place to make a wharf. Along the Atlantic coast of 
France there is a serious daily rise and fall of the tide, 
which greatly hampered rapid work, as it demanded 
special details of construction and equipment. This vari- 
ation is the smallest at Pauillac, near the mouth of 
Gironde, with a mean of 13.7 feet and a maximum of 
18.1 on spring tides. The rise increases as the tidal 
wave runs along the coast, reaching the great figures of 
21.7 feet on mean and 28.3 feet on spring tides at Treport. 



26 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Further north there is a decrease, the variation between 
high and low water at Calais being 16.2 feet on a mean 
tide and 21.0 feet on springs. The harbor facilities at 
St. Nazaire and La Rochelle were, therefore, tidal basins 
into and from which vessels had to be passed through 
lock gates at high tide only. Such basins are matters of 
elaborate construction in masonry, are permanent in 
character, and offer many difficulties for alteration or 
extension. In actuality, radical development was impos- 
sible because surrounding permanent improvements such 
as streets, buildings, factories, and railways prevented 
extension. Bordeaux and its subsidiary port, Bassens, 
across the river and some five miles lower down, were 
about seventy-five miles from the river mouth, with 
shoals intervening which restricted vessels even at high 
water to a maximum draught of twenty-six or twenty- 
seven feet. All these places were really no more than 
names. For American purposes, they were not ports. 
The French promised temporary accommodations for a 
few ships, but clearly pointed that for the fleet that would 
eventually arrive, everything must be constructed and all 
the necessary unloading cranes and other freight 
handling machinery must be purchased in America and 
sent out. 

The British authorities, as has been shown, could use 
the existing ports which, without reconstruction, were 
exactly adapted to the small type of vessel that would 
naturally be used in cross-channel traffic. Further, these 
vessels could be expected to arrive and depart at a sub- 
stantially constant rate. For the American service, the 
base at New York was some 3,700 miles away, even in 
a direct line, and long miles they were across the Atlantic 
waste with submarines abounding. To cover the dis- 
tance, only vessels of large type were available, and after 
such a long journey, they must be expected to arrive at 
irregular intervals. As a matter of fact, they actually 



A'MEEICA'S PEOBLEM 27 

arrived in convoys instead of singly, making the prob- 
lem still more difficult, because the coming in convoys 
involved the provision of accommodations in excess of 
any allowance for an approximate average that would 
ordinarily be assumed. 

The conditions surrounding railway transportation 
were no less difficult. While in May, 1917, no definite 
statement could be made as to the sector to be assigned 
to the American troops, a few facts stood out quite 
clearly. The British sector was definitely fixed. The 
French desired, for obvious reasons, where if sentiment 
played a part, it was a proper and very forceful part, 
that only French troops should cover Paris. For similar 
reasons of sentiment the French desired to retain for 
their own occupation, the extreme right of the front in 
Alsace next to the Swiss frontier, where a lodgment had 
been effected in 1914 on the eastern slope of the Vosges 
in Germany, and was still held. The American sector 
had, therefore, to find a place between, say, Eheims and 
the department of the Vosges. It is now interesting to 
note that at the end the American army occupied nearly 
the whole of this part of the front. 

Taking Toul as the center of gravity of a probable 
American sector, the distance in an air line from St. 
Nazaire was about 400 miles and slightly more than that 
from Bordeaux, but these figures would be very greatly 
increased by following any selected combination of pos- 
sible railway routes. This was a very different matter 
from the corresponding distance between the British 
front and their channel ports from fifty to not exceeding 
125 miles. The difference was really much greater than 
the numerical ratio of eight to one would seem to indicate, 
because the routes crossed a part of France where there 
remained the original population supplemented by the 
evacuated people from the northern departments. All the 
local and through railway traffic had to be maintained, 



28 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

because on this part of the country France depended for 
the greater part of her supplies for both the military and 
the civilian population. 

For this traffic over a distance as great as from Boston 
to Washington, there was no rolling stock available, not 
one locomotive, not one car! The French railway com- 
panies had lost much equipment through captures during 
the first two months of the war, other vehicles had been 
destroyed, some had been worn out in the ordinary pro- 
cess of use and had been discarded, while many locomo- 
tives and cars were so completely in need of repair as 
to be out of service through lack of men to attend to them. 
During the war few or no replacement purchases had 
been made. France no longer had enough rolling stock 
for its own military traffic and, therefore, could not meet 
ours even in part. The same was true of the lines them- 
selves. French railways, like their ports, had been 
adjusted carefully, very carefully, to meet commercial 
traffic requirements which in France were much more 
constant than similar requirements in America. The 
lines, if they had rails, could carry more trains, but the 
real measure of capacity of a railway is how many cars 
can be passed through junction points, or made up into 
trains in terminal yards. These critical points were 
already fully congested. But not all the rails were in 
place. On account of the difficulty and expense of import- 
ing rails from America and in order to meet the impera- 
tive calls from the military lines at the front which must 
be answered at all costs, the French authorities had, 
during the two years preceding our entry in the war, 
removed the rails from many lines of secondary impor- 
tance. Some double-track lines had been reduced to 
single lines, and some single lines had temporarily ceased 
to exist at all. Many of these voids must be refilled to 
sustain the new burdens. 

A margin of supplies in France that might be gener- 



AMERICA'S PROBLEM 29 

ously safe for BritisH demands and conditions was obvi- 
ously not only dangerously narrow for American 
requirements, but quite impossible for safety. [What 
would answer for a waterway thirty miles wide would 
never do for one nearly 4,000 miles wide. But it was not 
only a question of distance. The ocean-going units were 
necessarily larger as we have seen. The loss of one 
would, therefore, be exceedingly serious unless there 
were already on hand in France surplus supplies similar 
to the lost cargo. Then, even at best, they could not be 
counted on to arrive in steady flow, as the small vessels 
or barges at Calais and Boulogne. It was agreed that 
nothing less than a supply of all articles to carry the 
American army for sixty days without replenishment 
could suffice. Later, the general staff increased the mini- 
mum to ninety days, but that was found to be unneces- 
sarily liberal, the enemy submarines failing to be as 
effective as was feared they might prove to be. 

By the word ** supplies '' is meant not only the food 
eaten, uniforms worn, and ammunition expended, but a 
vast category of articles that ordinarily would never be 
thought of. Hardware and tools of every sort, bakeries, 
cooking outfits, and mechanical laundries, motors big and 
little, carts and wagons, railway materiel, plain wire for 
telegraph and telephone lines and barbed wire for entan- 
glements measured by thousands of miles, harness and 
saddlery, medical and surgical supplies by train loads, 
pipes large and small with pumps, furniture, and house- 
keeping articles, building materials of almost every 
nature, coal, oil and gasoline, stationery without end. In 
the Ordnance Department alone, which furnished many 
articles besides arms and ammunition, there were more 
than 100,000 separate and distinct items to be sent to 
the army and the Expenditure of this one department to 
fequip an army of 5,000,000 men was estimated to be more 
than $12,000,000,000, an amount equal to almost half the 



30 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

total money appropriated by all the congresses of tlie 
United States, from the first continental congress down 
to the declaration of war. Or, to pnt it in another way, 
the rate of estimated expenditure by this department 
would suffice to build a Panama Canal every thirty days. 
To this huge mass of articles were to be added the many 
things, from candies and playing cards to books and spe- 
cial clothing furnished by the Red Cross and other 
similar organizations, which, if not an integral part of 
the army supplies, nevertheless went to increase in 
amount and variety the shipments to be made which, 
finally, aggregated the enormous total of 7,500,000 tons. 

It was an army of 5,000,000 men that was foreseen, a 
number equal to more than three-fourths of the total 
population of the City of New York, including women and 
children. Let it be recalled that without outside help 
and in spite of the enormous quantity of supplies carried 
in New York's stores and markets, the city could not live 
for more than two weeks, not for so long as two days in 
some items, and then, perhaps, a mental picture can be 
had of what would be needed to maintain such a fighting, 
working, and constructing army in a foreign country for 
three months. 

For these supplies, orderly storage space must be pro- 
N^ided and for the perishable articles, which constituted 
a very large part of the whole, there must be water-tight 
buildings, some next the wharves to give temporary shel- 
ter when the cargoes were discharged from ships, some in 
great main supply depots inland, some in more advanced 
and scattered bases near the battle line to hold the 
important things ready for immediate use. 

Then there loomed up the exceedingly difficult personal 
question. France's men were home. Great Britain's 
men could be sent home from time to time. America's 
men would have the Atlantic Ocean between them and 
home. Only those could go back across the sea who were 



AMERICA'S PEOBLEM 31 

so incapacitated by wounds or illness as to be unfit for 
further service. Provision mus^ be made for earing not 
only for tlie wounded, but for those convalescing from 
slight disability who, in the case of our allies, would go 
to their homes for recuperation and the best form of 
mental as well as physical rest. Then there would be the 
men on leave, for even soldiers must have a little relaxa- 
tion. .They could not be turned loose in France. Eest 
areas must be selected, camps laid out and an organiza- 
tion established for the control of the men. 

That was America's problem which, in breadth of scope 
and multitude of detail, staggered the imagination. In 
this brief sketch of the picture that the !War Department 
faced in the spring and early summer of 1917, no refer- 
ence has been made to providing for the necessities of 
the fighting engineers, the men who were to be engaged 
in digging trenches and holding them, in reconstructing 
or destroying captured fenemy positions, in bridging 
streams, or in doing the many works of construction inci- 
dent to an army at the front. All such work was com- 
mon to the armies of France, Great Britain, and the 
United States, depending for its extent on the length of 
front defended. The description in this chapter is to 
show where and in what respect the engineer problem of 
the three allied nations differed one from the other. 

Of course, all this was known to our 'enemies. It is 
easy to imagine how the Germans, with their mental 
inclination for thorough analysis, worked over the details 
of the problem. [With their belief in their own invinci- 
bility and their unbounded reliance in the efficacy of the 
*' U " boat, they easily led themselves to become confi- 
dent beyond any doubt that the problem could not bei 
solved, that the ships to carry the men and supplies did 
not exist, and even if built, there were no ports to accom- 
modate them or buildings to house the men or store sup- 
plies, or railways to move them, not at any rate for some 



32 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

years and long before ttat time arrived, llae HoHenzollern 
standard would be floating over the ruins of Paris, and 
their own brand of Kultur and barbarism fettered on the 
world. 

Having thus determined that America was as negligi- 
ble as was ** the contemptible little army of England " in 
the summer of 1914, the campaign of ** Schrecklichkeit " 
became a perfectly safe policy to follow; it was obviously 
wise to drown helpless women and children, to sink hos- 
pital ships and disregard all rights of neutrals. America 
was powerless. It was really best to defy her so as to 
bring her into the dance in order to be on hand to pay 
the fiddler's bill when it was over. 



CHAPTER IV 

ENGINEER ORGANIZATION 

An army at war is employed in two distinct fields, so 
distinct that they naturally lead to a separation of imme- 
diate directive control. There is that part of the army 
engaged in the forward area in actual fighting, which for 
the time constitutes the combatant force, and there is 
the remainder of the army occupied in undergoing pre- 
liminary training, supervising bases, maintaining lines 
of commuication or resting after a period of active ser- 
vice. As wars have become more complicated with a 
greater and more varied demand for all sorts of supplies, 
these latter functions have developed enormously in 
importance, calling for an increased proportion of the 
whole force. 

The normal distribution of an American army, 
according to this main line of cleavage, was set 
forth in the United States Field Service Eegula- 
tions, the little book that was supposed to be 
the official guide for the army during a war. 
But its teachings failed to apply in France. These 
regulations, written long ago with additions from time to 
time to conform to new experience, contemplated only 
two contingencies : a war in the United States, where the 
forces would be at home acting on the defensive, or a 
war overseas in a foreign enemy country, where they 
would be acting on the offensive. The possibility of an 
American army operating in a foreign friendly country, 
driving an invader out of that country, and for practical 
purposes being on the defensive, in that it was not pos- 
sible to take advantage of captured country for seizing 
supplies or converting it to one's own use, was outside 
- 33 



34 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

the range of vision of this otherwise most excellent 
work. It was necessary to develop a new organiza- 
tion to meet the unforeseen conditions and to harmonize 
with the established organizations of our allies. 
The Army of the United States, of course, included the 
whole military force, no matter where found, whether at 
home or abroad, but to facilitate operations in Europe, 
the part that was overseas was called the American 
Expeditionary Force, and to it was assigned a Com- 
mander-in-Chief. On account of the great distance sep- 
arating the theatre of operations, from the seat of the 
Government in Washington, and because the A. E. F. 
was cooperating with two large armies, broader powers 
were necessarily given to the Commander-in-Chief than 
the Field Service Eegulations contemplated for such an 
officer. The part of the army that remained in the United 
States (either permanently or waiting transportation 
overseas, came under the immediate direction of the War 
Department, and was entirely independent of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Force. The 
officers of the Department controlled all matters con- 
cerned with the organizing, equipping, and training of 
the great army, the erection of cantonments to hold it, 
the manufacture or purchase^ of the stupendous mass of 
supplies needed by an active army in the field, and the 
building or acquisition of ships to carry the men over- 
seas, their equipment and supplies, in order to meet, as 
far as possible, the requirements of the Commander-in- 
Chief, American Expeditionary Force. These officers 
in "Washington were not limited in their vision to the 
army of 2,000,000 men that were in France, but had in 
mind and demanding their attention the greater army 
of 5,000,000 men that America might be called on to con- 
tribute if the war should continue beyond the year 1918, 
which then seemed likely. Their labors were, therefore, 
directed towards the upbuilding of the larger unit. 



ENGINEER ORGANIZATION 35 

The Field Service^ Regulations divided the theatre of 
war into two zones, the Zone of the Advance and the 
Zone of the Rear, the latter in the case of an overseas 
war to include the home service and water transport. 
For France this was impossible. The powers and respon- 
sibilities of the A. E. F. began only with the coast of 
France, matters of ocean transport being controlled from 
.Washington. The main principles underlying the Field 
Service Regulations were made applicable to France so 
far as was possible, and the territory; occupied by the 
A. E. F. was subdivided into the Zone of the Advance 
and Service of the Rear. But as all designations and 
titles were abbreviated into their initial letters, the latter 
was spoken of as the S, 0. R. and it quickly became trans- 
formed into the ^' Sore " Department. !^Vhether or not 
the unfortunate combination of letters was the real cause 
for the change of name, the men in the field, while not 
knowing, nevertheless believed it to be. At any rate, the 
Service of the Rear was ahnost immediately changed to 
the Service of Supplies, and the S. 0. R. became the 
S. 0. S. 

The Zone of the Advance corresponded to the similar 
zone described in the Field Service Regulations. It cov- 
ered the area in which all active operations were being 
carried on and to a sufficient depth from the front to 
include the troops thus assigned whether in the line or 
in reserve. The length of such zone was the length of 
front held, the width varied with topography and local 
conditions, but roughly speaking, was about twenty 
miles. In this zone the authority of the army command- 
ers was supreme, except only as they were subordinate 
to the personal direction of the Commander-in-Chief. 

For the purpose of this book, it is not necessary to 
describe at length the complete organization of the Ser- 
vice of Supplies, which cared for the soldier from the 
moment his ship came in sight of the coast of France until 



36 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Ms departure to America. Tlie S. 0. S. clotlied, Housed, 
and fed him, saw to the obtaining, storing, and forward- 
ing of his arms and ammunition, paid and insured him, 
created and maintained for his benefit hospitals and rest 
camps, kept his records; ran a great post of&ce and a 
telegraph and telephone service; established enormous 
refrigerating plants, into which whole cargoes of meats 
were taken with ease, bakeries, shops where old uni- 
forms, other clothing and shoes were cleaned, repaired, 
and re-issued; carried into effect elaborate construction 
of ports and buildings, and operated railways, roads, and 
canals ; organized a police system ; in short, touched every 
phase of a soldier's work, life, and death, and extended 
its delicate machinery over all of France and in such a 
manner as to harmonize with French laws and estab- 
lished customs. It was a wonderful organization, but for 
the moment, we are concerned only with the part of the 
Service of Supplies that controlled engineers and their 
work. 

The Service of Supplies, being something new to an 
American army, naturally passed through a somewhat 
disturbed period of evolution before it finally reached a 
satisfactory working condition. There is no need to dis- 
cuss the intermediate stages, except to say that as the 
perfect machine was being erected, there were many 
radical changes. Thus the transportation department 
was completely transformed, except as to the executive 
head, finally becoming a special corps and reporting 
directly to the Commanding General, S. 0. S. 

The huge army of engineers amounting, as was shown 
above, to about 350,000 men, demanded a complex and 
very carefully adjusted organization that on one hand 
maintained rigid military authority and yet permitted 
freedom of thought and even of action by which the new 
problems in the application of science that arose almost 
daily could be solved. The organization had to be 



ENGINEER ORGANIZATION ' 37 

devised so as to direct the great force scattered all over 
France, to create, lay out, and supervise its work, to 
insure coordination and cooperation, to avoid friction 
and especially conflict of authority, to be so flexible that 
whole units could be transferred promptly from one 
department to another, to furnish channels of communi- 
cation, and for the exercise of command that should 
ramify throughout the services of both the Zone of 
the Advance and of Supplies. Such an organization had 
never been attempted in the Corps of Engineers. 

It was quite impossible to bring all these engineers 
under one control, except that nominally exercised by thQ 
Commander-in-Chief. As with the army as a whole, the 
engineers were divided first into two main classes, those 
serving in the Zone of the Armies and those in the Serv- 
ice of Supplies. In this case the expression *' Zone 
of the Armies " is intentionally used rather than " Zone 
of the Advance," because for certain administrative pur- 
poses it was not possible to have all lines of demarbation 
between the two zones exactly coincident, and many 
troops assigned to and under the control of the S. 0. S. 
were engaged in the Zone of the Advance. 

For the non-military reader, it may be convenient to 
recall that the American Expeditionary Force was 
divided into armies. At the time of signing the armis- 
tice, there were two such armies actually in the field with 
a third in process of formation, which became subse- 
quently the Army of Occupation. An army is composed 
of several corps, each corps of divisions, each division 
of brigades, and each brigade of regiments, with certain 
attached special troops in each case. 

To every army, certain engineer regiments were 
assigned, reporting to and receiving orders from thg 
Army Chief Engineer who was on the staff of the Army 
Commander. These regiments were engaged with all 
jn3,tters of heavy construction that were the concern of 



38 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the army as a whole. The chief engineer of an army 
was charged with the location and construction of new 
main railways and the repair and maintenance of old 
ones. He saw to the building of roads, of light rail- 
ways to serve troop and advanced artillery positions; 
the locating of quarries from which might be procured 
stone for road metal or railway ballast; bridges; the 
finding of a satisfactory service of water supply and its 
distribution; the construction of secondary lines of 
trenches and defensive works of a permanent character ; 
tunnelling and mining operations; the surveying and 
mapping of the territory occupied by his army or likely 
to be occupied by it ; the care of electrical and other spe- 
cial machinery used in his army area; the determination 
of enemy battery positions by sound and flash ranging; 
the study of the geological conditions in the army area 
and the camouflage protection of the guns, controlling 
positions, or important buildings. For these varied and 
complicated duties he was given special troops which, on 
account of their detail, were called army troops. 

Other engineer units were attached to a corps under the 
general command of the corps engineer on the staff of 
the corps commander. The functions of the corps engi- 
neers were similar to those of army engineers, but 
geographically, were more restricted, being confined to 
the operations by the corps taken as a whole. The num- 
ber of troops thus attached to army or corps was not 
fixed by any regulation or general order, but varied 
according to the fluctuating demand of the movements 
under consideration or in hand. 

With each division and forming an integral part of it, 
was one regiment of engineers, whose commanding officer 
was ex officio division engineer on the staff of the divi- 
sion commander. This regiment executed all construc- 
tion work that was assigned to a division or to any of 
its component brigades. It maintained the local lines of 



EXGIXEER OEGAXIZATIOX 39- 

commimicatioii, sited and dug trenches, laid out and built 
forward defense works, and strung the barbed 
wire entanglements, erected temporary or small 
bridges, made surveys, drained camps, and did all 
the things of a structural nature required bv the 
men on the fighting line. In the case of an 
advance, the engineers went forward with the divi- 
sion, bridging streams, repairing roads, consolidating 
the captured enemy positions by reversing their face and 
repairing shell damage, and erecting new wire entangle- 
ments. If the advance were only a raid, that is, an attack 
followed by an immediate withdrawal before an enemy 
counter attack could be launched, the engineers destroyed 
enemy guns, dugouts, trenches, and all other works in 
the time available. In case of retreat, they formed part 
of the rear guard, demolishing roads and bridges or 
erecting obstacles to delay the enemy pursuit. For- 
tunately, in the war just ended, American engineers wer^ 
not called on for this last duty. ^While all special troops 
were spared as much as possible, the army, corps, 
or division engineers were always regarded as available 
to be used as infantry in case of emergency, and were 
frequently detailed to hold and defend by hard fighting, 
the trenches that they had built. 

It is not without interest to point out in connection 
with actual fighting that the ratio of death casualties 
in battle among officers to similar casualties among men 
was higher with the engineers than with the infantry, 
artillery, or cavalry, and that the number of battle deaths 
per thousand officers and men of each arm in France 
was gi'eater in the engineers than in either the artillery 
or cavalry, being exceeded only by the infantry. 

The total number of engineers, including attached 
auxiliary troops acting in the Zone of the Advance with 
armies, corps, or divisions, exceeded 100,000 men. 

Engineers in the Service of Supplies were nominally 
under the control of the Commanding General, S. 0. S., 



'40 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

tlirough various cliaiinels. The senior officer, from whom 
they received orders, was the Chief Engineer, A. E. F., 
an officer on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. This 
office was held first by Brigadier-General Harry Taylor 
and finally by Major-General ^Villiam C. Langfitt (orig- 
inally Colonel, Thirteenth Engineers), both members of 
the Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. 

Although nominally an officer of General Headquar- 
ters, the Chief Engineer, for reasons of convenience, 
established his headquarters not at G.H.Q., at Chaumont, 
but at the headquarters of the S. 0. S. at Tours. As 
Chief Engineer, A. E. F., he had charge of all engineering 
construction and work in France, both within and without 
the Zone of the Advance, and came, therefore, in contact 
with the army commanders and the Commanding Gen- 
eral, S. 0. S. 

The work of the engineers in the army zone has already 
been outlined. The channel of communication between the 
higher engineer command, the Chief Engineer, A. E. F., 
and the chief engineers of the armies was maintained 
first through the Director of Military Engineering and 
Engineer Supplies (D. M. E. and E. S. for short) on the 
staff of the Chief Engineer at Tours, and finally, as the 
extent of the American operations increased, through an 
assistant to the Chief Engineer at G. H. Q. 

All construction work, if in connection with ports and 
harbors, railways, water supply, buildings, hospitals, etc., 
and also all forestry operations were under the control 
of the Director of Construction and Forestry, Brigadier- 
General Edgar Jadwin, original Colonel of the Fifteenth 
Engineers, the first engineer regiment to reach France, 
who reported to the Chief Engineer. During the early 
days of American activity in France, railway construc- 
tion was executed by engineers attached to the Trans- 
portation Department, but finally all such forces were 
transferred to the Director of Construction and Forestry, 
who, therefore, had charge of all construction of what^ 
ever nature outside of the zone of the armies. 



ENGINEER ORaANIZATION 41 

Coordinating witH the D. C. and F. was the 
Director of Light Railways and Roads, D. L. R. 
and R., at first General Langfitt, but at the last 
Brigadier- General Charles H. McKinistry, first 
Colonel of the Eleventh Engineers. It will thus 
he seen that the first nine engineer tregiments fur- 
nished four general officers for high staff command, 
the above three, and Brigadier-General Herbert Deakyne, 
first Colonel of the Nineteenth Engineers, who was made 
Chief Engineer, Second Army, on its constitution. The 
Director of Light Railways and Roads had charge of all 
light railways, including the principal repair shop and 
roads except such portions of both light railways and 
roads as lay within the Zone of the Advance, which it was 
deemed best to place under the control of the army com- 
manders. The Director reported to the Chief Engineer. 

The extended and complex powers of the Director of 
Construction and Forestry were exercised through a 
series of section engineers, usually officers with the rank 
of colonel, among whom was distributed the work as con- 
tained in certain arbitrarily defined areas. Under the 
general command of the Chief Engineer, acting xDrinci- 
pally through the Director of Construction and Forestry 
and the Director of Light Railways and Roads, there was 
a force, as has been shown, of more than 100,000 officers 
and men. 

The next largest aggregation of engineers was found, 
in the Department of Transportation, a department that 
would have been in another year, one of the largest, if 
not the largest department, in the A. E. F. The Transpor- 
tation Corps had charge of the operation of all standard 
gauge railway lines assigned to American use ; of terminal 
and storage yards ; of trains worked by American train- 
men on French railways ; of a large central machine shop 
with smaller subsidiary shops for the repairs of locomo- 
tives and cars ; of the movement of traffic on canals and 



42 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the preparation of plans for new railway construction 
to be carried out by the D. C. and F. This department 
was composed of about 60,000 engineer officers and men 
under the command of Brigadier-General W* W. Atter- 
bury, formerly Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Rail- 
road, and an engineer by profession, with the title of 
Director-General of Transportation, abbreviated to 
D. G. T. He was independent of the Chief Engineer, 
except as the latter constructed the lines, yards and 
structures to be used by his department and reported 
directly to the Commanding General, S. 0. S. As 
the duties of the D. G. T. increased, a new and sepa- 
rate corps, known as the Railway Transportation Corps 
(R. T. C), "was created, and all engineer officers con- 
nected with transportation were recommissioned, if not 
originally commissioned, as officers of that corps. 

At General Headquarters and elsewhere, there were 
some scattered engineer units, which, while not compara- 
tively large in numbers, had charge of work of the 
highest importance. These were the engineers engaged 
in the making and printing of army maps, in the study of 
the general geology of France, in the development and 
working of apparatus for discovering enemy guns or 
airplanes at night by sound or flash, and in camouflage. 
They came under the supervision of the Chief Engineer. 

Then there were engineers in the Motor Transport 
Corps. As motors varying in type from high speed 
motor cycles to huge motor trucks and tractors began to 
arrive literally by tens of thousands, it soon became evi- 
dent that another new field of army work had been 
opened, a field so large and so important as to be worthy 
of an independent status. These motors had not only to 
be set up and run, but maintained and repaired, requiring 
for the last a special shop. The Motor Transport Corps 
was organized, and as it had reference to troop and sup- 
ply movement, it was made a department of the Quarter- 
master Corps. 



CHAPTER y 

' POETS 

la the chapter on America's Problem, it was there 
shown that one of the great difficulties, perhaps the 
greatest, in 1917, was to find and prepare gateways 
through which the army; that the [W^ar Department had 
begmi to raise, with all its guns, ammunition and other 
stores, could enter France. At that time the number of 
500,000 men was spoken of as the American contribution. 
To receive even this number seemed to those first on the 
ground a staggering problem when they saw that France 
never had possessed port facilities much in Excess of her 
own requirements, that her northern ports had been 
assigned to British use and that natural physical fea- 
tures forbade rapid construction of additional accommo- 
dations. How much more staggering it would have 
appeared had it been known that provision must be made 
for an ultimate' army of 4,000,000 men, of whom more 
than half werg actually to reach France, and that during 
each of three consecutive months 300,000 men, with hun- 
dreds of thousands of tons of freight, would be landed! 
Sometimes ignorance, plain dense ignorance, is an ^yen 
present help in time of trouble. 

iTo the Engineer Commission there appeared to be oulyi 
two localities susceptible of sufficient development to fur- 
nish immediate relief, the lower reaches of the Loire and 
the Gironde-Garonne Elvers. 

About seventy miles from the" bar marking the 
entrance to the Gironde is Bordeaux, located on the 
Garonne, which river, with the Dordogne, makes the 
Gironde. Yessels drawing twenty-eight feet can ascend 
as far as Bordeaux, the head of masted vessel naviga- 

'4:3 



44 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

tion, but a tidal rise of about ten feet demands that the 
passage be made at bigli water in order to be able to 
cross certain shoals. 

Six miles below Bordeaux and on the opposite or right 
bank of the Garonne is Bassens, where the French had 
constructed wharves to furnish facilities for some war 
industries, which they were extending in the spring of 
1917 so as to provide accommodations for ten steamships. 
Of these wharves, seven were finished. The French har- 
bor authorities pointed out that a second development at 
least as large as the one in hand could be constructed 
immediately adjacent to those already built, and until 
that was completed, some of the berths, perhaps seven, 
could be placed temporarily at American service. On the 
other hand, Nantes and St. Nazaire, neighboring places 
on the Loire, offered many immediate advantages. Four 
berths at the former and five at the latter were available 
at once, while St. Nazaire, situated at the river mouth, 
had twenty-nine feet of water on the lock sills (like many 
French ports, it consisted of a tidal basin) and was 
equipped with large lift cranes, capable of handling the 
heaviest weights. 

By July, 1917, the French made the following assign- 
ment of existing facilities to continue until such time as 
they could be replaced by new construction: 

St. Nazaire : . . . 5 berths 

Nantes 4 berths 

Bassens 7 berths 

Pauillac (on the Gironde) . . 2 berths 

La Pallice 2 berths 



20 berths 



But it was clearly apparent to everyone that this total 
of shipping accommodation would pe quite insufficient for 
the American army whose size people were already 



PORTS 45 

beginning to recognize would exceed the early; estimates. 
[What form the additional facilities should take and 
where they; were to be located was the subject of much 
discussion. Mith. no thought that they; were to be the 
sole creations, it was decided to build, first and simul- 
taneously, at La Martiniere on the Loire and at Bassens 
continuous wharves capable of accommodating ten ships 
each. The former project was, however, soon abandoned 
on account of unsatisfactory foundation questions, leav- 
ing Bassens as the only scheme authorized during 1917. 

It was decided that probably forty per cent of the 
A. E. F. cargo could be brought into the Girond-e River 
and handled principally at Bassens, although some of 
it could be taken care of at Pauillac, where thQ French 
had built a wharf capable of accommodating four or five 
vessels. Being located near the mouth of the river, this 
port was somewhat more convenient than Bassens higher 
up. At Bassens the French, according to promise, turned 
over to American use, seven of the ten berths which they 
had built there. Subsequently, as they did on many 
another occasion, they exceeded their promises of 
cooperation and finally all ten berths were given over to 
permanent American occupation. 

After a trying wait during several months for mate- 
rials to arrive, work was started in November, 1917, on 
a ten-berth American wharf immediately below the 
French wharf, which was ready for taking vessels in the 
following March. This wharf had a length of 4,100 feet 
and a width of eighty-two feet. In order to get it in use 
as rapidly as possible, it was designed according to what 
might be known as American typical wharf construction, 
using wooden piles and wooden stringers, covered with 
heavy planks. As finally constructed there were used no 
less than 11,000 piles and 4,500,000 feet board measure of 
timber, nearly the whole of which came from American 
forests. 



46 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Tlie Paris-Orleans Railway; Company; Had a branch 
leading to the French wharfs. The American engineers 
constructed, in connection with their own wharves, ample 
switching facilities, including both classification and 
departure yards, together with additional tracks connect- 
ing the French wharves with the American wharves, so 
as to make a complete and unified plant to accommodate 
[twenty ocean-going vessels simultaneously. 

iThe American wharves were equipped with forty large" 
American gantry cranes for the rapid unloading of 
cargo. A continuous line of warehouses was erected in 
order to furnish immediate protection to perishable 
goods pending their reshipment to warehouse depots in 
the interior. This construction, with its many large rail- 
way yards and trackage, is the only American project 
completely equipped prior to the armistice and it stands 
as evidence of what the A. E. F. would have done in the 
line of wharf and other construction had the war con- 
tinued. The gantry crane equipment used on tliis ter- 
minal project more than fulfilled the exi^ectations of 
those who were responsible for its installation, and Bas- 
sens became the chief port of entry for American cargoes. 

]With the failure to develop La Martiniere on the Loire, 
Montoir was selected as the site for the chief Ameri- 
can port on that river. The original plan called for a 
wharf 3,230 feet long, to accommodate eight vessels 
simultaneously, with a double-track trestle bridge 4,000 
feet in length. Owing to the lack of construction mate- 
rials and the difficulty in finding a satisfactory location 
for this project, due to the peculiar nature of the river 
bottom, there was considerable delay in commencing the 
work. In fact, it was not started until July, 1918. At 
the time of the signing of the armistice, the work was 
well advanced and would have been ready for complete 
operation early in 1919. In view of the cessation of hos- 
tilities, it was decided to concentrate work of construe- 



PORTS 47 

tion on tHe completion of three bertlis and tHese were 
ifinished in January, 1919. fThis wharf, like the one at 
Bassens, was of the American type, but it is interesting" 
to note that material for it came from France, the French 
reversing their first decision that wharf material could 
not be obtained in Europe. The piles, which yaried in 
length from eighty to one hundred feet, came from trees 
cut in the Yosges Mountains. [While the work at Mon- 
toir was being carried out, the American transportation 
service used the berths at Nantes and St, Nazaire, which 
ihad been turned over by the French. Nantes being 
higher up the river, could accommodate vessels whose 
draft did not exceed twenty-three feet. Traffic to this 
point was, therefore, restricted to light-draft, cross- 
channel vessels or for larger ocean-going vessels, part 
of whose! cargo had been taken off usually by lighters at 
St. Nazaire, thus reducing their draft to such a figure as 
iwould permit them to ascend the river to Nantes. 

At the very beginning, Brest had been set aside as not 
available', because it lacked extensive terminal facilities. 
fThere were no berths available where vessels drawing 
twenty-seven feet could comg alongside and, conse- 
quently, everything had to be handled by lighter. Brest 
was the chief French naval base on the Atlantic Ocean, 
therefore the Government accommodations were entirely 
reserved for its own use, while the most valuable portion 
of the commercial port was congested with ships bring- 
ing in munitions for Russia and Roumania. 

Another disadvantage in the Brest situation was 
that the outward railway haul was over heavy gradients 
and was 200 miles longer to the American sector 
than the line from St. Nazaire, and in order that 
freight from Brest could reach thg American lines of 
communication, it was necessary that it pass over a 
single-track line from Le Mans to Tours. The topog- 
raphy of the harbor frontage precluded the possibility 



48 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

of expansion except at a prohibitory cost botli in money 
and in time for development. During the autumn of 1917 
and the spring of 1918, the only use that the Americans 
made of Brest was one lighterage wharf. Consequently 
all troops and cargo arri\dng at Brest were discharged 
at this wharf after having been unloaded from the trans- 
port vessel on to lighters. 

With the beginning of the German offensive in March, 
1918, and with the realization by all the military high 
commands that the war would probably be fought to a 
close during the next few months and that, owing to the 
intensity of the coming struggle, it was desirable that 
the full strength of American man power should be 
brought into play, the whole question of troop transport 
and troop discharge was again brought under considera- 
ition. By this time, the naval authorities in the United 
States had taken over and had repaired the deliberately 
damaged German passenger liners that had been kept by 
their owners in American ports since the beginning of 
hostilities, which the United States Government had 
seized on the declaration of war in April, 1917. 

The largest of these vessels and, consequently, the most 
yaluable ones for the transport of troops, drew more 
water than could be found at any French Atlantic port 
'except Brest. The British and French Governments 
offered to cooperate in the increased delivery of troops 
through a supply of a greater ship tonnage by the former 
and by permission of the latter to use the naval facih- 
ties in the port of Brest. 

As the result of this agreement in the spring of 1918, 
the American engineers immediately undertook the prep- 
aration of extensive plans for the improvement of the 
port, including the construction of several berths for 
deep draft vessels and the utilization of the existing 
jetties. Actual construction of the work was begun in 
July, 1918. During that and the succeeding months, 



■ ^ POETS 49 

when llae arrival of American troops in France readied 
the maximum figures, Brest became the port of entry for 
all large vessels. The work in hand was finished in Sep- 
tember and Brest thereafter was the chief port of 
troop arrival and of departure until the final return of 
the army in 1919. 

But all the while the plans of the A. E. F. were steadily 
growing. After the failure to construct a satisfactory 
port at La Martiniere and while the Montoir project was 
Btill under discussion, engineers charged with the respon- 
sibility of transport began looking about to obtain other 
places where landing facilities could be secured or, if 
necessary, be constructed. 

In June, 1917, the attention of Colonel Taylor, the then 
Chief Engineer, A. E. F., and Major Parsons, the Chief 
;of the Engineer Commission, had been drawn to the pos- 
sibilities of developing an entirely new port at Talmont, 
a little fishing village on the right bank of the Gironde 
Biver and directly at its mouth. At this point it would 
Ibg possible to berth vessels of the maximum draft that 
could pasa over the bar and there would be saved the' 
journey up and down the river from the mouth of the? 
river to Bassens, a journey which, on account of the wait- 
ing for high tide, would average at least twenty hours in 
both directions or nearly two days for each round trip; 
of a ship. 

The objection to Talmont was its open exposure to 
winds from the southwest which, should they reach gale 
proportions, might render this port not usable during 
their continuance. For this and on account of some local 
French objections, the use of Talmont was temporarily 
•set aside, but with the impossibility of using La Mar- 
tiniere and with the steadily growing demand for more 
and more space — a cry that ceased only with hostili- 
ties — Talmont was again taken under consideration in 
the summer of 1918. After full study of the physical 



50 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

surronndings, it was decided IHat tHe objections could be 
so reduced that they would not outweigh the natural 
advantages, and construction was undertaken. As a mat- 
ter of fact, Talmont was one of the few places where a 
new extensive water and rail terminal could be created, 
a combination that was imperatively necessary should the 
war continue for another year. uThe plans adopted and 
approved called for the creation of accommodations for 
ten vessels, together with the necessary warehouses and 
track facilities. Construction materials were ordered 
from the United States and work had been already 
[energetically begun on thg construction when the armis- 
tice was signed. Then the project, so far as American 
use was concerned, was abandoned. 

During 1917 and the early part of 1918 no considera- 
tion was given to the use of the Mediterranean ports on 
account of the exposure in the approach to these places 
to submarine attack on vessels coming through the com- 
paratively narrow straits opposite Gibraltar. [With the 
demands for greater accommodations, and as the limit 
of capacity of the Atlantic ports of France had been 
treached, it became apparent that recourse must be had 
to the Mediterranean harbors. By the summer of 1918, 
the Navy Department advised that sufficient patrol ves- 
sels were available to provide the necessary anti-subma- 
rine protection. Arrangements were then made with the 
French for the use of the ports of Marseille, Toulon and 
Cette. During June the port of Marseille was opened 
for the use of the A. E. F., and chiefly for the handling of 
subsistence, clothing, forage, motor vehicles, air craft 
machinery, rails, gasoline, oil and a few locomotives. 
The' French turned over to exclusive American use nine 
berths. Later six more, without track facilities, were 
ready to be turned over when the armistice was signed, 
the plans for equipping them with the track and unload- 
ing facilities having been worked out. Tjnfortunately, 



PORTS 51 

the 'existing' terminal facilities at all these hertEs were 
not adapted to the nse of American cars. Had the war 
continued, the whole track layout would have necessarily 
been reconstructed. As it was, American cargo was 
handled exclusively hy French equipment and French 
train crews. 

In the autumn of 1918 the French Minister of Marine 
gave the A. E. F. the use of two piers belonging to the 
Navy Department at Toulon. Three piers at Cette were 
also devoted to American use which had been previously 
given to the British and a few cargoes were discharged 
by the latter. Had the war continued, this port would 
have been reconstructed and largely extended for 
American use. 

The above are the main ports that our army occupied, 
though American traffic went in small consignments to 
other places, the French cooperating loyally by obtain- 
ing facilities from private owners or granting the use of 
Government space which, at the outset, they considered 
would not be possible to accomplish. 

For administration purposes, the ports operated, or to 
be operated, by the A. E. F., were divided into groups 
as follows: 

Channel Geoup: Le Havre, Eouen, Caen, Cherbourg 
and Honfleur. 

Upper Coast Geoup: Brest, St. Male, Lorient and 
Granville. 

Lower Loire Group : St. Nazaire, Montoir and Donges. 

Upper Loire Group: Nantes and subsidiary small 
ports in vicinity. 

Charente Group : La Pallice, La RocHellg, Rochef ort, 
Tonnay-Charente and Marennes. 

GiRONDE RrvER Group : Bassens, Bordeaux, Sursol, 
Blaye, Frut, Pauillac, St. Loubes, St. Pardon and 
Talmont. 



52 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN PRANCE 

Mediteeeanean- Geoup : Marseilles, Toulon and Cette 

Opeeated Independently : Bayonne. 

Eventually to be Opeeated with Gieonde Geoup: 
Les Sables d'Olonne. 

Beittsh Poets: London, Soutliampton and Liverpool 
in England ; Glasgow, Scotland ; Barry, Cordic and Swan- 
sea in Wales, and Belfast in Ireland. 

It should be stated that the ports of the Channel 
group which had been assigned by the French to the 
British were used chiefly for the discharge of men and 
cargoes reaching France via England, or for the dis- 
charge of supplies purchased in England. The British, 
like the French, realized the importance of American 
assistance and assigned five berths at Le Havre to 
American use in the autumn of 1918, with the understand- 
ing that the A. E. F. would provide the necessary tracks 
and warehouses. These berths were put in service before 
the signing of the armistice. 

The total number of berths actually used by the 
A. E. F. amounted to no less than ninety-seven, of which 
twelve had been constructed by Americans and eighty- 
five had been furnished by the French and British, 

When it is recalled that the French stated in May, 
1917, that all that France could be expected to do would 
be to furnish, perhaps, fourteen berths at Bassens, St. 
Nazaire and Nantes inclusive, and that these were to be 
loaned temporarily only, it will be seen how great was 
French cooperation and how they not only made good 
their original promises, but exceeded their estimates, the 
latter being such a rare experience in the usual handling 
of construction work. 

The labors of the Transportation engineers were not 
limited to negotiating with the French authorities for the 
assignment of berthing facilities and the planning of their 
construction or rehabilitation. At all the new places, 



PORTS 53 

such as Bassens, complete railroad facilities had to be con- 
structed At the already existing ports the track layouts 
conformed entirely to the French standards. This stand- 
ard called for parallel tracks connected only by hand- 
worked turntables with tracks at right angles to the main 
lines, so that in order to shift a car from one line to the 
other, it had to be run to one of these small turntables, 
placed upon the right angled intersecting track, run to 
the track on which it was desired to be placed finally and 
again revolved on a hand turntable. This obviously 
made a very slow and cumbersome operation. In order 
to get the maximum rate of delivery, these tracks had to 
be all redesigned, relaid, and connected by means of 
cross-overs and switches, so that locomotives could shift 
the cars either singly or in train lots from one track to 
another But it is to be recalled that at many of these 
places the existing tracks leading to or actually on the 
wharves were intersected by city streets. It can be 
imagined how difficult was any rearrangement when it 
had to be carried out maintaining the street crossings, 
with the removal of large buildings, and under an intense 
railway traffic. 

As an illustration, at St. Nazaire such changes and 
reconstruction to the American standards of switching 
entailed a total of twenty-five miles of new track. 
At the same place a double-track railway connection was 
built approximately four miles in length, in order to pro- 
vide the necessary additional facilities between the docks 
and the storage and classification yards so that the sup- 
plies from the ship's sides could be removed as rapidly 
as possible and thus free the vessels for their return 
journey. This line was built through the city. 

The control of the port work was in the hands of a 
bureau called the Army Transport Service which, prior 
to the entry of the United States into the war, was oper- 
ated as a department of the Quartermaster Corps through 



54 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FEANCE 

thg .Water Transportation Branch of tlie office of the 
Chief Quartermaster General in Washington. All mat- 
ters pertaining to procuring and allocating tonnage and 
managing vessels, including the operation of docks, 
wharves and terminals, were placed under a civilian 
organization known as the Shipping Control Committee, 
formed in the early part of 1918, and given the powers of 
the War Department and of the Shipping Board relative 
to vessel procurement, allocation and operation. While 
no definite limit was placed upon the authority and juris- 
diction of the Shipping Control Committee, their efforts 
were confined mainly to home ports. They did not 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the operations of 
the Transport Service in Europe. They contented them- 
selves with the appointment of a permanent representa- 
tive of that Committee with G. 1, General Staff, S. 0. S. 

The Army Transport Service of the A. E. F. was at 
first operated under the Quartermaster Corps by an 
officer who had accompanied the Commander-in-Chief to 
Europe. He was placed in direct charge of the work 
as Director of Docks. Under the provisions of G. 0. 78, 
G. H. Q., 1917, the Army Transport Service was trans- 
ferred from the Chief Quartermaster, Lines of Commu- 
nication, to the Transportation Corps, and this same 
officer was appointed Director, A. T. S., reporting to the 
Director General of Transportation. 

On May 24, 1918, the Army Transport Service was 
reconstituted and a standard organization prescribed for 
all ports with corresponding divisions in the office of the 
Director, thus affording the necessary control and super- 
vision and a comprehensive development of the terminal 
organizations. Due to the long continued lack of per- 
sonnel, the complete organization was not effected until 
a short time prior to the signing of the armistice. 

On the Staff of the Director, A. T. S., were the 
following: 



PORTS 55 

Deputy Director; Executive Officer; General Inspector; 
Supervisor of Operations and Chief of Troop and Cargo 
Divisions; Supervisor of Terminal Facilities; Chief of 
Inland Water Transport; Chief Marine Engineer and 
Property Officer. 

The organization al the Base Ports comprised : 

a. General Superintendent with an assistant in chargo 
of each group of ports. 

b. Superintendent in direct charge of each port. 

c. Camp Commander reporting to the General Super- 
intendent in direct charge of military affairs. 

d. Executive officer in charge of Administration 
Division. 

e. Supervisor of Operations in charge of all Marine 
operation, including Marine Superintendents, etc. 

f. Superintendent, Troop and Cargo Division, in 
charge of all matters pertaining to troops and cargo 
from ship's hold to railroad operating department. 

g. Supervisor of Terminal Facilities, in charge of 
procurement, inspection and maintenance of all terminal 
facilities. 

h. Property Officer in charge of all supplies including 
stevedore gear. 

Beginning with a few officers and 491 civilian steve- 
dores, the personnel of the Army Transport Service was 
gradually increased until at the time of the signing of the 
armistice it consisted of approximately 800 officers, 
22,000 enlisted men, 2,509 civilians and 900 German 
prisoners, a total of over 26,000 men. 

This rearrangement of the Army Transport Service 
brought the management and operation of all the port 
facilities under the authority of the Director General of 
Transportation, where it belonged. The fewer the Hum- 



56 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

ber of conflicting bureaus with the consequent division 
of responsibility and power, the greater the ultimate 
efficiency. 

The British, as has been stated, made great use of the 
very excellent existing French system of canals which, 
fortunately for them, led directly from their main ports 
of entry to the distributing points along the front. The 
American sector was so placed that, unfortunately, it was 
not possible for the A. E. F. to make similar use of the 
French canals. Consideration was given to the utiliza- 
tion of these inland waterways as a means of relieving 
the overtaxed railroads from unnecessary traffic. 

Cargo that arrived at Le Havre and Rouen could 
be shipped — and was, to a great extent, so handled — 
by barges up the River Seine, thence by the canals reach- 
ing from the head waters of the Seine to various interior 
points. To the end of January, 1919, the Transport Serv- 
ice handled over inland waterways in France a total of 
380,000 tons, not an extraordinarily large amount, though 
one which afforded an appreciable and very welcome 
relief to the railway transportation. 

The principal part of the construction of the ports 
was done by the Seventeenth Engineers with headquar- 
ters at St. Nazaire and by the Eighteenth Engineers at 
Bordeaux. 



CHAPTER VI 

' FRENCH RAILWAYS 

The entire railway system of all France is composed of 
two classes of lines, those with, a broad gauge and those 
with a gauge of one meter. The broad gauge has a width 
between rails of 1.44 meters or, expressed in English 
measure, of 4 feet 8.7 inches, differing by only two- 
tenths of an inch from the standard gauge of 4 feet 
Sy2 inches of our own lines. In fact, the difference is so 
slight as to be negligible and American as well as Brit- 
ish car trucks were shipped to France without altera- 
tions. The railways of all the principal countries of 
Europe, except Spain and Russia, have the same gauge 
as the French. The broad gauge system is divided 
among five separate corporations; les companies des 
chemins de fer du Nord, de L'Est, de Paris a Lyon et 
a la Mediterranee, for short called the P-L-M; de Paris 
a Orleans (the P-0), and de I'Etat. There is a sixth 
company, the Midi, but it belongs to and its lines 
form a part of the Paris-Orleans system, although the 
company maintains its individual corporate identity. 
The above companies are all stock concerns with the 
exception of the Etat, formerly known as the Chemin de 
Fer de I'Ouest, which was taken over by the general gov- 
ernment some years ago and is operated by it as a state 
railway. The other concerns enjoy some measure of 
Government assistance in the way of advances or guar- 
antees, in return for which they will become Government, 
property in the course of time. 

The main offices of these five systems are located in 
Paris, from which point the lines radiate to all parts of 
France, very much as the spokes of a wheel lead away 

57 



58 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

from the hub. Paris is, therefore, the nerve center of 
France as regards government, finance and control of 
transportation. 

By mutual consent and a definitely adopted arrange- 
ment, specific sections of France are assigned to the above 
companies. There is scarcely any invasion of the terri- 
tory served through one system by the lines of another, 
and even where adjacent divisions join, there is but little 
overlapping. Competition for traffic between the com- 
panies, therefore, does not exist. These arbitrary terri- 
torial divisions are wedge- or fan-shaped, with their small 
ends meeting at Paris. 

The Etat covers that part of France lying west of a 
line beginning at Dieppe on the Channel and running 
through Paris, Orleans, Tours, Poitiers to Bordeaux. 
In consequence it serves the ports of Dieppe, Havre, 
Rouen, Cherbourg, Brest, St. Nazaire, Nantes, La 
Rochelle and Bordeaux. 

The Paris-Orleans system, including the lines of the 
Chemin de Fer du Midi, lies east of a line commencing 
at Paris and passing via Chateaudun, Tears, Poitiers, 
Angouleme and Bordeaux to Biaritz and the Spanish 
frontier, thence north of the Pyrenees Mountains, and 
west of a line running from the Spanish frontier on the 
Mediterranean along the latter and through Mont- 
pellier, Nimes, Clermont-Ferrand, Nevers to Paris, with 
branches on the west side from Tours, one to Le Mans, 
the other to Nantes, St. Nazaire and Brest. This latter 
branch is the only case of a line of one company invading 
to any appreciable extent the otherwise exclusive terri- 
tory of another. The P-0 company has no monopolistic 
control over any harbor except the small one of Bayonne 
near Biaritz, though it provides the main service to Bor- 
deaux and carries the bulk of the traffic to and from that 
great port. On the other hand, the Etat is the sole rail- 
way running into Dieppe, Havre, Rouen, Cherbourg, and 



FEENCH EAILWAYS 59 

Ea Eochelle, and is the principal line to Brest, St. 
Nazaire and Nantes. 

The territory of the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee lies east 
of that of the Paris-Orleans and is bounded on the west 
by a line marked by Paris, Nevers, Clermont-Ferrand, 
Mmes, Montpellier, on the south by the shore of the 
Mediterranean, and on the east by the frontiers of Italy 
and Switzerland, and a line through Belf ort, Is-sur-Tille, 
Dijon, Paris. While this system does not touch the 
Atlantic seaboard, it reaches the great Mediterranean 
port of Marseille and the naval base at Toulon. It pro- 
vides the main lines of communication to Italy and 
Switzerland and connects the three largest cities of 
France, Paris, Lyon and Marseille. 

The Chemin de Fer de I'Est serves eastern France 
as included between two lines running from Paris, one 
to the German frontier as it existed before the war in 
Alsace, the other to the 'eastern part of the Belgian 
frontier and Luxembourg. The first or southern of these 
lines, is marked by Paris, Troyes, Is-sur-Tille and Bel- 
fort, the northern one by Paris, Meaux, Soissons, Laon 
and Hirson. The Est is the only French railway com- 
pany whose rails do not reach salt water. It furnished 
the sole lines to Germany and Luxembourg, the former 
via Metz and Strasbourg. It enjoyed a valuable traffic 
in minerals, especially iron ore and steel, and covered the 
great wine districts of Champagne and Burgundy. 

The Nord system made a net work over the rich and 
highly important part of France lying between Paris, the 
northern channel ports and Belgium, an area bounded 
on the west by the tracks of the Chemin de Fer de I'Etat 
and on the east by those of the Est, as defined by the two 
Tadiating lines, Paris-Beauvais Treport and Paris-Laon- 
Hirson. "Within these boundaries, the smallest area 
belonging to anyone of the French railway companies, 
lay France's greatest coal fields, stretching from Arras 



60 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

to the Belgian frontier; Lille, the fifth city of France; 
Calais and Bonlogne, main ports for Anglo-continental 
traffic and the railways connecting Paris with Belgium 
and through Belgium with Holland and northwestern 
continental Europe. 

From the above description of the routes of and the 
territories served by the several systems, it will be seen 
that the Nord and Est companies were the only ones 
whose; rails reached the actual theatre of war, and 
of these the Nord was the one chiefly affected. 
Considerably more than one-half of the lines of this lat- 
ter company were in enemy hands or turned over abso- 
lutely to the French or British mihtary authorities for 
operation by them. 

The second class of French railways consisted of dis- 
connected lines under mutually unrelated ownership and 
operation with a gauge of one meter (3 feet 3 1/3 inches), 
their construction having been begun at a time when 
there existed a very mistaken but widespread belief in the 
economy of narrow-gauge railways. At the same period 
many miles were constructed in accordance with the 
same error in the United States, especially in the West, 
and notably in Colorado. These second-class railways 
iwere purely local concerns, in fact, they were officially 
described as *' Chemins de Fer d'Interet Local " and 
were controlled by corporations in which the communes 
or municipalities adjacent to the lines were interested, 
frequently to the major extent. The lines of each sepa- 
rate company were usually short, rarely exceeding 
seventy-five miles for any one concern, though the total 
length for the whole country was about 5,600 miles. The 
traffic, consisting chiefly of passengers, was light, and, 
consequently, the indirect local accommodation usually 
exceeded in value the direct financial return to the 
owners, that is, the adjacent communes. 



FKENCH EAILWAYS 61 

The variation in gauge between the first- and second- 
class railways was unfortunate for military purposes be- 
cause, except in a very few instances, the metre gauge lines 
could not be used for military ends on account of their 
own lack of sufficient rolling stock and the undesirability 
of acquiring locomotives and cars that could not be used 
universally. These lines were, therefore, of little or no 
use at all when they lay in the zone of the armies, unless 
they could be reconstructed into standard gauge lines. 
This was a matter of some difficulty, as the old cross- 
ties would not answer and the rails were too light except 
for very restricted traffic. The other alternative was 
to convert them into narrow-gauge lines of the light rail- 
way or military gauge of 60 cm. Such change was 
readily accomplished by simply drawing the rails 
together and was nearly always done if the meter gauge 
railway, by its location, lent itself to being made a part 
of the army light railway system. 

Exclusive of the meter gauge railways, the five great 
corporations, or six, if the Midi is regarded as a separate 
concern, comprised approximately 25,000 miles of main 
line with 10,800 miles of second tracks and, therefore, 
was in extent of mileage, the third largest system in 
Europe, being exceeded only by the railways of Germany 
(38,500 miles) and Eussia (45,000 miles). In regard to 
volume of traffic the French lines again ranked third 
among European countries, coming next after the com- 
bined railways in the United Kingdom and of Germany 
in the order named. 

The French lines can be fairly compared with the 
American railways composing what the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission formerly described as Group II, or 
those ai3proximately of the States of New York, Pennsyl- 
vania, New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware. This area 
in the United States includes the important lines such 
as the New York Central, between New York and Buffalo, 



62 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

and the Pennsylvania, Baltimore and Ohio, between New 
York and Pittsburgh; the Jersey Central and Reading, 
all the Lackawanna lines, Erie and Lehigh Valley. These 
American railways were almost exactly of the same 
length as the combined French railways, and serving, as 
they did, the most densely populated and most highly 
productive portion of the United States, enjoyed the 
most intense traffic to be found in any section of the 
country. Although they constitute but about one-tenth 
of the whole railway mileage of the United States, they 
carry more than one-third of all the passengers and 
nearly one-third of all the freight. As to comparative 
traffic between the French railways and the American 
railways covered in Group II, the former carried pas- 
sengers in the ratio of five to three, but freight tons in 
the ratio of only two to five. As French freight trains 
were shorter and passenger trains more frequent than 
similar American trains, the traffic units on French rail- 
ways were run at much shorter intervals than ours, giv- 
ing a more congested service and, consequently, pre- 
sented serious difficulties to the introduction of a great 
number of additional trains, such as the entry of 
America into the war entailed. 

Before the war French railways were in fine physical 
condition with heavy rails, stone ballast, complete block 
signals and permanent structures. There were run, espe- 
cially on the Nord lines between Paris and Boulogne and 
Calais, some of the fastest trains to be found anywhere 
in the world. Although, through lack of new material 
and equipment and the great shortage of labor, it had 
been impossible to maintain these railways during the 
war at the previous standard of excellence, nevertheless 
the authorities had succeeded in keeping them in sur- 
prisingly good condition when all the attending circum- 
elances are taken into account. In fact, when the Railway 
•Commission travelled on the main line of the Est railway 



FEENCH RAILWAYS 63 

in 'June, 1917, a speed of sixty to eigMy miles an hour 
was made over a considerable distance. 

As against the contingency of war, the French general 
staft had planned years ago, and with no particular war 
in mind, full provision for the most efficient method of 
operating the railways with the double view of military 
exigencies and existing commercial requirements. The 
employees on French railways were all subject by lawi 
to army mobilization, and were so mobilized in thei 
late war. This mobilization, providing for holding 
skilled men at their posts and securing a permanent 
working staff, greatly facilitated control of the railways 
by the military authorities. The French army regulations 
ordered that, while the general officers of each railway] 
corporation should continue to function and administer 
the properties in the event of war, and while the 
employees of all grades, whether mobilized or not, should 
remain at their posts to carry on their regular daily 
routine, a new controlling supervision, to last only dur- 
ing the emergency, should be established in which thi^ 
imperative military needs and the civil demands could 
be exammed, adjusted and both be satisfied. 

This control consisted in chief of two commissioners 
or ** Commissaires " to use the official title, one, the 
*' Commissaire Militaire," being named by the War 
Department, the other by the company. These two offi- 
cers worked side by side with equal authority, but with 
required joint action to be effective. They passed on 
and determined all matters of general principle, acquisi- 
tion of equipment or permanent way material, decided 
on the necessity for and ordered the construction of new 
or additional lines, tracks, yards, storage places or other 
major facilities, placed maximum and minimum limits on 
trains to be run, made arrangements for the military ser- 
vice, and fixed the number of the working staff and their 
compensation. In short, they so ordered the workings 



64 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

of the railway system as to permit the harmonizing to the 
fullest extent of the double function of serving the needs 
of the army and of the civil population. 

It was impossible for these two commissioners to 
supervise all the minor details, so that under-commis- 
sioners were appointed for all places where there was 
any likelihood of clash between military and civil inter- 
ests. Such places were terminal yards where surplus 
rolling stock was stored and trains made up, or regulat- 
ing stations where trains were received with military 
supplies which, in some instances, were to be put in stor- 
age, in others to be forwarded to other stations with or 
without breaking bulk. It is obvious that at such points, 
questions would frequently arise as to whether it was 
more important to assign cars to contain a shipment of 
shells for the army or to carry a consignment of coal to 
some factory, or to what extent priority in schedule was 
to be given to troop trains over those with ordinary pas- 
sengers. Such questions were dealt with by the under- 
commissioners who, like their cliiefs, worked in pairs, 
representatives of the two services, with equal power and 
equal responsibility. These men investigated all such 
questions on the ground and, having ascertained the 
facts, were usually able, acting under general instruc- 
tions handed down to them from time to time, to reconcile 
apparently conflicting demands. Should they be unable to 
agree or be unwilling to assume responsibility for a 
decision fraught with such importance as apparently, per- 
haps, to exceed their powers, the matter would be referred 
to higher authority for decision, the reference being 
accompanied by recommendations from the two duly 
charged military and civil representatives. 

To an American accustomed to the principle of a sin- 
gle executive or unacquainted with European practice, 
such duality of control might seem dangerously compli- 
cated and be considered as apt to lead to frequent aiid 



FEENCH EMLWAYS 65 

annoying deadlocks. But the European manager has 
been trained to it by long experience through a system 
of double signatures to bank cheques and letters, double 
approval for all orders, etc. He practically never acts 
alone as an American general manager usually does. 
Consequently the commissioners and under-commission- 
ers had had previous experience in working alongside 
of a mate with joint and coequal powers and found 
little difficulty in producing results. In the French 
situation, both of each pair of men felt that they were 
working for France and, undoubtedly, faithfully endeav- 
ored to reach the best solution. There was no antagonis- 
tic feeling of the army versus the civilian nor jealousy 
of the former by the latter, because, although the rep- 
resentative of the latter might not be in military uniform, 
he was nevertheless mobilized and was, equally with his 
fellow, a soldier of France. Both realized that, while the 
army must be served promptly and served well, the civil 
industries must also be served, because on them the army 
depended for its supplies, and on these supplies rested 
the country's safety. They saw to it that a conflict 
between the two opposing demands was avoided, and that 
the service, whose needs were paramount at the time, was 
given priority. 

One great advantage in this scheme (and so carefully 
studied and worked out in time of peace) for harmonizing 
the double functions was that it was quickly put in force 
without any disturbance of the existing operating 
machinery. When war was over, the working staff was 
demobilized, the chief and under-military commissioners 
were withdrawn and the operating staff of the railway 
company resumed its functions as a complete working 
unit without necessity for any reorganization. During 
the war nothing had been changed, nothing had been dis- 
located. There had been added, temporarily, certain 
special officials with equal but not superseding authority, 



66 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

"wliose duty it was to see tliat the militarj requirements 
were understood and cared for properly but not to the 
detriment of the other obligations of the railway. When 
the necessity for such cooperation was passed, the officers 
were withdrawn. 

France having been invaded and a considerable por- 
tion of the country and many miles of railway being in 
the hands of the enemy, there was a limit beyond which 
civil or commercial traffic ceased and there remained only 
the service of the combatant army. This line was the 
arbitrary demarkation between the Zone des Armees and 
the Zone de I'Interieur. The Zone des Armees had an 
irregular width averaging about twenty miles. [Within 
this zone the civil population was largely evacuated, but 
not entirely so. In particular districts, such as the coal 
mining country in the north, civilian life still existed well 
within shelling distance, even women and children con- 
tinuing to remain at work in the mines. But once beyond 
the ling of the Zone, all normal civil railway traffic ceased. 
There were no tickets to be had, nor time tables to be 
consulted. All trains were handled by the military 
authorities, and all movements were subservient to army 
demands. Such civil traffic as might exist within the for- 
ward zone was of secondary importance. 

The general control of all railways in the Zone des 
Armees was under the charge of an officer stationed at 
General Headquarters. In the event of an advance being 
made that could be considered permanent, the limitations 
of the Zone des Armees would be moved forward. At 
this new limit the exclusive military control would cease 
and the authority of the railway companies through the 
joint commissioners be established. 

As there was a single officer at the French General 
Headquarters controlling army railway operation, so 
there' was a single officer in the War Department in the 
Boulevard St. Germain, Paris, acting as the liaison 



FEENCH EAILWAYS 6Z 

officer or connecting channel between tlie Comniissaireg 
Militaires and the chief militar j authority. fThe personal 
niachine was, therefore, complete. Any disputes between 
those high in. authority were adjusted by a responsible^ 
officer of the Government, a member of the Cabinet, who 
also in the name of the Government arranged for pur- 
chases of railway material and saw to it that the available 
supply of material and labor was distributed among the 
five companies according to their actual and most 
pressing needs. This official was the Sous Secretaire des 
Transports, ranking as a cabinet member without port- 
folio, but under the Minister of Public [Works. At the 
time of America's entry into the war, this post was ably 
filled by Monsieur Albert Claveille, an engineer by pro- 
fession, formerly general manager of the Chemln de Fer 
de PEtat. Subsequently, M, Claveille became Minister of 
Public [Works in the Ministry of Painleve. [Ee retained 
this portfolio through the following ministry of Clemen- 
ceau until after hostilities had ceased. 

A picture of the French railway system and its war- 
time management is necessary to permit an understand- 
ing of the structure that was to be so essential to the 
successful American participation and on which the spe- 
cial American service was to be grafted. 

Of the five railway companies, only two, as was said 
above, reached the actual battle front. The British oper- 
ations were confined wholly to certain parts of the [bTord 
lines except for the men and supplies that ientered 
through Dieppe, [Havre, or [Rouen, and who made the[ 
initial stage of their journey on the rails of the Etat com- 
pany. On the other hand, the Est lines running towards 
8oissons, Chateau-Thierry, Verdun, the [Valley of the 
Meuse, St. Mihiel, Toul and Nancy, werg, the lines of 
communication serving the American front. The Ameri- 
can troops, with their supplies, were landed at the several 
ports from Brest southward, whence they were trans- 



68 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

ported over the Etat or P-0 lines and across those of the 
Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee to reach the Chemin de Fer de 
I'Est. American railway movements came, therefore, in 
contact with four of the five main systems, and as the 
principal traffic currents of these concerns flowed 
towards Paris, the American routes ran transverse to 
this established order, which introduced additional com- 
plications in operation. 



CHAPTEE VII 

AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS IN FRANCE 

Wlien the staff took up the question of organizing a 
transportation system for the American Expeditionary 
Forces in France, it had the benefit of British experience. 
The latter had been obliged to do as evidently Americans 
would be forced to do, to modify opinions as to methods 
of railway operation in order to meet French views, to 
adapt themselves to existing conditions that could not be 
changed, and to learn how to manage a system of rail- 
ways burdened with military demands that must be met 
promptly and at the same time with a local civilian traflSc 
that could not be ignored. But they had found a sat- 
isfactory solution. 

During the first year of the war. Great Britain handled 
its traffic over French railways without any well-estab- 
lished organization or definite plan for cooperation with 
the French. But as the army grew in size, as the amount 
of supplies increased in tonnage, and as the French 
became more and more in need of assistance, the British 
realized the necessity of constructing a well-designed 
operating machine whereby their men and materials 
could be handled with the maximum of certainty and the 
minimum of friction. For this task, Mr. Eric Geddes 
was selected, sent to France and given the rank of major- 
general that he might have proper authority. 

Mr. Geddes, or the Et. Hon. Sir Eric Geddes, K. C. B., 
as he afterwards became, was one of the human features 
of the war. Born in 1876, he passed some years in the 
United States in railway service, chiefly on the Baltimore 
and Ohio Eailroad. After some extended experience in 
India, he returned to England and became General Man- 

69 



70 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

ager of tlie North Eastern Eailway. Early in 1917, 
Major-General Sir Eric Geddes was recalled as chief of 
transportation in France, placed in charge of hastening 
ship construction in England and created Vice-Admiral. 
He, therefore, had the unique distinction of a civilian 
holding at the same time temporary rank as Major- 
General and Vice-Admiral in the British army and navy 
respectively. Before the war came to an end, Sir Eric 
Geddes was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, an 
office corresponding to the Secretary of the Navy in the 
United States. He was succeeded in France by his previ- 
ous deputy, Major-General Sir P. A. M. Nash, who before 
the war had been Locomotive Engineer of the Great 
Northern Eailway of England, and to whom the A. E. F. 
owe many courtesies. 

Major-General Geddes was given command of all 
transportation matters in France with the title of 
Director General of Transportation, or D. G. T,, as it 
was always mentioned. The organization that he built 
up embraced every channel for transportation, including 
standard gauge railways, light military railways, canals 
and roads, their construction, maintenance, and opera- 
tion, and the authority of the Director General of Trans- 
portation extended unbroken and unchallenged, except as 
it had to conform to military exigencies, over the whole 
of France wherever British operations were paramount. 
To the British transportation department there was no 
line separating the Zone of the Advance from the Zone 
of the Eear as there was in the French and later in the 
American service, nor was there any conflict in authority 
between the several branches of transportation, because 
they all reported to one head. The only exception was 
the control of the transjDort vehicles, motor and horse, 
used on highways. 

The organization thus created consisted in chief of five 
directorates, reporting to the Director General of Trans- 



[^MEKICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 71 

portation, but exercising separate authority over trans- 
portation, light railways, roads, inland water transport 
and docks. There were three technical departments 
whose chiefs, with the titles of Chief Railway Construc- 
tion Engineer, Chief Mechanical Engineer and Chief 
Engineer of Port Construction, while reporting direct to 
the Director General of Transportation, cooperated with 
the several '' Directors " and carried out the necessary 
railway or mechanical construction in their several 
departments. In addition there were appropriate sec- 
tions dealing with questions of organization, statistics, 
stores and accounts, while the Canadian Railway troops 
maintained a section of their own, more fully described 
in Chapter XXV. 

Liaison with army commanders was maintained 
through two Deputy Directors General of Transporta- 
tion, between whom the five armies, that composed 
the British Expeditionary Force, were divided into two 
groups and under whom were Assistant Directors Gen- 
eral of Transportation, one for each army. It was the 
duty of the latter, having ascertained army needs and 
learned of proposed movements, to report on the same 
through the Deputy Director of the army group to the 
Director General who made the necessary provision 
through the Directors having supervision. In the event 
of any difference of opinion between the Director General 
and an army commander final decision was rendered 
nominally by the Commander-in-Chief, but in practise 
by the Quartermaster General acting in his name. 

The authority of the Director General was confined 
strictly to France. Vessels arriving at French ports 
were discharged by a staif working under officials of the 
admiralty, but once the cargo was placed on the quay 
and freed from the ship 's tackle, it became the charge of 
the Transportation Department and so remained in its 
passage through the storage depots until finally con- 
sumed by men or guns. 



72 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

The headquarters of the Transportation Department 
were established in the Chateau Monthuis, quite close to 
Montrcuil, in whose charming park the office buildings 
and quarters for the headquarters staff were erected. 
The General Headquarters of the British Army were 
located in Montreuil, the delightfully quaint old city 
witji its medieval walls and moat perched high on a hill 
overlooking the valley of the Nocq. To the west was the 
sea, at Etaples only ten miles away, while not much fur- 
ther to the south was the historic field of Crecy. The 
Director General was thus in close touch with the center 
of military activity, and was conveniently located to 
reach quickly any point on the British front and the ports 
of Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne. 

Montreuil was never referred to by name, but always 
as " G. H. Q." There was the fiction that somehow the 
enemy did not know where the British headquarters were 
located, and they would never know if only everyone 
would refrain from mentioning the name of the place. 
Of course, they did know, but it was a singular fact that 
Montreuil was never bombed. It was said, but probably 
with as much truth as many other things, that the Ger- 
mans avoided bombing Montreuil through the personal 
orders of the Kaiser, who hoped that in return the Brit- 
ish would avoid bombing his own headquarters in the 
field. In this matter of mentioning names, Americans 
were not quite so particular, for although Chaumont was 
generally spoken of as '' G. H. Q.," the fact that there 
were two main points, Chaumont and Tours, the head- 
quarters of the Army and headquarters of the Service 
of Supplies, led unavoidably to the speaking of both 
places by name. 

The American Transportation Department was pat- 
terned on the British experience as a model, and in the 
fearly planning, practically all the work was done by 
Major W. J. Wilgus, the sole member of the first engi- 



AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 73 

neer commission who was not assigned to other duties 
as were the other members. It was no light task that 
faced the Staff. The investigations of the Commission 
showed the transcendent importance of transportation. 
But neither the system nor its component parts were 
in existence and much time would obviously be needed to 
manufacture and ship the rails, the rolling stock and the 
other required materiel. Orders, therefore, must be 
placed at once if the equipment were to be on hand when 
needed. The nature of the equipment depended in large 
measure upon the size of the American army, its compo- 
sition and the sector it was to occupy, and in June, 1917, 
no one of these fundamental details had been determined. 
However, in spite of difficulties, a requisition for materiel 
was drawn up and cabled to Washington in July. 

The skeleton plan on which this requisition was based 
contemplated, as suggested by the Staff, a possible initial 
American sector between Epinal and Nancy, which could 
be served by the existing double-track railway lines from 
Bordeaux and St. Nazaire, meeting at Bourges. Erom 
this point there was a railway capable of handling 
25,000 tons of supplies daily, with supplementary lines 
having sufficient capacity over local requirements of 
25,000 tons more. Beyond a daily tonnage of 50,000 
tons it was not possible to see. 

It was recognized that the additional burden on the 
French railways would require, on the part of the 
American Army, the construction of new yards, water 
supplies, engine terminals and other facilities that 
responsibilities of this kind entail, and also the con- 
struction of many other additions such as extra tracks, 
cut-offs, and regulating stations, all with the view of 
removing any special restrictions that might hamper the 
maximum train movements. In addition, but fortunately 
this was one of the few questions whose answer could be 
postponed, was the collecting of ample equipment of 



74 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

all kinds for reconstructing railways in the enemy's ter- 
ritory when the movement towards Berlin should begin. 

The requisition covered not only sufficient rolling stock 
and track materiel, but the necessary railway operating 
personnel for the above traffic, on the assumption that 
the A. E. P. would work its own locomotives and cars by 
American train crews in transporting its supplies from 
the ports of entry to the front, but subject to the oper- 
ating rules in force on the French railways. The hand- 
ling of American traffic to as large an extent as possi- 
ble under American control was held as absolutely 
necessary, as otherwise the success of the American 
armies might be jeopardized should the French supply 
of personnel and equipment fall short of needs at a crit- 
ical moment. 

In carrying out a comprehensive plan of this kind, one 
of the first questions arising was the character of the 
rolling stock to be used on the French railways. A deci- 
sion was reached that the locomotives should, if practica- 
ble, be in accord with the American practice and have a 
traction force that would be limited only by the struc- 
tural clearances of the French railways and the support- 
ing strength of the bridges. It was decided also that the 
cars should be of the American type with a capacity 
consistent with the same limitations as for locomotives 
and equipped with air brakes, but with the French type 
of couplers and buffers instead of corresponding Ameri- 
can devices. The outcome of these decisions on equip- 
ment was that the Transportation Department was 
furnished with consolidation locomotives with a tractive 
effort of 36,000 pounds and cars of thirty tons' capacity. 
Thus the policy adopted in the early days of the Trans- 
portation Department, then a function of the Chief Engi- 
neer, contemplated and finally permitted the A. E. P. to 
run its own trains made up of American locomotives and 
cars and manned by American personnel under ' ' track- 



AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 75 

age rights " over French railways from the sea to the 
front, a distance of about 600 miles, by the several routes. 

Immediately after sending the requisition for materiel, 
the Commander-in-Chief cabled to the Secretary of War 
that an extensive study of the transportation methods of 
the Allies had convinced him that the operation of the 
railways must be under a man with large experience in 
managing commercial railways in the United States. He 
asked that the ablest American railway man available 
be sent to him, explaining that, after the unfortunate 
results with inexperienced men, the British had selected 
the best executive man they could find to have charge of 
transportation, and that the question was mostly one of 
operation and management in intimate relation with the 
French who would retain general control over their own 
commercial transportation. 

Acting on the recommendation of the Commander-in- 
Chief, the Secretary of War sent over Mr. W. W. Atter- 
bury, Vice-President in charge of operations of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. 

On September 14, 1917, the Transportation Depart- 
ment was established by General Order 37, G. H. Q., 1917, 
and thereby became one of the technical services of Gen- 
eral Headquarters. This G. 0. ordained that : 

1. A Transportation Department is hereby established 
as one of the technical services of the Headquarters, 
A. E. F. This department will be charged with the 
operation, maintenance and construction of all railways 
and canals under American control and with the con- 
struction and maintenance of wharves and roads, and of 
shops and other buildings for railway purposes. Until 
such time as the number of construction troops in France 
warrants a division of engineer troops and labor between 
the Lines of Communication and the Transportation 
Department, all construction work will be done under 
the Commanding General of the Lines of Communication. 



76 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

The Cliief of the Transportation Department will "be 
the Director General of Transportation and will be 
assisted by the following staff: 

a. Deputy Director. 

b. Engineer of Construction. 

c. Manager of Light Railways. 

d. Manager of Roads. 

e. Business Manager. 

f. General Manager. 

g. Deputy Director with each Army Commander. 

The Deputy Director (personal) will be the personal 
representative of the D. G. T. and will act for him in 
his absence. The Deputy Director in each of the army 
groups will be the representative of the D. G. T. with 
the Army Commander; will be responsible for keeping 
the D. G. T. advised of transportation requirements 
within his area; and, in an emergency, shall act with the 
authority of the D. G. T. 

The General Manager will be responsible for operation 
and maintenance of all broad gauge lines, including 
equipment and terminals. He shall be assisted by: 

a. General Superintendent. 

b. General Superintendent of Motive Power. 

c. Engineer of Maintenance of Way. 

d. Superintendent of Transportation. 

e. Superintendent of Railway Telegraphs. 

The Business Manager will be responsible for pur- 
chases, supplies, stores (unless on line, in which event 
they are under the Division Superintendent), accounts, 
statistics and disbursements. He shall be assisted by: 

a. Purchasing Agent. 

b. Chief Accountant. 

c. Chief of Bureau of Claims. 

d. Statistician. 

e. Treasurer. 



AMEEICAN EAILWAY OPERATIONS 77 

The Engineer of Construction will be responsible for 
construction of new lines (broad gauge), terminals, 
docks, shops, sheds, buildings and other structures con- 
nected with railways. 

The Manager of Roads will be responsible for main- 
tenance of existing highways, reconstruction and con- 
struction of new highways within the zone of the armies 
occupied by our forces. 

The Manager of Light Railways will be responsible for 
construction, operation and maintenance of all light rail- 
ways for use of our forces. 

The same order named Mr. Atterbury as Director Gen- 
eral of Transportation, Major (subsequently Colonel) 
Wilgus as Deputy D. G. T., Brigadier-General "William C. 
Langfitt as Manager of Light Railways, and Brigadier- 
General Charles H. McKinstry as Manager of Roads. On 
October 8th Mr. Atterbury was made a Brigadier- 
General. 

The early days in the history of the Transportation 
Department were not particularly cheerful. The Director 
General was confronted with the difficulty of arranging 
for operating trains over lines not then adequate to 
sustain the double burden of French commercial and 
American army needs, lines that had been developed in 
accordance with principles and were being worked by 
methods diametrically opposed to those in vogue on the 
railways in the United States, whose staff spoke a dif- 
ferent language, and of adjusting the principles of 
American railroad operation to an established military 
system whose officers had been educated along quite dif- 
ferent lines. 

When the burden of work of the Commander-in-Chief 
began to assume huge proportions, it was deemed advis- 
able to relieve him of all unnecessary details, so that on 
February 16, 1918, there was issued General Order 31, 
creating the Service of Supplies, wherein the Department 
of Transportation was made a section of the Service of 



78 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Utilities, the latter being one of the main component 
parts of the Service of Supplies. 

Transportation was found to be too important to be 
left as a branch of a department, even though charge of 
railway construction had been taken from the Director 
General and given to the Director of Construction and 
Forestry in March, 1918. Consequently the Service of 
Utilities was abolished by G. 0. 114, July 11, 1918, and 
the Department of Transportation substituted therefor, 
thus permitting the D. G. T. to report directly to the Com- 
manding General, Service of Supplies. As thus consti- 
tuted, the Transportation Department covered: 

Operation and maintenance of all railways and canals, 
under American control. 

Operation of inland water transport and ocean trans- 
port with England and other European countries. 

Compilation of accounts due the United States for 
material furnished the French raihvays. 

Compilation of statistics showing classified tonnage 
received at ports; that moved over railways; and that 
delivered at rail heads. 

Operation of terminals, including unloading of ships, 
and transportation of goods to storehouses. 

Procurement of railway supplies. 

Control of- telephones and telegraphs for railway 
purposes. 

Railway personnel. 

Control and maintenance of all rolling stock and motor 
cars. 

Disbursement incident to performance of foregoing 
duties. 

Some difficulties were found in adjusting military 
organization to the operating organization of a commer- 
cial railway whose functions were the moving of men 
and material from one point to another. In the latter 
organization, the ordinary regimental unit did not fit. 



AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 79 

Finally it became apparent that the best solution was 
the creation of a transportation corps wherein the struc- 
ture of an infantry regiment, the base of all military 
units, could be dropped and men formed in such cate- 
gories as would be best adapted for railway operation. 
To this end the approval of the War Department was 
secured and the necessary orders were issued just as 
hostilities ceased. The organization that was contem- 
plated consisted of 6,000 officers of various ranks and 
200,000 enlisted men, although on November 11th the 
actual number of individuals in the corps was 1,677 
officers and 61,894 enlisted men, the largest technical 
service in the A. E. F. 

American railway operation in France can be divided 
into three phases. 

The first phase covers the period from 1917 to the 
spring of 1918 when the A. E. F. was in the position of 
a large shipper, all its troops and freight being moved 
by French equipment with French train crews exclusively. 

During the second phase which continued from the 
spring of 1918 until November of the same year, when 
the American army operated its own terminals with its 
own rolling stock and men, and by means of its own 
engines, cars and men gave to the French substantial aid 
in a steadily increasing degree in handling traffic on the 
railways. 

At the conclusion of hostilities the third phase was just 
beginning, for it was then arranged to take over certain 
definite sections of French railways and work them with 
American personnel and under the American system of 
train operation. 

To supervise operation, the Director General of Trans- 
portation appointed a General Manager under whom 
were a Superintendent of Motive Power and a General 
Superintendent of Transportation. 

As was fully explained when discussing French rail- 



80 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

ways, the systems with wliicli Americans came in contact 
were the Etat, the Paris-Orleans and Midi, the Paris- 
Lyons-Mediterranee and the Est. The first two of which 
extended easterly from the several ports of entry between 
Brest and Bordeaux, and converged to places in the cen- 
ter of Prance, east of Tours and south of Orleans, where 
there were established the principal intermediate supply 
depots and the great aviation camps. From the points 
of convergence, other lines radiated to the regulating 
stations of Is-sur-Tille, Liffol-le-Grand and St. Dizier 
and beyond to all points in the American sector. The 
total length of French railways used by American traffic 
was about 5,000 miles. 

These lines, or such portions of them within the limits 
of the Service of Supplies as carried American ship- 
ments, were divided for operating purposes into six 
Grand Divisions, and these were further subdivided. 
Each of the former was under the charge of a General 
Superintendent reporting to the Superintendent of 
Transportation, and each division under a Division 
Superintendent who, reporting to the General Superin- 
tendent of the Grand Division, exercised supervision 
over the American train crews cooperating with the 
French, had charge of repairs to American equipment, 
and did what he could to expedite American shipments 
in French hands. All these officials had military rank. 

This organization was established only in the territory 
behind the regulating stations. Matters connected with 
transportation in the advanced section were, at first, 
largely under the control of the regulating officers 
appointed by General Headquarters, although an Assist- 
ant General Manager for the Zone of Advance, was 
appointed and attached to the Assistant Chief .of Staff, 
G. 4 at G. H. Q., to assist in the transportation problems 
in that territory. Later, when it became apparent that 
the transportation problems in the Zone of Advance were 



AMEEICAN EAILWAY OPERATIONS 81 

becoming more difficult, tlie Director General was 
requested to place a Deputy at General Headquarters. 
Subsequently, a similar organization to that which 
obtained in the Service of Supplies was formed and 
placed in effect in the advanced section. 

In May and June, 1918, five battalions of railway men 
were assembled in France, the troops being selected at 
the classification camps at St. Aignan and Blois from the 
combatant regiments. They composed the first American 
operating unit. They were assembled at several points 
and for thirty days were instructed in French train 
operation by representatives of the French railways. 
Miniature signals were made and classes held at the 
camps in order to familiarize the men with signal opera- 
tions. A resume of the rules of the several lines over 
which the Americans were to operate was translated 
from the French and published in standard book form. 
The book contained the essential rules for French rail- 
way operation, showing the signal aspects in colors. As 
soon as the period of instruction was finished, the men 
were turned over to the French and used as much as pos- 
sible to drive American locomotives which had begun to 
arrive and which were being used by the French to haul 
American freight. 

The increasing number of American troops had put a 
tremendous burden on the French railways. At the end 
of May the amount of freight unloaded at the ports 
exceeded 25,000 tons a day. To relieve still further the 
transport situation, a request was made by Marshal Foch 
that railway troops from the United States be given 
priority and that 24,500 railroad men be sent over during 
June and July. Although this program was not fully 
realized, about 15,000 operating men did arrive in France 
before the end of July, and immediate steps were taken 
to instruct them and put them into service. Meanwhile, 
engine houses were being erected as fast as possible and 



82 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the sufficiency of tlie water supply was being investigated 
with the view to future extended operations. Because of 
the need of thirty days' instruction for the men, il was 
not until September that the first trains, operated 
entirely by American crews, began to run from the coast 
to the regulating stations. 

It was agreed that Americans should operate their own 
trains so far as possible, the same to be made up at the 
ports and run through unbroken to the American inland 
terminal points. Wherever it was possible, no American 
trains were handled in French yards, as these were 
already congested and could not take care of additional 
traffic. 

Freight runs were, therefore, made on the main line 
from Montoir to Saumur, from Saumur to Gievres, from 
Gievres to Marcy, and from Marcy to Is-sur-Tille, thereby 
obviating the use of the French yards at Angers, St. 
Pierre des Corps (Tours), Vierzon, Never s and Dijon. 

Although this kept French yards from being further 
congested, some difficulty arose by reason of the fact 
that the runs of the French pilots, one of whom was on 
every American train as conductor, did not coincide with 
the regular French train runs. The lack of through com- 
munications from the American yards to French yards, 
added other complications and it was frequently difficult 
to arrange for '' marches " for American trains after 
they were made up in American yards. 

The chief difference between the American and French 
railway operation was that of centralized control in the 
case of Americans and local control in the case of the 
French. 

Before an international system of train working 
could be put on a satisfactory basis, it was seen that a 
new method of communication would have to be estab- 
lished over our lines, as the French system of telegraph 
and telephone, running only from station to station, could 



AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 83 

not meet tlie needs of the American service. A selector 
telephone system was, therefore, installed from St. 
Nazaire to Is-sur-Tille, from Bourges to St. Florentin 
and Liffol-le- Grand, and from Bordeaux to Bourges and 
Vierzon. The line was cut at each division terminal so 
that operation of trains over any given division was 
under the control of a Chief Train Dispatcher at that 
point. In addition to the selector telephones, tele- 
graphic communication was also established on all lines 
over which American trains were operated. This 
telephone-telegraph service proved efficacious, and, in 
fact, better communication was afforded on the lines oper- 
ated by the Transportation Corps in France than on 
many good railways in the United States. 

The French Chef de Gare or Station Master has abso- 
lute control over the movement of all trains through his 
station, and no train is permitted to depart without his 
consent. The Chefs de Gare are, therefore, a series of 
independent train control authorities, each one supreme 
in his own territory with no superior authority 
corresponding to the American train dispatcher. 
The trains are run on a series of schedules or 
" marches,'^ beginning at one minute after midnight. 
The *' marches " of trains in the direction of Paris are 
even numbered, those in the opposite direction odd num- 
bered, and are arbitrarily spaced twenty minutes apart 
throughout the entire twenty-four hours. Therefore, on 
a double-track railway seventy-two trains per day in 
each direction is the limit of the traffic that can be 
handled. As a matter of actual practise, this limit is 
never reached on account of road delays, terminal con- 
gestions, etc. 

On French railways all runs for trains and engine 
crews are turn-around runs, the crew starting from its 
home terminal and returning at the end of the day. The 
system of putting crews on rest at an outlying point, 



84 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

common in American practise, is entirely unknown in 
France. Trains are blocked from station to station, 
all signals being under manual control, and with tbe 
exception of certain distant signals, no permissive sig- 
nals exist. 

The French rolling stock is very light and air-brake 
equipment on freight cars was almost unlmown before 
the advent of American-constructed cars. The average 
French car has a capacity of about ten tons, while the 
American cars used in France had a capacity of thirty 
tons. 

The French locomotives are of good design and con- 
struction, well adapted to the needs of that country under 
ordinary conditions. They are lighter than the locomo- 
tives generally used in the United States. In France a 
higher average speed is maintained and shorter and 
lighter trains are hauled than on American railways. 

On account of the ordinary French freight cars being 
entirely without air brakes and that a great many of 
them were not even equipped with hand brakes, it was 
necessary to place a certain number of brake cars in each 
freight train, the number varying on the different rail- 
ways according to the gradients and the length of trains 
hauled. 

Owing to a fairly even balance of traffic in pre-war 
days, no central system of car distribution had been 
found to be necessary, the Chefs de Gare generally hav- 
ing enough empty cars at their stations to take care of 
local needs. If not enough cars were available, request 
was made on the nearest divisional terminal for the 
required number. The same lack of central coordination 
existed in respect to the distribution of locomotives, and 
no definite system was in force for the balancing of 
motive power along the lines. Such matters were left to 
the station masters. 

It was believed that American trains could be 



AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 85 

rnn more safely and more !economically if oper- 
ated with air brakes, but tbis was forbidden by 
French operating practise. However, as a result 
of a conference with the French railway officials 
and representatives of the Fourth Bureau of the French 
"War Department, it was agreed that a test train should 
be run. Air brakes were used throughout and as a result 
the French operating representatives were convinced 
that the plan was entirely feasible. A second 1;est train 
was run on another part of the railways assigned to 
American use, and it also was convincing to the French 
officials. In compliance with their recommendations, the 
Minister of Public Works issued an order authorizing 
the operation of American, trains with air brakes over 
any portion of the American lines of communication. 

In case that the American trains were made up partly 
of American and partly of French equipment, it was 
agreed that where such combining of equipment occurred, 
the French cars were to be placed behind the American. 

Another point which involved extended discussion was 
that of tonnage rating, the French officials claiming that 
the American tonnage ratings were much too high, and 
that we would not be able to accomplish what had been 
planned. A thorough survey of the lines was made, and 
it was found that the French in computing their tonnage 
ratings used a greater margin of safety than is common 
in American practise, and that in the main their ratings 
more nearly approximated the facts than our own. 
American trains were limited to a length of not exceeding 
500 meters, including the locomotive, but this limitation 
was not due to the type of motive power used, but to the 
length of passing sidings on the French railways. 

Many of these questions might easily have led to seri- 
ous differences. That they were all adjusted was due to 
the ^act, courtesy and accommodating character of the 
French officials. 



86 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Until some time after the signing of the armistice the 
actual operations of troop trains were conducted almost 
Entirely by the French, although in some cases American 
equipment and American crews were used. The troop 
trains, however, were run between French terminals and 
not between American terminals, as was the case with 
freight trains. 

One of the most serious problems in the transportation 
of troops was t"he prevention of personal injury. The acci- 
dent ratio among troops travelling over American lines of 
communication was very high. During the warm weather 
the temptation was great for soldiers to get out of the 
cars in which they were crowded and to ride between 
them or on top, or to sit in the doors of box cars, with 
their heads and legs projecting. The clearance between 
cars and bridges and tunnels on the French railways is 
considerably less than similar clearances in the United 
States. To attempt to lessen the consequent frequent 
occurrence of accidents, an active campaign was started 
by the Transportation Service in the shape of posters 
and warning notices which were distributed among the 
troops at points of entrainment. But the average 
American was incorrigible, apparently it is only death 
that stops him. In spite of all warnings, notices and 
orders, in spite even of the many fatal accidents, it was 
impossible to prevent the practice. The men would take 
the chance. 

For the transportation of sick and wounded, the 
Transportation Department ordered ambulance trains 
to be built in England after the standard British plans. 
Nineteen such trains with a total of 304 cars 
were delivered, and twenty-nine more trains were 
under construction or ordered when the war ended. 
These trains were composed of cars with two tiers of 
iron beds very comfortably arranged, a car divided 
into an operating room and dispensary, kitchen and din- 



AMERICAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS 87. 

ing car, and cars for all kinds of supplies and quarters 
for doctors, nurses and attendants. Wlien war broke out 
in 1914, there were no such trains in existence and 
arrangements had to be improvised out of any cars at 
hand. The British trains were models of completeness, 
comfort and general excellence of design. 

A distinctive feature of the railway organization in 
France was the establishment of the Railway Transport 
Officer or R. T. 0. Service. This system was patterned 
after the one in use in the British army where speciallj'j 
trained officers, '' R. T. O.'s " were placed at the more 
important freight and passenger stations to keep watch 
on freight movements and to aid other officers and men 
when travelling. The difference in language made it 
very difficult for the travelers to get information regard- 
ing train schedules and the handling of baggage and 
freight. The Transport Officers were installed both 
with the view to assist them, and incidentally to relieve 
the French from the burden of dealing with a great num- 
ber of passengers unfamiliar with the language and 
customs of France. 

Effort was made to secure for this purpose officers 
who had had railway experience and who, whenever pos- 
sible, possessed some knowledge of the French language. 
Such officers as it was possible to select were sent to a 
school where they were instructed in French railway 
methods and the manner in which shipment of troops and 
freight was made. There was a total of about 220 of 
these officers stationed at the more important stations 
and terminals. The Railway Transport Officers were not 
confined to the main lines of communication, but were to 
be found all over France in leave areas or at important 
junctions, and even in England and Italy. If an 
'' R. T. 0." was efficient and possessed tact with patience, 
he was an important member of the army and a very 
helpful friend to his fellow-soldiers. ^ 



CHAPTER Vin 

STORAGE YARDS AND OTHER RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION 

Ports were needed for the landing of men and supplies, 
and railways were needed for their transportation, but 
all the ports and all the railways would have been worth- 
less if provision had not also been made for the housing 
of the men and the storage of materials. The men were 
not difficult to handle, although barracks with a floor area 
of 250 acres had to be erected. Men can go almost any- 
where and take care of themselves. They soon learned 
that they would not see again, until their return to the 
United States, anything approaching in completeness and 
comfort the camps they occupied during their period of 
training at home, and ceased complaining of hardships. 
It was the mass of inanimate objects of all sizes, shapes, 
weight and composition that caused official concern. 
This dead freight had to be cared for, and carefully, from 
the moment of discharge from ship until that of actual 
consumption. 

At the outset the Commander-in-Chief laid down the 
rule that sufficient supplies of all kinds to maintain the 
army for ninety days must be kept on hand. He sug- 
gested that this quantity might be distributed among 
three points. Following this suggestion it was decided 
that supplies enough for forty-five days were to remain 
at a base storage, for thirty days at some intermediate 
point, and for fifteen days in the advanced area. 

Storage facilities for army supplies were of three 
classes. The first was open storage, where imperishable 
articles such as pipe, pig metal, coal, lumber, etc., could 
be kept, which required but the necessary area of land 
with convenient tracks to permit cars to be unloaded and 



STOEAGE YAEDS — CONSTEUCTION 89 

again loaded. Tlie second was also open, but tarpaulin 
covers were used to protect such articles as hay, canned 
goods, small arms in boxes, and ammunition. The third 
was covered storage as afforded by buildings for the 
various things that exposure to dampness would injure. 
It is the last which caused most worry, for both forms of 
open storage were easily and quickly arranged. 

It was at first estimated that to house ninety days* 
supply per man there would be required an average of 
twenty-one square feet of covered floor area. As the 
storage building unit was fixed at a width of fifty feet, 
this average meant that, when an army of 4,000,000 men 
were in France, warehouses would be needed equivalent 
to one building thirty-two miles long. Fortunately, this 
estimate was proved to be unnecessarily generous, as it 
was found that more and more goods could be kept quite 
safely under the sole and simple protection of a tarpaulin. 
In consequence, the lesser standard of ten square feet of 
covered storage area per man was adopted. But the 
demand for men was so great following the German 
offensives of the spring of 1918 that all available vessel 
space was given to troops at the expense of supplies, so 
that a sufficiency to carry the army for ninety days was 
never on hand. During 1918 the minimum was enough 
for twenty-three days during January, and the maximum 
for seventy- two days during June, when new ships of the 
emergency fleet began to become effective. There was an 
average of fifty days ' supply from January to November. 
In the meanwhile the requirement to hold a minimum of 
ninety days* supply had been reduced to forty-five days. 

There was a tremendous number of storage places 
located, literally speaking, all over France. There were, 
first, the warehouses and open storage spaces forming a 
part of the wharf construction, where the cargoes were 
housed or placed when discharged from the steamers 
and while waiting transhipment to interior points. It was 



90 :A.MERICAN ENGINEEES in FRANCE 

too slow a process and one involving too mucli delay in 
freeing vessels to transfer directly from ship to car as a 
regular proceeding. 

Next in order came the base depots, huge affairs cov- 
ering, as will be seen presently, areas whose boundaries 
could be stated in miles. These depots were located as 
close as could be arranged to the ports that they served, 
and to them were taken the supplies from the wharves 
and wharf warehouses as fast as they could be handled. 
This prevented congestion on the wharves. At the base 
depots the supplies were sorted systematically, similar 
kinds of articles being put by themselves. Ships' cargoes 
were often badly mixed in loading, so that sorting and 
segregation were necessary after discharge in France. 

The base depots were the main reservoirs. They were 
too far from the front to be relied on for quick service 
in case of emergency. Intermediate depots were, there- 
fore, constructed, about midway between the coast and 
the front, which rivalled in size some of the base depots 
and where enough supplies could be stored, either under 
or without roof, to carry the combatant army for, per- 
haps, twenty days. Such a figure is stated in general 
terms. Of some classes of articles there was usually a 
generous surplus, while of others there was always a 
shortage, but of such supplies as there were on hand, 
a successful effort was made to keep a substantial amount 
at the intermediate depots. 

The intermediate depots were located in the interior of 
France, away from the coast and frontier, beyond the 
congested districts next to the seaports, where serious 
train delays were frequent, delays that frequently and 
seriously interrupted a steady forward delivery. On the 
other hand, they were sufficiently far back from the fight- 
ing front so as not to be exposed to easy airplane 
attack or be threatened by an enemy advance, and yet 
sufficiently near to the front that supplies might be sent 



STOEAGE YARDS — CONSTRUCTION 91 

to the army zone by motor truck in case of urgent call, 
which sometimes happened. 

Next to the intermediate depots, and third in the chain, 
came the regulating stations, where shipments were 
received in train loads from either the base or the inter- 
mediate depots. The regulating stations, while extensive, 
were simple when compared with the other depots. 
They consisted of yard tracks where cars of incoming 
trains could be sorted according to ultimate destina- 
tion. Covered and open storage facilities were provided 
where supplies could be held if the forward depots or 
*' dumps " were full. The regulating stations were in 
the advanced area and, though perhaps beyond the 
reach of shells, were nevertheless likely to be bombed. 
It was, therefore, not desirable to hold at such points 
more supplies than necessary to furnish a small balanc- 
ing reservoir. 

Beyond the regulating stations were the advanced 
or army dumps at the rail-heads where the minimum 
amount of supplies was stored. There were, therefore, 
four steps in the progress of materials from the coast to 
the front trench. It was not necessary that every article 
should pass through each deiDot. The base and interme- 
diate depots were nothing but huge reservoirs holding 
the surplus. If there was a demand at the front for cer- 
tain, articles, shipments could be made direct from the 
wharves to the nearest regulating stations, cutting out 
the base and intermediate depots entirely, or a draught 
might be made on either one of the last two. 

There are neither words nor statistics that will enable 
one to see in his mind's eye one of these great depots. 
"When the units of measure are hundreds of miles for the 
railway tracks, acres for the floor area of buildings, and 
square miles for the extend of land, it is quite impossible 
to picture the scene, with the puffing locomotives, long 
strings of loaded freight cars, piles of every imaginable 



92 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

kind of merchandise and the operating force in uniform 
under military discipline. There is no single railway- 
terminal in the United States that equals in capacity 
for the handling and storage of goods, any one of several 
of the American army depots in France. 

The interlocked system of port, base and intermediate 
depots, with the regulating stations, forward dumps and 
their various component parts, was not a single creation. 
It represented the joint action of many boards of engi- 
neers. In fact, not only had the end not been reached 
but plans for still further increases were being consid- 
ered when the cessation of hostilities in November, 1918, 
put an end to all development. 

The first step in the matter of storage yards was taken 
by the French early in the summer of 1917, prior to the 
organization of the Transportation Department, by Jfix- 
ing on the site for the yard of a regulating station at the 
junction of the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee and the Est 
Railways near Is-sur-Tille, in the department of Cote 
d'Or, about sixteen miles north of Dijon. They made 
this selection as giving the best location for a regulating 
station, assuming that the American sector would be in 
the neighborhood of Toul, which it finally was. 

The French engineers prepared plans for the depot 
and submitted them to the American Chief Engineer in 
August, 1917. The French plans were not suitable for 
American methods of operation and had to be completely 
revised by the Transportation Department. The Ameri- 
can plans, work on which was begun in the autumn of 
1917, contemplated the occupation of 840 acres with 
ninety-five miles of tracks, sixty warehouses providing 
1,847,000 square feet of storage area, and open storage 
amounting to more than 5,000,000 square feet or 125 
acres, nearly all of which was finished and put in use. 

In August, 1917, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Engineers were in France. They provided a 



STORAGE YARDS — CONSTRUCTION 93 

skilled force capable of investigating, planning and exe- 
cuting on a large scale. Concurrently with making deci- 
sions as to the use of existing ports and the creating of 
new ones, determination as to the location of certain 
main depots was reached and their construction put in 
hand. While that worli was in progress, studies were 
continued as to other projects. The sites selected for 
immediate occupation were St. Sulpice and Montoir as 
base depots for the several landing places in the vicinity; 
of Bordeaux and St. Nazaire respectively, and Gievres 
as an intermediate depot. 

St. Sulpice is located about nine miles east of Bassens. 
The site was acquired in 1917, the French Government 
using its powers of expropriation to secure the land 
either by lease or purchase. Such cooperation on the 
part of the French Government was, of course, always 
forthcoming. Plans were at once adopted contemplating 
147 miles of track, 144 warehouses with a covered storage 
area of 2,263,000 square feet and open storage amounting 
to nearly 7,000,000 square feet. This layout had a length 
of about two and one-half miles, covering approximately 
850 acres. By November, 1918, more than the originally 
contemplated covered storage area facilities had been 
constructed, with ninety-one miles of track and approxi- 
mately one-half of the open storage area put in use. 
St. Sulpice itself was reinforced by the extensive ware- 
houses along the wharves of Bassens, where much mate- 
rial could be held pending its shipment to the main base 
depot. 

After extended and intensive study of the whole ques- 
tion of the most efficient development of the estuary of 
the Loire River, it was finally decided to place the base 
storage depot at Montoir, on the north bank of the river. 
This was a convenient location to serve both St. Nazaire 
and also the new wharves which it was proposed to build 
adjacent to Montoir. The plans finally developed for the 



94 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Montoir depot provided for 236 miles of track, 180 ware- 
houses with 4,125,000 square feet and approximately 
10,000,000 square feet of open storage. The construction 
of this yard was continued until the signing of the armis- 
tice, when considerably more than one-half of the original 
plan had been completed. The ground covered by the 
Montoir development was about two and one-half miles 
long and had an area of 1,200 acres. 

Ranking in importance with St. Sulpice and Montoir 
were the two intermediate depots at Gievres and Montier- 
chaume. The first site selected for a main intermediate 
depot was Gievres in the department of Loir et Cher, a 
point on the Paris-Orleans Railway, east of Tours and 
south of Orleans. The reasons for the selection of 
Gievres were : Firstly, it was located in a broad sandy 
plain where there was but a small local population to 
inconvenience and the maximum of topographical facility 
for extended construction was afforded ; secondly, it was 
reached by direct rail communication, 208 miles long 
from St. Nazaire, which had been decided upon as the 
first point of arrival for American freight. No less than 
2,600 acres of land were obtained in August, 1917, and 
a plan adopted contemplating 264 miles of track, 195 
warehouses, aggregating 4,410,000 square feet of covered 
storage and 10,370,000 square feet of open storage, mak- 
ing it the largest depot of the American Expeditionary 
Force in France. By the autumn of 1918 one-half of the 
track mileage had been completed and about 3,600,000 
square feet of the covered storage, and 6,000,000 square 
feet of the open storage put into service. This work at 
Gievres was begun by the Fifteenth Engineers, the first 
of the original regiments to arrive in France, who made 
all the preliminary surveys and plans. 

Gievres was conveniently located, with direct com- 
munication with the ports on the Loire River 
and also with Brest. It was necessary, however,^ 



STOEAGE YAEDS -^ CONSTRUCTION 95 

that a complementary; depot should be constructed witK 
similar direct-rail communication with Bordeaux 
and the ports south of St. Nazaire. For this 
purpose a site was chosen in August, 1917, at Montier- 
chaume, near the city of Chateauroux, in the depart- 
ment of Indre, thirty-five miles south of Gievres and 
227 miles from Bassens. The plans for Montierchaumei, 
were drawn on a scale quite similar to those at Gievres, 
as it was contemplated to have these two depots of the 
same size. At these depots were to be stored all supplies 
for the departments of engineers, quarteiTaaster, sig- 
nals, etc., except ammunition. There was some delay in 
getting the work at Montierchaume started. In fact, it 
was not begun until March, 1918, so that it never reached 
the size of Gievres, but it would have done so had the 
war continued. Provision for the ammunition which was 
not handled at Gievres and Montierchaume, on account of 
the danger of explosion or fire, was made by construct- 
ing two yards to hold nothing but ammunition at Mehun, 
a few miles east of Gievres and on the same line of rail- 
way, and at Issoudun, similarly located with respect to 
Montierchaume. 

The general principle on which the storage depots were 
laid out was to have the large base depots at St. Sulpice 
and Montoir serving the groups of ports on the Gironde 
and Loire Rivers, and the intermediate depots at Mon- 
tierchaume and Gievres as the next advanced storage for 
these groups of ports respectively. But as other ports 
were turned over by the French or British for American 
use, other storage depots had to be constructed which, 
though individually small as compared with the huge 
installations already described, were nevertheless far 
from being insignificant. Especially was this the case 
since by far the greater part of this extensive and expen- 
sive construction was for temporary use only and had 
little prospect of future permanent value. 



06 1A.MEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FEANCE 

A small base depol was erected at Aigrefeuille, near 
La Pallice which, however, was not decided on until May, 
1918, with an initial installment of twenty-three miles of 
track, a covered storage area of 204,000 square feet and 
an open storage of 430,000 square feet, the whole cover- 
ing about 300 acres. Only a small proportion of this 
work was completed when the orders for cancellation 
came following the cessation of hostilities. 

."When it was decided that Marseille should be used as 
a port of embarkation, it became necessary to locate a 
storage depot at that point. A site was selected at 
Mirimas, at the junction of the two double-track lines of 
the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee railway, thirty-three milea 
west from Marseille, there being no point nearer to Mar- 
seille than this on account of the rugged topography of 
the country. The plans for Mirimas contemplated 108 
miles of track, 120 warehouses with a total of 2,500,000 
square feet of covered space and 12,000,000 square feet 
of open storage, the whole yard covering more than 
1,000 acres. Had the war continued and Mirimas been 
completed, it would obviously have ranked in size with 
the two large yards at Montoir and St. Sulpice, but only 
a small portion of the work had been finished when the 
war came to an end. 

Similar preparations for a large storage yard near 
Brest had been located at Pleyber Christ, thirty-two 
miles away, nothing nearer being available for the same 
reasons which prevailed at Marseilles. This develop- 
ment, on which no work was started, contemplated thirty- 
two miles of track, thirty-six warehouses, 816,000 square 
feet of covered storage and 2,000,000 square feet of open 
storage area. A small storage yard had also been built 
at St. Luce near Nantes. 

Large and capacious as was the forward storage area 
and regulating station at Is-sur-Tille, the engineers of 
the Transportation Corps recognized that it would not be 
ultimately sufficient. 



STOEAGE YAEDS — CONSTEUCTION 97 

A second site was chosen at Liffol-le-Grand, located 
in the department of the Vosges, with similar railway- 
connections as at Is-sur-Tille, although it was some miles 
further to the east. Plans for Liffol-le-Grand had been 
prepared by the French. These were completely revised 
by the American engineers who drew new plans provid- 
ing for seventy-two miles of track with 400,000 square 
feet of covered storage and 1,200,000 square feet of open 
storage. "Work at Liffol-le-Grand was begun in April, 
1918, and practically the whole of both the covered and 
open storage had been prepared in time for the American 
offensives of St. Mihiel and the Argonne. Both the yards 
at Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand were connected with 
the large railway yards and storehouses at St. Dizier, a 
French regulating station, which became a base yard for 
American occupation and use during the Argonne attack. 
The total covered storage constructed by the A. E. F. in 
France and exclusive of more than 1,000 acres of open 
storage amounted to the following: 

Depot Storage: 

Gievres 3,839,000 sq. ft. 

St. Sulpice 2,627,000 sq. ft. 

Montoir 3,447,000 sq. ft. 

Montierchaume . . . 1,214,000 sq. ft. 

Is-sur-Tille 1,355,000 sq. ft. 

Other depots 3,047,000 sq. ft. 15,529,000 sq. ft. 

Dock Storage 3,028,000 sq. ft. 

Miscellaneous Storage 3,958,000 sq. ft. 

Total 22,415,000 sq. ft. 

From various types of construction, including even 
buildings with steel frames manufactured and sent from 
the United States, the type that was finally adopted as the 
standard, after some experimenting, which was quite suf- 



98 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

ficent for practical purposes, provided for a building 300 
feet long, fifty feet wide. The frame was composed of 
round posts four to a bent, the bents being about fifteen 
feet apart. The roof trusses were made of six by one 
inch boards, the roof and ends were covered with corru- 
gated iron and the sides were left either open or were 
covered with canvas. These buildings were erected very 
quickly, in fact, there is a record of one having been 
put up complete by sixty-one men in eight and one-half 
hours. There was no wooden flooring except in buildings 
where supplies were kept that were readily vulnerable 
to injury by moisture, such as salt, sugar, and flour. 

The greatest part of railway construction done by 
American forces in France was in connection with the 
various storage depots. As a general thing, the main 
lines of the French railways were capable of handling 
all the tonnage that was offered, especially after the 
intensive American methods of operation had been intro- 
duced. It was, however, necessary, in addition to build- 
ing the storage yards, to increase the local facilities such 
as constructing additional side tracks and engine termi- 
nals, and to relieve points of congestion by new main 
tracks. Of the last, the most important was near Nevers. 
At this place there was a junction of east and west and 
north and south railways, fixing a moderate limit to the 
amount of freight that could be sent through. Inasmuch 
as the east and west line was to become one of the main 
lines of the American service, it was decided to build a 
new short double-track railway passing to the south of 
the city of Nevers, and avoiding the junction congestion. 
This was the most ambitious piece of railway construc- 
tion undertaken, involving as it did, 162,000 yards of 
excavation, 428,000 yards of embankment, a large bridge 
and trestle 1,400 feet in length crossing the Loire Eiver 
and Canal, and an overhead bridge crossing the Paris- 
Lyon-Mediterranee Eailway. The whole project was 



STORAGE YARDS — CONSTRUCTION 99 

five and one-half miles in length, effecting a saving of 
SS miles in operation and an elimination of junction 
delays. 

There was considerable talk in American papers that 
the Amercan engineers were constructing a four-track 
railway across France. Fortunately, because the engi- 
neers had quite enough to do without undertaking unnec- 
essary work, the only justification for this rumor was the 
doubling of an existing double-track line over a distance 
of about four miles just east of Bourges. At this place, 
there was a convergence of the tracks from Bordeaux 
and St. Nazaire. It would have been impossible to carry 
the tonnage over the one double-track line for the short 
distance to the place of divergence. This work of adding 
two more tracks to the existing two tracks was under- 
taken and completed by November, 1918. 

Other main running tracks were built in connection 
with the various base and intermediate storage depots in 
order to give access to the existing French lines. Engine 
terminals solely for the use of American operation were 
built at Montoir, Saumur, Gievres, Cercy-la-Tour, Is-sur- 
Tille, Liffol-le-Grand and on the main line running out 
from Bordeaux at Perigeux and Montierchaume. All 
these engine terminals were finished and placed in 
operation. 

The Transportation Department also undertook, in 
case the war should continue, a study of how the carrying 
capacity of the entire French railway system might be 
still further increased so far as it affected American 
plans. This study included the preparation of tonnage 
and density charts, an examination of possible routings, 
of desirable locations for new yards, regulating stations 
and other facilities. Studies were also made of the 
routes and possibilities of further development of the 
French canal system, and of railroad lines to be used and 
facilities to be required in the event of the possible 



100 AMEEICAN ENGINEEKS IN FEANCE 

advance of the American army to the Ehine. The total 
length of the standard gauge lines including yard tracks 
constructed by American engineers in France amounted 
to about 1,000 miles. 

The carrying out of these projects, involving as they 
did, modifications of the French railway system and of 
certain radical changes in their methods of operation, 
produced at times long and tedious negotiations. 

The plans of each project, after having been designed 
and authorized by the proper authorities of the American 
army, were submitted to the French government. The 
French railways were under the general jurisdiction of 
the Minister of War, who acted through the Minister of 
Public Works and gave final approval on all such mat- 
ters. The latter Minister was assisted in this work at 
first by a bureau designated as the Fourth Bureau of the 
Ministry of War, later by a board called the Franco- 
American Special Service. After the plans reached the 
hands of the Minister of Public Works they were sub- 
mitted by him for approval to the French railway com- 
pany directly concerned. Because of the wide difference 
in operating methods and inlierited traditions, the plans 
were seldom accepted as designed and counter proposi- 
tions were usually presented. To eliminate red tape and 
minimize delay, the Minister of Public Works finally 
directed the American Director General of Transporta- 
tion to submit designs for new work to the particular 
railway company interested and, after having secured 
the approval of the officers of that company, to submit 
the design formally to the French government and the 
American General Staff. The approval of the French 
government, when secured, carried with it the right of 
acquisition of the necessary land and conveyed authority 
under which the work was to be undertaken. The 
approval also contained a clause as proposed by the 
American Director General of Transportation that '* in 



STORAGE YARDS — CONSTRUCTION 101 

the event of any or all of tliese facilities being retained 
by the French government, railway or service after it has 
served the purpose of the American army credit should 
be given the American army for the work performed and 
materials furnished." 

In many cases the French railways or the marine serv- 
ice deemed it necessary that additions to existing facili- 
ties or entirely new facilities should be constructed on 
account of the extra burden imposed on them by reason 
of the American traffic. In such cases, where the plans 
were prepared by the French, they were sent through 
the Minister of Public Works to the Director General of 
Transportation for acceptance. 

Naturally, with ideas originating from so many 
sources, French as well as American, government officials 
and railway managers who had been trained along lines 
based on absolutely opposed hypotheses there developed 
what at first seemed to be irreconcilable difficulties. But, 
as is nearly always the case when men are imbued with a 
determination to find a working solution, the impossible 
was gradually resolved into the possible, differences 
were adjusted, difficulties were minimized, and official 
machinery made to run smoothly. Credit for this is 
largely due to the broad-minded force of Albert Claveille, 
Minister of Public Works. When hostilities ceased plans 
covering no fewer than 316 different projects had been 
approved. The total extent of French railway wholly or 
partly used by the American army exceeded 5,000 miles. 



.CHAPTER IX 

AMERICAN" LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS 

Altliougli many American methods of railway opera- 
tion were introduced in France, it is very doubtful 
whether any one of them has secured a permanent rest- 
ing place so as to be recognizable hereafter. There may 
be here and there a slight modification of French methods 
but it is hardly likely that there will remain any visible 
effect of American influence. French methods are well 
adapted to local conditions and to the national tempera- 
ment, and probably will not undergo much change as a 
result of the war. French railway rolling stock on the 
other hand is much more likely to show hereafter modi- 
fications in its design. So many locomotives and freight 
cars of the standard American type and manufacture 
were sent to France, and have been left there for French 
use, that it seems impossible that the French design of 
their own similar rolling stock should escape from being 
considerably influenced. It is hardly conceivable that 
French railway officials, who are exceedingly intelligent 
and progressive, will return to the exclusive use of their 
old models when they have become acquainted with loco- 
motives whose mechanical details are simpler than theirs, 
with larger freight cars, with cars on bogie trucks 
equipped with air brakes, and with the economical advan- 
tages presented thereby. 

Of the nine original regiments, there was but one, the 
Nineteenth Engineers, that was recruited entirely from 
the mechanical crafts and intended for the sole purpose 
of repairing locomotives and cars. Although this regi- 
ment was formed, as the others were, on the basis of two 

102 



AMEEICAN LOCOMOTIVES AND CAKS 103 

battalions of three companies each, it was later expanded 
to a regiment of fourteen companies, distributed among 
five battalions, and comprised about 3,600 men. On its 
arrival in France it was confronted with the situation as 
previously described, namely, a shortage of equipment 
and the existing equipment, such as it was, in bad repair. 

It was intended that the new large shops of the 
P-L-M Kailway at Nevers in course of construction when 
the war broke out in August, 1914, and never completed, 
should be used as the main place where American rolling 
stock should be repaired. But the great buildings were 
not entirely under roof, and the special heavy machine 
tools necessary for work on locomotives were not in 
existence in France. Consequently the six companies of 
the regiment were distributed between as many different 
and widely scattered places, while work on furnishing the 
structure of the Nevers shops and equipping them was 
ordered to be rushed. 

The company of the Nineteenth Engineers located at 
St. Nazaire was engaged in erecting American locomo- 
tives as they were discharged from ship. The remainder 
of the regiment was assigned to overhauling French roll- 
ing stock, and the whole of the Thirty-fifth Engineers 
was detailed to the erection of cars as fast as they were 
unloaded from the ships. Practically all such car erect- 
ing was done by this latter regiment. 

The companies assigned to work in the French railway 
shops were under the control of the French military 
authorities. As might have been expected, these men 
were greatly embarrassed at first by their lack of knowl- 
edge of the French language. The men were strangers 
to French equipment and tools, and especially to French 
methods of working, which to the average American 
mechanic were often incomprehensible. All this naturally 
engendered a lack of confidence in the Americans on the. 



104 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

part of tlie Frencli, who for some time would not trust 
the Americans to proceed with their work without having 
a Frenchman constantly at their side to supervise their 
most simple tasks. This lack of confidence was not 
shared in the least by the higher officials of the railways 
who, without exception, were appreciative of and grate- 
ful for the assistance rendered. As time went on, the 
obvious benefit of allowing the Americans to work by 
themselves and follow their own methods became appar- 
ent to the French, who directed that thereafter the 
Americans should be organized into separate gangs in 
the various departments under their own leaders, a step 
that was followed immediately by a marked increase in 
efficiency. 

During the latter part of 1917, it was clearly evident 
to all concerned that the French equipment had deteri- 
orated to such an extent that unless large forces of men 
were assigned to repairing their locomotives and cars 
without delay, serious difficulty would be encountered 
in handling the railway traffic, with a resultant bad 
effect on the general situation. A hurry call, at the 
request of the French, for locomotive and car repair men 
was cabled to the United States. The answer was a total 
of 2,645 men who were distributed among fifteen different 
railway repair shops under French charge in all parts 
of France. 

By the spring of 1918 the main shops at Nevers were 
nearly completed and the Nineteenth Engineers were so 
expanded in size as to man them and the other shops as 
well. On June 21st the first locomotive was taken in for 
repairs and by August the shops were in full operation. 
By this time "even the enlarged regiment was insufficient 
to do all the work, and other units, chiefly the Forty- 
ninth and Fiftieth Engineers, were placed under the 
orders of the General Superintendent of Motive Power, 



AMEKICAN LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS 105 

The locomotive shops at Nevers comprised the follow- 
ing buildings : 

Erecting, machine and boiler shops 350 ft. x 350 ft. 

Smith shop 330 ft. x 70 ft. 

Wheel shop 300 ft. x 80 ft. 

Paint shop 130 ft. x 75 ft. 

Foundry (temporary construction) 50 ft. x 30 ft. 

Storehouse 175 ft.x 30 ft. 

Offices (three stories) 90ft.x 35ft. 

In addition to the above, there were : a refectory, ninety- 
feet by thirty-five feet (intended for use of French work- 
men but used by the American troops as a Y. M. C. A. 
hut and later as an Officers' Club) ; a hospital or first 
aid room, fifty feet by thirty-five feet (used by representa- 
tives of the French railways) ; (^ne single and two double 
houses (used as Officers' quarters) ; apprentice school 
(used as a power plant) ; an electrical shop and several 
minor buildings. 

The main building contained : two erecting bays, each 
iequipped with two sixty-five-ton cranes and two ten-ton 
cranes; three machine shop bays, the center one being 
equipped with a fifteen-ton crane ; and three boiler shop 
bays, the center one being equipped with two thirty-five- 
ton cranes. 

The locomotive shops' enclosure covered approxi- 
mately forty-five acres. 

The main building had been designed originally as a 
steel-frame structure, but the shortage of steel during 
the war compelled the French to redesign it to be made 
of reinforced concrete. As such they completed it, and 
produced a magnificent building. The French furnished 
a special water service from the Loire River, whence 
water was pumped into a concrete tank holding 100,000 
gallons. A complete and adequate sewer system was also 
installed. 



106 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

According to the first French plans, power for operat- 
ing the machine tools and cranes was to come from an 
electrical installation to be established at Garchizy, four 
and a half miles distant. The substation at the shops, 
where the current at 15,000 yolts would be received, was 
to be equipped completely, including wiring, switchboards, 
distributing panels, etc., by the Americans. Unfortunately 
the Garchizy plant was not completed so that current 
could be furnished until 1919. The American engineers 
immediately on their arrival ordered boilers and gener- 
ators to be sent from the United States, for a temporary 
steam plant. To furnish some power until the new 
apparatus should reach Nevers, they installed three 
100 kw. direct connected generator sets and three 100 
E. p. vertical boilers that were available in France. 

The necessity for providing a shop for the general 
repairs of American freight car equipment was apparent 
from the start. The advantage of locating such a shop 
at Nevers was manifest, not only on account of having 
it supported by a thoroughly equipped machine shop and 
a general storehouse, but because Nevers was the most 
central point on the lines of communication for the 
A. E. F. Property for this purpose was available just 
opposite the locomotive shops, and while it did not lend 
itself to the most desirable layout, it answered the pur- 
pose sufficiently well. 

As designed, this plant held 240 French or 140 Ameri- 
can cars under repairs at one time. Storage room was 
also provided for 259 American or 500 French cars. These 
storage tracks were spaced so as to permit their being 
utilized, if necessary, in whole or in part, for tracks on 
which cars might stand while undergoing repairs. 

A planing mill of sufficient capacity to handle the work 
of both the car and locomotive departments was installed 
at this plant, as was also a storehouse, a small machine 



AMEEICAN LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS 107 

and smith shop, and four work buildings. The car shop 
enclosure covered approximately twenty acres. 

This plant was finished September 6, 1918, and 
continued in operation until June 7, 1919, at which time 
it was turned over to the French. 

It is exceedingly interesting to record that 5,764 
French and American cars were repaired at the Nevers 
shops by American mechanics and returned to service. 

The American standard gauge locomotives were almost 
wholly of one type. In all 1,610 were erected in France 
by American mechanics, of which 1,333 were erected for 
American service and 277 for French. Of these, thirty 
were small saddle-tank engines for work in yards, with 
6,225 pounds tractive power ; ten were 150 h. p. gasoline 
engines ; and the balance, 1,570, were of the one pattern 
adopted as standard. 

The last, which were used as road or train Engines had 
a wheel arrangement described technically as 2-8-0, that 
is, one leading and four driving axles. Their main char- 
acteristics were: 

Cylinders — simple 21 in. x 28 in. 

Driving wheels — diameter 56 in. 

Weight, working order 166,400 lbs. 

Weight on leading truck 16,400 lbs. 

Weight on driving wheels 150,000 lbs. 

Tractive power 35,600 lbs. 

Boiler pressure 190 lbs. 

Wheel base, total 23 ft. 8 in. 

Wheel base, driving wheels 15 ft. 6 in. 

Tender capacity: 

Water 5,400 gallons 

Fuel 9 tons 

The locomotives were equipped with superheaters, air 
brakes and the regular French couplers. 

American-made cars were used exclusively for freight 
purposes. 19,975 were received in France up to March 



108 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

28, 1919, of wMcH 18,441 of tlie following fypes Had "Been 
erected : 

Box cars 8,003 

Flat cars 1,700 

Gondola cars, Mgli sides 2,858 

Gondola cars, low sides 3,893 

Tank cars 625 

Refrigerator cars 950 

Ballast cars 400 

Dump cars 12 

18,441 



Of the above, 17,866 were erected by the Thirty-fifth 
Engineers, principally at La Rochelle, the port of entry 
for such consignments, and the balance by the British 
at their shops at Andrnicq (Pas de Calais)'. 

These cars were designed in accordance with standard 
American practice except that they had the French type 
of couplers and buffers. The carrying capacity was 
60,000 pounds. The box cars weighed when empty 32,640 
pounds and the flat cars 26,500. The principal dimen- 
sions were : , 

Truck wheel base 5 ft. 6 in. 

Center to center of trucks 26 ft. 2% in. 

Length over end sills 36 ft. 2% in. 

Length overall 39 ft. 10 in. 

Width over side sills (boxes) 8 ft. S^/^q in. 

Width over side sills (flats) 8 ft. 514 in. 

Width overall (boxes) : 9 ft. 6 V^e in. 

Width overall (flats) 9 ft. 33/4 in. 

The extreme height from rail to the top of the French 
brakeman's hood on box cars was 13 feet 10% inches. 
All members of the underframes, and side frames of box 



AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS 109: 

cars, were of steel, the flooring of all cars and the siding 
of the box cars were of yellow pine. 

The work accomplished by American mechanics in the 
various repair shops was very great, amounting to : 

American locomotives set up 1,333 

French locomotives set up 277 

American cars set up 17,866 

American and French locomotives repaired 

(Nevers shop) 366 

American and French cars repaired (Nevers 

shop) 5,764 

French locomotives repaired (French shops) . . . 1,474 

French cars repaired (French shops) 52,850 



The above figures cover erection and heavy repairs 
only and do not include light repairs to rolling stock exe- 
cuted in the small machine shops at Montoir, Gievres, 
Cercy-la-Tour, Is-sur-Tille, Bassens, Perigeux, Chateau- 
roux and Liffol-le-Grand staffed by American engineers. 
The figures do not include the labor expended in erecting 
the machine tools and equipping the power plant for the 
Nevers shops, the setting up of sixty-seven steam shovels, 
pile drivers and locomotive cranes, the putting into com- 
mission of nineteen hospital trains received from the 
makers in England, and the shipping of more than 2,200 
car loads of material prepared for other departments. 
They are also exclusive of the work of erecting and 
repairing the rolling stock for the light railway system 
which was done in the shops of that department with its 
own independent force of engineers, as will be later 
explained in Chapter XXI. 

The supervising and controlling authority for all this 
work was vested in the General Superintendent of Motive 
Power, an officer under the General Manager, the latter 
being on the staff of the Director General of Transporta- 



110 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

tion. Tlie position was filled during tlie whole time by 
Colonel H. H. Maxfield, who went to France as second 
in command of the Nineteenth Engineers. In pre-war 
days, Colonel Maxfield held the position of Superintend- 
ent of Motive Power of the New Jersey Division of the 
Pennsylvania Eailroad. In January, 1918, he succeeded 
to the command of the regiment and exercised the double 
function of regimental commander and General Super- 
intendent of Motive Power. Under the latter authority 
he had jurisdiction over the work of three other regi- 
ments, the Thirty-fifth, Forty-ninth and Fiftieth, and 
some attached units. On the railway lines, the authority 
of the General Superintendent was transmitted through 
Superintendents of Motive Power, one of which was 
assigned to each of the nine Eailway Grand Divisions. 



CHAPTER X 

THE CAMBRAI OFFENSIVE 

The military situation when America entered the T^ar 
was far from satisfactory. 

On the western front the British and the French had, 
in the summer and autumn of 1916, conducted the cam- 
paign which is known as the battle' of the Somme, during 
which the Germans had been driven back to a line run- 
ning north and south through Peronne. There had been 
an Allied advance to an irregular depth varying up to 
seven or eight miles on a front of about twenty miles, a 
fine victory, but one purchased at terrific cost. In the lat- 
ter part of the winter of 1916-1917 the enemy voluntarily 
made an exceedingly brilliant retreat in this whole sec- 
tor between the river Scarpe, feast of Arras, to the river 
Oise near La Fere, a distance of about fifty miles, to the' 
carefully prepared position known as the Hindenburg 
iine. 

It was a clever move. The Germans gave up territory 
that was of no use to them, territory which as a matter 
of fact they retook, in a few days, in the great offensive 
beginning the 21st of March, 1918. In falling back they 
laid the country absolutely waste, every house was lev- 
eled, fevery railway and highway was destroyed. One of 
France's gardens had been changed into a desert wilder- 
ness. The Allies were thus forced to change their plans 
and to ■reconstruct from a military point of view the 
abandoned country before the advance could be resumed. 
In the meanwhile the Germans had securely entrenched 
themselves on ground of their own selection. On the 
eastern front Russia had collapsed, the Gallipoli cam- 
paign had been abandoned and the outlook in the Levant 
was dark. 

Ill 



112 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

In April, 1917, the French made an attack in force in 
the Champagne country, against the advice, it is said, of 
the military; chiefs, an attack that gave bnt little result 
except losses whose totals have never been made public. 
Discontent was growing. There were socialist strikes 
in Paris with the red badge of anarchy; openly 
displayed. The garrison forces of the capital 
were strengthened. In the north a series of 
isolated affairs was undertaken by the British 
whose chief value lay in strengthening the morale of the 
fighting forces and the gradual wasting of the enemy by 
attrition, yimy Eidge was carried by Canadian troops 
and a satisfactory advance made by the British forces 
east and northeast of Arras. In June Messines Ridge was 
taken, leading to the third battle of Ypres. In July a 
wide attack was begun in Flanders but, as had happened 
with nearly every allied effort in that year, it was accom- 
panied by heavy rains continuing for days which, in the 
level clay plains of the north, sufficed to bring that offen- 
sive or any other possible one to a standstilL Men and 
guns could not be moved in that sea of deep thick mud. 
During August and September the attack was resumed, 
resulting in the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge and 
much territory east of Ypres. But still no vital point had 
been reached, no serious break in the German lines was 
threatened. 

By this time the first contingent of American Engi- 
neers was in France. The Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Regiments had reached Aldershot in 
England, the first named arriving at the end of July. 
The Fifteenth and Sixteenth were on lines of communi- 
cation in central France, the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
had commenced the all important wharf construction at 
St. Nazaire and Bordeaux, while the Nineteenth was 
estabhshing itself to repair locomotives and cars. 

The Eleventh Engineers were ordered during the 



,THE CAMBRAI OFFENSIVE 113 

early days of August to join the Britisli forces in 
Flanders to construct, they were told, some main lines of 
communication which were necessary to facilitate an 
advance in prospect. But after being held for a week 
near the Belgian frontier, countermanding orders wero 
received and the regiment entrained for the Somme coun- 
try, where it was soon joined by the Twelfth and Four- 
teenth regiments. The latter two were assigned to th^ 
very useful *' light " railways which were the means of 
distributing ammunition and supplies beyond the points 
where standard gauge railways could not be maintained. 

It was not long before it became evident that some great 
new movement was in contemplation. After a few minor 
engagements following the German retirement to the 
Hindenburg line in February, the Somme front, the scene 
of such bloody warfare during the preceding autumn, 
had become a ^' quiet (?)" sector, with only an occa- 
sional raid — ''shows" the British Tommies called 
them — or an exchange of artillery compliments. The 
main activity was farther north. 

Southeast of Arras, northeast of Peronne, and distant 
about eight miles from the British lines was Cambrai, a 
city of nearly 30,000 population in pre-war days and a 
highly important railway and road center. It had been 
uninterruptedly in German hands since its first capture 
by them in September, 1914. Its recapture in connection 
with the gains further north in Flanders would seriously 
complicate the German position and might easily involve, 
as the Somme battle had, a further retirement during the 
coming winter to a new Hindenburg line. 

The battle which followed. General Pershing in his 
final report described as of '' special interest, since it 
:was here that American troops (Eleventh Engineers) 
first participated in active fighting." 

To the American engineers was assigned the task of 
preparing the lines of railway communication to receive 



114 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the increased traffic that was soon to be thrown upon 
them, of constructing new lines of communication so as 
to be able to satisfy the voracious hunger of the new bat- 
teries about to be installed, of repairing abandoned main 
lines so that they might be reconstituted if an advance 
were secured, and what was a new experience, unloading 
and putting in position great fleets of tanks. 

Much of this work lay in advance of the British guns, 
between them and the British trenches and at times in 
plain sight from the German lines. Under such condi- 
tions men worked only in small scattered parties to avoid 
notice, or in large forces at night and during foggy 
weather, times of *' low visibility.'* New excavation 
was immediately covered with boughs or with camouflage 
so that it should not show in airplane photographs. Men 
thus engaged were under a cross-fire of shells both 
going out and coming in, and the Eleventh Engineers had 
the distinction of reporting the first American battle 
casualties as early as the 5th of September, 1917. 

The tank was really the only entirely new creation of 
the war, all the other novelties in warfare having had 
a previous application or at least consideration. 

The idea of the tank originated with a Frenchman, but 
was taken up and developed by the British Navy and put 
into use by the British Army. The Germans at first 
decried it, but after facing tanks for more than a year 
and a half, an experience that filled them with wholesome 
respect for this new development in warfare, they 
decided to use the innovation and actually put some on 
the field, though not in sufficient numbers nor in time to 
produce any material effect. 

The British used them first in the Somme battle as 
auxiliary weapons with great effect. The original tank 
weighed about thirty tons, was armored heavily enough 
to deflect rifle bullets or shell splinters, and was armed 
with small guns. They were moved by caterpillar tractor 



THE CAMBEAI OFFENSIVE 115 

belts, one on eacK side, operated by a single engine 
and steered by a wheel rudder. Later tliey were given 
two independent engines of increased power, one driving 
each belt so that the tank could be steered without a 
separate rudder. One type of tank was armed with 
cannon posted in sponsons and called a " male," while 
the '' female "had only a battery of Lewis machine guns. 
During the latter part of 1917 and the early part of 1918 
the tank was subjected to close study by the three armies, 
French, British and American, with the result of bring- 
ing forth three designs. The first was a large machine 
similar to the early British tanks weighing thirty-five 
tons, armed as above and carrying a crew of twelve men. 
This machine had the advantage of weight and great bat- 
tering force; it could cross trenches six feet wide with 
ease, demolish buildings and concrete " pill boxes " con- 
taining machine guns, and, with its heavy armament and 
large crew, possessed great offensive value. It had the 
disadvantage, inherent to its size, of being unwieldy and 
slow, its speed not exceeding two and a half or three 
miles per hour. The second type was a French model, 
a small machine weighing 15,000 pounds, carrying two 
men, armed with a 37 mm. {V/z in.) cannon or a 
machine gun and had a speed of five or six miles an 
hour. These little tanks, called ^* whippets," were 
largely used by the American army, especially in the 
Argonne operations. They were exceedingly efficacious 
against machine-gun nests, being in themselves proof 
against anything but artillery fire. The third type of 
tanks was one still smaller than the ''whippets," weighing 
not over three tons, carrying like them two men, mount- 
ing but one machine gun, and having a speed of eight 
miles an hour. 

In planning the battle of Cambrai, General Sir Julian 
Byng, commanding the Third Army, B. E. F., decided 
to use tanks on a much larger scale than they had ever 



116 'AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

been employed before and in a new role. An attack in 
force had always been preceded by artillery preparation 
continuing for some time, perhaps for hours. The great- 
(Bst number of guns that could be collected would be 
massed and, at a given moment, begin to scatter shells on 
the enemy front trenches and the wire entanglement in 
front of them, beating down the latter and making the 
former untenable. .When this had been accomplished the 
range would be increased and the fire concentrated on the 
support or second line of trenches. Under the protection 
of this curtain of falling shells the infantry would 
advance and occupy the first enemy trench if all went 
well. Such artillery preparation was usually effective but 
it gave the enemy notice that an attack was coming and 
allowed him to take some provision for artillery reply, 
for resistance or for counter attack. 

General Byng proposed to effect if possible a complete 
sui'prise, to use a very brief but intense artillery prepa- 
ration and then to launch a great fleet of tanks which 
would trample flat the wire entanglements, drive the 
defenders from the front trenches and so permit an 
immediate infantry advance, the guns in the meanwhile 
giving tanks and men a forward protecting barrage, 
silencing the enemy's guns and preventing a counter 
attack. 

Both the allied and enemy lines in this sector were 
lightly held, the greater part of both forces having been 
withdrawn to strengthen the offensive and stiffen the 
defensive operations in Flanders. It became necessary, 
therefore, for the British to return the old or concentrate 
new units on the Somme front, to move in the guns and to 
accumulate vast stores of ammunition. Extensive prepa- 
•rations were in progress during October and became 
intensified with the coming of November. As the success 
of the attack depended on its being a surprise, all move- 
ments had to be made under cover of darkness. For two 



ITHE CAMBEAI OFFENSIVE 117 

weeks prior to tHe battle tHe procession began to move 
as soon as it became dark. Eailway trains showing no 
lights brought in their loads of men or artillery, who 
were at once detrained and moved to position. 

The camp of the Eleventh Engineers was next to the 
main highway leading east from Peronne. All through 
each night during the period of preparation there could 
be heard the tramping of men, the grinding of wheels, 
the rumbling of guns and tractors and motor lorries, the 
last heavy with shells, as the column crawled eastward 
like a great serpent. We knew that there were other 
khaki-clad similar columns on other roads. But the 
movements of all were so nicely adjusted, that before 
each day broke a predetermined stage had been reached 
and visible activity stopped for twelve hours. Men 
were concealed during the day in ruined villages 
and the guns and wagons were parked off the road, 
leaving the latter quite bare and free. The enemy avia- 
tors could then come and inspect all they pleased if they 
were willing to risk air duels. They could take photo- 
graphs to any extent but these would reveal no apparent 
change in the situation behind the lines. Perhaps there 
might be shown some shadows that suggested a concen- 
tration, but suspicion would be laid at rest by the photo- 
graph on a following day showing the same shadows. 
What the photographs did not tell was, that the shadows 
which appeared to be the same, were shadows of other 
guns and of other men. 

After all the disappointments of the year the weather 
now and for the first time favored the Allies, For two 
weeks there was a dense fog every night completely 
blanketing the ground and making night flying absolutely 
impossible, so the Germans did not have even the chance 
that a night machine flying low might permit the observer 
to note the dark procession on the white roads. 

At last we knew when the battle was to begin. An 



118 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

attack was always laid out on a detailed schedule some- 
wliat resembling a railway time table. The commence- 
ment of the affair, usually the artillery opening, was 
fixed at ** zero '* hour, and then each subsequent step, 
such as the change of range, the establishment of the 
barrage, the infantry going over the top, at so many 
hours or minutes reckoned from zero time. This sched- 
ule would be given to each unit commander, and then all 
that remained was to notify the several commanders at 
the latest moment what the equivalent of the zero hour 
would be expressed in local time. Each commander 
would then correct his watch with the standard time at 
headquarters and carry out his orders, beginning at the 
exact minute. On November 18th we were notified that 
zero hour was 6 :30 A. M., substantially the beginning of 
day light, on November 20th. 

The Twelfth Engineers had charge of certain light 
railway lines which they had put in order. The Eleventh 
Engineers had been ordered to be ready, as soon as a 
sufficient advance was effected, to relay the track on the 
main line of the Nord railway running north into Cam- 
brai. The Grermans had taken up this track at the time 
of their retirement in February, 1917, had carried away 
the rails, fastenings and crossties, and had blown up the 
bridges. The American engineers had in the previous 
weeks removed the debris of demolished bridges and 
filled shell craters so that the roadbed might be ready to 
receive the new track. That the Eleventh Engineers 
might be in readiness to act promptly, a part of the regi- 
ment was ordered to assemble immediately behind the 
attacking line. The commanding officer directed the 
author, at that lime second in command, to remain the 
night of the 19th-20th at regimental headquarters should 
any change of programme requiring executive action 
arise at the last moment, but otherwise to join him in 
the early morning at the advanced post. 



THE CAMBEAI OFFENSIVE 119, 

The morning came and with its coming there vanished 
the fog that for so many nights had been such a com- 
forting cover. With the regimental surgeon and a bat- 
talion commander I left camp at dawn. The air was 
sweet and crisp as might be expected in late November. 
To one who was not a professional soldier but who had 
always taken a keen interest in military affairs, had read 
of battles, had as a small boy seen France once before 
under the heel of the German oppressor, but who had 
now reached a point in life when there was no reason 
even to dream of taking part in war, the sensation was 
peculiar. In spite of all seeming impossibility I was 
to see and even take a part in a great battle, to witness 
a blow struck and, to the extent of the power of one indi- 
vidual, to aid the force of that blow against the long-time 
enemy of France, and now the enemy of my own country. 

From stories and accounts of other battles that I had 
read I had a mental picture of disorder along the high- 
ways leading to the field, of stragglers, of belated con- 
voys, of wrecked vehicles lying by the roadside where 
they had been overturned to clear the way, of staff offi- 
cers and orderlies galloping along to restore order out 
of disorder and to hasten onward some detail of men or 
consignment of material specially needed. 

As we motored to the front there was no confusion 
along the road, in fact the latter was quite empty of any 
traffic except for three little one-horse carts, that had no 
connection with the day's work, and a large covey of 
fine partridges flushed by the noise of our motorcycles. 
There were no stragglers, no wrecks and no dashing 
horsemen. The processions of men and supplies that we 
had heard passing frontward for a fortnight had all 
reached their destinations. Every man, every gun, every 
shell was in its appointed place, a magnificent and per- 
fect piece of staff work. Then precisely when the zero 
hour arrived, all along the British front for some twenty 



120 AMERICAN ENGINEE]^S IN FRANCE 

miles or more there arose a simultaneous roar from every 
gun, a roar that was to continue unbroken, night and 
day, for five days. The battle was on ! Then to the ear 
there came another sound, another roar, slightly more 
muffled with not quite the same sharp crack, the din of 
bursting shells as the German guns began their reply. 
But the great difference in volume between the two was 
clear evidence that there was a wide discrepancy in the 
number of guns employed on the two sides. The Ger- 
man guns were evidently outnumbered, the surprise was 
undoubtedly a success. 

The Eleventh Engineers had been ordered to remain 
under cover in reserve until such time as it was certain 
that the enemy had fallen back and that no immediate 
counter attack was imminent. While waiting I went into 
Havrincourt Wood which was the center of the attack. 
There the British eighteen-pounder field pieces were 
standing almost wheel to wheel, with only enough space 
between them to permit the crews to serve the guns. 
Every gun was in action as fast as the gunners could 
shove home a shell and close the breech. Some infantry 
battalions were there, whose time for taking part had not 
yet come. They were passing the moments of waiting 
with foot races and other sports. There were no last 
letters being written, no farewell messages being sent. 
Beyond in some fields across from the ruins of what was 
once a fine sugar mill was a whole division of Bengal 
Lancers, some 12,000 or 15,000 splendid figures with 
khaki turbans surmounting their black-bearded swarthy 
faces, hoping that all the, lines of trenches would be car- 
ried so that they could at last have the chance of gallop- 
ing far afield among fleeing infantry. 

There was little news. There was a rumor that the 
village of Havrincourt in our immediate front was quite 
cleared of the enemy. That was all. It suggested the 
account by Henry M. Stanley of his experiences as a Con- 



THE CAMBEAI OFFENSIVE 12l 

federate; private at the battle of Shiloli, how as he lay, 
■wounded on the field he had not the slightest knowledge 
of how fared the day. The nearer one gets to the front, 
the less one knows. He can see only those things that are 
in his immediate neighborhood. He has no breadth of 
yision, no perspective. 

Then there came down the road, marching westward, 
a little procession of perhaps fifty figures in field-gray 
uniforms, the first prisoners, mute but satisfactory evi- 
dence that the enemy lines had been reached. Their 
faces, the first freshly captured prisoners I had seen, 
made a curious study. There was a mixture of all sorts 
of men, from quite young boys to men of thirty-five. 
Some were sullen, some just stupid looking, others rather 
interested in their new surroundings, while some were 
unmistakably nervous as to what might be in store, in 
striking contradiction to those who were evidently not 
displeased to realize that the war, af least in active fight- 
ing, was for them at an end. 

Then came another procession — unfortunately not the 
last — evidence that, if the enemy lines had been reached, 
it had not been done without cost. Men with heads and 
arms simply bandaged by the field surgeons, the walk- 
ing wounded as they were called, going back for better 
treatment, and the little motor ambulances with two 
tiers of badly wounded, their feet only showing at the 
open end of the car. 

An infantry column came up at a brisk swing. They 
have been ordered in. The commanding officer fell out 
and running up to two British officers standing by the 
road asked, " How's the news? " ** Quite good," was the 
reply. *' Thanks," he said as he turned to rejoin his 
men. How delightfully British, and how thoroughly 
un-American ! Three sentences, six words on a matter of 
life and death in a great battle. The answer conveying 
absolutely no information but leaving everyone satisfied ! 



122 :A.MERICAN engineers in FRANCE 

At noon we were informed that all tlie BritisK guns 
had been moved forward, confirming our belief that the 
roar from the Havrincourt Wood was less distinct, that 
the infantry had occupied all the first objectives and that 
we could commence our work. The commanding officer 
directed me to go forward to ascertain the posi- 
tion. By 2 P. M. I had crossed the famous Hindenburg 
line, where the British soldiers were eating with much 
relish the breakfast-the Germans had left, for after see- 
ing the tanks coming, the latter had fled precipitately. A 
mile beyond and on the far side of LaVacquerie farm, 
no longer a farm but only a name on the map, were the 
British guns standing in rows in the open without tar- 
gets, as contact with the enemy at that point had been 
temporarily lost. Just there the roar of battle had almost 
ceased, only the sharp crack ! crack ! of machine guns on 
the right, and in front of Gonnelieu, being heard as some 
scattered German outposts still held on and gave a little 
trouble. Before us were the spires of Cambrai cathedral 
only two miles away, and there was a rumor, unfortu- 
nately not true, that the cavalry were already beyond the 
city. 

Among the guns were the victorious tanks, great awk- 
ward ungainly affairs, looking for all the world like some 
old dinosauria or other fossil pachyderms which, after 
many ages, had suddenly come to life. There were no 
visible signs of guidance and yet there they were slowly 
moving about with a raucous, grinding, grating noise, 
climbing in and out of shell craters, or flopping over gap- 
ing trenches with a motion similar to the rolling and 
pitching of a bluif bowed vessel making heavy weather 
in a tumbling sea. Some 400 of these monsters, that is 
the number we were told, had taken part in the fight and 
great service they rendered. They had taken the enemy 
quite unawares and gave him no time for preparation. 
They leveled the wire defenses so flat as to make them 
look ahnost as if they had never existed, so that the 



a?HE CAMBEAI OFFENSIVE 123 

infantry had gone on unchecked. It was a great plan 
that General Byng conceived and it succeeded admirably. 
It is said that the tank commander when he went into 
action flew from his flag tank a set of signals reading, 
** England expects every tank to do its damndest." 

Stretcher bearers were moving here and there, picking 
up those who could not walk and carrying them to 
waiting ambulances to be hurried to some field dressing 
station, and thence to a hospital for full treatment. To 
these bearers the color of the uniform, whether khaki or 
field-gray, made no difference. Some figures which were 
lying quite still the stretcher bearers passed by. In a few 
hours a kind chaplain will read for them the sweet words 
of the simple service of the Church of England and there 
will be a few more white crosses scattered among that 
forest of crosses that stretches in an irregular wide belt 
across northern France. 

In my pocket I had put that morning a flask filled with 
whiskey. During the afternoon the contents went in 
small portions to badly wounded. Finally but one little 
drink remained. But it did not have to wait long. I soon 
met a poor fellow sitting against the broken stump of a 
tree waiting for an ambulance. Part of his face was 
gone, and his wound must have been as painful as it was 
ghastly. 

' ' Would you like a little drink, my man ? ' ' 

The remaining half of his face seemed to smile as h^ 
replied quietly, ' ' Yes, sir, I would, thank you. ' ' 

He took the cup with great care, drank but a portion, 
and handing it to a man beside him, who I noticed for the 
first time had but a trifling wound in the foot, said, 
^' Here, matey, I will go halves with you." 

This incident was not the only exhibition of the fiing 
spirit displayed. Somehow all the horrors and sufferings 
of battle seem to awaken in men not a thirst for more 
blood, for more slaying, but the kindlier, gentler traits 
of human nature. .War is not all bad I 



CHAPTER XI 

THE CAMBRAI DEFENSIVE 

After five days of hard fighting the battle of Cambrai 
died down. Cambrai itself had not been taken, the Ger- 
mans having rushed in heavy reinforcements, whose pres- 
sure compelled the advanced British line to be contracted 
slightly through the villages of Fontaine-Notre-Dame 
and Bourlon, while possession of the wood of the latter 
name was retained by the British, though for a few days 
only. An apparently safely secured advance of some five 
or six miles in depth had been made, heavy casualties 
inflicted and a goodly toll of prisoners counted. 

As soldiers in the field we knew nothing of the plans 
of the higher command. We looked down on the towers 
and roofs of Cambrai, we formed ideas of our own as 
to its importance to the enemy, we longed for a change 
of scene, and to have the novelty and excitement of enter- 
ing a large city that had been so long in German hands. 
Especially because the city was still fairly well intact 
as, naturally, it had been spared by both British and 
French artillery. We hoped, therefore, that the fine 
advance that had been made, with the comparatively easy 
breaking of the Hindenburg line would furnish a good 
jumping oif place, as we called it, for a new attack, a 
further advance, and another victory. 

While the infantry were settling themselves in their 
new trenches and the artillery maintaining a continuous 
duel with the German guns, the American engineers had 
plenty to do. 

The Twelfth Regiment were extending the narrow- 
gauge railway lines across what had been No Man's Land 
to reach the new battery positions, and converting the 

124 



THE CAMBBAI DEFENSIVE 125 

lightly built previous front lines of railways into sub- 
stantially constructed back lines as they now became. 

To the Eleventh Engineers was assigned the task of 
strengthening and improving the standard gauge rail- 
ways in that section, and particularly the task of putting 
in good condition the main line of the Nord railway, that 
prior to the Cambrai offensive they had cleared of ob- 
structions. Before November 20th this railway had been 
in front of the British guns, but now on account of the 
advance, it lay behind them, and was so situated as to b^ 
a line of great importance should there be a further 
advance, or even if only the gain in ground already made 
were securely held. On the afternoon of November 20th 
they began, in cooperation with the Fourth Battalion 
Canadian railway troops, to relay the permanent way on 
the old embankment of this line that they had repaired 
with painstaking care. The general direction of the rail- 
way was north and south and it, therefore, crossed the 
opposing fronts diagonally as their general bearing was 
here northwest to southeast. There was no track left on 
this line for about five miles behind the British trenches. 
The enemy had removed the rails and ties, and had blown 
up the bridges when they retired to the Hindenburg line 
earlier in the year. For the above distance the British 
had not restored the track because the line lay so close to 
the front as not to be available for use, it being in plain 
sight from the enemy trenches for nearly the whole way. 

After passing the German front line the railway route 
turned to the east towards Cambrai and thence away 
from observation, so that the Germans had been able to 
retain the old track in use almost to their front trenches. 
It was the relaying of this track that the American and 
Canadian engineers undertook, the advance made on 
November 20th having left the railway, if rebuilt, in a 
reasonably safe location for operation. 

The Germans in their retreat that day made no attempt 



126 AMEBICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

or did not have time to destroj^ the part of the railway 
that had been in their hands. In fact, they had not even 
blown up the bridge crossing the Canal de I'Escaut at 
Marcoing. Holes were found excavated in the masonry 
and filled with explosives needing but a detonating spark 
to create a serious and annoying breach. All important 
bridges in advanced positions which might be seized by 
a surprise attack were usually thus mined by engineers 
and kept ready for instant demolition. But no spark 
reached the charges that day to explode them and one 
cannot help asking, *' Why?" Did the officer or man 
who was assigned to this duty join in such haste the 
retrograde movement that he had no desire to tarry in 
order that his orders to demolish the bridge might be 
carried out, or did he simply forget, or did, perhaps, 
some chance shell win for him a little cross with the 
inscription, ^' One unknown German soldier "? In any 
event the bridge was found intact, and presently the 
engineers laid new rails across it and connected them 
with the abandoned German rail-head. Thus, for a few 
days, direct-rail communication between Paris and Ber- 
lin, which had been interrupted on every line since Sep- 
tember, 1914, was actually restored. It is obviously not 
to be understood that trains were or could be run, but 
that a continuous track existed from the British lines 
across the new No Man's Land to the German lines and 
beyond. 

This reconstruction involved the laying of eight miles 
of track, requiring eight days of very strenuous labor, as 
the line was being repeatedly shelled. November 29th in 
that year was the American Thanksgiving day, and as 
the through track connection had been made on the day 
previous, after a final twenty-two hours of continuous 
work, the national holiday was observed as a much 
needed day of rest. This was permissible because the 
artillery duel had slowly softened and by November 29th 



THE CAMBEAI DEFENSIVE 127 

we began to understand tliat no further advance was con- 
templated for the moment, and that we were not to have 
the excitement of entering Cambrai. The daily routine 
was resumed as it existed before the battle began. Once 
more the situation answered the description by the 
stereotyped phrase in the official communique — '^ Nothing 
to report ' '. Our belief that quietness was really restored 
was confirmed by a letter from the army commander him- 
self to the British officer in charge of railways in the 
army area, containing the following extract, which he 
conveyed to the troops concerned: 

" Now that the Third Army offensive has reached its 
limit, and the normal trench warfare has been resumed, 
I would like to take the opportunity of giving you a short 
appreciation of the services that you and other transpor- 
tation officers have rendered." 

At that time and as a result of the attack on Cambrai, 
the new British lines constituted an almost rectangular 
salient projecting into the enemy's line, facing north- 
east towards Cambrai, about nine miles long and six 
miles deep with two sharply defined re-entrant angles, 
one at Gouzeaucourt on the southeast and the other north 
of Boursies on the northwest. 

On Friday morning, November 30th, after the day of 
rest, the Eleventh Engineers proceeded to Gouzeaucourt 
with orders to begin the reestablishment of the railway 
yard at that point, as the transportation department had 
decided to place there a transfer rail-head. The existing 
layout of highroads made this location highly convenient. 
It was known that no British offensive movement was 
intended and it was believed that nothing was imminent 
that would call for defense. As the officers desired the 
men to be free from any unnecessary encumbrance, only 
tools were carried, orders having been given that all 
arms should be left in camp. As the train carrying thg 
men ran over the newly made track, some heavy shelling 



128 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

7;v^as heard to the eastward. A few shells were seen to 
burst on the top of the ridge running parallel with the 
track where the British batteries were posted, but this 
excited no special comment. Suddenly at 8 o'clock the 
firing increased in intensity and became concentrated 
into a barrage. As such it advanced over the ridge, down 
the slope and finally rested across the track close to 
where the men were working. Then some British troops 
were seen falling back through the open fields, and the 
engineers recognized that an attack in force was being 
pressed by the enemy. 

The Germans had succeeded in repeating exactly 
what the British had accomplished ten days earlier, 
the effecting of a complete surprise. They had, 
unknown to the British, massed troops opposite 
Gouzeaucourt and Boursies, and after a very short 
but heavy artillery preparation had launched simul- 
taneously two heavy infantry attacks on the reen- 
trant angles of the newly formed salient with the 
intent, if a sufficient advance could be made, either 
to force a general retirement from the salient or, per- 
haps, to cut off a large body of troops holding it. The 
attack directed on Boursies made but little impression 
and was useful only in drawing men away from other 
parts of the line. At Gouzeaucourt it was more success- 
ful. The Germans quickly recaptured their own posi- 
tions that they had lost ten days before, forcing the 
British first back to and then out of the lines they them- 
selves had occupied before their own attack. Then press- 
ing on they swept over the British lines and went beyond 
them. 

To the ^engineers, the situation as it affected them was 
painfully clear. They were unarmed and, therefore, 
unprepared for any offense. The senior officer present 
recognizing that his men were being uselessly sacrificed, 
very properly ordered a withdrawal. This was attempted 



THE CAMBEAI DEFENSIVE 129 

at first by train, but the barrage was so intense that tbe 
train had to be abandoned, the locomotive only being 
saved. The men consequently became somewhat scat- 
tered, though not disorganized. Some succeeded in mak- 
ing their way under the command of their officers through 
Gouzeaucourt, some sought refuge in dugouts from the 
downpour of high explosive and gas shells, while some 
were rallied with British and Canadian soldiers sepa- 
rated from their commands into an improvised unit and 
offered resistance. They seized any weapons at hand, 
although some fought effectively with their picks and 
shovels until overcome. It is related that one fellow was 
seen to lay low five of the enemy with only a shovel 
before he fell. This irregular body undoubtedly delayed 
the advance along the main Cambrai-Gouzeaucourt road 
imtil the troops in reserve could be posted to make an 
organized stand. Casualties were occurring fast, while 
of the men who were in the dugouts many were captured, 
although one party remained in safety in a shelter for 
forty hours, succeeding in returning to their camp during 
the darkness on the second night, by which time a British 
counter attack had forced back the attacking line beyond 
the village of Gouzeaucourt. During the first day of their 
voluntary imprisonment a German soldier appeared at 
the entrance and calling into the darkness, asked who 
was there. One of the men replied in German that they 
were wounded Germans, an answer that apparently satis- 
fied the enquirer, because he went away and did not 
return. 

"While the attack was in progress German airplanes 
flew low, sweeping the ground with machine-gun bullets. 
They did not spare even ambulances loaded with 
wounded, whose character was plainly indicated by large 
red crosses painted on the sides and roofs, several Ameri- 
cans already wounded being hit again while being trans- 
ported. The barrage composed of both high explosives 



130 AMEKICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

and gas shells was very severe, so mucli so in fact, that 
an investigation made a few days later when the railway 
line had been recaptured, showed that a direct hit on the 
track had been scored every thirty-three feet on the 
average. 

Such was the first participation of American troops 
in Europe in a major engagement. The picturesqueness 
of men fighting successfully, hand to hand, armed only 
with their tools against rifles and bayonets, undoubtedly 
enhanced the effect and went a longer way than perhaps 
the incident justified, towards establishing American 
prestige. For up to that time the fighting quality of 
Americans was quite unknown to the other armies. Offi- 
cial recognition of what was done on this occasion is 
shown by the award of two Military Crosses and one 
Military Medal by the British, followed by three Distin- 
guished Service Crosses by the Commander-in-Chief, 
A. E. F. 

The battle of Gouzeaucourt, or the Cambrai Defensive 
as it was officially named, followed the same general 
course as the Cambrai Offensive that began on November 
20th. At the end of the first day the British brought up 
reinforcements and counter attacked, regaining some of 
the lost ground. Then followed an intense artillery duel, 
during which both sides used gas in large quantities. By 
December 4th the intensity began to subside and the 
British, realizing that the salient they had previously 
established was in a vulnerable location, gradually with- 
drew from some of the advanced positions to give them 
a line that could be held more easily. The net result of 
the two battles, the offensive and defensive, left an 
extent of territory in the hands of the British of about 
one-half of what they had captured between November 
20th-25th, and probably a credit balance in the matter 
of prisoners taken and casualties suffered. 
"Witlo. the cessation of activity of the Cambrai Defen-i 



,THE CAMBRAI DEFENSIVE 131 

sive tlie campaign of 1917 came to an end. The year had 
begun with the German retirement from Noyon, Nesle, 
Peronne, Bapaume and the country lying east of the field 
of what is known as the battle of the Somme, and later 
was filled with a series of attacks and counter attacks 
which, on the whole, had netted a gain for the allied 
cause. There had been periods of great anxiety which 
were now relieved by the entrance of America into the 
struggle. But still the end was not in sight and, perhaps, 
the double battle of Cambrai well illustrated the futility 
of attacking until a great preponderance of force had 
been secured. Ten days after the counter attack had sub- 
sided and both armies were once more dug in, hard 
freezing weather came on, and there was nothing to do 
but to wait until winter was over. The general feeling 
among the troops was that the next offensive would be 
undertaken by the Germans. 

The Cambrai Defensive had been a severe disappoint- 
ment but, though the allied troops had suffered much, 
they were not discouraged, knowing that help on a larger 
scale was not far distant and that if they could hold on 
for a little longer final victory was assured. As a small 
illustration of their spirit it is recalled that while the 
German counter attack was still raging with the result 
in the balance, there was heard the sound of bagpipes one 
evening at the hour when darkness was just coming on. 
Then down the road a battalion of Scotch Highlanders 
was seen returning to reserve, having been relieved 
after defending an important position for several days 
against repeated attacks and great odds. They were 
marching in regular formation in " column of fours," 
or of *' squads " as the American manual describes 
it, with their band at the head. There was but a handful 
of them, the others were in hospitals or lying in silence 
where the guns were banging away. They were painfully 
tired looking, but they marched in cadence and in forma- 



132 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

i 
tion. The Americans gave them a handclap but not a 
cheer as they passed, because no man in the crowd dared 
to trust his voice to cheer, but the Scots paid no atten- 
tion to it, their jaws were set tight and every face spoke 
quite clearly of their determination, of their reali- 
zation that, although cut to pieces, they had held their 
post until relieved, and of their pride that the honor of 
Scotland had been kept. All the while the bagpipes were 
screeching out a wild weird Highland paean of victory 
and defiance. Perhaps, that extraordinary instrument 
is the only one that could have done justice to the moment 
and occasion. The unit might have been decimated but 
it had not been beaten. 



CHAPTER Xn 

THE AiMERIOAN " R. E.'S '* 

In the British service it is the custom to abhreviate 
all names to their initial letters, and what corresponds 
in the British Army to the Corps of Engineers in the 
American Army, namely, the '' Royal Engineers,*' is 
always referred to as the '' R. E.'s" in the same way as 
the artillery arm is shortened to R. A. 

Several of the original engineer regiments were as- 
signed to the British forces for long periods, varying from 
nine to twelve months, so becoming in actuality for the 
time being an integral part of the British engineer force. 
Among their associates and from the standpoint of serv- 
ice, they were " R. E.'s," but to distinguish them from 
British engineers, they were spoken of as the ** American 
R. E.'s," the amusing contradiction in terms between the 
American and the R. standing for Royalty never being 
noticed. But on the other hand the appellation, * ' Ameri- 
can R. E.'s," did convey a real sense of the friendly 
relations that existed between the engineer units of the 
two armies. They were one and the same. 

It was interesting to watch the association of two 
bodies of men, with their opposite points of view, their 
different customs, their little peculiarities and personal 
idiosyncrasies, with a feeling at first on the one side' 
that the others had been a little slow in enter- 
ing the war and had left the common burden 
to be carried too long by others, while on the 
opposite side there outcropped that perfectly ridicu- 
lous superstition engendered by silly school books 

133 



134 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

that England was still the foe of what had been once her 
colonies. But gradually as both sets of men came to 
know each other better, they began to understand that if 
there was any surface antagonism it was nothing more 
than the ordinary antagonism of two members of the 
same family, ready to argue with each other but at heart 
united. And so it was! After the first few days of 
strangeness there developed between the American and 
British soldiers a close, warm friendship with the high- 
est mutual respect, esteem and admiration. The mere 
being thrown together for a few days, the going of an 
American unit to a camp in England on its way to 
France, or the chance association in a rest area during 
the short term of a leave would not and did not suffice to 
break down the barrier of reserve on the one part or the 
little feeling of suspicion on the other. What was needed 
was actual service side by side, bri,nging the American 
and the Britisher together under a united command and 
for a long enough time to permit the men of both peoples 
to get through and beyond the screen of nationalism. 

The effect of time and joint service in producing this 
mutual good will and understanding is shown in the 
experience of one American regiment, an experience 
that was fairly typical of all. When this particular regi- 
ment learned on its arrival in England that it had been 
assigned to the British forces, to be in fact British sol- 
diers and under British orders, the disappointment was 
openly expressed through all ranks from the commanding 
officer down. Officers and men, with scarcely an excep- 
tion, would have preferred any assignment to that. Six 
months later when this same regiment was detached from 
the British Expeditionary Force and ordered to the 
American Expeditionary Force the regret at the change 
was as widespread and as sincere as the disappointment 
over the first assignment had been. After a short 
interval the fortune of war suddenly and unexpectedly 



THE AMERICAN '' R. E.'S " 135 

brought the regiment back again into service with the 
British, a return that was hailed with wild enthusiasm. 
Although the regiment was again withdrawn there was 
always a hope among both officers and men that, perhaps, 
the fates would once more be so Mnd as to send them 
back again to Flanders Fields. In this particular case 
there was nothing in the composition of the unit to give 
the men a pro-British bias, in fact just the contrary, 
because more than fifty-five per cent of "the men were 
Roman Catholics and at least one-half of them either 
Irish or of Irish descent. 

On its way home a part of the regiment was placed 
on a passenger steamer on which were others not in the 
service. One day the commanding officer was seated on 
deck talking with an eminent bishop of the Church, who 
inquired as to the relationship existing between the men 
and the British. On being told how cordial it had been, 
he expressed his pleasure, mixed, however, with a little 
surprise, because he said that contrary stories in other 
instances had come to his ears. On being pressed he 
admitted that he had never heard the opposite view 
expressed by anyone who had actually served with the 
British. To give corroborative testimony the colonel 
stopped the first two officers who happened to pass and 
asked them to state their opinions and then directed that 
the very first enlisted man met should be sent to him. In 
a few minutes a man came up, saluted and said, " Ser- 
geant Mc reports, sir," giving a good old Irish 

name. The bishop did his own questioning and finally; 
said, *' Now, Sergeant, I am going to ask you two ques- 
tions. First, when you speak of ' Tommy,' I presume 
you are referring to the Canadians or, perhaps, the 
Australians that you have met? " To which came the 
answer, " I suppose I include the Canadians and the 
Australians, sir, but it was not exactly them I had in 
mind. It was the Englishman." 



136 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

'' And now, my second question," said the bishop. 
** Why was it that the men would have been glad to have 
gone back to the British, at any time up to the close of 
hostilities? " ''I do not know exactly the reason, 
Bishop," replied the sergeant, '* but, perhaps, one thing 
was that while we believed that in a close spot our own 
men would stand fast, we hieiv that ' Tommy ' would." 

In giving this answer the sergeant had not the slight- 
est intention of making any adverse criticism or reflec- 
tion on his fellow-American soldiers. He had served 
more months in the British advanced zone than anywhere 
else, he had become thoroughly acquainted with the Brit- 
ish soldier, had learned to know and understand him, to 
appreciate his steadfastness and other good qualities, 
and was expressing an opinion of him in his straight- 
forward way, an opinion that was not intended to be 
comparative. 

The British soldier, or '' Tommy," a contraction of 
" Thomas Atkins," as he was always called, was a 
remarkable person. Brave, of course, but then most, if 
not all, men are brave when properly led, his striking 
individual characteristics were, first, an indomitable 
doggedness, impressing everyone with the fact, as Ser- 
geant Mc put it, that he '' would stand fast," a 

cheerfulness that never failed him, never deserted him 
in the most trying hour of defeat or when sore pressed, 
a simplicity that never lost its charm or balance even 
when flushed in the most glowing moment of victory, an 
ability to accept conditions when he knew they could not 
be bettered and, therefore, to refrain from complaining, 
and a constitutional appreciation of the value of disci- 
pline. If he had a fault it was his inability to recognize 
when he was beaten. In spite of all that the Germans 
could do, that was one lesson they could never teach the 
** Tommies." So much did all this affect the Americans 
that on one occasion when there was being given a joint 



THE AMERICAN " R. E.'S " 137 

Anglo-American vaudeville performance, that an Ameri- 
can quartette asked to be excused from acceding to a 
request from the British officers to sing, '* Over There," 
on the ground that the words were boasting. The song 
was, however, sung and received with loud applause by 
the British, but the men never allowed their regimental 
band to play it afterward without protest, so much so 
that it was soon dropped from consideration. 

Then for a while the British officer was not understood, 
due probably largely to the fact that his mode of living 
was quite unlike the accustomed mode of the majority 
of Americans. To begin with, his hours were so differ- 
ent, for, unless he was compelled to do otherwise, he 
breakfasted when the American officer had already been 
at work for some time, he stopped for '* tea," a seem- 
ingly awful waste of precious moments, and he dined at 
the outrageously late hour of eight or eight-thirty. For 
the latter function he dressed, that is, he saw to it that 
his uniform was clean or at least freshly brushed, and 
put on *' slacks " or long trousers instead of wearing 
his riding breeches and heavy boots. At dinner all mili- 
tary talk or '' shop " was absolutely taboo. Instead, the 
conversation was what one would hear in a London club, 
on travel, books, art, good stories, but never about war. 
All this struck the average American at first as flippant 
and superficial, an impression accentuated and not 
removed by the Englishman's habitual reserve until 
acquaintance begins to ripen into friendship. What the' 
American did not know in the early days was that long 
after he had gone to bed, his British host with whom he 
had dined so excellently and agreeably had returned to 
his office quarters on his guest's departure, to work until 
the morning hours on his military problems when all 
light conversation was as much" forbidden as the contrary 
had been at dinner. It did not take the American long 
to appreciate the good features of the British habits of 



138 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

life and to value the great importance of the ability to 
lay aside cares and worries and to give the mind a much 
needed rest through thoughts on lighter things, even if 
only for an hour. Tea at five o'clock soon became an 
institution at more than one American mess. 

Both British officers and men insisted on having their 
pleasures and physical comforts to the very maximum 
possible, even at times and under conditions that were 
really serious, though never to the point of interference 
with military duties. The officers saw to it that every 
opportunity was afforded to the men for their recreation, 
in which they themselves frequently took part. In this 
way they succeeded in maintaining a spirit of cheerful- 
ness and high morale. 

To what extent the British could do this right up to 
the very line of the guns greatly impressed the American 
officers in the early days of B. E. F. service. On one 
occasion a British officer whose battalion was doing a 
tour of duty in the trenches notified an American friend 
that a " show " well worth seeing was being arranged, 
and that he would send the latter a friendly hint in time. 
In trench vernacular, '' show " meant an affair short of 
a major engagement, anything from a raid to an attack 
in force on a limited front. A few days later there came 
an invitation to tea on a fixed afternoon. On the Ameri- 
can officer's arrival at the British post he was told that 
the zero hour had been fixed for 7 :30, as it was desired 
to attack after dark, and that dinner had been set for 
8:30. All this was said quite as a matter of course, as 
no one at the front ever contemplated, let alone went so 
far as to suggest that such a thing as a chance shell might 
seriously interfere with any personal engagement. 

Meanwhile, tea was served in one of the headquarters' 
dugouts, a battalion headquarters precisely similar in 
general layout to many other headquarters along the 
front. Advantage had been taken of a high railway 



THE AMERICAN '' E. E.'S " 139 

embankment, into which and of course on the side away 
from the enemy a series of chambers had been excavated, 
the earth being held up by ordinary mine timbering or by 
semicircular sections of very heavy corrugated iron 
plates. The dugouts were about ten feet in width and 
perhaps as long. One was used for the headquarters 
office and officers^ mess, another was the kitchen, a third 
was the signals office whence led the telephone wires to 
brigade headquarters, while others were used for sleep- 
ing quarters with superimposed bunks as in a sleeping 
car. 

Through the open door of the dugout there lay what 
had once been one of the gardens of France which now, 
since the wave of the Somme battle had rolled over it 
during the previous year, had been transformed into an 
absolute desert, empty of all life but the soldier occu- 
pants. There in the distance to the left was Epehy, once 
a prosperous place, now with not a single house standing. 
There to the right the tumbled broken wreckage of the 
sugar mill of Heudicourt. In the foreground two bat- 
talions between whom existed a strong athletic rivalry 
were settling some old scores or creating new ones in an 
exciting game of football. 

"Was all this really war? "Well might doubt arise to 
question it, and still more to question the fact that in a 
few minutes a serious attack was to be made in which 
lives were to be sacrificed. The ruined houses, the 
broken trees, spoke war, but one was so accustomed to 
that sight ! The fields were green with a tangled crop of 
weeds and wild grass, which, interspersed with bright 
scarlet poppies or blue corn flowers, looked gay enough 
to make one forget that they ought rather to be covered 
now with ripening sugar beets or dotted with fat grazing 
cattle. But there are two details that suggested the 
imminence of danger. If the players in the game were 
wearing white breeches and club jerseys as might be 



140 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

seen on any EnglisH common on a holiday, the spectators 
dressed in khaki carried each a gas mask, ready for 
emergency, and just beyond was a row of six-inch guns 
that had only the night before been moved into place. 
As darkness descended, and the distant scene slowly 
faded, the game was ended, and the artillerymen began 
to strip their guns and the great piles of vicious-looking 
shells of the covering camouflage that during the day- 
light had hidden them from airplane observation. 

At 7:25 the artillery fire which had been during the 
afternoon customarily irregular and lazily desultory, 
ceased entirely, a silence so deep as to be almost audible 
and oppressive because all knew what it portended. The 
football game was forgotten now as watch in hand one 
listened to the seconds slowly ticking away. At pre- 
cisely the half hour there was a single warning shot, and 
then with one mighty voice all the artillery on a three- 
mile front, those guns regularly on station and all those 
others moved in. to reinforce them for the occasion, 
leaped into action. That night they hurled not the ordi- 
nary shells, but some filled with thermite, another cheer- 
ful contribution of the chemical engineer, a finely divided 
metallic combination which oxydizes so rapidly on expo- 
sure to the air as to become molten metal. 

The shells were so timed as to burst on high and 
directly over the enemy trenches on which there fell the 
rain of white-hot particles of the burning compound, set- 
ting fire at once to anything inflammable. It was like a 
wonderful display of fireworks on a gigantic but terrible 
scale, with the great flashes of the exploding shells and 
the steady continuous shower of falling sparks, with gun 
upon gun, battery on battery maintaining the supply of 
bursts and fire as fast as active men could serve them. 
It was not many minutes before the timbers holding up 
the earth banks of the trenches, the board walks at the 
bottom, the doors of dugouts and anything else that could 



THE AMERICAN '' E. E.'S " 141 

catch fire was in flames. The rows of German trenches 
on the hillside opposite were clearly marked in the dark- 
ness by livid bands of fire. 

But even such a scene must yield to the pressing 
demand of dinner, and after an hour's watching a return 
was made to the dugout, where an excellent six-course 
meal was served. 

The mess dugout was of the semicircular, iron-lined 
variety. Down the center was a narrow table seating ten. 
The tables and benches were of home-made design and 
army manufacture. But there was a white table-cloth, 
the glazed-surface kind that could be wiped clean, a dinner 
service of china, candles stuck in empty bottles for lights, 
and above all a genuine whole-souled soldier's welcome. 
There was a victrola in the corner playing a medley of 
ragtime airs and grand concert selections, and as the 
shells from the battery of six-inch guns in the neighbor- 
ing meadow went screaming overhead, there was a 
steady flow of good stories. The guns, however, were 
pointed directly towards the open dugout door so the 
full force of the concussion of each shot was felt most 
strongly in the confined space, which after a while so 
tired the patience of the host that he, turning to one of 
his junior officers, said, *' I say, Jones, please go down 
and ask those artillerymen to hold up their bally noise 
for a while. Tell them some gentlemen are trying to 
have a quiet dinner ! " 

On the way back to camp it was difficult to separate the 
confused impressions of a football game, an extraordi- 
nary artillery display, a delightful dinner and a sharp 
attack all at once. But the experience was not unique, 
it was the kind of thing that had taken place and would 
be many times repeated along the British front. It was 
their, way of keeping up their spirits and remaining 
cheerful. 

Sports were not only encouraged by the officers, but 



142 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

they themselves frequently took part with their men. At 
one time '' Tommy " and his commander might be giv- 
ing and receiving hard knocks on the ball-field without 
regard to rank, but immediately the game was ended the 
one insisted on and the other never failed to give, and 
to give cheerfully, the snappy military salute. The 
Americans soon realized that in playing together there 
was no attempt at patronizing on the one hand nor the 
slightest feeling of servility on the other in the subse- 
quent salute. They saw that the British officer, in spite 
of an assumed indifference, cared for his men as the 
officers of no other army did ; they saw in him one brave 
to recklessness, as he was accustomed to lead his men 
over the top armed with only a walking-stick until 
expressly forbidden to do so; they knew that he never 
ordered his men to do what he would not do himself. 
Those qualities naturally won the full respect and 
implicit confidence of the men, and established between 
officers and men a mutual respect that won the admira- 
tion of the observer. It was the soldierly qualities, the 
close cooperation of officers and men, their cheerfulness, 

their manliness that Sergeant Mc saw, and that 

made him want to go back to '' Tommy ". 

It is a pity that more American units could not have 
served with the British forces, but it is hoped that 
enough did so to lay the foundation of a fuller under- 
standing and a better feeling among all branches of the 
English-speaking race. In such understanding and feeP 
ing there lies the best hope for a world peace. 



CHAPTER Xm 

RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 

To develop and cement a close personal friendship, 
to enter into and become an integral part of tlie life of 
other men, to reach beyond differences in national char- 
acter and national customs, there must be completely 
unfettered freedom of speech. If there be in this respect 
any barrier no matter how small, the real spirits of men 
never meet. On account of the difference in language, 
therefore, there was not and there" could not have been 
the same close intimacy between American and French 
soldiers as between the former and the British. Then, 
perhaps, the fact that the first and last were both 
strangers in a foreign land made another bond between 
them. 

But there were two traits of French character that 
impressed the American, filling him with surprise and 
admiration; first, the calm self-control not only of the 
French soldier but of the nation as a whole, and second, 
the conduct of the French women. The comic papers 
have always indicated the three nations by certain typical 
characteristics. The Frenchman was represented as a 
very excitable and excited person, gesticulating wildly 
and getting much wrought up over nothing, while the 
Britisher was shown as a rotund complacent John Bull, 
and the American as a lanky passive Uncle Sam, the last 
^0 both models of imperturbable calmness, each in his 
own peculiar manner. The comparison is neither just nor 
accurate. No matter where the French were met, nor 
under how great a crisis, they were always calm, never 

143 



144 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

excited, a control and calmness that the people of neither 
of the other nations could surpass. 

When in the South African war the news of the victory 
at Mafeking was received in England the people went 
wild. Great boisterous, jostling crowds surged through 
the streets of London and the English language became 
enriched by the word " mafeking," signifying a noisy 
and somewhat unruly celebration. Compare that occur- 
rence with what took place in Paris on the famous Novem- 
ber 11th. While everyone had for some days previously 
believed that the end was near, nevertheless on Novem- 
ber 10th it was reported in Paris that the actual conclu- 
sion of the armistice might be delayed for one or even 
two days. When an American officer learned at the 
American headquarters at 9 :30 A. M. on the lltli that 
the armistice had actually been signed that morning at 
five, and was to go into effect at eleven, he hastened to 
the street expecting to find Paris already en fete cele- 
brating the consummation of her victory over her heridi- 
tary foe. But the great Boulevards were as quiet and 
orderly as on other days. There was no shouting, no 
excitement, no newspaper extras, no demonstration, and 
yet in ninety minutes the greatest war of all history that 
had held France on the rack for more than four years 
would be at an end. Meeting a French naval officer he 
imparted the news. '' I had not heard it," the French- 
man said, " but hope it is true. I will inquire at the 
Ministry of Marine whither I am going." It was not 
until 10:45 that the Bourse confirmed the news to the 
Paris banks. 

Then, but not till then, did Paris begin to celebrate. 
Shops were closed, flags were displayed, and without any 
ordinance or concerted action a general holiday was pro- 
claimed or rather went into effect. But the crowds that 
filled the streets were orderly and exceedingly quiet. 
Onlv the Americans were makin.o' a noise. 



EELATIONS VflTII THE FEENCH 145 

During July and August, 1918, a part of one of the 
original engineer regiments was occupied in constructing 
for the First Army, A. E. F., an ammunition dump south- 
westerly from Chateau-Thierry. In the early morning of 
July 15th, heavy firing was heard, but the nature of it 
could not be learned. That day the officer commanding 
the regiment lunched with some French officers at a 
neighboring aviation camp, and during the meal one of 
the latter very casually remarked, and in much the same 
tone as if it were of no great importance, that the enemy 
had crossed the Marne in the early hours of the morning. 
Commencing with their first great offensive that began 
on March 21st, the Germans had launched a series of 
major attacks towards Amiens, Montdidier, the Aisne, 
and the Marne, each of which had netted large gains, but 
certainly in the popular and to a large extent in the mili- 
tary mind, the Marne, the scene of the first victory, stood 
as the great barrier beyond which they could not pass. 
Now they had actually crossed it! 

"Were the French officers excited? Not in the least! 
They had received no details, but were quite confident 
that Poch had the situation well in hand. Just then two 
American officers who were passing, stopped, in the hope 
of getting something to eat. The contrast between them 
and the French was interesting. They were full of both 
news and excitement. An attack in force had been made 
and a crossing of the river on a wide front effected with 
the advance still continuing. They also said the high- 
way to LaFerte, the American headquarters, had been 
shelled and cut. Immediately after luncheon the com- 
manding engineer officer started in a motor for Army 
Headquarters. He found the road intact as the French 
officers said that he probably would, but he soon ran into 
the flotsam of battle. There were ambulances and all 
sorts of vehicles, both motor and horse drawn, hurriedly 
impressed into service, moving southward with their 



146 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

loads of wounded wHcIl were being distributed among 
extemporized hospitals in all the villages, and the 
upward flow of guns and ammunition lorries, of trucks 
and busses filled with reserves, all being hurried north- 
ward. 

As he sped on through Coulommiers, Aulonoy, Jouarre 
and other smaller places, the people were standing in 
scattered groups talking very quietly, and though their 
earnest faces showed unmistakably that they fully real- 
ized the alarming situation of the moment, they were not 
excited. They had seen the advanced line of foam of 
the first great German wave of August, 1914, trickle 
through these same streets, they knew of those other 
great waves of the immediately preceding months that, 
rolling over villages and cities by the score, had washed 
them away, and now this very day there was a new wave 
just set in motion, with its oncoming roaring crest less 
than fifteen miles distant. Were their homes, which had 
seen one tide actually lap their very door steps and 
recede, now to be swept away? For them it was a terri- 
bly anxious moment, their all was at stake but there was 
absolutely no excitement, no running hither and there, no 
noise. As each new ambulance came up, they stopped 
their talking and gave a hand to help carry the wounded, 
for temporary rest, into their houses until other accom- 
modations farther to the rear could be provided, houses 
that might be in ruins before another day's sun should 
go down. "Would an American crowd have been so calm, 
so completely self-possessed? Perhaps, but they could 
not have shown a finer spirit, they could not have sur- 
passed the conduct of those French people' as shown 
under the trying conditions of that July 15th. We know 
now, what they did not know then, that on that morning 
the line of furthest advance had been reached, and that 
in three days the great counter offensive would begin, the 
first since Cambrai, and that this offensive was to con- 



RELATIONS WITH THE FEENCH 147 

tinue along the whole front until final victory was gained. 

France has suffered in the war as no country, no 
people has ever been called on to suffer. In her defense 
the women have given more than 1,300,000 sons, hus- 
bands, fathers who will never return. They lie buried om 
that continuous field that stretches all the way from the 
Yosges Mountains to the North Sea. The women have 
submitted to that sacrifice without complaint, and bravely 
doing what they themselves could do, in maintaining the 
home, in working in the fields, factories and mines, look- 
ing to and hoping for that day when it would all end. 
This they did with unsurpassed bravery for more than 
four terrible years, and now it is their lot to live on with- 
out those who were or later would have been their main- 
stays in life. To the women of France all honor I 

The physical damage that has been done to the coun- 
try cannot be imagined. To realize the full awfulness of 
it, the destruction must have been seen when it was 
still fresh, because the gentle hand of time has already 
begun to sear the open wounds and to smooth the scars. 
Although the actual destruction will not grow smaller, 
its fearfulness is already beginning to be less garish, and 
in a few years will have lost much of its terrible aspect. 
So soon are we led to forget ! 

But take a map of France and draw on it a line begin- 
ning at the Belgian frontier and running through St. 
Omer, St. Pol, Amiens, Compiegne, Chateau-Thierry, 
Rheims, Suippes, Pierrefitte, Commercy, Toul and Nancy 
to the German Alsatian frontier, and you will have 
roughly delineated this western or southern line of battle 
destruction. West of the line there are places that have 
been damaged by air raids, and some seriously so, such 
as Abbeville, Paris, Chalons, and Bar-le-Duc, but they are 
isolated cases. Between the above-described line and the 
northern boundary of France, an area more than 280 
miles long and with a mean width of about fifty miles. 



148 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

there is not a city or a village but that has been almost 
completely destroyed. Places along the outer limits may 
have been damaged in part only, but all towns and cities 
in the interior of the war belt have, without exception, 
been rendered uninhabitable. In many, many instances 
not only has every house been knocked down, but so com- 
pletely demolished that not even the lines of the founda- 
tions or the location of the streets can be distinguished. 

This territory was one of the fairest and richest of all 
France. Now it is laid absolutely waste. The houses 
where the people lived and the mills where they worked, 
no longer exist, the rich top soil that produced year upon 
year its abundant crop has been blown away over exten- 
sive areas by the exploding shells, trees have been cut 
down, and the fields furrowed deep by trenches or cov- 
ered with acres of wire entanglements. 

Elsewhere than along the western fringe of the devas- 
tated district the civil population had been almost 
entirely evacuated, except in the coal districts in the 
north, where such as could work were allowed to stay. 
There women and children remained, doing their share 
by helping the miners or tilling the fields and thus releas- 
where there was not a house that did not show some 
damage, where not a pane of window glass remained, 
and living to all outward appearances entirely oblivious 
of war and death. It was really most extraordi- 
nary how they managed to continue the accustomed 
details of their normal life. As an illustration there 
comes to mind a picture of a sweet morning of a Sunday 
in early June in a little village among the coal mining 
districts near Bethune, whence the German trenches were 
not more than two or three miles distant. Down the 
main street constituting as is usual in France the sole 
street of the village and along which were ranged the 
miners' houses, every one with its battle scars, there 



EELATIONS WITH THE FKENCH 149 

passed a procession of young girls dressed in white 
going to their first communion, a procession exactly like' 
those other processions in which their mothers and grand- 
mothers for ever so many generations had taken their 
part. It mattered not to them that an occasional enemy] 
shell shrieked overhead. Poor little things, their mem- 
ories could not in some instances recall the days when 
there were not such sounds and, therefore, they took 
them quite casually and as a matter of course now. The 
young brothers of these girls, too young as yet to be 
accepted in the army, and their mothers were filling the 
places of their older brothers and fathers in the mines 
that France might have coal for her factories to turn out 
guns and shells. The little old parish church to which 
the procession went, may have an ugly gaping wound in 
its roof, its windows may be quite destitute of any glass, 
and only a shattered stump of its belfry may remain, but 
the old white-haired cure, too infirm to render service 
in the trenches, still ministers to his flock, and under what 
remains of the shadow of the cross the women and chil- 
dren cling to home and work for France. Those little 
ones in white seemed to personify the splendid spirit of 
France that enabled her to face losses, damage and suf- 
fering such as no nation had ever been called on to 
endure. 

But these were the workers. They were yoimg and 
theirs was the hope of victory and peace and with that 
consummation the reunited family and the restored home. 
In contrast there comes another picture, one that has 
been many times repeated, perhaps the saddest type of 
picture of the whole war. It was in a little village in the 
Somme country where everything was absolutely 
destroyed. An aged couple had somehow obtained one 
6T those much-coveted passes to visit their old village 
located in the fighting zone. They were looking for what 



150 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

had been their home, something dear to ns all, hut per- 
haps dearest to a Frencliman who is not accustomed to 
travel and is particularly strongly inclined to live in the 
place where his forefathers lived. The old people had 
found the site they were seeking, but their house was like 
jevery other house for miles, just a pile of blackened 
stones. The poor old woman was seated on the broken 
mass eating a piece of dark war bread. There were no 
tears, tears could not flow under such circumstances, but 
the expression of mute agony on that poor old soul's 
face, as her eyes looked in silence on her life's wreck, told 
in unmistakable terms the story of her grief, of the full 
realization of her all having been swept away, and the 
recognition that the years remaining to her were too few 
to give her any hope for a resurrection. She, too, had 
bled for France I 

This tenacity of the French to their homes, even when 
the homes had ceased to exist as habitable houses and 
when they were actually under the fire of their own 
French guns, caused annoyance to the Germans, as Mr. 
Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, now Ambassa- 
dor, to Belgium, recounts in his admirable book, 
** Belgium." The French peasants behind the German 
lines in northern France, *' in their stubborn and pathetic 
attachment to the land, continued to till their soil," as 
Mr. Whitlock says, and when the Germans were 
criticized for not evacuating these people, they answered : 

** But they do not wish to be evacuated. Try yourself 
lo make them leave." 

In pursuance to this suggestion, and with the view of 
saving the French inhabitants from destruction by their 
own or British fire, some of the delegates of the Ameri- 
can Commission on Belgian Relief in the north of France 
were detailed to question the peasants. '' They offered 
them the chance of leaving, but they would not go ; they 
preferred to stay in their homes as long as their positions 



EELATIONS WITH THE FEENCH 151 

were at all tenable, and to face tlie unknown dangers 
there rather than to confront the unknown dangers of 
the mysterious world outside. Peasants ploughed while 
an occasional shell fell in the fields about them, and old 
peasant women, driven from tKeir homes by bombard- 
ment, crawled back at night to seek some shelter in the 
ruins that still had some air of familiarity. ' ' 

The French soldiers undoubtedly entertained toward 
their American brothers-in-arms a sincere feeling of true 
comradeship, to which they gave' expression on every 
occasion. The following treatment of one of the engi- 
neer regiments is an illustration of French sentiment, 
with its roots striking through mere superficial politeness 
down into that earnest good will that the French troops 
and French nation offered to their transatlantic allies. 

The regiment in question found itself in central 
France engaged on some construction work during the 
early days of July, 1918. The officer commanding the 
local French troops called on the American colonel and 
requested his cooperation in a military review on the 
forthcoming great French national holiday, July 14th. 
When they came to arrange the details it was found that 
the American officer was the senior in point of rank. The 
French officer not only at once conceded priority, but 
insisted that the American troops should occupy the right 
of the line, the position of honor accorded to rank, and 
that for precisely the same reason, the American officer 
should take the salute on the march past. On such am 
occasion the French ceremonial requires that after the 
troops have been inspected and reviewed, they shall 
be again formed in line and that a salute be rendered to 
the flag, posted with the appropriate color guard in 
advance of the formation in line. Now it happened that 
the French unit had no colors, colors during the war not 
being much used, and the French officer proposed that 
the American flag be saluted instead. The American 



152 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

officer protested that it was a Frencli holiday, that, in 
according the posts of honor to his regiment and himself 
America had already received more than her share 
of attention on such an occasion, but the Frenchman 
would listen to no objection. ** II n'y a q'une armee, 
q'un drapeau," he exclaimed. 

Then on July 14th in the quaint medieval square of the 
old city, in the presence of the people massed on the side- 
walks or crowding every window, and of the city officials 
with their tricolored scarfs grouped on the courthouse 
steps, the command, *' Honneur au drapeau! " was 
given and the men of the two nations brought their rifles 
to the position of salute, there floated upward toward the 
old round tower, which legend says was once the resi- 
dence of Richard Coeur de Lion of England, the strains 
of the stirring, moving '^ Marseillaise " and of the well 
beloved " Star-Spangled Banner.'* 

The French recognized that there were different 
nations but only one aim. They were always very polite 
in acknowledging their gratitude, as they expressed it, 
for America's assistance to France, but they knew quite 
well that America was fighting its own and not France's 
battle and they much preferred to be answered that 
America was struggling with and not for France. It was 
the community of purpose, the identity of ideal that they 
saw and desired to have expressed, or as the French 
officer put it, '' One army, one flag! " 



CHAPTER XIV 

FORESTRY 

A British officer defined lumber as a munition of war. 
On account of its many applications and uses, the enor- 
mous quantity needed, and the fact that no substitute 
for it could be found or manufactured, it seemed to b© 
entitled to the dignity of the higher classification rather 
than be treated as merely one of tens of thousands of 
articles grouped under the head of supplies. 

France, thanks to the wonderful system of reforestra- 
tion which she had been enforcing for many years, had 
been and during the war was able to supply in great 
measure her own local needs. This was not true for 
Great Britain, who had depended largely on foreign 
countries, America, Australia and the Baltic districts. 
Lack of ocean tonnage that could be spared for timber 
shipments during the war greatly reduced the available 
supply from all these sources, and Great Britain turned 
to France for assistance. France on other occasions had 
responded to other calls and she did not fail her ally in 
this one. 

French forests are much more extensive and contain 
more large sized trees than an American would expect 
to find in an old, densely populated country where the for- 
ests have been exploited for centuries, accustomed as he 
is to the spendthrift squandering and sickening waste of 
his own once magnificent timber wealth. In France forests 
are the property of either the state itself, of the various 
communes, of certain public institutions such as hospitals 
or universities, or of individuals. In times of peace all 
forest lands, however owned, came under the jurisdiction 
of the Service des Eaux et Forets, a bureau of the 

153 



154 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Department of Agriculture, which administered the state 
properties and controlled to some extent the others. 
Indiscriminate and wasteful cutting of trees was forbid- 
den. No section of forest land could be laid waste. 
Instead only a certain proportion of trees might be 
removed at one time, leaving enough to protect the half- 
grown trees and the young growth, When trees were 
cut, others were set out to take their places. Thus by 
cutting over a part of any forest area each year and by 
working in slow rotation over the whole area, it has been 
possible to get a regular annual crop and still leave the 
forest intact. In short, a French lumberman draws from 
his investment its regular product of interest and never 
touches the principal. 

The French official and the French lumberman are also 
keenly on the alert against fire, an enemy to be feared 
quite as much as waste. By a proper staff of watchmen, 
by the removal of all fallen limbs and dead pieces, by 
systematically laid out clearings to prevent the rapid 
spread of fire should one start, and above all, through a 
wholesome respect for and realization on the part of the 
entire population of the enormous value of the forests 
to the nation, France has been spared those frightful and 
so unnecessary holocausts that have so often swept 
American forests. In this matter we as a people have 
much to learn. 

The consequence was that, when after it was recognized 
that the war was to be a long protracted affair and that 
EDi ovierseas supply of timber could not be obtained, 
France could and did undertake to care for her allies 
as well as for herself. The peace-time forestry organiza- 
tion continued to function during the war, but to adapt 
it to the new conditions, to provide for allied needs and 
to correlate private with government interests, so that 
all might work for the common cause under intelligent 
direction, there was established the Comite Franco- 



FORESTEY 155 

Brltfanique de Bois de Guerre, under the. direction of tHe 
Inspecteur General des Services de Bois. This Commit- 
tee furnished the necessary machinery for the procuring 
of timber from government or state lands and arranged 
that there should be no conflict in demands, no unneces- 
sary competition with inflation of prices and that waste 
should be reduced to the minimum. 

This committee saw only to the matter of supply of 
and payment for standing timber, each army attending 
to the felling and sawing of the trees allotted to it. The 
British government organized a special forestry service 
from among the Canadian troops, but this force, like so 
many of the special forces, was inadequate to the huge 
task. Therefore, when the Balfour Commission was dis- 
cussing, in May, 1917, with the American government the 
details of American cooperation, Lieutentant-General 
Bridges, the military attache to the conunission, 
requested that a special regiment of woodmen be raised 
to be loaned to the British army to assist in getting out 
various lumber products. 

"When the American Engineer Commission arrived in 
France, the French government made it very clear that 
enormous quantities of lumber of all sizes for all pur- 
poses would be needed and that, while they preferred 
that such material should come from our own forests, 
they recognized the practical impossibility of transport- 
ing such a bulky commodity when all available ship ton- 
nage would be needed to bring the men and those sup- 
plies that must come from America, such as could come 
from nowhere felse. They further stated that French 
forests would be at America's service to a limited extent. 
But the government also made clear the point that all 
the forestry force and all the cutting and sawing 
machinery with means of transportation from the forests 
to the main railways must be furnished by the United 
States. 



156 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

[WitH the American entry into tlie European timber 
field it was evident that the demand for timber was to be 
greatly increased and that the arrangements which had 
heretofore contemplated only the demands by the French 
and British armies must be reorganized. The first step 
was to enlarge the Franco-British Committee into an 
Inter- Allied Committee along the same general lines but 
with increased membership, wider scope and greater 
power. The details of the careful and highly organized 
methods for the control of timber lands and timber prod- 
ucts, so far as they aifected the army, are admirably 
described in the historical report of the Chief Engineer, 
A. E. F.: 

" Wlien the advance guard of American Foresters 
arrived in Paris in June, 1917, they found the French 
Government and Army highly organized for supplying 
the French and British forces with timber. Each of the 
French Army Groups carried on its staff a Forestry 
Service attached to the ' Direction des Etapes.* Under 
the Forestry Service of the Army Groups were Chefs 
d'Arrondissement and under them in turn Chefs de Sec- 
teur. This elaborate organization, maintained by the 
French Genie (i. e., Corps of Engineers), requisitioned 
existing stocks of lumber or wood, bought or requisi- 
tioned forests or obtained cessions of timber from the 
State Forests of the region, operated saw-mills with Ger- 
man prisoners or French Genie troops, largely handled 
its own motor and railroad transportation and func- 
tioned as a whole as a verj^ intensely organized and spe- 
cialized section of the French Army supply service. In 
the Zone of the Eear, a large organization had been 
developed under the Ministre de 1 'Armament et des 
Fabrications de Guerre for obtaining the stocks of rail- 
road ties, aviation lumber, artillery and vehicle lumber, 
and all other forest products needed to carry on the war. 
This organization centered in the Inspecteur General des 



FOEESTRY 157 

Services de Bols in Paris, wlio directed the activities 
of some twenty Centres des Bois, the latter embracing 
all parts of France outside of the Army Zone. Each 
Centre de Bois consisted of a group of French engineers 
or forestry officers, headed by a Directeur de Centre, who 
represented the French Government in obtaining mili- 
tary supplies of forest products in a given region. The 
Centres de Bois had authority by presidential decree to 
requisition up to seventy-five per cent of the output of 
any saw-mill at a standard scale of prices fixed by th^ 
Inspecteur General at Paris. They also purchased spe- 
cial products like railroad ties, piling and so forth, at 
prices fixed by the individual Centre. They purchased 
or requisitioned forests, installed mills which were oper- 
ated largely by German prisoners, but to some extent 
by French Genie troops ; and formed, in a word, an exten- 
sion of the Wood Supply Service of the French Army 
Groups over the entire territory of France, although 
under the control of the French Ministry of Munitions. 
The line between the Army Zone and the Zone of the 
Eear was very sharply drawn, and the organizations on 
either side of it were totally distinct. [Within the Army 
Zone, the; French Army Groups obtained their timber 
supplies directly by their own services and had prac- 
tically absolute control of all forest resources within the 
Zone. In the Zone of the Eear, on the other hand, the 
organization was a civilian one, although made np largely 
of militarized personnel, functioning through the French 
Ministry and disposing of its products in accordance 
with such budgets or allocations as might be determined 
upon by the Minister of Munitions and the Minister of 
War.'' 

In accordance witH the habitual French respect fori 
trained advisory bodies, there was organized La Commis- 
sion Forestiere d 'Expertises, independent of the Inter- 
Allied Committee, but necessarily associated with it, 



158 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

:wliose duty it was to determine tlie amount of timber on 
any private tract allocated to military service, to 
appraise the value and negotiate the purchase. The 
Comite permanent de Bois de Guerre, consisting of the 
Inspector General, representatives of the Department of 
Agriculture, prominent French lumber manufacturers 
and members of the French Parliament, laid down the 
lines of a general policy to be pursued by the govern- 
ment in regard to military demands of the allies, 
including, of course, the French, for lumber. The Inter- 
Allied Commission for the purchase of lumber, with 
headquarters in London and Paris, correlated all pur- 
chases of the allied armies from neutral countries, par- 
ticularly Scandinavia, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. 
Then there were the permanent government organiza- 
tions such as the Ecole de Chemins de Fer, controlling 
the existing stocks of railway ties in Prance, and the Ser- 
yice de Ponts et Chaussees, with jurisdiction over the 
use and repair of roads, the disposition of timber along 
public highways, and the use of streams for driving logs. 

All this may have seemed too complicated and unneces- 
sarily cumbersome to the average American, unaccus- 
tomed to referring affairs to trained specialists. In fact, 
sometimes younger officers, not understanding European 
procedure, criticized the application of the principle, but 
it was the French method of reaching a result, and any 
other method would have ended in chaos. 

As to the details of procedure of acquiring forests and 
how successful the French plan was, it is again con- 
yenient to quote from the report of the Chief Engineer : 

** The group of foresters and lumbermen who came to 
France in August and October, 1917, were employed very 
largely on reconnaissance to locate suitable tracts of tim- 
iber," * * * and the ** reconnaissance for timber was 
Sextended over practically all France south of the occu- 
pied departments and the departments forming a base 



FOEESTEY 159 

for the BritisK Army. Officers attached to the Central 
Headquarters of the Section, and the personnel in the 
Office of the American Delegate on the Inter- Allied Com- 
mittee scouted continuously for timber in new regions, 
including the Central Plateau, the French Alps and the 
Pyrenees.'* 

As each forest was examined, a report upon it with 
recommendations for or against acquisition was sub- 
mitted to the Chief of the Forestry Section, through the 
District Commander in all regions covered by operating 
districts. 

If the forest was deemed to be desirable for A. E. F. 
operations, the representative of the Section at Chaumont 
was instructed to acquire it if possible, if the forest was 
situated in the War Zone area, while the American 
Delegate on the Inter-Allied Wood Committee at 
Paris acquired it if it lay in the rear of the 
Army Zone. In the War Zong, the acquisition 
of the forest was requested from the Direction des 
Etapes of the proper French army group, through the 
French Mission at American General Headquarters. 
The French forestry officers on the Direction des Etapes 
decided if the forest could be allotted to the American 
Expeditionary Force, and if so, proceeded to acquire it 
through their own field organization which negotiated 
directly with the French Forestry Service in the case of 
state or communal timber, and with private owners in 
the case of private timber. The Direction des Etapes 
possessed ample powers for the requisition of forests, 
which were exercised more freely than in the Zone of 
the Eear. Acquisitions in the War Zone, in the main, pro- 
ceeded rapidly, all details being arranged between the 
local officers of the Forestry Section and the Chefs du 
Secteur of the Direction des Etapes. 

In the case of forests in the Zone of the Eear, the 
American Delegate had first to obtain the approval of 



160 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the cession or purchase in behalf of the A. E. F. from 
the Inter- Allied Wood Committee. In the case of state 
or communal timber the consent of the French Forestry- 
Service had also to be obtained. The allocation of the for- 
est to the A. E. F. might then be made or refused, after 
considering our needs for it in relation to those of the 
French and British Armies. The Canadian Forestry 
Corps had established operations in four of the regions 
logically tributary to the A. E. F., namely; The Yosges 
Mountains, the Jura Mountains, the northern part of the 
Loire River Valley, and the pineries south of Bordeaux. 
Competition between the A. E. F. and the British 
Directorate of Forestry for desirable tracts was often 
keen and the allocation of the forest to one army or the 
other, if indeed the French did not reserve it for them- 
selves, had to be thrashed out in the Inter-Allied Wood 
Committee. Once a forest was allotted to the A. E. F., 
all further details were settled directly with the French 
Forestry Service in the case of state or communal hold- 
ings. In the case of private holdings, the Commission 
d 'Expertises was requested to estimate and appraise the 
timber and, if possible, to effect its purchase. This pro- 
cedure was extremely slow, largely on account of the 
limited personnel available to the Expert Commission, a 
situation which was met as far as possible by loaning to 
the Commission a considerable number of trained Ameri- 
can foresters to assist in the field estimates. If the 
Expert Commission succeeded in effecting a purchase, 
and in view of the difficulties encountered, its work in the 
main was surprisingly successful due to the energy and 
ability of its chief, a contract with the owner was made 
by the Centre de Bois concerned. If the Expert Com- 
mission was unable to obtain the forest by friendly pur- 
chase it was necessary to request the Comite Permanent 
to approve its requisition. 
But the careful, thrifty French would not permit their 



FORESTRY 161 

forests to be despoiled. Timber might" be cut, but noli 
wasted. To obtain the supply for the current year it was 
shown that it was not necessary to kill the growing sup- 
plies of future years. To this end the following require- 
ments were enforced, as set forth in the report of the 
Chief Engineer : 

** The methods of cutting state and communal forests 
iwere fixed by the terms of the cessions as drafted by the 
Conservateur of the district concerned. In the case of 
private forests, cutting regulations were outlined in the 
* Proces Verbaux ' prepared by the Expert Commission, 
5n the course of its appraisal of the timber. These were 
later embodied and sometimes changed in the formal 
contracts made with private owners by the Centres des 
iBois. The contracts were uniformly delayed until long 
after cutting had begun. In each district, however, a 
special liaison officer representing the Inspecteur Gen- 
ieral directed the methods to be followed in cutting pri« 
(vate forests and settled complaints from owners. In thd 
Army Zone, these duties were discharged by the Chefs 
<du Secteur. In the state and communal forests, methods 
of cutting were closely controlled by the field officers of 
fthe French Forestry Service." 

** The requirements of the French bureau of forestry 
mere enforced in state and communal cessions. They 
were departed from in the' case of many private forests 
which had been requisitioned or whose owners were fa- 
vorable to a heavier cut than forestry rules would nor- 
mally permit. In the southern pineries, following the 
forestry system of the region, the timber was cut clean 
and the requirements were comparatively simple. In a 
few instances the terms of the cession required the 
removal of the undergrowth of briars. In the hardwood 
forests and the softwood forests of the eastern moun- 
tains only trees selected and marked by the FrencK 
foresters could be cut, and these usually consisted of 



162 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

from fifteen to forty per cent of tlie total volume of mer- 
chantable material. In a few large hardwood areas, spe- 
cial concessions permitted the removal of as much as 
eighty per cent of the timber in the coupes cut over. The 
piling of brush was required in the pine and fir forests 
of central and eastern France, but not as a rule in th6 
hardwood forests where the close utilization of fuel wood 
left nothing but small twigs. In a few instances, the pull- 
ing of stumps after cutting was enforced." 

" The most serious restriction from the standpoint of 
effective logging operations was the limitation of the 
total quantity of timber which could be removed from 
many forests. In the state and communal forests of 
eastern France, containing many magnificent areas of 
fir and spruce timber, cutting was restricted to a limited 
number of * coupes * which were ready for fellings 
under the exact methods of management applied by the 
French Forestry Service. Certain coupes of mature tim- 
ber would be withheld, for example, because the regener- 
ation of young trees was not sufficiently advanced. Th^ 
markings in these forests, as a result of continued pres- 
sure by the American representatives who dealt with the 
French Forestry Service, were extended to include in 
some cases from five to ten * annual possibilities,' that is, 
from five to ten times the quantity permitted to be cut 
in one year under the working plan prescribed for the 
management of the forest in question, all timber marked, 
however, being restricted to such as could safely be 
removed from the standpoint of maturity and the regen- 
eration of the new crops. As a matter of fact, French 
forestry practice in. this region is so conservative that 
several of these forests carried an excessive amount of 
old timber, and cuttings of this character and extent were 
not injurious from a purely technical standpoint. The 
most extreme illustrations of the application of French 
forestry requirements occurred in a few cases of large, 



FORESTRY 163 

rich forests where the cntting of only a small fraction of 
the merchantable timber was allowed, this being 
restricted to wind-falls or thinnings." 

It is hoped that the above lessons how to care for for- 
iests and to conduct operations have been learned and will 
be appreciated by our own lumberman. 

The first unit of the American forestry force was the 
10th Regiment of Engineers organized among the lum- 
ber districts of the west. It arrived in France on Octo- 
ber 2, 1917, and was followed in quick succession by the 
20th, 41st, 42d, and 43d Engineers, and the 503d, 507th, 
517th, 519th, 523d, 531st and 633d Service Battalions. 
On October 18th, a forestry service was organized by; 
combining the above regiments into one regiment known 
as the; 20th Engineers, and the service battalions into 
attached Forestry Service Companies. 

The regiment finally consisted of fourteen battalions 
of forty-nine companies and at the close of hostilities 
contained about 20,000 officers and men, the largest regi- 
ment in the American Army. Plans were under contem- 
plation to increase the personnel to 50,000 men, which 
would have made it the largest regiment in any army 
of the world, larger even than the Fifth Engineers of the 
French Army, the famous unit of railway troops. It 
was commanded by Colonel J. A. Woodruff, who, with 
four lieutenant-colonels through headquarters at Tours, 
administered not a regiment, except in name, but a great 
manufacturing festablishment. As indicating how actual 
figures exceeded the estimated requirements, the maxi- 
mum forestry force likely to be needed was computed 
at the beginning of operations to consist of ten battalions 
of forestry troops, formed by three battalions of engi- 
neers and seven service battalions, a total maximum 
force of 15,000 men. 

Much of the timber that was cut came from extensive 
forests without interior means of transportation. Nar- 



164 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

row-gauge railways were constructed in those places 
where haul hj motor, by tractor or by team was too 
great for reasonable economy. The main items of plant 
used by the Twentieth Engineers included : 



400 miles of railway track 
of 60 c. m., 3 ft. 
meter and standard 



282 sawmills, 
1,850 logging wagons, 
12,500 horses, 

128 power tractors, g'^^-^gQ, 

2,300 motor trucks and 2,070 railway logging cars, 
trailers, 85 locomotives. 

The chief areas from which timber was cut were the 
Landes district south of Bordeaux, producing pine of a 
rather inferior grade, the Vosges and Jura Mountains, 
where firs were found giving splendid piles as long as 
100 feet, and many scattered isolated forests through 
central France furnishing oak, beech and other hard- 
woods. The following table shows the total production 
by the American Forestry Section : 



TOTAL CUT OF FORESTRY SECTION, DEC. 1, 1917 TO 
APRIL 1, 1919 





By Units 
Working 

FOR 

Americ^ust 
Army 


By Units 
Working 

FOR 

French 
Army 


By Units 
Working 

FOR 

British 
Army 


Lumber ft. B. M 


212,528,000 
5,065,000 
4,853,000 


3,011,795 
210,124 
228,130 


953,874 

219,366 

64,025 


Standard gauge R. R. tie^, pieces 

Light railway ties, pieces 






Total 


222,446,050 


3,450,049 


1,237,265 






Miscellaneous round products, pieces . . 
Piling pieces 


1,883,504 

127,598 

14,102 


39,095 


1,194,817 
64,049 


Fuelv/ood stores 




12,295 








Total 


2,025,204 


39,095 


1,271,161 







FORESTEY 165 

Tlie lumber was used for all sorts of purposes, but the 
greater part for wharves, buildings, bridges and timber 
roads, although items such as packing boxes consumed 
much. The '' Miscellaneous Round Pieces " include 
poles for telegraph and telephone lines, props for mines, 
dugouts and trench supports, and something like 
1,000,000 stakes from two to five feet long, for wire 
entanglements. The maximum cut in one month (Octo- 
ber, 1918) was 53,000,000 feet B. M. 

At first the French authorities, in order to permit 
American engineers to commence work on the erection 
of the wharves and storehouses, undertook to supply the 
necessary timber by their own forces, with the under- 
standing that American foresters would later cut for 
them at least an equivalent amount. 

The prospect of supplying three large armies with con- 
struction timber over and above French commercial 
needs, all of which was to be cut from their own care- 
fully preserved forests, naturally filled the French 
authorities with alarm lest the standing supply should 
be depleted seriously. Had the wa'r continued this fear 
would have had reasonable justification, but even the 
great cut made by the American engineers did not 
amount to more than fifteen per cent of the normal annual 
cut in France prior to the war. 

Although the men of the Twentieth Engineers were 
intended primarily to operate far removed from the bat- 
tle line, and were given only a small amount of military 
drill and armed only so far as to furnish guards, never- 
theless some of the work was carried out under fire, and 
more than one gold star stands to their credit. 

One of the battalions went overseas on the Tuscania 
early in 1918. On the afternoon of February 5th thg 
voyage was rightly considered over. The north coast 
of Ireland was in plain sight, only ten miles away on the 
starboard beam, when suddenly the ship was lifted by 



166 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

tlie explosion of a torpedo. The few vessels that were 
near took off as many men as they could, but as some of 
the Tuscania's boats could not be lowered, owing to the 
listing of the ship, and others had been smashed, about 
700 men were left on board with no help in sight. As the 
ship slowly settled they cheerfully sang: 

" ^here do we go from here, boys, 
Where do we go from here ? " 

Then a destroyer came up and continued the rescue, 
but as it was, ninety-two found a resting place in Irish 
soil or with those many other men, women and chil- 
dren, who were victims of the silly, cruel policy that 
availed Germany so little and contributed so much to her 
eventual downfall. 



;CHAPTER XVi 

^iVATER SUPPLY 

That an army cannot exist .witliont water is axiomatic, 
but that in no previous war did an army need so much 
water as in this one is also true. The armies were 
larger, and besides the men and animals to be supplied 
with drink there were also locomotives and motors. In 
addition to quantity of water, quality was now con- 
sidered for the first time, because general staffs realized 
that there was a difference in waters, and that, if thS 
health of armies were to be conserved, only water of 
certain purity, or chemically brought to that standard, 
must be supplied. 

To furnish the requisite amount of pure water for a 
city of say 50,000 population is no small task, but what 
of the task of furnishing enough water for that number 
of men who have been moved into an uninhabited area 
on a few days' notice? That was usually the problem 
given to the engineer. To solve it properly he must be 
something of a hydraulic expert, a chemist, and a 
bacteriologist. 

The American army on arrival found water supply 
services established in both the French and British 
armies, and as the "American forces were to occupy aH 
first a small part of the existing front and gradually, as 
more troops arrived, a greater and still greater part, it 
was only immediately necessary to take over the installa- 
tions already made. 

iUsually an army depended for its supply of water on 
a series of water stations, wells, streams, or reservoirs 
located substantially parallel with the front line and dis- 
tant from it three to six miles, depending on the topog- 

167 



168 li^MEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FEANCE 

rapliy of the ground and available source of supply. 
[Waaler stations make excellent targets. From the water 
carts that are always standing by taking load the sta- 
tions are easily recognized in aerial photographs, and on 
account of their importance soon receive attention from 
the enemy guns. They must, therefore, be kept out of 
range of the field artillery. These advance stations were 
very simple installations consisting of a gasoline operated 
pump, as a steam pump with its smoke would never do, 
a tank with a pipe line from the pump, stand pipe or 
hose from the tank to fill the carts, water-troughs and 
perhaps one or more pipe lines for distribution. 

The difference in extensiveness between the French 
and British installations was quite marked. The theory 
of the former was that immobility of an army could not 
be, or at least should not be, believed to be of long con- 
tinuance, and that, therefore, extensive water develop- 
ments were but a waste of time and effort. Even though 
the front might be stabilized for long periods of time, as 
was the case, nevertheless the extent of the forces hold- 
ing any given sector fluctuated between perhaps wide 
limits, approaching a condition of mobility. They argued 
that it was better to use local resources or, if they 
were insufficient, to set up other water points in great 
numbers, of small individual capacity and of the simplest 
character. 

The British practice was rather the converse. They 
were inclined to dig or bore large wells giving a gener- 
ous capacity of flow, which lead to a smaller number of 
water points for a given output. But the British instal- 
lations being larger than the more numerous French 
ones, had a more complex equipment. 

Good arguments can be advanced for either point of 
view. On the one hand that it is better to avoid concentra- 
tion, when the failure of a single unit might have serious 
consequences ; on the other, that the more permanent and 



WATER SUPPLY 169 

larger plant was less likely to go wrong throngli failure of 
mechanism, while the danger of concentration was more 
than offset by the safety arising from the inspection and 
control naturally attendant to a large installation. But 
the real reason for the difference anose from the oppos- 
ing traits of national character. The same was visible 
in trench construction, in railways, in buildings, in fact 
rn almost every detail of organization and execution. 
One nation by nature leans to lightness, delicacy and 
mobility, the other to strength, solidity and permanence. 
It made an exceedingly interesting study in psychology 
to observe the constant exhibition of thfe contradictory 
national tendencies. It is impossible to say which was 
the better system. Probably each army was right, 
because by following what was for it, the seemingly 
proper path the best results were obtained. 

Some skill was frequently displayed in hiding water 
points, using ruined buildings for sites for tanks or 
putting pumps under an earth cover. 

Pipe lines to the front were usually impossible on 
account of being exposed to breakage by shell fire, 
against which burying in trenches provided no shelter, as 
shells were effective far beyond any limit of practical 
depth of pipe trench. If pipe lines leading to the front 
in advanced areas were used, experience showed that it 
was safer to run them across country rather than along 
roads, as tlie latter were so frequently used as targets 
by the enemy when troops were known to be passing or 
in the hope of catching them by chance. As an uninter- 
rupted supply of water was necessary, the lines had to 
be immediately repaired, if they were cut. To this end 
special gangs lived in nearby dugouts where they 
kept in stock a full assortment of tools and an extra 
supply of pipes and connections. The usual method of 
transportation and distribution to troops in advance of 
water points was by water-tank cars on the light rail- 



170 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

ways, by automobile water trucks and horse drawn tank 
wagons. For storage in the trenches, nothing better was 
found than the ordinary gasoUne cans or '' petrol tins " 
as the British called them. They were light, non-break- 
able, of convenient size, easy to handle and good for no 
other purpose. For a while the water might have a dis- 
tinct flavor, but under trench conditions, men soon 
iearned not to be too particular in such little matters. 

Such were the normal conditions of supplying water 
to an army that was stationary. So long as it remained 
so, the only concerns were maintenance, assurance that 
there was a proper standard of purity and the details of 
traffic control at points where perhaps sixty water carts 
an hour would report for fillilig. These are all matters 
of routine organization. It is when an army starts for- 
ward in a successful offensive with attending rapid 
advance, or worse still, a succession of advances, that 
real troubles begin. 

The first thing to be done after it was seen that an 
attack was successful or that a foothold had been gained 
in the enemy's trenches, was to get without a moment's 
delay a supply of water to the newly captured position. 
It was there that the petrol tins rendered their maximum 
service. Across a shell-torn, wire-encumbered no man's 
land there were no roads, not even a horse cart could 
make" progress, but eight two-gallon cans in two crates 
could be strapped to a pack animal and delivered to the 
men in their new position, where the small units, weigh- 
ing about twenty-five pounds each, were readily dis- 
tributed by hand. By such means, water actually 
reached men in their new objectives within half an hour 
after they had taken them, and there is one case reported 
where carrying parties delivered water to a new position 
in four minutes after its occupation. Water must be 
brought forward at once during the fighting, there should 
be no waiting. Having attended to the immediate press-f 



.WATER SUPPLY 171 

ing demand that will brook no delay, the next step was 
to organize a new source of supply, unless the advance 
was so small or so unimportant in extent as to permit 
water for the new position to Fe drawn from the previ- 
ous points. First, the existing wells were found and, as 
little reliance could be placed on either streams or wells 
that were uncovered by an advance as not being polluted 
either by natural causes or by the deliberate action of the 
enemy, it was better to keep them posted as unfit for 
drinking until after they had been examined. This was 
the French rule and it was a very wise one. 

The source's of supply which, after examination, were 
accepted were equipped with mechanical apparatus. 
Afterward additional sources, if needed, were dug or 
driven, the latter being preferred as giving quicker 
results and usually better water, as such wells furnished 
a supply free from surface contamination. Then pipe 
lines were laid, routes for water carts marked out and 
a new system established on a line more advanced than 
the old. As an illustration of what can be accomplished, 
the record made by the British engineers in carrying 
water forward after the battle of Messines Ridge, which 
began on June 7, 1917, is worthy of notice. On that date 
the troops at the front were supplied with water that 
came from lakes and ca'tch pits well in the rear. By 
June 15th the pipe lines had been laid across the cap- 
tured and completely devastated country and were deliv- 
ering water into what had been German positions at a 
rate of 600,000 gallons daily. Under the conditions 
existing during the progress of a hard-fought battle, it 
was found possible to lay a mile of four-inch main in 
twenty-four liours. 

So transcendently great is this matter of water sup- 
ply that in the forward area it was found desirable in 
both the French and British experience, to have the 
establishment and control of water points and regula- 



172 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

tions for distribution fixed by and under the control of 
the chief engineer of each army through a special water 
supply officer. In this way the questions of sufficiency, 
purity and distribution of water were coordinated for 
each army as an operating unit and not left to diverse 
and perhaps conflicting efforts on the part of subsidiary 
units such as divisions or even corps. 

The French, in order to coordinate the service of their 
armies and to see that no one army received an unneces- 
sarily larger part of the meagre supplies at the expense 
of the others, stationed an officer with the title of Chief 
of Water Supply at General Headquarters. He had 
broad authority over all water-supply work throughout 
all the French armies. For each individual army there 
was a water-supply officer reporting to the Chief Engi- 
neer of the Army. While carrying out the plans as 
laid down by the latter, he was assisted by the advice of 
the Chief of Water Supply and made requisitions on 
the last for any special equipment or additional amount 
of ordinary equipment that might be needed. Junior to 
the Army Water Supply Officer was a staff of assistant 
water-supply officers, each with an area under his juris- 
diction which, while it might conform — as it usually 
did — with that of a corps or possibly of a division, this 
coincidence did not diminish the responsibilty of the 
assistant to his chief nor carry authority to the com- 
manding officer of the smaller unit. Water supply was 
wholly an army function. Each assistant water-supply 
officer had a small force of skilled mechanics reenforced 
from time to time as occasion demanded by drafts from 
infantry or service battalions, the regular water-supply 
troops providing the necessary technical skill. 

The British system was not so scientifically balanced. 
There was no general chief of water supply, Sach Chief 
Engineer of Army having absolute and final authority 
within territorial limits of his army. The component 



[WATER SUPPLY 173 

corps commanders acting through the corps engineers 
had control of water problems that were peculiar to their 
own corps, and in this respect there was lacking the unity 
that existed in the French system. With the British 
there were no water-supply troops. Whatever work was 
to be done was executed by army or corps engineer 
troops except when mechanical details were concerned. 
These were taken care of by the Electrical and 
Mechanical Company, a unit quite similar to the Ameri- 
can regiment of the same designation described 
in Chapter XVII. 

The American Expeditionary Force, as it was being 
built up, made a study of both the French and British 
systems of organization and the details of their execu- 
tion in the field. As in other matters, although the" 
experience of the two Allies was most valuable and both 
countries extended every help and gave freely of advice, 
the American situation was not exactly like that of either 
of the other two and, therefore, for the A. E. F. some- 
what different- standards had to be adopted. The British 
front was not far removed from its base so that army 
influence predominated, using the word army in its 
technical sense of a certain definite combatant unit, 
French army needs for water supply were the only ones 
with which the French military authorities needed to con- 
cern themselves, because behind the Zone of the Advance 
the separate cities, villages or communes provided for 
their own wants or such additional demands that the war 
threw upon them. 

But the A. E. F. had not only to supply the needs of 
its combatant force but also those of the great ports, 
storage depots, hospitals, semi-permanent replacement 
camps and intermediate headquarters that either did not 
exist with the French and British or, if they did, existed 
on a much smaller scale. An American water-supply; 
organization, therefore, covered two distinct services, 



174 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

first that of the Service of Supplies and second that of 
the Armies in the field. 

Since the first detachment of combatant troops moved 
into certain portions of established positions in connec- 
tion with the French where the water points were already 
in operation, it was not necessary to take any steps in 
regard to the second of the above services until there 
was a sufficient concentration of American troops at the 
front, which did not begin until late in the spring of 
1918, beyond making plans and provision in advance. 
For the wharves at Bordeaux and St. Nazaire, for the 
operation and fire protection of the warehouses, for the 
camps being erected to hold the troops that were to come 
and for other similar water-consuming installations it 
was necessary to act at once to furnish water from either 
previously existing French sources of supply, such as 
neighboring municipal plants or from other sources 
newly developed. The Twenty-sixth Engineers, after- 
wards designated as the Water Supply Regiment, began 
to arrive in France in November, 1917, and undertook 
this work. 

On August 7 and 8, 1918, there were issued 
from General Headquarters, A. E. F., a General 
Order and a Bulletin, Nos. 131 and 55 respec- 
tively, defining the organization of the Water Sup- 
ply Service and giving official recognition to a 
system that had been in operation for some weeks. 
The G. 0. and the Bulletin stated that the Water Supply 
Service was a branch of the Engineer Department, but 
that in the Zone of the Armies it would be administered 
through special troops assigned to the Army, the com- 
manding officer of whom would be Water Supply Officer 
of the Army. It was the duty of the Water Supply 
Officer ** to anticipate and make suitable provision to 
meet the water supply needs of the army and exercise 
such technical supervision and control over water-supply 



WATER SUPPLY 176 

^rork in the entire area occupied by the army as may be 
necessary to coordinate water-supply developments and 
economize time, labor and material.'' He was also 
charged with the making of laboratory and sanitary 
inspection necessary to determine potability and to pre- 
vent contamination. The laboratory facilities were pro- 
vided generally as sections of the Medical Department. 

Water supply for the Service of Supplies was an 
adjunct of the Director of Construction and Forestry, 
and was, therefore, distinct from water supply in the 
advanced area. Although there was lacking the unity of 
control as presented by the French organization, this 
was overcome by the; various officers working harmoni- 
ously together in the matter of available supplies. Had 
the war continued it is likely that some system analogous 
to the French would have been adopted, the advantages 
of which were apparent, and the department concen- 
trated under a single engineer officer at General 
Headquarters. 

The great achievement in the matter of water supply, 
and it was a real achievement, was in the quality of 
water delivered. In all previous wars, typhoid fever haa 
been accepted as a necessarily existing evil. With the 
beginning of the present war the French and British 
authorities undertook to eliminate it by the inoculation 
of the soldiers and the purification of the water. 

Water can be purified in several ways, either by remov- 
ing or killing the disease germs. The first could b^ 
accomplished by passing the water through sand, char- 
coal or some form of porcelain filter, and the second by 
boiling the water or introducing into it some chemical 
compound possessing germ toxic properties. Sand 
and similar filters are efficient only for fixed installations 
on account of their bulk; porcelain filters are portable 
but are too frail to withstand battle conditions, while 
boiling was out of the question on account of the timS 



176 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

involved, plant required and scarcity of fuel. The AVater 
Supply Engineers were, therefore, reduced to use some 
form of chemical treatment that would kill the germs 
but leave the water not too disagreeable to the taste. 

There were many chemicals that were efficacious 
against disease germs, but few that met the obviously 
necessary requirements of being certain in result, rea- 
sonably rapid in action, harmless in general character, 
that did not discolor the water, and, that were easy of 
application even in the field. To show the necessity for 
the last, there is a British story that during some prac- 
tical trials one soldier was heard to ask as he held in his 
hand three tablets that were to be introduced in a cer- 
tain order, '^ Now then, Bill, which of these 'ere pills 
goes in first? " '' Lord knows, shove the whole bloom- 
ing lot in together and 'ave done with it ! " 

Permanganate of potash was tried, which had a salu- 
tatory action through the release of free oxygen. It was 
very efficacious against cholera germs but not so much 
against those other bacteria that convey enteric diseases. 
It had the disadvantage of being slow in action. Calcium 
permanganate was experimented with, but though good 
in laboratory experiments, was too complicated for field 
application and called for filter caps on water bottles. 
Bromine, iodine and liquid chlorine were all tried. They 
possessed some advantages but were rejected as failing 
to meet the requirement of ease in application. Finally 
there were left two compounds, ordinary bleaching 
powder and sodium bisulphate. 

Bleaching powder had the great initial advantages of 
low cost, permanence in character and of being an article 
of regular commercial production on a large scale. Like 
similar substances it is composed of several chemical 
compounds, some of which exist as technical impurities, 
but its principal ingredient is known as calcium-chloro- 
bypochlorite, whose chemical formula is CaClO, CI. It 



WATER SUPPLY 177 

was known that chlorine was a powerful and quick-acting 
agent against bacteria, one part of chlorine per million 
destroying germs in thirty minutes. Bleeching powder 
when dissolved undergoes the following transformation : 

2 CaClO, Cl=CaCl2+Ca (C10)2 (hypochlorite). 

Hypochlorite has strong oxidizing properties, being 
converted in calcium chloride and free oxygen thus : 

Ca (C10)2=CaCl2+Ooo. 

The sterilizing action is due in part to oxidation and 
in part to the toxic properties of hypochlorite on germs. 

Two grammes of bleaching powder of ordinary com- 
position will give 1 1/3 part of chlorine per 1,000,000 
parts of water, which is in excess of the required amount 
of one per million, but it is well to have such an excess 
to allow for deterioration in the powder or possible 
excess of impurities diminishing the amount of chlorine 
present. 

It was customary to chlorinate water in the water 
carts when filled or in the water receptacles in which 
drinking water was stored. The dose varied from the 
above minimum to six times the amount, depending on 
the condition of the water, as water would absorb chlorine 
in proportion to its own contained impurities. There 
was a very simple field testing apparatus that quickly 
gave the amount required. In a large receptacle, such 
as a water cart, it was well to refrain from using the 
water for some hours after being treated in order to 
allow the chemical action to penetrate all parts. In a 
small container holding a few gallons, reaction was com- 
plete in half an hour. Water so treated, especially if the 
dose were strong, had a slight and not particularly attrac- 
tive taste, but men did not mind it because the disagree- 



178 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

able taste assured tliem that tlaey were drinking water 
that had been rendered sterile for their benefit. 

Sodium bisulphate was another chemical that met the 
requirements of a satisfactory sterilizing agent, the chief 
objection being that long continued use might form sul- 
phate of lime, which is insoluble in the alimentary canal. 
It also attacked iron, copper and nearly all alloys. Of 
metals that might be used for water containers aluminum 
was the only one not injuriously affected, but as nearly 
all water bottles or canteens were made of aluminum, 
sodium bisulphate, which could be put up in tablet form, 
made a very convenient and valuable means for individ- 
ual use when the regular sterilizing apparatus was not 
at hand. Men who might be thus separated from their 
main supply were provided with these tablets, one tablet 
of two grammes sufficing to kill the germs in an ordinary 
canteen in thirty minutes. The chemical reaction is 
shown by the formula : 

2 NaHSO^= Nao SO^-f R^ SO,. 

It is the sulphuric acid set free that has the toxic effect. 

The disagreeable taste of the acid can be counteracted 
by making up the tablets with oil of lemon and saccharine. 

When the men came to understand that they could 
drink treated water with impunity whereas plain water, 
no matter how clear and limpid in appearance, might and 
probably did carry deadly disease germs, they were very 
careful to insist on the former. 

It was difficult to ascertain and consequently adopt a 
standard for the minimum amount of water required for 
troops as the consumption varied between such wide 
limits, according to local conditions or composition of 
units. The British made a careful study of these ques- 
tions because it was necessary for them to have some 
basis on which to design their larger concentrated water 



WATER SUPPLY 179 

points. They finally decided that on the average the fol- 
lowing figures per man per day gave a fair basis for 
computation : 

Troops living in huts 5 gals. 

Troops in camps where clothing 

was washed 5 gals. 

Troops in camps where clothing 

was not w^ashed 3 gals. 

Troops in bivouacs 1 gal. 

Troops on the march drinking 

water only, minimum 'Vs g^^' 

Hospitals 10 gals. 

Horses per head 10 gals. 

Mules per head 6 gals. 

The above are rated in British imperial gallons, which 
should be increased by one-fifth to give figures in U. S. 
gallons. 

The above consumption of water was probably greater 
than that used by the French. On the other hand it was 
undoubtedly much less than that demanded by the 
Americans, who invariably consumed more than either 
of the other allied armies. The American national pro- 
pensity for waste was everywhere apparent and it used 
to be said jokingly that an American unit would waste 
or unnecessarily consume enough supplies of all kinds to 
maintain satisfactorily a French unit of corresponding 
size. That this remark had some justification, in fact, 
was shown by the comparative expenditures of the two 
nations. 

As it was not until August, 1918, that the Water 
Department became thoroughly and officially established, 
it was only in the two great offensives of St. Mihiel and 
the Argonne-Meuse that it really functioned in the field. 
The work done by the Water Supply Eegiment in thosd 



180 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

I 

offensives will be referred to in the cHapter describing 
the results accomplished by the engineers. 

The largest single feat of the Water Supply Depart- 
ment was in the Service of Supplies in connection with 
the large hospital at Mars-Sur-Allier, where a system 
including a pipe line ten inches in diameter, five miles 
long, with a pumping plant working against a head of 
200 feet and delivering sufficient quantity to supply 
hospitals with 40,000 beds, was installed in thirty days. 

The health statistics of the American army, con- 
firmed by the similar statistics in all the other armies, 
present eloquent testimony as to the beneficent results of 
the enforced application of science. Typhoid fever, the 
great silent enemy of armies, boasting always of more 
victims than shells or bullets ever did, was banished 
from the field. 

In the Mexican war for every 100 men killed in battle 
or who died of wounds, 726 died from disease. In the 
Civil war on the Federal side the ratio for death 
by disease to death from battle was 200 to 100, 
while in the war with Spain, the ratio again rose, due 
largely to the fearful ravages of typhoid even in home 
camps, and accounted for 85 per cent of the total 
number of deaths, the actual proportion being as 520 
to 100. On the contrary, in the recent war, the propor- 
tion was only 36 to 100. Had it not been for the epidemic 
of influenza-pneumonia which swept over not only the 
army in France, but the whole world, the last-named 
ratio would have been much less, perhaps not over 25 
to 100. In the whole American army and up to May, 
1919, including, therefore, a period of six months after 
the cessation of hostilities and battle casualties, there 
were only 2,328 cases of typhoid fever reported with the 
comparatively insignificant total, when dealing with men 
by millions, of 227 deaths. Of all causes of death from 
disease, pneumonia, with which water supply had no con- 



WATER SUPPLY 181 

nection, was the greatest, contributing 83.6 per cent. To 
typhoid, the previous scourge, there fell but one-half of 
one per cent, when expressed as a fraction of the whole, 
while the actual number of men who died of typhoid was 
the same as those who died from either peritonitis or 
Bright 's disease, causes that are ever present and never 
occasion alarm. 

The American war with Spain made clear beyond 
doubt the cause of yellow fever and showed that that dis- 
ease and malaria as well could be eradicated, so likewise 
the recent war has proved that typhoid fever need not 
and should never again be present to a large extent in 
gatherings of people even under the trying conditions 
of active war in the field. When the history of the war 
is compiled, this fact will stand out in high relief as one 
of the greatest strides ever made in the record of medico- 
chemical science. 



CHAPTER XVI 

CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 

Although poisonous gases were used for the first time 
during the war, their employment had been considered 
on many occasions, but the proposal was rejected each 
time and by every nation. 

During the past century chemists, inventors and even 
military people had urged their adoption, but no bel- 
ligerent had been found bold enough to defy world opin- 
ion by having recourse to an innovation from which the 
mind recoiled with horror. 

At the meeting of the first Hague Peace Conference 
in 1899, the matter of lethal or asphyxiating gas was 
referred to a special committee. When the matter was 
put to a vote the representatives of the following coun- 
tries on the committee voted in favor of prohibiting its 
use: France, Austria-Hungary, Norway and Sweden, 
Japan, Holland, Denmark, Turkey, Italy and Germany. 
The American delegate, in accordance with his instruc- 
tions, answered "No " and placed upon the records the 
following explanation of his vote : 

" 1. That no siieli emitting such gases is as yet in 
practical use or has undergone adequate experiment; 
consequently, a vote taken now would be taken in ignor- 
ance of the facts as to whether the result would be of a 
decisive character, or whether injury in excess of that 
necessary to attain the end of warfare, of immediately 
disabling the enemy, would be inflicted. 

** 2. That the reproach of cruelty and perfidy made 
against these supposed shells was equally uttered 
formerly against firearms and torpedoes, although both 
are now used without scruple. Until we know the effect 
of such asphyxiating shells, there was no saying whether 

182 



CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 183 

they would be more or less merciful than missiles now 
permitted. 

*' 3. That it was illogical and not demonstrably^ 
humane, to be tender about asphyxiating men with gas, 
when all were prepared to admit that it was allowable 
to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, 
throwing four or five hundred men into the sea to be 
choked by water, with scarcely the remotest chance of 
escape. If, and when, a shell emitting asphyxiating 
gases has been successfully produced, then, and not 
before, will men be able to vote intelligently on the 
subject." 

i 

The British delegate stated that there was little proba- 
bility of such an invention but, if there were a prohibi- 
tion, it should relate only to iDrojectors whose express 
object was to diffuse asphyxiating gases. 

At a second meeting of the Committee on a vote to 
adopt the proposition for a reference to the conference, 
fourteen votes were cast in favor of prohibition, only 
the American delegate voting '' No." The subject finally 
came up before the Peace Conference, whereupon a vote 
** prohibiting the use of projectiles whose sole object is 
to diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases " was carried 
imanimously with one exception : the one dissenting vote 
being that of the United States, although Great Britain's 
vote in the affirmative was cast on the condition of 
unanimity. 

Relying on the declaration of the Hague Conference, 
the allies gave no consideration to the employment of 
toxic gases, assuming that the enemy would observe 
internationally established and generally recognized 
humane methods of conducting war. The allies had 
made no preparations for defense against such an attack. 
,When, therefore, on the 22nd of April, 1915, a yellow 
cloud was seen rolling slowly across No Man's Land, 
blown by the gejxtle easterly wind against the allied 



184 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

trenches, it raised at first nothing more than curiosity 
among the watching British soldiers as to what it meant, 
and then caused horror and consternation as the irritat- 
ing, cholving, killing mist swept over them and they fully 
recognized the awful significance. There was no escape, 
men must breathe steadily or die, and now the men at 
Ypres had to breathe and die. "What the losses were has 
not been published. 

The allies understood at once that Germany intended 
to place no limits on the weapons or means to be 
employed and that, therefore, it was necessary for them 
to devise immediately some sort of defense and to turn 
against the enemy their own fiendish device. In both of 
these efforts they were highly successful. It seems 
probable that if a balance of the account could be struck 
it would be found that the Germans were, on the whole, 
heavy losers by the use of gas, especially as the blockade 
seriously interfered with the importation by the central 
powers of certain highly necessary raw materials used 
in the manufacture of both gases and protective masks. 
Sometimes one wonders whether the Germans, having 
decided to employ gas, could not have manufactured and 
had on hand such a supply that they could have made 
attack closely following attack, and so actually have 
forced their way to Paris before the allies were able to 
improvise masks for defense or make the gas itself with 
which to return blow for blow. Was this another oppor- 
tunity to reach Paris that was presented to the enemy 
that he neglected to use! At the moment it appears so, 
but perhaps some day when all the facts are available, 
another generation will learn definitely. 

The gas used in the Ypres attack was chlorine, one of 
the two constituents of common salt, out of which it is 
manufactured by electrolytic process. It has a greenish- 
yellow color with a very irritating and suffocating 
quality. The effect on a person breathing it is violent 



CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 185 

choking and, if taken in sufficient concentration, seri- 
ous inflammation of tlie respiratory organs by its irritat- 
ing property, causing an outpouring of mucous in the 
lungs which frequently results in death as from drown- 
ing, or .else so irritates them that severe and long con- 
tinued bronchitis or pneumonia results. iWhile chlorine 
gas was easily manufactured, it was not very satisfac- 
tory as a weapon of offense on account of its volatile 
nature and quick dispersion. Studies were, therefore, 
made to produce gases that were both heavier and more 
deadly. 

Of gases of this type, the two chief examples were 
chlorpicrin and phosgene. The former was the next gas 
made following chlorine. It is a combination of chlorine 
and picric acid and is a strong poison, attacking both 
eyes and lungs. The fact that it injured the eyes, ren- 
dered useless the first respirators, which were simply 
mouthpads soaked in a solution of hypochlorite of soda. 
Phosgene, on the other hand, is a chemical combination 
of chlorine and carbon monoxide (CO -f- Clg^ COCI2) 
and is the most deadly of all the gases that were used. 
On account of its slight odor, its presence was scarcely 
recognizable and the effect on men breathing it was most 
insidious, for although its main attack was on the lungs, 
it also affected the heart, so that men who had had small 
doses might suddenly drop dead without knowing that 
they had been subjected to phosgene. It was, therefore, 
ordered that, whenever men knew that they had been 
exposed to phosgene, they should lie quite still until 
removed on a stretcher or in an ambulance. These gases 
when under pressure or at a temperature of about 32" F. 
became liquid and as such were loaded into shells and 
cylinders. When allowed To escape at atmospheric pres- 
sure they became gases which were heavier than the air. 

Although chlorine was sometimes used, chlorpicrin 
and phosgene were relied on when deadly effects were 



186 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

desired. So terrible wag phosgene tlia£ one full deep 
inhalation was sufficient to cause death. But, even if 
death did not result from an exposure to chlorpicrin and 
phosgene, a man's whole respiratory apparatus was seri- 
ously injured. If the injury were not actually permanent 
it sufficed in many eases, depending on the amount of 
poison inhaled, to disable the sufferer from active duty 
for months, rendering him susceptible to pneumonia or 
other pulmonary diseases, and leaving him for a while 
as one afflicted with tuberculosis. A soldier in such con- 
dition was, so far as the fenemy was concerned, better 
than one dead, as he not only ceased to be a belligerent 
but actually became a burden. 

The treatment of serious cases of chlorpicrin or 
phosgene poisoning consisted in general of insisting on 
absolute avoidance of muscular effort, followed by bleed- 
ing of the patient and with an injection of a salt solution. 
The amount of blood withdrawn might be considerable, 
being in extreme cases as high as one and a half per cent 
of the body weight. Oxygen was administered and also 
stimulants like brandy, the patient being kept warm and. 
so far as possible, in a well ventilated place. 

In addition to the lethal gases, others were developed 
which when used alone produced only discomfort. Of 
these the first to be employed were the lachryrnator or 
tear gases which irritated the eyes in such a manner as 
to cause almost immediately a great discharge of fluid, 
involving much pain and temporary blindness. They 
were more cheaply produced than phosgene and although 
not fatal, were exceedingly useful when projected 
against the first-line fighting force and especially the 
artillery, because even a trace of tear gas rendered a 
man blind and, therefore, quite useless for a short while. 
These tear gases had a bromine base, the cc-mmonest 
form being brom-benzyl-cyanide. 

Later the Germans produced a new gas that attacked 



CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 187 

externally as well as internally, the famous mustard gas, 
so called not because it was produced from mustard or 
had any connection with it, but because it had a somewhat 
similar odor and produced precisely similar burns. 
Chemically speaking, it was di-chlor-ethyl-sulphide, 
manufactured by blovv^ing gaseous ethylene into 
sulphur monochloride. The Germans made a great 
blunder in using this excellent means of causing 
human suffering, because the Allies promptly began 
to use it, too, and in spite of boasted German 
excellence in all matters chemical, the Allies were 
able to manufacture it in a far larger quantity than 
the Germans could. In fact, the War Department report 
on American Munitions states that on the conclusion of 
the war the whole German capacity for turning out mus- 
tard gas was only six tons a day as against an American 
capacity alone of ten times that amount, with a large 
British and French output in addition. Mustard gas 
presented many advantages over phosgene even if it were 
not so deadly, although it was fairly satisfactory in that 
respect. It was a liquid, stable at ordinary low tempera- 
tures and volatile at higher temperatures, with an odor 
in the open so slight as to be recognizable only with dif- 
ficulty. Ground saturated with mustard gas would con- 
tinue to give off vapor for many hours after its receipt, 
perhaps for several days if the weather were cool and 
the ground sheltered from sun or wind. Troops might 
be moved into an area which, quite unknown to them, had 
been '' gassed " with mustard sometime previously and 
actually sit down in an atmosphere that would presently 
cause casualties, and not be aware of it until the casu- 
alties began to appear, especially as this gas did not 
give a choking or other warning as did the chlorine com- 
pounds. Although it attacked the bronchial tubes and 
respiratory organs and caused many deaths by pulmo- 
nary disease, when it was a novelty and proper treatment 



188 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

was unknown, its most usual effect was exceeding painful 
surface burns, which occurred most acutely on those 
parts of the body where there was the maximum of 
perspiration. Such burns would completely disable a man 
to the extent of keeping him in the hospital for weeks. 
The internal effects of mustard gas or the external burns 
were frequently severe enough to cause death even after 
the nature of the attack was understood, but it was noted 
that while there was no difference between the injury 
produced internally on whites and negroes, it was found 
that the latter were markedly less sensitive to skin burns. 
When the first wave of gas was projected against the 
allied trenches, our friends were without any protection. 
One quick-minded and ingenious quartermaster of a Brit- 
ish division took the first step in defense by supplying 
his troops, within twenty-four hours after the first attack, 
with a pad of several thicknesses of cotton cloth soaked 
in hyposulphite of soda which gave them fairly good 
protection for a short time. For this he was rewarded 
with the coveted Distinguished Service Order. But the 
matter was so obviously threatening that it was immedi- 
ately taken up for serious study by both the British and 
the French. Until perfected apparatus could be devised, 
the men were provided with simple respirators capable 
of absorbing the deleterious properties of chlorine gas, 
the only one used at first. But as the enemy began to 
vary the gases and especially to use gases that attacked 
the eyes, the allies were obliged to discover more effi- 
cient and more complete means of protection not only 
against the chemical action of the different gases, but 
also as a covering for the whole face. The investigations 
and experiments were conducted with the view of devis- 
ing a headgear that would protect the eyes, cover the 
very sensitive parts of the face and permit the wearer 
to breathe a steady supply of purified air. Such a head- 
gear was unavoidably awkward and uncomfortable, but 



CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 189 

nevertheless a form had to be found that would cause the 
least inconvenience, and one that men could wear and 
even work in while wearing it for hours at a time in a 
gas-laden atmosphere where but a few inhalations meant 
death. The designing of the apparatus was quite as com- 
plicated a problem as finding the most satisfactory 
chemicals to absorb or nullify any gas likely to be used 
before the air carrying it could reach the men^s lungs. 
Even the fabric out of which the headgear should best be 
made required special study because so many substances 
were subject to decomposition by the action of the 
gases. All this makes a fascinating story in itself. The 
investigations called for the most intense study on the 
part of the master chemical engineers of Great Britain 
and France, and later of those of the United States. 

As the result of the first experiments in the laboratory 
and practical tests in the field, troops were furnished 
with two types of anti-gas protectors, a helmet consist- 
ing first of one and later of two thicknesses of flannel 
soaked in a solution of sodiumphenate, caustic soda and 
glycerine, which could be drawn quickly over the head 
and gave some protection against weak gas for a short 
while, and an air-tight mask fitting the face closely and 
preventing any external air from reaching the lungs 
except through the protected mouthpiece. 

The helmet was used by both the French and British 
armies and for a while by our own as a secondary means 
of defense, but in the year 1918 it was discarded as not 
being satisfactory. It was nothing but a loose bag with 
the open lower end tucked in under the wearer's coat, 
air being drawn in through the porous material. There 
was an unavoidable leak and the efficacy of the chemicals 
began to fail after short exposure, against which the 
advantage of its lightness and ease in adjustment 
weighed but little, especially as every soldier was 
obliged to carry also the more perfect equipment. It 



190 AMERICAN ENGINEEBS IN FRANCE 

was soon discovered tliat with the helmet respirators, 
artillery was practically out of action where gas was 
present. This necessitated the development of some 
other protection and the result was the box respirator. 
The first form was quite cumbersome and too heavy for 
infantry to carry but as its protection was nevertheless 
excellent a smaller and lighter model soon appeared. 

The mask or small-box respirator, as it was sometimes 
called, consisted of a rubberized fabric covering the 
whole face and held in place by elastic bands passing 
behind and over the head. Air for breathing was drawn 
into the mouth through a mouthpiece held between the 
teeth, whence there led a flexible pipe to a canister con- 
taining gas-absorbing chemicals. The breath was 
exhausted through the mouthpiece, whence it escaped 
through an automatic valve. Breathing through the nose 
was mechanically prevented by a clip attached to the 
inside of the mask which closed the nostrils by compres- 
sion. Any gas that might find its way behind the mask 
could not, therefore, reach the lungs. There were two 
large eyepieces of a non-breakable glass. The whole 
apparatus was carried in a square canvas bag slung over 
the neck but hanging on the chest when in the position 
of '* alert," or ready for immediate use, and held against 
swinging by a cord tied around the body. Men were 
trained so that the mask could be withdrawn from the 
bag, put in place, nose clip adjusted and mouthpiece 
inserted in less than ten seconds. That was the maxi- 
mum time allowed, and no man was passed through his 
gas-training course until he could accomplish the opera- 
tion in that time. "When the men became expert, all the 
fiteps could be completed in five or six seconds. The 
chemical containers remained in the bag. The dimen- 
sions of the latter were about ten inches square and three 
inches thick and the whole apparatus weighed a little 
more than three pounds. 



CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 191 

The training in the adjustment of the respirators was 
carried out in the presence of lethal gases, the men being 
taken into closed buildings filled with gas. Besides learn- 
ing how to put on their respirators quickly and receiving 
an explanation of the dangers due to gas, they were con- 
vinced by practical tests that absolute safety was 
afforded by their respirators. This added greatly to 
their morale when exposed to the same fiendish forms of 
barbarity in the field. 

It is not an exaggeration to say that these contraptions 
were exceedingly disagreeable, but men could work and 
actually sleep in them. The discomfort was offset by the 
knowledge that, thanks to the skill of the chemical engi- 
neer at home, the wearer could live in an atmosphere 
that would cause death in a few minutes without them. 
So great was the advance and perfection in manufacture 
that, while the earlier types of mask became inoperative 
in a few hours through the exhaustion of the absorbing 
chemicals, those that were being produced at the close 
of hostilities had a working life several fold greater. 

The active part of the mask respirator was the absorb- 
ing chemicals which removed the toxic gases as the 
poisoned air was drawn through the container by the act 
of inhalation. Carbon was known to be an excellent 
absorbing agent. The difficulty was to secure a form 
of charcoal having a great density, as that gave the maxi- 
mum of absorptive power for the minimum of weight, 
with hardness to resist breaking into dust that might 
clog the interstices of the mixture in the canister and so 
reduce its air-passing capacity. All kinds of material 
were tested, hundreds of varieties in number and from 
all parts of the world. But after experimenting, by the 
aid of a large staff of chemists, with almost every con- 
ceivable vegetable substance, the unsuspected cocoanut 
skell stood out as nearest to the ideal. 

"When the United States took up the making of masks 



192 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

and decided to use coeoanuts as the basis for the 
supply of carbon, it was estimated that an amount of 
forty or perhaps fifty tons a day would suffice. As the 
demand increased, this figure was constantly raised until 
finally it reached 400 tons of shells or the equivalent. 
Now the total supply of coeoanuts from the West Indies, 
Central America and the northern coast of South 
America amounted to only seventy-five tons a day. The 
above countries were necessarily the main source of 
supply, because lack of ocean tonnage prevented exten- 
sive importations from the far East. Then it was found 
that the shortage in home sugar supply reduced candy 
and sweets manufacture, and consequently curtailed 
cocoanut consumption. This unexpected turn forced the 
government, firstly to start the famous " Eat more 
coeoanuts " campaign to stimulate the production of 
shells and, secondly, to find the most satisfactory substi- 
tutes. Among the latter, various nuts and fruit pits, 
including those of the peach, apricot, cherry and plum, 
were discovered to be reasonably satisfactory. These 
were obtained from the canning establishments and 
through collection receptacles placed in the streets. 

Mixed with the charcoal were particles of a special 
lime cement to neutralize the acid quality of certain 
gases, sodium hydroxide to give increasing alkaline 
effect and sodium permanganate for its oxidizing prop- 
erty. When this mixture had absorbed its quota of 
poison, the canister was removed and a new one substi- 
tuted. This change of canisters was regulated by having 
every man record on a slip attached to his mask the 
hours of exposure and, when a fixed limit of forty-eight 
hours was reached, to have the canister exchanged. 

Horses also had masks, but here, fortunately, the prob- 
lem was much simpler than with their human riders or 
drivers. It was found that horses' eyes were not affected 
,^by tear gases, and that to toxic gases they were much 



CHEMICAL ENGINEBES 193 

less sensitive tlian men. As the horse always breathes 
through his nostrils and not through his mouth, all that 
was necessary was to provide a loose porous bag of 
heavy soft material soaked in neutralizing chemicals that 
could be drawn over his nose, leaving his mouth free for 
the bit. 

Gas waves as first projected at Ypres were discharged 
from steel cylinders, the gas being allowed to escape 
from nozzles and be carried down wind towards the 
allied trenches. This was the only method employed for 
some time by both the Germans and the Allies. Such a 
method was open to many serious objections. The large 
cylinders were cumbersome, taking some time to put 
in position, and as the wind was the only propelling 
force, this position had to be as advanced as possible. 
As a matter of fact it had to be in the very front trench, 
because obviously the gas wave could not be allowed to 
pass over one's own men. 

As action depended entirely on the wind, and that 
must be exactly right — not only as to direction but also, 
as to force, gentle rather than strong — the actual loos- 
ing of the gas might have to wait for days for favorable 
weather conditions after the cylinders had been set in 
place. During this period the cylinders not only filled 
the trenches to the inconvenience of the defenders, but 
there was danger that they might be discovered and so 
give warning that a gas attack was imminent, or some 
might be damaged by shell fire, freeing the contents 
among the very men tending them. In the event of the 
discovery, an immediate bombardment by hostile artil- 
lery would certainly result. 

A further objection to cylinders was that the ele- 
ment of surprise so essential to success was absent 
or nearly eliminated. "When gas and the methods 
of its liberation were understood, the commencement of 
a wave attack was easily recognized even at night, when 



194 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

nothing could be seen, by the sound of the escaping gas. 
As the best wind was a gentle one with a velocity of 
about five or certainly not exceeding ten miles an hour, 
so as to avoid disturbing and scattering the cloud, an 
interval of time of about fifty seconds would elapse 
before the wave travelling at the higher velocity reached 
the opposing trench, even if it were only 250 yards away. 
This time, short as it was, sufficed to permit an alarm to 
be spread, and for men even in the front trench oppor- 
tunity to adjust their masks. Men farther back had still 
more liberal warning. Furthermore, the strength of the 
gas was entirely dissipated three miles from the point of 
origin. Then finally there was the danger that, after a 
cloud had been started, a sudden change in wind might 
occur and the whole nasty mess come rolling back, an 
accident that was of actual and not infrequent occurrence. 

These objections started both sides to devise means of 
firing gas from guns. Although gas clouds liberated 
from cylinders were up to the end of the war sent out 
occasionally under very favorable conditions, main reli- 
ance was placed on gas-laden shells which both sides 
soon learned to manufacture and fire with great success. 

Gas shells were made with thinner walls than ordinary 
shells so as to provide the maximum gas-holding 
capacity. They were given a bursting charge of some 
high explosive just sufficient to break the case and free 
the gas contents. By means of shells a gas attack could 
be made at any time regardless of weather and could be' 
directed on any part of the enemy's territory — either 
the front-line trenches or among the reserves as far back 
as the guns could reach. Such an attack could be made 
suddenly without warning. Under these conditions no 
one within four or five miles of the front was safe against 
gas attack at any moment. "Within that distance it was 
ordered that gas masks should always be carried. 

Gas shells, on account of the smaller bursting charge, 



CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 195 

made a much lower toned report than that of ordinary 
high explosive shells and, therefore, were easily recog- 
nized. To disguise the use of gas shells, it was custom- 
ary to send over gas and high explosive shells at the 
same time ^d so drown in the mingled roar any differ- 
ence in sound between individual bursts. Or the ratio of 
the bursting charge to the gas content might be increased 
so as to make the bursting sound more nearly like that 
of an ordinary shell. While the latter course would 
diminish the amount of gas liberated, the smaller amount 
would be highly efficacious if the enemy could be caught 
unaware of any gas being used. 

Gas projected in shells had a much longer range than 
when discharged from cylinders. It could be thrown into 
back areas or in scattered and unsuspected attacks. 
Therein lay an additional advantage in the use of 
chlorpicrin and phosgene over chlorine, as their more 
stable character delayed the dissipation of the gas. 
Tear, sneezing or vomiting gases were usually projected 
just prior to the discharge of chlorpicrin with the hope 
that some might be caught by the former and either 
could not get their masks on or, in desperation tear them 
off, when the sufferers would receive the full effect of the 
lethal gas. The tear gases were particularly effective in 
this, as a very minute amount, too small to be otherwise 
noticed, would injure the sight for several hours. 

The gases in liquid form had another damaging char- 
acter in that drops might be spattered over wounded 
men's clothing and would continue to vaporize for some 
hours. Many casualties have thus resulted from soiled 
clothing being carried into confined sleeping quarters or 
to other men tending wounded, and even among doctors 
and nurses in hospitals working over men that had been 
gassed as well as shot, whose clothes were, perhaps quite 
unknown to them, gas polluted. The heavier gases would 
flow down into shell holes or dugouts and lie there for 



196 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

hours before becoming dissipated. Curtains made from 
blankets soaked in or sprayed with a solution of sodium 
thiosulphate (1>^ lbs.) and sodium carbonate (3 lbs.) to 
three gallons of water, hung in front of dugout entrances 
furnished some protection. 

Besides discharging gas in shells from long-range 
guns, it was also thrown in hand grenades and in various 
forms of shells fired from trench mortars. Of the latter, 
the most effective was the Livens projector, something 
like an old-fashioned, smooth-bore mortar, except that 
it was longer and lighter in the barrel. From it were 
fired cylinders twenty-four inches long by eight inches 
in diameter, with an effective range of about one mile. 
As the tubes and cylinders were easily and cheaply made, 
large installations could be collected and a great volume 
of gas liberated in a few minutes. The hand grenades 
contained poison gases and also phosphorus gas, produc- 
ing smoke clouds and fires. 

"When the United States entered the war, chlorine gas 
was the only gas of the toxic variety that was produced 
on a commercial scale in this country, and even the whole 
product was quite insufficient to meet the suddenly 
increased demand for war purposes. The government 
was obliged to create a plant with a daily capacity of 100 
tons of liquid chlorine. Although chlorine alone was lit- 
tle used, it formed an important part of the composi- 
tion of other gases, notably chlorpicrin, phosgene and 
mustard. 

The American gas output began in January, 1918, with 
ten tons, while in the month of October more than 2,700 
tons were accepted, with a total of nearly 11,000 tons 
before the 11th of November. To transport this huge 
amount there would have been needed nine trains of tank 
cars, each train being one-half of a mile in length. 

Between twenty and thirty per cent of all American 



CHEMICAL ENGINEEES 197 

casualties were due to gas, the greater pari fortunately 
being light. 

So great was the importance of gas work that a sepa- 
rate corps was established called the Chemical Warfare 
Service, to which the Thirtieth Engineers were trans- 
ferred as the first Gas Engineers. 

Arms and all equipment made of steel were subject to 
the evil effects of gas quite as much as men and beasts. 
To prevent corrosion, rifles had to be kept oiled, but as 
that was not always possible it was ordered that, when a 
gas attack was in progress, rifles and machine guns should 
be fired occasionally to insure their not jamming. When 
the attack had j^assed they were to be taken down, thor- 
oughly cleaned and oiled. Even ammunition and the 
working parts of hand grenades were effected and had 
to be protected. In short, very little escaped the injuri- 
ous action of this terrible, insidious, searching fiendish 
agent. 



CHAPTEE XVII 

CAMOUFLAGE AND OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERING 

In addition to the large fields of activity, such as trans- 
portation, general construction and the more delicate 
work in electricity, chemistry and physics, where engi- 
neers had the opportunity to apply their science on a 
broad scale, there were other fields where, if the men 
employed were not numbered by the tens of thousands, 
if their accomplishments were not so spectacular, they, 
too, formed an important link in the work of the success- 
ful conduct of a modern army. 

The first of these was the telegraph and telephone sys- 
tem. When a battle front is continuous for 400 miles 
and an engagement under the direction of one man cov- 
ers perhaps fifty miles, it is obvious that no longer is it 
possible to rely even in part on the old methods of 
sending orders by orderly, courier or some form of hand 
signals. Consequently in the war just ended, the tele- 
graph and telephone became of transcendent importance 
and were used more extensively 'than ever before, prac- 
tically superseding all other methods of sending commu- 
nications except the slow one of courier post for bulky 
letters or for those not urgent. Telephone wires placed 
every camp, every headquarters-dugout, even posts in 
the front trenches, as well as the important points in the 
rear, in instant communication with each other. 

This work, although of an engineering nature, was 
taken care of by the Signal Corps and not by the Corps 
of Engineers. But the subject cannot be left without 
comment, even if the work was not performed or the serv- 
ice maintained by the Engineers, without at least record- 
ing that the American telegraph and telephone system, 

198 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEEEING 199 

of American material with wires strung by American 
troops, made a network over a large part of France. It 
included within its meshes the base ports of entry, the 
many supply depots, concentration camps, the main head- 
quarters at Chaumont, Paris and Tours, and the head- 
quarters of the various armies, corps, and divisions, as 
they were found in the field. Then as the final advance 
progressed, the lines were extended to keep in touch with 
the ever-changing front. To construct and maintain these 
lines an appalling amount of material had to be shipped 
to France, of which the one item of line wire and cables 
amounted to no less than nearly 150,000 miles, or suffi- 
cient wire to stretch six times around the earth. 

The English language always stands ready to absorb 
any improving modification. As the result of the war 
it has taken many additions to its vocabulary of 
which undoubtedly a large proportion will be permanent. 
In this process of change even the alphabet did not 
escape. We are all aware that several of the letters have 
a similar sound, leading both to confusion and error, 
when spoken over the telephone. Some British genius, 
whose name ought to be recorded, removed the difficulty 
by giving new names to those letters that might be mis- 
taken. Thus AGK stood for A, Beer for B, Don for D, 
Emma for M, Pip for P, Esse for S, Too for T, Vic 
for V, while the last letter of the alphabet was always 
called by its regular English name Zed. The other let- 
ters retained their accustomed sounds. So thoroughly 
practical was this innovation that it was adopted by the 
American telephone operators in large part, and would 
have become universal had the war lasted longer and 
more men had become familiar with it. 

The British always, and the Americans usually, abbre- 
viated all names to the initial letters. Some of these" 
combinations were easily recognizable, like G. H. Q. for 
General Headquarters, or 0. C. for Officer Commanding, 



200 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

but some, like D. A. D. 0. S., were not quite so readily 
legible. TMs last combination was not to be confused 
with the dodo, the extinct form of bird, but described 
a simple-minded sort of person performing the duties 
of a Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Supplies. 
So firmly was this method of abbreviation rooted that 
even in ordinary conversation there would be used the 
initial letters and not the words themselves describing 
an officer, place or some article in common use, and fre- 
quently the letters would be given their new names. 
Thus an observation point, which was always spoken of 
as an 0. P., was called on *' o-pip," while a trench 
mortar, shortened to T. M., became a '' Toc-emma." 

But if the main telegraph and telephone lines were in 
the hands of the Signal Corps, some electric wires were 
installed and maintained by the engineers. In addition 
to their work in range finding the Seventy-fourth Engi- 
neers took care of the '' listening-in " sets by which 
enemy telephonic conversations were overheard. The 
front-line telephone system was at first a single-wire 
line, the earth being used for the return circuit. But a 
French engineer devised an instrument called a geo- 
phone, which was afterwards so improved and developed 
as to have a greatly extended field of usefulness. In 
principle the device consisted of a drum in which the 
enclosed air space received the sound waves, magnified 
them and by electro-mechanical apparatus transmitted 
them to any conveniently located listening station. As 
finally perfected these instruments were sufficiently deli- 
cate not only to catch sounds transmitted through the 
air, but to give notice of raiding parties operating at 
night between the trenches, and even picking up low- 
toned conversations between the enemy lines. With sev- 
eral such mechanical ears open, it was possible to locate 
enemy movements in the dark by simply noting the rela- 
tive intensity of noise on the several geophones. 



OTHEE FIELDS OF ENGINEEEING 201 

These instniments, of course, even in their first com- 
paratively crude form, could easily catch the return 
current from a single-wire telephone or telegraph sys- 
tem. This forced the installation of double-insulated 
wire lines on which the return current could not be 
tapped as the gi'ound return could be. But the 
man of science was not to be beaten. By mak- 
ing his geophones more delicate he was able to over- 
hear the actual conversation behind the enemy lines as 
spoken into a telephone receiver, provided only he could 
place one of his little mechanical ears, which, with its 
connecting wires, was a most inconspicuous object, close 
to the enemy trenches. 

The setting of these boxes at night in No Man's Land 
was a nerve-testing task. On one occasion as an engi- 
neer was returning to his own lines after attending to 
his instrument, he was suddenly stopped by a challenge 
from a negro sentry in the firing trench whom he had 
aroused by the noise he made as he stumbled over the 
body of a dead German. 

'' Fo' the land's sake; whatyo' all doin' out yonder? " 
asked the negro, but all the while keeping him covered 
with his rifle. 

When the member of the Seventy-fourth Engineers 
explained who he was and what he was doing, the darky 
lowered his gun, told him to advance, saying : 

" The Lawd be praised, but I certainly is pleased I 
don't belong with the engineers." 

In one American division there were some Cherokee 
Indians who, in order to overcome the danger of having 
telephone messages overheard and understood by the 
enemy, were employed as telephone operators in the 
front trench. "When the message was received at head- 
quarters it was there translated back into English. "What 
pains the Germans must have taken, with their accus- 
tomed thoroughness, to discover the key to this extraor- 
dinary code ! 



202 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

These geophones had another application. Both sides 
carried on extensive underground operations in driving 
tunnels beneath the other's positions, filling the leading 
chamber with high explosives and then blowing up a 
great section of trench or a strong point at the critical 
moment of an attack. The geophones would give warn- 
ing by noting the sound of pick or drill underground 
even at a distance of seventy-five yards. By employing 
two geophones on the binaural principle and changing 
their position until the intensity of sound was the same 
in each ear, the direction whence sound came was deter- 
mined. The intersection of two such lines of direction 
gave the exact spot where work was being executed. 
Then the tunnelling engineers would be called on. A 
counter gallery or tunnel would be driven and the enemy 
attempt frustrated. 

As facility and extent of observation by airplane were 
increased and the accuracy of indirect fire developed, it 
became necessary to hide or screen guns, ammunition and 
troops. "When the war began the French army wore the 
old and well-known scarlet breeches, which made a won- 
derful display to airplane observers and were the causg 
of many casualties. From such experiences both sides 
soon realized that observation from above had begun a 
new era, and that men must do as the wild animals did 
and render themselves inconspicuous. Sombre uniforms 
that lacked distinguishing contrast were adopted, glisten- 
ing gun barrels disappeared under paint, even the bright 
parts of men's accoutrements were covered. But this 
was not enough. Masses as well as details had to be 
obscured, and a special corps headed by experts was 
organized to create what was more than an art, almost 
a science, to which was applied the French name of 
" Camouflage." 

This word, which has become firmly rooted not only 
in French, but in English and probably other languages, 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERING 203 

is, like tanks and very long-range guns, a product of tlie 
war. Dictionaries of a date earlier than 1914 do not con- 
tain it, and there is considerable doubt whence it came 
or how it was introduced. The nearest approach to it 
was '' camouflet," which had quite a different meaning, 
a puff of smoke blown in the face, or in a military sense, a 
small mine. Apparently camouflage comes from old 
Franco-Provengal stock and was drafted into the slang 
of thieves in Paris under the form of '' comoufle," 
meaning disguise, whence it was taken up by the 
artist community and popularized by them in the form 
now known. 

The basic idea of camouflage was to hide men or 
objects from observation, either by giving them a mix- 
ture of colors so that they would blend with surrounding 
objects, or by so destroying their apparent outlines or 
confusing the outlines with the shadows that they cast, 
as to prevent or interfere with recognition when viewed 
from a distance and especially at a distance from above. 

To obtain concealment by actual hiding was usually 
impossible, especially for the most important objects — 
men, guns, piles of ammunition, or special buildings. 
Any covering sufficiently large to hide such objects would 
in itself be visible. It was, therefore, necessary to have 
resort to the more subtle phases of the art. In the dis- 
covering, studying and applying the colors or imitations 
that would deceive or mislead rather than hide, there was 
ample room for unlimited exercise of human ingenuity. 

The dun color of the regulation olive drab uniform 
rendered men quite inconspicuous provided they did not 
look up when an enemy plane was passing. If they did, 
their white faces showed in the photographs but more 
particularly to direct observation. Men were, therefore, 
ordered to restrain their curiosity when " Fritz " was 
overhead and to refrain from looking up. Men lying 
down were practically invisible, so well did the color of 



204 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

their uniforms lose itself in the color of the ground. Men, 
if standing, cast shadows which were visible, especially 
to the eye of an aerial observer if the men were moving. 
He could more easily recognize what a moving shadow 
meant than a stationary one. Bright mess kits, naked 
bayonets, or tools polished by work reflected light and 
called attention to the probable presence of men even 
when the latter were not visible. Suspected presence of 
men was almost certain to draw artillery fire which, as 
will be explained later, could be directed with extraordi- 
nary accuracy on a target invisible from the guns. 
Although strict orders were issued as to conduct by 
troops in all such matters, they were always difficult to 
enforce, especially such simple ones as that faces should 
not be raised or that shovels be carried in the hand blade 
down and not over the shoulder. 

For misleading concealment chief recourse was had to 
color, the object to be hidden being painted with great 
irregular patches of contrasting colors, whites, blues, 
yellows, blacks, in such a way as to destroy the outlines, 
to accentuate depressions, to tone down parts that would 
ordinarily show high, and to confound all objects with 
their shadows. This offered great scope in the practical 
application of color, not only as the colors gave a false 
expression to the human eye, but as they would be 
recorded on a photographic plate. This naturally cre- 
ated a branch of warfare in which artists and color stu- 
dents excelled. 

Everything was j^ainted, buildings, tents, guns, wagons 
and especially covered wagons, railroad cars that loaded 
with ammunition serving railway artillery might be 
standing for days at a time on some siding, and some- 
times even the steel helmets of the men were decorated, 
although the last was a needless refinement. 

The author recalls some of his tents that would have 
taken prizes in any exhibition of cubist art. Speaking 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERING 205 

of tents it was hard at first for American officers to free 
their minds from preconceived ideas as to what a mili- 
tary camp should be and to eease placing tents in straight 
and regular rows. Such an arrangement no camouflage 
could conceal. 

If covering as a whole was impossible, and undesirable 
had it been possible, covering in part was freely resorted 
to. The material most used for such purpose was tree 
boughs, which thrown over freshly turned earth from 
trench excavations that it was desired to conceal, over 
guns, or piles of ammunition, so broke the outlines, hid 
the natural color or confused the shadows as to render 
detection impossible or extremely difficult. But boughs 
were not always available. To take their place wire net- 
ting was used or nets were made of cord, in the interstices 
of which were woven pieces of painted cotton cloth resem- 
bling leaves or clods of earth. Such screens, hung on 
poles over guns, gave excellent protection but still per- 
mitted the gun to be served. The fact that the horizontal 
screens might be transparent in spots heightened their 
efficacy, as they failed to throw a definite shadow or show 
a marked outline. Similar screens were hung vertically 
along the side of roads exposed to observation from 
enemy balloons, cutting off the view of troops so that 
they could pass behind the shelter of the screens without 
much danger. 

The making of all these articles became an important 
industry; and for their production the A. E. F. estab- 
lished a well-equipped shop at Dijon, where much valu- 
able assistance was given by the British and French 
camoufleurs. This shop was managed by the Fortieth 
Engineers, who employed a large staff of women to assist 
them. Here there were manufactured wire netting, 
fish nets, garlands, hangar covers, sniper suits for men 
to wear on sniping out-post duty, painted burlaps and 
coco mattings. 



206 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

The amount of such, material produced was very exten- 
sive, aggregating, in eight months during 1918, 3,000,000 
square yards, or nearly one square mile in area. In addi- 
tion there were made and sent to the front observation 
posts, imitation shell holes, dummy heads, and other 
articles intended to produce a visible effect of something 
that did not exist instead of concealing what did exist. 
Sometimes the best concealment is obtained by drawing 
attention to an illusion. 

So important was camouflage that recommendation 
was made that specially trained camouflage troops be 
attached to each battery whose duty it should be to mark 
out paths and roads, to fix the location and to hide the 
piles of ammunition, and by painting or otherwise to dis- 
guise the guns, latrines and kitchens; in short, to study 
the best means of concealing each gun and to see that an 
intelligent plan was carried out. 

In the St. Mihiel offensive guns and ammunition 
moved, into position just prior to the attack, were 
camouflaged with boughs or fish nets. After the attack 
began and until the offensive subsided, the troops were 
compelled to maintain the camouflage. The Germans 
had accurate maps of the whole country, especially of 
that part that they had only recently occupied but had 
been forced to evacuate, and they were thus able to con- 
centrate an accurate fire on any point where their air- 
planes or balloons reported the presence of artillery. In 
thg Argonne-Meuse offensive the movement into position 
was made only just before the attack began. After the 
battle commenced the concentration of artillery was so 
great, not only locally but on the whole front, and the 
fire so continuous both night and day that little attempt 
was made either to conceal or to deceive. Guns were 
stood in the open and there served. 

To install electric light and power plants, to care for 
and operate engines and pumps for water supply and to 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERING 207 

do many things of a mechanical nature for armies and 
corps, an electro-mechanical section was established and 
the Thirty-seventh Engineers assigned as the Electro- 
Mechanical Regiment. Subsequently this regiment was 
attached to the First Army, A. E. F. 

Prior to the beginning of the American offensives, the 
Electro-Mechanical Section set up a number of electric 
light and power plants in the Service of Supplies, chiefly 
for lighting hospitals, storage yards, warehouses, docks, 
bakeries, refrigerators and other similar institutions, 
and the furnishing of power to small machines. In some 
cases the Electro-Mechanical Regiment obtained current 
from French sources, in others they erected their own 
generating plants. This work did not differ from electro- 
mechanical installations under ordinary commercial con- 
ditions. In the distribution of the current about 125 
miles of transmission lines were strung. 

With the First Army the greater part" of the service 
rendered by the regiment was in arranging during the 
Argonne-Meuse offensive for the mechanical parts of 
water supply systems, such as large pumping installa- 
tions, and in providing lights for various headquarters 
through small mobile installations, the plants ranging 
from one to 200 kilowatts each, average about twenty kw. 
It was found that the units ranged in capacity as follows : 



Army headquarters 10 kw. 

Evacuation hospitals 10 

Corps headquarters 5 

Division headquarters 3 

Brigade headquarters 1 

Hospitals 5 to 25 kw. 

Experience showed that a whole regiment was an 
unnecessarily large body to be attached to an army for 



208 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

electro-meclianical purposes, and the men were detailed 
for other work. A smaller body of experienced 
mechanics, if assisted by ordinary engineer troops, 
wonld have been more economical. Another reference to 
this point will be made in a subsequent chapter devoted 
to the discussion of the best organization of engineer 
troops. 

Electro-mechanical troops were used by the French 
with great success in keeping certain wires in the entan- 
glements in front of the trenches charged with deadly 
high-tension currents. Sometimes barbed-wire fences 
were electrified but the most satisfactory device was an 
independent plain wire. This was stretched irregularly 
in plan from tree to tree and from it were dangling wires 
at about fifty-cm. (20 ins.) intervals and reaching 
to within perhaps twelve inches from the ground. The 
main wire was about three m. (9 to 10 ft.) high and, 
therefore, above the plane of ordinary vision. These 
wires were absolutely invisible at night and almost so 
by day. The main wire was charged with a 1,500-volt 
current. If a person came in contact with one of the 
loose wires he at once established a ground through his 
body and was either instantly killed or effectively dis- 
abled for a while. Sometimes traps were constructed 
with barbed-wire entanglements so placed that raiding 
parties were hemmed in by lines of barbed wire, perpen- 
dicular to the front, which either were electrically charged 
or by their position forced the enemy patrols to advance 
against a net of charged loose wires. In all such work 
the French were particularly skillful, especially in con- 
cealing the electric trap. 

Such a protection could be used only on a quiet sector. 
If there was much artillery activity the lines would be 
cut so often by shells as to deprive them of any relia- 
bility. The largest installation was on the French front 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERING 209 

between Baccarat and Hartmanswillerkopf, a *' quiet " 
sector 150 km. long, of which approximately one-third 
was protected by charged wires. 

The Germans tried to do the same thing, but they were 
not nearly so successful as the French. This was due 
partly to their lack of equal skill and delicacy in attach- 
ing and hiding the obstructions, but chiefly to their extra- 
ordinary obsession for conducting operations on a fixed 
methodical time table, an obsession that they displayed 
with respect to artillery practice and other movements, 
but always with failure to inflict loss commensurate with 
the expenditure of effort. In the case of electric traps 
they did not keep the wires continuously charged with 
current but only during fixed intervals. The French 
made a study of the method followed on different parts 
of the front and having discovered the key, sent out 
experienced electricians who would cut the wires during 
a dead period immediately previous to any contemplated 
raid or patrol reconnaissance by French forces. 

The Transportation Department had its extensive 
shops for repairs of rolling stock, the section of Light 
Railways and the Motor Transportation Corps had 
theirs. The Chief Engineer soon foresaw that in addi- 
tion to the above he would need a shop where there could 
be repaired the miscellaneous equipment belonging to the 
engineers and not covered by any one or all of the above. 
As indicating the necessity for such a shop, the following 
items of heavy engineering equipment were on hand, 
which had to be maintained and repaired. In the matter 
of repairs, war service is not conducive to the easy keep- 
ing of mechanical plants in good working condition and, 
therefore, there is all the more need for well-equipped 
shops. 

Some items of American engineer plants on hand in 
France prior to the 11th of November, 1919, were: 



210 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

Steam shovels 59 

Pile drivers 35 

Concrete mixers 350 

Locomotive cranes 125 

Gas-electric generators 1,600 

Motors 700 

Pumps, hand 10,000 

Pumps, power 1,600 

Gasoline engines 600 

Air compressors 150 

Derricks 300 

Boilers 200 



A shop section under the control of the Director of 
Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies (D. M. E. 
and E. S.), an officer on the staff of the Chief Engineer, 
was organized in December, 1917. Later the Twenty- 
fourth and Thirty-fourth Engineers were assigned as 
shop regiments. 

The first step in construction was a shop erected at 
Is-sur-Tille equipped with such machine tools as could 
be purchased in the European markets. This original 
building was a very modest little affair, being only fifty 
feet wide by 125 feet long, but it did good service, soon 
beginning to deliver newly constructed engineer equip- 
ment urgently needed for the spring operations. 

In the meanwhile the engineer officers in command of 
the section were studying the question broadly and rec- 
ommended the establishment of a large shop to be 
ierected lat the principal engineer depot at Gievres, where 
all engineer shopwork for the Service of Supplies could 
be attended to. The extension and application of the 
Is-sur-Tille plant to work for the Zone of the Advance 
and, what was equally important, the acquisition of sev- 
eral independent shops, some of Tivhich were to be mobile, 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEEEING 211 

for each army was also recommended. The plans for 
the main shops at Gievres and Is-snr-Tille were laid out 
on the same general scheme to consist of a group of six 
buildings each fifty feet by 500 feet. By November, four 
of these buildings and in addition a large foundry where 
brass as well as iron castings were made, were erected 
at Gievres and put in operation. At Is-sur-Tille, while 
the first shop established was retained in service, a sec- 
ond building sixty feet by 400 feet was erected, consist- 
ing of the steel-frame work of an unused bakery building. 
A small shop was also established at St. Sulpice, the 
assembling point for engineer materiel on its arrival in 
France. 

Each army shop consisted of a semipermanent metal 
and wood-working shop with a number of mobile outfits 
on motor trucks. These latter were composed of four 
units, consisting of machine, blacksmith and wood-work- 
ing shops and a material supply car, each being mounted 
on a five and one-half-ton motor truck chassis. The 
machine shop truck contained, among other things, a 
work bench, a drill press, a portable electric drill, a 
grinder and a fourteen-inch lathe. The blacksmith shops 
contained work benches, forges, pipe-fitting tools, weld- 
ing outfit, while in the wood car were drills, saws and 
grinders. All had their individual gasoline-driven power 
plants and full complements of small tools. The machine 
shop truck cost $8,500 and the carpenter shop $7,600, 
including equipment. These mobile shops were able to 
do a wide range of repairs and even construction work 
in the field. On account of their great mobility, they 
could be run rapidly to the points where needed and thus 
could and did render exceedingly efficient service. In 
war flexibility and mobility are features whose impor- 
tance cannot be overestimated. 

Had the war continued through another year the Shop 
Section would have grown to be an institution of large 



212 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

proportions. As it was it accomplished most useful 
results. 

Both the British and French armies maintained tun- 
nelling companies, recruited from among miners, whose 
duty was the doing of all underground work, such as 
excavating dugouts with their subsurface chambers and 
the driving of tunnels to reach points beneath the 
enemy's positions. The first-named structures will be 
described in Chapter XXIII. The details of the tunnels 
presented little of professional interest. They were 
small drifts only large enough for men to work in and 
timbered no more than was necessary to support the roof 
and sides for a short time only. On reaching the desired 
situation, perhaps beneath an annoying point in the 
opposing lines of defense, or a controlling one that must 
be removed before an attack could be launched with hope 
of success, a transverse gallery or terminal would be 
excavated. In this chamber a large supply of high explo- 
sives would be stored and fired at the critical moment 
by electricity. What had been a moment before a posi- 
tion bristling with machine guns and crowded with men, 
would be transformed in a twinkling into a huge crater. 
The idea was not new, having been used in all wars for 
very many years. In the past war, however, the intro- 
duction of the delicate hearing instruments gave to tun- 
nelling a new aspect and rendered it a more hazardous 
operation then formerly, one in which success was much 
more difficult of atfainment. As soon as enemy tunnel- 
ling operations were discovered to be in progress, it was 
an easy matter to drive a cut-off gallery and frustrate 
his attempt. In spite of this the French and British, and 
unfortunately the Germans also, did succeed in making 
some very brilliant coups. The American army did but 
little in this respect. By the time it took a really active 
part, the character of the warfare had changed from 
stabilized trench work to open fighting, which presented 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERING 213 

little opportunity for operations, such as tunnelling, that 
required considerable time for execution. 

There was one outlet for engineering energy that was 
just reaching systematic organization when hostilities 
were ended, the work of salvage. War is inevitably 
costly and much waste cannot be avoided. The engineers 
of the allied armies had found that a large part, however, 
of the waste could be prevented and had established well 
organized services to that end. They found that nearly 
fevery discarded article had some recoverable value. Old 
clothing could be made over, parts of broken weapons 
could be assembled, old food cans were worth melting 
to obtain the solder, while even the refuse of kitchens 
and lavatories, if only it could be saved, produced 
grease, out of which glycerine for explosive compounds 
was obtainable. The grease was collected by ordering 
the water from all kitchens, bath houses, etc., to be 
passed through a filter box in which one compartment 
was filled with straw. The soap and grease were caught 
in the straw, removed periodically and shipped to places 
where the glycerine or valuable fats were extracted. To 
encourage saving among British troops, a percentage of 
the value of the recovered glycerine was paid to the men 
of the unit according to the amount and composition of 
the refuse turned in. The British authorities estimated 
that the glycerine thus secured cost about £50 per ton 
as compared with a price in the open market of £250. 
When the A. E. F. put the saving of refuse into effect, 
the value of the recovered fats and glycerine amounted 
to $57,000 in September, 1918, to $109,000 in October and 
to $120,000 in November. 

When the American General Staff realized how great 
were the possibilities of salvage they began to establish 
a scientifically organized service. The largest installa- 
tions were the shops near Tours, where discarded shoes 
were remade and clothing repaired. The value of tha 



214 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

clothing and shoes overhauled and made wearable at this 
depot was nearly $20,000,000. In this total were included 
a great number of the large felt hats with which Ameri- 
can soldiers were at first equipped. The hats were sub- 
sequently abandoned as an article of issue, because they 
occupied too much valuable space in vessels, when being 
sent overseas, and because they could not be worn in the 
field in connection with gas masks. Instead of discard- 
ing the hats, they were cut up at the Tours shops and 
out of them excellent slippers for hospital wear were 
made. 

There was not a part of a vehicle that was nof 'worth 
saving and being sent to the Motor Transport Repair 
Shops at Verneuil for combining to make a new truck 
or wagon. Even the spokes of broken wheels, fragments 
of motors and the bent frame of a truck chassis could be 
and were made use of. 

The assortment of articles picked up by the salvagei 
corps was limited in variety only by the number of dif- 
ferent things carried or used by a soldier. A list taken 
at random and given in ''America's Munitions " records 
the following items as the result of one day's business 
at a single rail-head : 

1,100 pairs of leggins 275 German rifles 

21 pairs of shoes 3 boxes tent poles 

30 leather gun cases 7 boxes gun repairs 

21 bags of harness 150 rifle grenade throwers 

350 mess kits 4 German machine guns 

750 condiment cans 200 German canteens 

750 bacon cans 8,000 gas masks 

150 first-aid packets 1 ammunition cart 

50 saddlebags 4 ration carts 

1,400 canteens 17 wagon wheels 

200 caps 4 boxes artillery material 

900 helmets (telephones, etc.) 

1,025 pack carriers 1,400 American canteens 



OTHER FIELDS OF ENGINEERINa 215 

750 canteen covers 400 American rifles 

1 wagon 47 German automatic 
76 wagon parts guns 

50 feed bags 75 gun bolts 

300 pistol holsters 100 respirators 
1 wagon bed 

The total value of articles salvaged in France during 
the year 1918 was the great sum of nearly $63,000,000, or 
almost as much as was appropriated for the army during 
the fiscal year of 1898, which included all .of the pre- 
liminary expenditures for the Spanish war. 

This total was made up as follows : 

Value of output, depots and shops . $47,018,374 

Battlefield recoveries 15,100,000 

Kitchen economies 474,515 

Waste sales 39,680 

Rubber 159,157 

Wool cloth shipped to the British. . 71,984 

Lumber 69,025 



$62,932,735 



The early efforts in salvage were directed by various 
and somewhat disconnected authorities, but at the close 
of the war the whole organization was being brought 
under the control of the Chief Engineer Officer. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

MAPS 

In no branch of military activity has the complication 
of modern war been more evident than in the maps of the 
field of activity and the making of them. No branch, with 
the possible exception of chemical warfare, has shown a 
greater development. In 1914 the British staff was 
entirely without military maps. Even the French relied 
on maps of their own country plotted on a scale of 1 over 
80,000, or about three-fourths of an inch to the mile, 
picturesque affairs where topography was indicated by 
hachures, according to the skill or personal taste of the 
draughtsman. These maps bore original dates of years 
during the decade beginning with 1830, although marked 
revised in the years 1910 to 1913. These were the largest 
scale maps of the theatre of operations obtainable in 
1914, except for certain limited districts in fortress areas 
of which maps were in existence on a scale of 1 over 
20,000. The maps of the 1 over 80,000 scale, which were 
quite sufficient both as to scale and accuracy for the art 
of war as it existed in August, 1914, formed the basis on 
which the first battle of the Marne was fought and won. 

But the tremendous increase in very long range heavy 
artillery and the application of the principles of indirect 
fire to pieces of short as well as long range, together 
with the development of trench warfare along the entire 
line of contact, created a demand for maps vastly better 
in all respects than those existing and to a perfectly 
appalling amount. To meet this demand it was neces- 
sary to plot anew France and Belgium, not only along 
the battle front but for very extensive areas on both 

216 



MAPS 217 

sides of it — even well behind the enemy lines — on 
scales varying from 1 over 5,000, where every little detail 
of topography, including such items as farm buildings, 
could be shown accurately, to the small scale of 1 over 
600,000 where only the main features were displayed. 

New plates had to be made frequently in order that 
new maps might be issued showing changes in the battle 
line and the constant alterations in and additions to the 
trench systems. 

To do this by the ordinary methods of field surveying 
was quite impossible within the limits of time available, 
but aerial photography came to the relief of the mapping 
iengineer through the development of photographic sur- 
veying. This surveying brought into play a new art, the 
reduction of air photographs to map form and accurate 
scale. 

This improvement in aerial photography made it pos- 
sible to carry on detail mapping in the enemy territory 
and to plot on maps the greater part of the enemy's 
trenches, lines of communication, battery positions, build- 
ings and supply '^ dumps." 

The variety of information led to the multiplication 
of the scale of maps in use, while the complication of 
modern warfare demanded an increased amount of 
graphic representation for simplification. In order to 
derive the greatest benefit from the increased accuracy 
and scale of the battle maps, it was necessary that the 
artillery using indirect fire should have a network of 
triangulation and traverse points on the ground in order 
to determine the exact location of their batteries. 

For the purpose of carrying on this work of surveying, 
plotting, map-making and printing there were in exist- 
ence in the various European armies at the time of our 
entry into the war topographical sections of the various 
staffs, and in conformity with their practice, there was 
organized in the American Expeditionary Force in the 



218 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

summer of 1917, a topographical sub-section of the Intel- 
ligence Section of the General Staff, which was charged 
with the direction and supervision of the engineer troops 
assigned to this work. 

On the military maps of all nations the scale is stated 
in the form of a representative fraction; thus, the scale 
of 1 inch to the mile is 1/63360 ; that is, 1 foot on the map 
represents 63360 feet on the ground. In France the scale 
was invariably in some fraction of a thousand and was 
always spoken of in terms of the thousands that made 
the denomination of the fraction. Thus a scale of 1 over 
20,000 was called a twenty-thousand map. The scales 
used by the various armies on the western front are 
shown on the following table : 

TYPES AND SCALES OF MILITARY MAPS 



AMERICAN 


FRENCH 


BRITISH 


GERMAN 


1:5,000* 


1:5,000* 


l:5,000t 


1:2,500 

and 
1 :5,000 


1:10,000 1 


1:10,000 1 


1:10,000 1 


1 :10,000 


1 :20,000 


1 :20,000 


1:20,000 


1 :25,000 


1:40,000 


1:50,000 


1:40,000 




1:80,000 


1 :80,000 


1:100,000 


1 :100,000 


1:200,000 


1 :200,000 


1:250,000 




1:600,000 


1 :600,000 







* Suppressed by French and Americana, August, 1918. 
t Practically discontinued at close of war. 



The scales shown in this table for the American army 
are purely theoretical, since time and means were not 
available for surveying or redrafting. The American 



MAPS 219 

Expeditionary Force accordingly adopted the French 
maps and standards. The decision in favor of using 
French rather than British maps was based largely on 
the prospective use of French artillery by our troops. 
The main difference between the French and British 
maps was in the employment of the metric scale by the 
former and yard measure by the latter. Before the close 
of the war the British had decided to change to the metric 
system, even though this involved re-calibration and 
standardization of all their artillery range instruments. 

In studying this table a surprising feature is the uni- 
formity of practice throughout the various armies, both 
friendly and enemy. The French 1/80000 and 1/50000 
were hachured maps and were, therefore, inferior in 
appearance, clearness and legibility to all the others 
which were contoured. The British quickly supplanted 
these maps by a new 1/40000 contoured map, but prior 
to the entry of the United States in the war, only sporadic 
attempts were made locally by individual French armies 
to produce a 1/50000 contoured map to take the place of 
their hachured map. The battle areas occupied by 
American troops were entirely covered at the time of the 
armistice with 1/50000 contoured maps produced by 
their own topographical sections, and after the armistice 
maps of this scale were extended to include the Ehine 
valley between Cologne and Mayence. 

A relatively small amount of original topographical 
surveying in the theatre of operations was done by the 
American Expeditionary Force, which took its base 
maps showing culture and topography from the French. 
The American maps, therefore, partook of the same char- 
acteristics as the French. But the American engi- 
neers bore their full share of aerial surveying and 
plotting of enemy organizations. At the close of hostili- 
ties they were keeping their maps up to date and print- 
ing all the maps used by troops under American direct 



220 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

command, whicli included a number of French divisions. 

Comparing the British and French maps, the former 
were mechanically superior. They were printed on linen- 
backed or other superior qualities of paper, were more 
finished in draughtsmanship and workmanship, and much 
more durable. They were also more accurate in detail 
for a variety of reasons. The old French maps upon 
which they were based were in general better and more 
up to date in that part of the line which the British held. 
The British, holding the most vulnerable part of the line, 
were massed more heavily and the area which they 
were obliged to cover was much smaller. They were 
thus enabled to do more new surveying and to more 
thoroughly revise the old work. Another factor 
which cannot be neglected is characteristic British 
thoroughness. 

The French maps were superior in geodetic control 
and in projection as is explained below. While the Ger- 
man military maps of Germany itself are very detailed 
and complete the German maps of the theatre of war 
were inferior to the allied production both in accuracy 
and workmanship. 

"When the battle line became established in 1914, after 
the first battle of the Marne, and trench warfare fol- 
lowed, there was an immediate demand for large scale 
maps. Before this demand could be met, there grew up 
all along the line a series of disconnected sketches and 
maps made by anyone who was able — or who thought 
he was able — to survey and draw. These unsystema- 
tized efforts frequently produced grave errors in the 
individual maps, and when an attempt was made to join 
adjacent maps or sketches, the result was often pathetic. 
The first step necessary was to cover the entire theatre 
of operations with a suitable system of triangulation and 
prepare an accurate map which would use as far as pos- 
sible the work already done. The scale adopted was 



MAPS 221 

1/20000. The basis for the control was the ancient tri- 
angulation of France made in the early part of the 19th 
century, which located every church spire and natural 
monument. In the territory occupied by the French this 
triangulation was in process of revision before the war, 
and a considerable amount of work had been done. In 
the territory occupied by the British there had been no 
•revision and the country had been so much fought over 
by the time that the battle line was stabilized, that a 
large number of the natural monuments had disappeared. 

The question of map projection even for ordinary pur- 
poses is extremely complicated from a mathematical 
point of view. The difficulty arises from the effort to 
portray the spherical surface of the earth on a flat map. 
This inevitably leads to distortion and all systems of pro- 
jection are based on an attempt to distribute these dis- 
tortions in such a manner that they will be locally neg- 
ligible. "When the average map user attempts to join 
together a number of maps of a series, covering a con- 
siderable area, the difficulty of fitting them together is 
usually attributed to shrinkage of paper or defects in 
the maps but is quite commonly due to failure to lay out 
in advance the system of projection and to join the maps 
in conformity with this system. For ordinary purposes 
errors introduced in this way are negligible. 

The military map, however, is used for indirect artil- 
lery fire commonly at ranges of from three to fifteen 
miles. It is necessary, therefore, that the exact mathe- 
matical location of both the gun and the target be known 
in order that the range and deflection can be computed. 
As battery commanders cannot all be geodesists nor even 
mathematicians, it is necessary that the map be as 
nearly free from error as possible and that the means of 
determination of range and deflection be simple or ' ' rule 
of thumb " methods. Even if the map as originally 
drawn be free from error, the distortion of the paper 



222 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

during printing or from the varying humidity of the 
atmosphere, and the error in joining adjacent maps 
together render it impossible to determine distances and 
bearings by measurements on the maps. There is, there- 
fore, superimposed on the map a rectangular grid from 
which the coordinates of any desired points can be deter- 
mined and the bearing of the line joining gun and target 
can be computed from these coordinates. If the grid be; 
laid out in kilometer squares and the range be fifteen 
kilometers, the constant error due to mechanical map 
imperfections by using coordinates will be reduced to one- 
fifteenth of the error from using map measurements, and 
the errors in laying out lines due to the imperfect joining 
of maps will be eliminated. The use of a rectangular 
grid and coordinates also furnishes a ready means of 
quick determination and description of the location of 
any point for all branches of the service. 

The difficult problem then was to select a method of 
projection, which, with a single origin for the whole 
theatre of operations, would not introduce greater dis- 
tortions at any point than would be allowable for artil- 
lery fire and which would permit the superimposition of 
a rigid rectangular grid with an origin coincident with 
that of the projection. This problem is mathematically 
very complex and volumes have been written on the sub- 
ject. Its exposition within the limits of this chapter is 
impossible but a brief description will be given of the 
methods of projection adopted by the various armies and 
the results obtained. 

The British used a projection known as the Bonne 
system, because at the beginning of stabilized warfare 
they were in Belgium where maps on a scale of 1/40000 
on the Bonne projection existed. When they extended 
south into France it was natural for them to extend the 
existing map system, especially since the triangulation 
of France had been computed and published for the 



MAPS 223 

Bonne system and the conversion into Lambert coordi- 
nates involved a long and tedious mathematical process. 

The Bonne projection is defined by parallels which are 
concentric circles and an initial meridian which is a 
straight line. The spacing of the parallels along the 
initial meridian is measured by the true latitude arc on 
this meridian. The subsequent meridians are obtained 
by laying off on successive parallels the true length of 
the longitude units, and through the points thus found 
drawing curves. These curves will intersect at a com- 
mon point on the initial meridian. It will be seen that 
distances along the initial meridian and along the 
parallels remain without error, but in all other directions 
linear errors increase with the distance from the initial 
meridian and large angular errors occur for a single 
fixed origin. These errors might reach values as large as 
1/380 in length and 2° 49' in angular measure for the 
area involved. In order to reduce these errors to the 
allowable limit for artillery fire it was necessary for the 
British to adopt several different origins for the pro- 
jection and the superimposed grid. Where the map 
sheets prepared on different origins came together seri- 
ous difficulties of adjustment arose. 

The projection used by the French in preparing their 
maps was the Lambert, whose essential features are 
that its meridians are straight lines converging at a com- 
mon point and that its parallels are concentric circles 
whose centres are at the point of convergency of the 
meridians, thus forming a simple conic projection. Dis- 
tances along the initial parallels have no distortion, but 
all other distances and angles are slightly distorted. By 
adjusting the distances between successive parallels a 
balance may be reached where the angular and linear 
distortions are the minimum. This adjusted Lambert 
is known as a conformal projection to distinguish it from 
.a true mathematical projection. For an area not exceed- 



224 AMEEICAN ENGINEEBS IN FRANCE 

ing four degrees of latitude and extending indefinitely in 
longitude, angular values are correct for all practical 
purposes and linear distances are correct within 1/2,0(K). 

The Germans used a polyhedral projection over lim- 
ited areas, were always bothered by failure of their maps 
to join up at the division line between these various 
areas, and were consequently compelled to print over- 
lapping maps for each section. 

When a single Lambert projection is extended over a 
wide range of latitude, a conformal adjustment intro- 
duces serious distortions. France was, therefore, 
divided into two Lambert Systems, the Lambert North, 
between latitudes 50 and 54, and Lambert South which 
included the territory south of latitude 50. Almost the 
entire theatre of active operations was included 
within the area of the Lambert North System. 

On this projection was superimposed a rectangular 
kilometric grid. The origin of the projection and the 
origin of the grid system were, of course, coincident; 
the Y ordinate of the grid system being superimposed 
on the axis of origin of the projection and the X abscisas 
drawn at right angles to it. The projection being conic 
and the grid rectangular, north as shown by the grid 
agreed with true north only at the origin and there was 
a constantly increasing divergence when moving in 
either direction from the origin. This had no effect what- 
ever on the use of the map by artillery but for geodetic 
reasons and comparison with magnetic north the amount 
of this divergence of the grid north from both true and 
magnetic north was shown on each map. 

This superimposed grid system on the projection 
divided the battle maps into squares, one lineal kilo- 
meter on a side. The lines creating this division were 
numbered successively from left to right and from the 
bottom of the sheet to the top. These lines, then, formed 
the basis for the French system of coordinates. 



MAPS 225 

Througli the unremitting labors of the hastily organ- 
ized French topographical sections, there finally emerged 
about a year after the opening of the war in 1914, 
the final French battle map or '* Plan Directeur," and 
since the latter was adopted by the American Expedi- 
tionary Force, it will be described in detail. The scale 
was 1 over 20,000 and the contour interval ten meters, 
or about thirty- three feet ; the culture, including both the 
natural features and the works of man being printed in 
black, the contours in brown. Since the map was to be 
used for over-printing enemy and friendly works and for 
numerous other over-printings, only these two colors 
were used for the base. For the same reason care had 
to be taken not to overload the map with detail. The 
same consideration governed the use of the rather large 
contour interval. 

These maps were covered with a rectangular grid of 
reference lines at intervals of one kilometer, or about 
six-tenths of a mile in each direction, also printed in 
black. The origin of the coordinates was at a point in 
the southwest of France and the coordinates increased 
to the northeast. As the battle line ran generally in an 
easterly and westerly direction and was about 500 kilo- 
meters long, the maximum east and west coordinate in 
the neighborhood of Switzerland was -{-500. 

The numerical X and Y coordinates of each grid line 
were printed on the margin, the unit being one kilometer 
or 1,000 meters. Wlien locating a point within a kilo- 
meter square, coordinates were written out with a 
decimal point after the kilometer, the X coordinate first 
as shown on Fig. 4, page 231. 

For a location to ten meters this meant writing ten 
figures, which proved too complicated and cumber- 
some, so the practice grew up of dropping the first two 
figures of each coordinate and writing the six figures on 
one line; the first three representing the X coordinate 



226 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

and tlie last three the Y. Maturally, with this method, 
repetitions could occur every ten kilometers. Both Brit- 
ish and German practice avoided these repetitions by 
using complicated systems of lettering and squares. 

The British maps were printed on sheets measuring 
twenty-six inches high by thirty-five and one-half inches 
wide, on which the actual map covered nineteen and three- 
quarter inches by thirty-one and one-quarter inches. As 
issued they were mounted on cloth and folded to four and 
one-half inches by six and one-half inches, a very con- 
venient size for the pocket. The main grid system 
divided the surface into squares 6,000 yards per side, 
each one being given a lettered designation, and as there 
were twenty-four large squares to a sheet, these letters 
ranged from A to X inclusive. The large squares were 
divided into secondary squares measuring 1,000 yards 
per side and numbered 1 to 30, a separate series for each 
letter and each secondary square subdivided into four 
smaller squares lettered, a, b, c, d. The map, p. 227, is a 
photo reproduction, exact size of a part of a British 
1/40000 map. The large or primary squares with their 
designating letters are shown, as well as the numbered 
secondary squares, and the subdivision of the latter into 
small squares indicated by the dotted lines. The method 
of portraying the features of the topography and the 
contours are clearly seen, although colors are lacking in 
the plate. To show how the system of coordinates was 
used to describe the location of a point, Vaucellette 
Farm can be taken as an example. This would be writ- 
ten 57CX13c8.5, where 57C is the number of the map, 
X the primary square, 13 the secondary square, c the 
lower left-hand quarter of the secondary square, and 8.5 
the horizontal and vertical coordinates in the square c, 
measured from its lower left-hand corner as an origin of 
local coordinates. As these small squares measured 250 
yards to a side, each decimal unit in the coordinates 



MAPS 



227 




Fob Description See Page 226. 



MAPS 229 

represented a distance of only twenty-five yards. By 
using larger scale maps and writing these coordinates in 
two or even three places of decimals, a very high degree 
of accuracy in writing the location of points on a map 
was obtained. 

Finally, toward the close of the war, all allied nations 
combined in a modification of the French system. 
Every fifty-kilometer square was divided into twenty- 
five ten-kilometer squares, each of which was given 
a separate letter of the alphabet. Enlargements of a ten- 
kilometer square and of a kilometer square are shown in 
Figs. 2 and 3, and the method of designating a point is 
described under Fig. 3. At the close of hostilities 
both French and Americans had effected the change. 
When we consider the incessant use of the military 
map to give exact locations, and the constant repeti- 
tion of these locations in documents by the artillery and 
infantry over the wireless, telephone and telegraph, the 
importance of this simplification and improvement can- 
not be overestimated. This change, together with many 
others looking toward the simplification and standard- 
ization of allied practice, was effected at one of the meet- 
ings of the Inter-Allied Map conferences, which were 
instituted as a result of America's entry into the war. 

The map on page 227 has particular local interest. 
It gives a part of the battlefield of Cambrai, that city 
being just beyond the upper right corner, the British 
offensive in that battle beginning just east of Villers- 
Guislain, extending thence north and west past Gonne- 
lieu and through Villers-Plouich. Here it was that the 
Germans made their counter offensive, and at the point 
marked *' Station " in square E31, the Eleventh Engi- 
neers made their stand, described officially as the first 
American participation in actual fighting. The village 
just on the edge of the map west of E31 is Gouzeaucourt. 
The size of the sheet was exceedingly convenient to 



M 310 320 330 340 350 



A 



L 



Q 



V 



B 



M 



R 



VV 



H 



N 



X 



D 



J 



O 



T 



Y 



K 



U 



50 



Kilo meters 



-300 



-290 



-260 



■Z7Q 



-2G0 



-250 



Fig. 1. — Inter-Allied System. Method of Lettering Fifty 
Kilometer Squares. 



300 f z 3 



teo- 

9- 
8- 
7- 
6- 
5- 
4- 



95. 



cr7 



P6 



05 



3- 

E- 

I- 

250- 



09 



!i_ 



f?i. 



-09_.ia_ 



02 



iSL 



!!_ 



s. 



K 



\2 



a. 



291 



Si, 



49 



SZ 



M. 



ISfi. 



4L. 



4L 



st_ 




5L 



5/ 



7 a 9 310 



St. 



6L 



1,5? to? „i7?, 



at 



80 80 



59- 



2a_ 



SL 



iifi- 



SS- 



M. 



^ 



22_ 



4L 



.jQ KiLamst5r2_ 



Fig. 2. — Inter-Alued System. Ten Kilometer Square Enlarged — Method 
of Numbering Kilometer Squares. 

230 



303 




304 



Fig. 3. — Intee- Allied System. Kilometer square enlarged. Point " A " 
is the same as shown on Figs. 1 and 2. Coordinates of Point 
"A" within Square V are Written V3593, a Point 20 Meters 
N. and E. of Point " A " would be V352932. A Point with Sim- 
ilar Figures May Occur Every 50 Kilometers, 



176- 



175- 



I Ki tomcher 



750 rnef^rs ^ 



lA. 



2?0 me+ers 



243 



244 



Fig. 4. — Old Fbench System, Kilometer Square. Coordinates of Point 
"A" Written as Follows, in Full: 243.75—175.22, or Abbrevi- 
ated: 375.522, 



231 



232 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE ^ 

handle, and the form was better than the American in 
that the major dimension was right to left, which con- 
formed to the shape of desk tops and was easier to hold 
in the hands than one where the major dimension was 
from top to bottom. 

The base map thus prepared formed a foundation for 
the over-printing of military information. The Battle 
Map, or ^* Plan Directeur," normally had over-printed 
on it the fenemy's trenches and defensive organizations 
and the location of the enemy's batteries and means of 
communication. In this form it was issued to troops 
down to units as small as companies. 

Hostile trench systems were over-printed in blue and 
friendly trenches in red on the French maps. The Ger- 
mans reversed this procedure so that a captured German 
map could be interpreted by the French in the same way 
as one of their own maps. The British color system was 
the same as the German, that is, allied trenches in blue, 
enemy in red. 

The Battle Map again formed a base for the prepara- 
tion of special maps, of which the most important was 
the Artillery Bombardment Objective map, which accent- 
uated by over-printing in different colors the points 
upon which fire should be concentrated so that the maxi- 
mum result could be obtained from the minimum 
expenditure of ammunition. 

Next in importance was the " Enemy First-Line 
Positions," a detailed study for the infantry, portraying 
the important objectives in the enemy's defensive organi- 
zation and the manner in which they were held, the 
important trenches being accentuated. 

Similar special maps were prepared for other offen- 
sive branches, such as the air service and tanks. Secret 
maps of our own trenches shown in red, and lines of com- 
munication were made for pur own construction and sup- 
j)ly services. 



MAPS 233 

The size of the American sheets was generally twenty- 
eight and one-half inches by forty- two inches, the major 
dimension being from top to bottom. 

To insure the most efficient use by the artillery of the 
Battle Map and Artillery Bombardment Objective Map, 
it was necessary to lay out on the ground for each battery 
or group of batteries traverse and triangulation points, 
from which their exact location and direction to the vari- 
ous objectives could be determined. 

In describing the organization of the American 
topographical section, it is necessary to explain briefly 
the growth of the European topographical sections prior 
to our entry into the war and their organization as found 
by the American Expeditionary Force on the arrival of 
its first units in France. 

The French topographical organization was formed 
by a combination of the mobilized '' Service Geograph- 
ique de I'Armee " and the '^ Groupes de Canevas de 
Tir," which latter may be freely translated as Fire Con- 
trol Sections. The '' Service Geographique, " operating 
in time of peace under the direction of the Minister 
of War, is the organization which would exist in this 
country if the Coast and Geodetic, Geological, Hydro- 
graphic and Land Surveys were combined into one 
bureau under the War Department. At the outbreak of 
the war the *' Service Geographique " was strong in 
personnel and materiel. The " Groupes de Canevas de 
Tir ' * were organized originally by the artillery and were 
controlled by that arm until taken over by the 
*' Service Geographique." After that the *' Service 
Geographique " exercised technical supervision over 
their work and furnished them men and materials. 
However, in the armies and lower units they came at 
first under the control of the Second Bureau or Intelli- 
gence Sections of the respective staffs, and finally, rising 
to be a separate branch of the staff, reporting directly 
to the Chiefs of Staff of the respective units. 



234 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

In tlie British army thg place of tlie '' Service 
Geographique '' was taken by the " Ordnance Survey," 
operating under the control of the map section of the 
general staff. The units in the field were field survey 
companies working as part of a map subdivision of the 
intelhgence sections of their respective staffs, officially 
known throughout the British Expeditionary Force as 
" Maps." Due to its work in the British colonial 
empire, the Ordnance Survey at the outbreak of the war 
was rich in experienced personnel. Like the American 
topographical division, the entire personnel of the Brit- 
ish service, including the staff officers, was drawn from 
the engineers. In both the British and French armies, 
the Sound and Flash Eanging services, which had grown 
to large porportions, were under the control of the 
topographical divisions. 

The German system was somewhat similar in organi- 
zation and staff control, except that the sound and flash 
ranging and a considerable part of the topographical 
duties which pertain directly to the control of artillery 
fire remained under the artillery, as was formerly the 
case with the French. 

It was necessary for the American Expeditionary 
Force to create not only topographical sections for its 
armies, but also to maintain in France a service similar 
to the British Ol'dnance Survey and French Service 
Geographique. 

Prior to our entry into the war, map making had been 
a duty of the Corps of Engineers, but for the American 
Expeditionary Force, staff control was adopted in con- 
formity with European practice. Had it been a ques- 
tion of original topographical surveys alone, the work 
might have remained under engineer direction, but due 
to the development of airplane photography, most of the 
maps included information regarding the enemy, which 
had been collected by the intelligence section of the Gen» 



MAPS 235 

eral Staff. The topographical work was accordingly 
organized with engineer personnel under the topograph- 
ical division of the Second or Intelligence Section, Gen- 
eral Staff, commonly abbreviated to G-2-C. At general 
headquarters in each army, corps and division, there was 
a staff officer (assigned from the engineers) in the G-2 
or intelligence section, who exercised supervision and 
technical control of the work of the following troops : 

G. H. Q. — One battalion of three companies (topograph- 
ical) 29th Engineers, operating the base 
printing plant which corresponded to the 
Service Geographique and Ordnance Sur- 
vey, and also furnishing a topographical 
section to the general staff at General 
Headquarters. 

For each army: — One battalion of three companies 
(topographical) 29th Engineers, corre- 
sponding to the " Groupes de Canevas de 
Tir " and *' Field Survey Companies." 

For Divisions and Corps: — Detachments from the Army 
Topographical battalions. 

At the time of the Armistice there were two armies in 
the field and the authorized strength of the attached 
topographical troops was nominally nine companies. Of 
these only five were on hand, of which three had been 
organized in the American Expeditionary Force from 
engineer replacements. This lack of personnel was 
largely compensated by the zeal and efficiency of the 
enlisted men, who set a pace that although it lasted over 
the emergency, could not have been sustained indefinitely. 

The detailed duties of the topographical organization 
formed from the Twenty-ninth Engineers were as 
follows : 

Surveying. 

Eestitution of aerial photographs. 



236 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Map making. 

Map printing. 

Map distribution. 

Special maps and plans for staff branches. 

Triangulation and traverse control of artillery fire. 

Relief map making. 

Panoramic photography and visibility studies. 

Photographic reproduction. 

Type printing, including publications, pamphlets and 
propaganda. 

Engraving. 

Adopting standards and furnishing technical advice 
and supervision. 

In conformity with French and British practice and 
because it could be more easily organized and developed 
by engineer personnel, the Sound and Flash Ranging 
Service, which is more properly a duty of the artillery, 
was also placed under the control of the Topographical 
Division, but its work will be described in another 
chapter. 

Another important aid to the artillery, which in 
time of active operations occupied about one-third of the 
personnel of the army topographical sections, was 
the means afforded by which the batteries could locate 
their positions on the map and thus compute the bearing 
and distance to invisible targets. The coordinates of all 
prominent natural objects were either obtained from old 
records or determined by triangulation and were issued 
in the form of tables, with silhouette sketches for pur- 
poses of identification, to all battery commanders. Any 
artilleryman within view of three points could locate his 
battery by tri-secting with a plane table. This was suf- 
ficient for rough work in open warfare, but when the bat- 
tle line was stabilized, traverses tied into the triangula- 
tion system were run through all actual or prospective 
artillery positions. These traverses were marked with 



MAPS 237 

special stakes and the coordinates of each station and the 
bearings of the lines connecting them were issued in the 
form of tables. These traverses, called by the French 
** Canevas de Tir " or " network of fire,'* enabled very 
large concentrations of artillery to be directed with accu- 
racy on invisible targets without any preliminary regis- 
tration. This survey work was all done by detachments 
of the Twenty-ninth Engineers from the army topo- 
graphical battalions. 

"When the first units of the American Expeditionary 
Force arrived in France, in July, 1917, the Topographical 
Service consisted of but one officer and eight men, oper- 
ating a hand lithographic press. The first and most 
urgent undertaking of procuring and distributing maps 
was immediately begun, the sources of supply being the 
French and British topographical services. The next 
step was the construction and the accumulation of the 
mechanical equipment for a base printing plant, corre- 
sponding to that of the Service Geographique, and for 
smaller plants for armies, corps and divisions. All of 
the equipment and supplies were furnished by the Engi- 
neer Corps in the early stages through purchase in 
Europe, and, toward the end, largely by shipment from 
the United States. The base printing plant was placed 
in operation in July, 1918. After September 1st, the 
American E. F. was independent of outside aid for its 
supply of maps. The First Army plant began to work 
in August, that of the Second Army in October, and of 
the Third in November. Meanwhile, plant, equipment 
and personnel had been furnished to each corps as organ- 
ized, the total number of corps having reached nine 
in November, 1918. These plants turned out more than 
15,000,000 impressions and printed about 4,500,000 of the 
6,000,000 maps distributed to the American Expedition- 
ary Force. 

While the mechanical problems connected with install- 



238 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

ing, equipping and operating the plant were successfully 
solved, the technical problems of procuring information 
and the reduction of this information to the most satis- 
factory form for presentation, although also successfully 
met, were much more difficult of accomplishment. 
This was due partly to the inherent difficulties, but 
largely to the lack at the outset of trained personnel and 
the entire newness of so many details of military map 
making, that had arisen as creations of the war. Of the 
1,800 officers and men in the topographical service at the 
conclusion of hostilities, about one-half were employed 
in the reproduction plants, on work that differed only 
in detail from their regular vocations before their 
entrance into the army. The other half, scattered 
throughout the field forces, were called on to practice 
arts which were either unknown or little used before the 
war. The most important of these were: interpretation 
of aerial photographs and their restitution or reduction 
to map form and scale; the preparation of initial copies 
of countless special and periodical maps for Intelligence 
operations, artillery, and other branches, a work which 
required comprehensive military knowledge ; the perfec- 
tion of the organization for gathering the necessary 
information and for editing and publishing it in intelligi- 
ble form and on a time schedule, and the establishment 
of the necessary liaisons with troops and with staff corps 
for this purpose; traverse and triangulation surveys for 
the control of artillery fire and publication of the results, 
which required special knowledge of the principles of 
artillery orientation ; the preparation of relief maps ; and 
the making of visibility studies. The personnel for all 
of this work were trained at the topographical schools 
especially established at Langres in the autumn of 1917, 
using French and British documents and photographs 
with American instructors who had been instructed in 
French and British schools. 



MAPS 239 

Beginning with the Chatean- Thierry operations in 
June, 1918, graduates of this school were furnished to 
the topographical sections of corps and armies, and 
American data began to be used in the school. Actual 
surveys made after the conclusion of the Armistice 
showed a gratifying degree of accuracy in the study and 
mapping of enemy organization. 

Not only was the American army independent by 
means of its own special force in the making and sup- 
plying of military maps at the close of the war, but it 
had outstripped the other allied services in two highly 
important respects : speed and mobility. 

Speed, so essential in all military operations, was 
imperative in the publication of maps and other intelli- 
gence information. In war, information a day late is 
often useless. Greater speed was secured through the 
superiority of American machinery and through the char- 
acteristic desire of Americans to use only the latest 
improvements in plant and methods. 

Mobility was secured by mounting specially designed 
lithographic presses and auxiliary apparatus on motor 
trucks, so that they were enabled to accompany armies 
and corps throughout their movements and to begin to 
operate within two hours after arrival at any place. 

The paralysis resulting from the lack of such mobility 
was illustrated during the German offensives in the 
spring of 1918, when three allied army reproduction 
plants were put out of action for periods of three or four 
weeks with the same serious effects as the stoppage of 
the daily newspaper would have on modern civilization. 
During the advance to the Rhine, the British and French 
armies were accompanied by mobile lithographic trains 
loaned by the American army and operated by American 
crews. The work done by these trains was the only 
reproduction work which these armies had for nearly a 
month. 



240 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Before proceeding with a further detailed description 
of the base printing plant and mobile trains, it would be 
well to outline the division of work between the base 
plant and the armies. The surveying, drafting and print- 
ing of base maps, and the making of relief maps, was 
done by the base troops. The interpretation and study 
of aerial photographs, their restitution and the over- 
printing of enemy organizations on base maps to make 
a battle map, and the establishment of artillery firing 
data were the functions of armies and were performed 
by the army topographical battalion. In one American 
army at the close of hostilities thirty-three periodic 
maps were being produced, the time of publication 
ranging from daily to monthly and the editions from 
fifty to 4,000 copies. In times of great emergency, such 
as during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, 
when it was necessary to revise and republish in large 
quantities every map in the army, the base printing 
plant came to the army's assistance, printing nearly 
1,000,000 copies for these two operations alone. 

The base printing plant employed about 800 men, 
divided into two twelve-hour shifts, and occupied about 
60,000 square feet of floor space. It included thirty- 
eight lithographic presses, eighteen type presses, six 
linotype machines, stereotype, photo-engraving and zinc- 
etching appliances, wet and dry-plate photography trans- 
ferring process rooms, power plant, machine shop and 
the necessary auxiliary machinery. While not so large 
as similar plants of the Allies, it was completely equipped 
and especially designed for the production of a large bulk 
of work at great speed. The army plants were much the 
same in principle though on a smaller scale. The mobile 
army printing train, which was not completely assem- 
bled and in operation until after the Armistice, consisted 
of thirty-nine motor trucks ranging from 1,500 pounds 
to five tons capacity and contained the most modern 



MAPS 241 

equipment for lithography and map printing, type print- 
ing and stereotyping and wet and dry-plate photography, 
zinc etching and photo engraving. Each train was inde- 
pendent in supply, power and repair facilities, and 
contained its own telephone exchange and wireless 
apparatus. 

There was no opportunity to try out this train in 
actual warfare, but its component parts had all been in 
service with various corps and armies during hostilities. 
Nevertheless, to demonstrate its practicability, it was 
operated in the field for one month under simulated war 
conditions, and proved a complete success. That its 
value was appreciated is demonstrated by the fact that 
the French government placed in the United States an 
order for ten lithographic trucks to form a nucleus for 
similar trains for their armies. 

General Pershing stated in an official communication 
that no army ever started an offensive operation better 
provided with intelligence, information and maps than 
the First American Army in the St. Mihiel offensive. 
This was due to the work of the Twenty-ninth Engineers, 
who, in addition to printing and publishing the great 
mass of intelligence documents that were used, also fur- 
nished 327,000 copies of maps prepared from data fur- 
nished or collected by them* The initial issue of fifteen 
tons of these maps was prepared in less than two weeks 
and was so timed as to permit distribution to the numer- 
ous units which moved to the front from all portions of 
the American area at the last moment in great secrecy. 
The high standard set in this achievement was main- 
tained, and even exceeded in some respects, in the more 
difficult Meuse-Argonne offensive. 

The striking feature of this operation was the great 
independence and efficiency developed by the corps print- 
ing trains which were operated by the detachments of 
the Twenty-ninth Engineers. In the war of movement 



242 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

and the consequent interruption of communications wMcli 
developed in this operation, time was not available for 
preparing up-to-date battle maps in the army topograph- 
ical section and base printing plant. Mobile printing 
trains, however, made it possible to print maps in quanti- 
ties and with great speed at the front, and the value of 
this work to our combatant troops was immeasurable. 

After the Armistice there was little diminution in the 
work of the Twenty-ninth Engineers until their depar- 
ture for the United States, in June, 1919. In addition 
to the organizaion and equipment of the Third Army 
Topographical Section for the Army of Occupation, 
intensive work was carried on in the preparation of maps 
of the occupied territory and of other parts of Germany 
beyond the Rhine, that the army might be prepared for 
the possibility of a further advance. In addition to the 
army and battle maps, great numbers of maps were pro- 
duced to accompany historical and technical reports of 
various department chiefs of the American Expedition- 
ary Force. 

The volume of work accomplished is shown in the fol- 
lowing tables : 



LITHOGRAPHIC MAPS 



SCALE 


NUMBER OP COPIES 


NUMBER OF 
IMPRESSIONS 


5,000 


12,050 

184,420 
1,016,825 
498,385 
569,975 
494,075 
458,608 


22 100 


10,000 


450 720 


20,000 


2 361 300 


50,000 


864 825 


800 , 000 


596 250 


200,000 


2,164 560 


Special 


875 530 








Map total. 


3.234,330 
1,371,200 


7,335,285 
1,961,440 


Miscellaneou 


3 Lithosraphic Work 




4,605,530 


9,296,725 



MAPS 

ALL GRAPHIC REPRODUCTION WORK 



243 





ORDERS 


IMPRESSIONS 


Lithographic Map Department 


2,275 
855 

1,197 
174 


9,296,725 


Type Printing Department 

Photographic Department 


5,865,953 
23,791 


Photographic Engraving Department 


1,622 


Totals 


4,497 


15,208,091 







When it is realized that two-thirds of this work was 
done in the five months from August to December, 1918, 
this represents an enviable record of achievement. It 
must be remembered, however, that less than half the 
men attached to the topographical section were engaged 
in reproduction. The work of the others, whether in 
running artillery traverses or taking photographs under 
fire, or in the delicate arts of interpretation and restitu- 
tion, cannot be measured by statistics. 



CHAPTER XIX 

FLASH AND SOUND RANGING AND SEARCHLIGHT DETECTION 

If the target was unseen by and perhaps unknown to 
the gunners, through the use of indirect fire controlled 
from a distant observation point, so were the guns them- 
selves equally invisible from the target. But if an 
effective reply to a harassing fire were to be made, the 
position of the guns must somehow be accurately deter- 
mined, even in spite of this invisibility. 

In formei* years when the range of guns did not 
exceed a mile or at most two, and guns were individually 
aimed over open sights, they were in full view, or if shel- 
tered, their location would be disclosed by the pall of 
smoke. With guns of much longer range and no telltale 
smoke, special means of discovery had to be devised. 
This gave rise to a most interesting game of hide and 
seek, where both sides resorted to every strategy of con- 
cealment and means of discovery. One form of mislead- 
ing disguise was to create false positions. To make guns 
unrecognizable, ingenious forms of concealment were 
adopted, taking suggestions from the coloring of the wild 
animals, which affords them protection by making them 
indistinct through their resemblance to surrounding 
earth or foliage. 

To tear off the hiding veil, to see the unseeable, to 
learn of the unknown, recourse was had, since the human 
eye was useless and the ear unreliable, to many beautiful 
applications of optics and acoustics, employing electro- 
mechanical instruments almost uncanny in their accu- 
racy. Among these instruments were the microphone 
which transforms the vibrations of sound into fluctua- 

244 



FLASH AND SOUND RANGING 245 

i 

tions of electric current, the geophone which multiplies 
the intensity of sound travelling through the ground to 
many times its original volume, and the amplifier which 
magnifies the effect of an electrical wave. These instru- 
ments with a delicacy of make hitherto considered prac- 
ticable only for laboratory work, permitted men to see; 
through darkness or over hills, to separate sounds as a 
game dog will distinguish between the scent of different 
birds, and to be able to hear actually down into the very 
earth itself. 

Sight is, of course, man's best sense for determining 
distant objects, and the airplane gave him not only 
increased range but a wholly new point of observation. 
Hills were no longer obstacles to sight. In his flying 
machine he could surmount them, and inspect at will and 
in detail the country beyond. Batteries, unless covered, 
could be detected with ease and certainty. At the begin- 
ning of the war, owing to the limited range of guns for 
vertical fire, observation airplanes could fly safely, so 
far as attack from the ground was concerned, at an alti- 
tude of 5,000 feet. At such a height the human eye can 
satisfactorily determine the character of objects on the 
ground. But the designers of anti-aircraft guns were 
active, and ^'Archies," the special anti-aircraft guns, 
greater caliber, longer range, and of greater precision 
were being turned out. With each step in progress the 
airplanes were obliged to keep at constantly increasing 
altitudes until finally no height was safe against surface 
guns less than 15,000 feet, or say three miles. Why anti- 
aircraft guns were called ''Archies," except that it was 
a contraction of Archibald, could never be learned. Who 
Archibald was, and why his name was made so memor- 
able, no one seemed to know. 

At a height of 15,000 feet or anything approaching it, 
in a vibrating machine travelling at 100 miles per hour, 
the eye ceases to be sufficiently accurate and the more 



246 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

sensitive instantaneous pliotograpliic lens and film were 
pressed into service. As the ''Archies " were improved, 
forcing the planes to fly higher and higher, so likewise 
was the photographic apparatus developed, bringing the 
earth in effect nearer and nearer, until even at a height 
of 15,000 feet, pictures were obtained showing^ with vivid 
clearness all the objects on the surface. 

But those in defense were not beaten, and art and 
trickery were called to aid. Guns were covered with all 
sorts of disguising protection. The barrels and limbers 
were painted with various colors, rivalling in gaudiness 
the leopard or the zebra, and when not in action they 
were covered with screens of boughs or nets in which 
were entwined pieces of canvas imitating leaves or earth. 
As the photograph would be taken vertically, it was not 
so much the outline of the object that would be shown but 
the shadow, and it was, therefore, desirable that the form 
of the gun should be broken by contrasting colors and 
that a sharply marked shadow should not be cast. 

The success attained by the camouflage expert in dis- 
guising or completely hiding guns was really remarkable. 
Guns actually in action could not at times be discovered 
at a distance of a few hundred yards unless the flash was 
noticed at the instant of discharge. 

Faked positions were frequent so that on a given hiU 
elope, where it was known that batteries were posted, it 
was difiQcult to distinguish the real from the imitation. 
In fact, were it not for other telltale marks it would have 
been impossible to locate batteries by direct observation. 

These marks were the momentary flash of the gun, 
either direct or reflected, the permanent effect of the blast 
and the evidences of human work and occupancy. The 
last were indicated with marked distinctness on the air- 
photos by dugouts and kitchens, by the paths worn by 
the feet when walking from them to the guns and by the 
roads worn by wagons in bringing up supplies and 



FLASH AND SOUND RANGING 247 

ammunition. The increasing definiteness of these tell- 
tale signs in pictures taken on successive dates, was suf- 
ficient to lead to the detection of the battery. This 
difificulty was partially solved by establishing batteries 
alongside roads. 

The effect of the blast of the guns was a sure sign, and 
one very difficult to conceal. The rush of air following the 
discharge killed all verdure in its path, making a dark 
stain, whose unmistakable character would be recognized 
on the photographic plate. Even bare ground would be 
affected by the blast. Ordinarily the shelter afforded by 
trees would offer splendid concealment, but here the kill- 
ing blast would at once leave its record. There was once 
a German battery that caused much annoyance, but so 
carefully had it been hidden from vertical observation 
that its position could not be discovered. It had been 
stationed on the shore of a small lake and the water 
surface gave no sign of the blast from the guns that 
passed harmlessly over it. With the coming of winter the 
pond froze. The next photograph showed the effect of 
the blast and the destruction of the disturbing battery 
promptly followed. 

This photographic work was not the simple matter 
that the above few words might seem to indicate. We 
have all had experience with ordinary photography and 
Imow how details are lost when the object is but a short 
distance away for, though a pretty picture results, the 
landscape is shown in broad shadows or contrasting 
lights without detail. Such a picture, however attractive 
from an artistic point of view, will not answer military 
requirements. The latter demand that prints show accu- 
rately the minutiae in the field, exactly as a distant view 
appears when examined through a powerful telescope. 
In photography this is accomplished by using special 
lenses set in peculiar cameras giving a telescopic effect, 
that is, limited breadth bu! magnified detail. But with 



248 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FEANCE 

photographs taken vertically, a new difficulty was found 
in the haze caused by the moisture in the atmosphere not 
present close to the ground, a difficulty finally overcome 
by using screens or color filters permitting the far-reach- 
ing lenses to pierce the inconvenient haze. The cameras 
attached to the very swiftly moving airplanes were 
subject to their jarring vibrations. To prevent the latter 
from completely spoiling the picture, the shutter must 
work with great rapidity, but such short exposures will 
not give great distant detail except on especially pre- 
pared plates. Apparatus of a character that would over- 
come all the above disturbing effects did not exist before 
the war began and had to be developed step by step, call- 
ing for highly scientific and resourceful research work 
on the part of skillful opticians and chemical engineers. 
But all the difficulties were not yet conquered. Th6 
cameras had to be so attached that they could be sighted 
and worked by the aviator with the minimum of effort 
on his part so as to allow him to devote his attention to 
his engrossing duty of handling his machine, and dodg- 
ing shells from enemy Archies or machine gun bullets 
fired from a hostile plane. 

The French cameras took negatives on glass 18 cm. by 
24 cm. (approximately 7.2 in. by 9.2 in.), while the British 
used 4 in. by 5 in. plates. The latter were usually enlarged 
for examination while prints from the former were made 
direct. The most satisfactory lens was one with a focal 
length of about twenty inches. Of such apparatus the 
United States possessed none in 1917, being obliged to 
develop even the manufacture of the optical glass of 
which Germany had previously supplied the greater part. 
There was finally evolved a very satisfactory camera of 
American design and manufacture, using films instead 
of glass, but of the French dimensions, 18 cm. by 23 cm. As 
an indication of the demand for photographic supplies, 
there were shipped to France during the month of Octo- 



FLASH AND SOUND BANGING 249 

ber, 1918, among other items, 1,500,000 sheets of paper, 
300,000 dry plates, 20,000 rolls of films and twenty tons 
of chemicals. 

After a picture was taken, developed and printed, no 
little skill was required to discover and correctly read its 
message. To the untrained eye there would appear noth- 
ing but empty fields and barren roads, while the expert 
would see, especially after comparing the picture with 
previous ones of the same locality, results of shell fire, 
new batteries, recent construction carefully concealed, or 
other signs of troop movements. 

Great as was the progress of aerial photography and 
the perfection of the apparatus, batteries could not 
always be located with certainty by such means, and 
recourse was had to other applications of scientific 
methods. 

An accurate means of locating a distant gun is by its 
flash. If a gun were so placed that it could be seen from 
two points, two observers using ordinary surveyors* 
transits could obtain the relative bearings of the spot of 
light. Then with the distance between the observers 
being measured, the determination of the location of the 
flash on a map was a matter of simple triangulation com- 
putation. There was one serious chance for error to be 
guarded against in this otherwise exceedingly simple 
method and that was that the observers might not be 
registering on the same flash. To be certain of this and 
to eliminate all readings that were not on the same gun, 
each observer, usually there were several, at the instant 
of noting and recording a gun flash, would push a but- 
ton on an electric wire and actuate a small light in the 
central station, perhaps some miles away. Then each 
one would immediately telephone to the same office his 
reading of the bearing of the flash. If the lights from 
three or more of the observers showed simultaneously 
and the bearings intersected at a point, it could be 



250 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

assumed with absolute assurance that ttiey were register- 
ing the same gun. 

Flash ranging was effective in locating a very consid- 
erable part of the field artillery posted within two or 
three miles of the front line, but was relatively ineffective 
in locating the hostile heavy artillery, which was usually 
so far back that even the reflected flashes were screened 
from direct observation. In the event that guns 
could not be observed by direct vision, then recourse 
to airplane observation was necessary. But if the eye 
of man, even when aided by telescopes and the highly 
sensitive photographic plates, was the sole means of 
detecting enemy's guns, many, perhaps the majority, 
would have escaped the most vigilant observer, on 
account of the difficulty in making accurate aerial deter- 
minations for the reasons given above or through the 
skill of camoufleurs. Undiscovered the guns could con- 
tinue to inflict damage with impunity. Flash ranging 
and airplane observation both required clear weather, 
but during six months the climatic conditions in northern 
France are unfavorable for observation. 

When direct vision and photography failed to give 
results the engineer called acoustics to his aid. Light 
travels in straight lines and if a hill intervenes between 
the enemy battery and the target or observer, the flash 
cannot be seen. But exactly as the projectile in its 
flight makes a curved path from gun to destination, the 
sftund of the discharge passes over the obstruction. If 
the flash cannot be seen the discharge can be heard. This 
physical fact opened a new field for scientific observation. 

Another characteristic of the sound wave in which it 
differs from that of light is in its vastly slower rate of 
travel, being under normal atmospheric conditions and 
at a temperature of thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit (zero 
centigrade), 1,086 feet per second, as compared with 
185,000 miles per second for light. This velocity of 



FLASH AND SOUND RANGING 251 

sound is easily measured and, if the exact length of time 
taken by the passage of sound between the point of origin 
and the hearer is known, the distance travelled can be 
computed within a negligible error. Now if instead of 
one hearer there be several who catch the sound of the 
discharge of the gun, for instance, at different moments 
of time and if the exact instant when the sound reaches 
the several observers can be separately measured in sec- 
onds and fractions of seconds, the difference in distance 
between the gun and each observer can be computed on 
the basis of 1,086 feet per second. As these differences 
determine the direction from which the sound comes as 
well as its distance, it is the work of only a few minutes 
and a very simple calculation to ascertain the position of 
the gun provided the relative position of each observer, 
with respect to the others, is correctly indicated on a map. 
In fact, with the observing points plotted on an accurate 
map, the determination is made mechanically by the inter- 
section of adjustable strings. 

The figure of velocity of 1,086 feet per second is 
subject to small corrections due to temperature, atmos- 
pheric humidity, wind, etc., which are readily made. 
This correction was determined on the British front by 
firing a gun, whose position was definitely known with 
respect to all observers, at frequent regular intervals. 
The instruments would record the differences in arrival 
time of this signal souhd and the variation from a stand- 
ard time interval would give the combined correction 
for all atmospheric conditions as they actually existed 
at that instant. The American method was to report the 
meteorological conditions as determined by observation 
balloons. Had the war continued, some better system 
would have been installed. 

The human ear is quite incapable of measuring small 
fractions of seconds. Even if it could, man could not 
record the sensation with sufficient accuracy, so the engi- 



252 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

neer was obliged to devise a macliine that could both 
hear and record the gun reports with absolute faithful- 
ness and accuracy. Without absolute accuracy it is obvi- 
ous that it would have been impossible to locate enemy 
guns, and accuracy means in this case a permissible error 
not exceeding one-twentieth of a second. 

Such a machine was actually devised and used with 
great success. To describe in detail this beautiful instru- 
ment with its delicate sensitiveness, and unfailing accu- 
racy with parts so rugged as to be capable of withstand- 
ing long exposure to wet, storm, cold, heat, and to continue 
working entirely automatically under the rude conditions 
of battle, is beyond the scope of such a book as this. 
But the solution of the problem by the French, the Brit- 
ish and the American physicists stands as one of the 
great scientific achievements of the war, and is remark- 
able as being one of the few steps in the application of 
science to war wherein the Allies distinctly excelled the 
Germans. 

In general, the apparatus as a whole consisted of a 
series of detectors or sound catchers, each detector con- 
stituting, therefore, a separate observing station, and all 
the detectors being connected with an automatic record- 
ing instrument by means of wires carrying a low electric 
current. The delicate hearing device or artificial ear 
was a piece of platinum cloth, heated by an electric cur- 
rent. The cloth was so sensitive that its temperature 
would be lowered by the small air waves which would 
be set in motion by the vibrations due to sound 
impinging on it. The electrical resistance of the wire 
cloth varied with changes in temperature. By thus 
affecting the intensity of the current flowing steadily 
through it the current gave a means of communicating to 
a distant point not sound, but the disturbances that indi- 
cated sound, and this same variation in current operated 
the string of a string galvanometer. 



FLASH AND SOUND EANGING 253 

The field detector part consisted of a drum in whose 
diaphragm was fixed the electrically charged platinum 
grille or cloth. These detectors, usually six to a group, 
were carefully screened against shell fire and wind. 
They were scattered over several miles of front, depend- 
ing on local conditions, but the location of each detector 
was accurately known and plotted on a map. The record- 
ing instrument with which the detectors were connected 
was set up in the rear in any convenient dugout or build- 
ing where it would be reasonably safe from hostile fire. 

This central instrument had a strip of sensitized films 
on which were photographed by a moving picture 
camera the strings of the galvanometer, each string being 
electrically connected with one of the detectors. If the 
electric current was of constant intensity, the strings 
were undisturbed and gave straight-line impressions on 
the sensitized strip as it was unwound mechanically from 
a reel. Whenever the detector diaphragms were affected 
by a sound vibration, the current was momentarily inter- 
rupted and the string made a small jump at right angles 
to the strip, breaking its straight-line trace. Immedi- 
ately afterwards the string resumed its original station- 
ary position and was ready for another gun. By photo- 
graphing on the same strip the strings corresponding to 
all the stations, together with a time scale, the actual dif- 
ference in time that a sound took to reach the several 
detector stations could be recorded and measured. 

The sensitized tape was given, a perfectly regular 
motion and at such a speed that intervals of one hun- 
dredth of a second could be measured with accuracy. 

Since sound travels at the rate of 1,086 feet per sec- 
ond, the error in an instrument reading to hundredths of 
a second becomes negligible. Errors in surveys, 
mapping and atmospheric corrections, however, affect 
results to such an extent that sound rangers claim no 
greater accuracy of location on a single reading than 



254 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

within fifty yards. This is not only within th« variation 
in accuracy of a gun firing at an unseen target some 
miles away, but is well within the deadly effect of shell 
fragments following the burst of a shell directed at the 
gun in question. A battery whose position is known 
within such a maximum error in distance can soon be 
destroyed. 

Accuracy of determination was rated on three scales, 
P, Q and R. A ^' P " location was one where four 
cords intersected on a map, when it was safe to assume 
that the error did not exceed fifty yards. When only 
three cords intersected on the map it was a '' Q " deter- 
mination and the limit of error was assumed to be 100 
yards, while two cords gave an ' ' R " indication with an 
assumed error of 200 yards. Repeated observations 
which agreed with each other gave a more reliable basis 
for assumption tFan even a single '< P " determination. 

Skill in accurately picking out and reading the mes- 
sages on the films was quickly attained, and finally 
to a trained observer the characteristic impression 
of the sound, of each different type of enemy gun 
became as familiar as the faces of old friends. This 
method of locating guns could be carried on at all hours 
of the day or night and could be interrupted only by the 
frequency of sound reaching the proportions of a bar- 
rage. The same instrument could also be used to direct 
the fire of friendly guns on located eneni}^ positions, when 
the instruments would be concentrated on locating the 
sound of the bursts of the outgoing shells and correcting 
the aim to the point at which the enemy gun had been 
located. 

From these instruments the best means of escape was 
either through a confusion of sounds by firing several 
guns simultaneously, by frequent changes in battery 
position, or by registering on a target with one gun and 
leaving the battery that was to do the execution silent 



FLASH AND SOUND BANGING 255 

"ontil the moment for action arrived. Such attempts at 
evasion were highly unsatisfactory, and the fact 
remained that the very beautiful sound-ranging outfits 
of * the Allies had the German gunners at a very serious 
disadvantage. 

Both the French and British experts produced sound- 
ranging apparatus of highly satisfactory type which, 
while differing in details, were founded on the same 
scientific theory. When America entered the war 
the army had no such outfit because it was not 
only a most recent product of the war, but even at that 
date was still in course of initial development. The 
Engineer Department selected the British machines as 
being more reliabe and portable than those of the 
French, and while supplying our own troops with such 
instruments, began the development of an improved 
form, which promised to be the superior of its proto- 
types in cost and ease of handling, and to be less 
adversely sensitive to annoying conditions. But the con- 
clusions of hostilities deprived this device of a field trial. 

The microphone detectors were placed far forward in 
order to receive as great a sound impulse as possible, 
and if not actually in the front trenches, were set up but 
a short distance away. The connecting wires, therefore, 
ran back across the open country subject at any or all 
times to bombardment. Since they must be repaired the 
moment a break is discovered, engineers for this purpose 
lived in forward dugouts whence they could be called 
quickly by telephone. Under such conditions mainte- 
nance was not the easiest labor, nor was it particularly 
pleasant to be called out of a bunk on a cold and stormy 
night with an order to find and repair at once a break 
in a line, with no certain knowledge where the break or 
breaks were, for there might be more than one. Lights 
could not be carried for fear of attracting hostile fire. 
Perhaps the only way to find the cut would be to take 



256 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the wire in hand and so follow its trail, tumbling into 
shell craters half full of water, climbing in and out of 
disused trenches, or stumbling over some object unseen 
in the darkness, and hearing every few minutes the 
s-w-i-s-h of a shell overhead or the still more unpleasant 
loud c-r-r-u-m-p ! as one burst nearby scattering splinters 
and sodden earth in all directions. 

The several lines of signal wire were usually named 
so that the message describing a break would take some 
such form as '* Bennie is dead." One night a new 
recruit was at the phone board and when the above mes- 
sage came in, he, not knowing the code, answered, '' I am 
so sorry, was he one of the boys at Central I " 

Besides locating the guns it was also necessary to find 
and render visible enemy bombing planes at night. The 
German motors had a distinctive note and could be 
recognized easily, provided they were low enough to be 
heard as they crossed the front lines. But it was neces- 
sary to hear also those machines that were flying at a 
great altitude out of ordinary ear range as they rushed 
on to attack some place far in the rear, in order that a 
general alarm might be transmitted by telephone. It was 
obvious that the ear must be reinforced, especially to 
detect machines at great height, and the apparatus to do 
this must be handled easily so as to give results quickly. 
Otherwise the planes travelling at their high speed would 
be out of range before they could be located. This called 
into being a new class of instruments which, although 
working under the laws of acoustics, were quite different 
in principle and detail from those employed in the sound 
ranging of guns. 

While the naked human ear unaided has but little 
sense of direction, that is, it can tell only in an approxi- 
mate way where lies the point from which any given 
sound is coming, it can with somewhat simple apparatus 
and with a little training be converted into a very satis- 



FLASH AND SOUND RANGING 257 

factory and reasonably accurate instrument of direction. 
We are all familiar with the simple megaphone and how 
the voice can be directed toward any point; how the 
megaphone, if placed to the ear, will in like manner give 
a greatly increased volume of sound when it is pointed 
in the direction whence the sound is coming. With two 
horns, one connected with each ear, not only is much 
greater sensitiveness obtained but there is also a closer 
approach to directive accuracy, because when an equal 
volume of sound is heard in both ears it means that the 
horns are directed on the same point. This principle 
which forms the basis of underwater signals to ships 
where two sound receiving boxes, located one on each 
side of the bow, when they transmit equal volumes of 
sound indicate that the vessel is on a direct course to 
the origin of sound, formed also the basis for airplane 
detectors. 

There were two types of apparatus. One type 
employed four horns in pairs, one pair determining the 
horizontal bearing of the plane as would be given by a 
magnetic compass, the other pair determining the 
vertical bearing of the plane; that is the vertical angle 
of the plane above the horizon, because the target being 
a point in space, both bearings were needed to fix the 
position. 

The other type of detector was the paraboloid reflector. 
For those who have not investigated or who may have 
forgotten their conic sections, it may be permitted to 
recall that the parabola is a figure of such shape that 
parallel lines falling on it are deflected and concentrated 
at a single point called the focus. If a parabola be 
revolved about its axis the surface described is a 
paraboloid, a cup-shaped structure with flaring sides, 
which brings to a single point all parallel lines or rays 
falling within it. A paraboloid if of sufficiently large 
dimensions and made of material that would accurately 



258 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

deflect sounds impinging on its interior surface, would 
evidently be a great sound collector and by placing the ear 
at tlie focus, sounds otherwise inaudible would become 
distinct. Furthermore, by slowly turning the apparatus 
first in one direction and then in another, it would be 
easy to recognize the moment when the maximum volume 
of sound was heard. At that instant the axis of the 
paraboloid would be pointed toward the point whence 
came the sound, and if the angles that the axis made 
horizontally with respect to some such line as the 
meridian and vertically with respect to the horizon, a 
single combined bearing would be given at once by which 
a search-light could be directed to the sound producer, 
in this case an airplane. 

In actual practice it was found that a paraboloid with 
a diameter of nine to ten feet at the open end could be 
constructed that would answer all the requirements. If 
it were given free motion in all directions with scales 
reading the vertical and horizontal angles of the direc- 
tion of the axis, an admirable airplane detector was pro- 
duced. Of course, the ear could not be placed at the 
focus of the paraboloid, but two tubes like the tubes of 
a m'^dical stethoscope, leading to the ears of the observer, 
answered the same purpose. To produce the best results 
it was necessary that the observer should wear a close- 
fitting head case, shutting out all sounds except those 
coming through the receiving tubes. 

The French developed the paraboloid and the Corps of 
Engineers at Washington followed their lead. They suc- 
ceeded in making improvements, for while the French 
apparatus weighed three and one-half tons, the American 
weighed but 1,300 pounds. This diminution of weight 
gave tremendously increased mobility, so very necessary 
for all articles connected with an army in the field. The 
American device could be set up and got into action in 
one- sixth of the time required for the French instrument. 



FLASH AND SOUND BANGING 259 

The cumbersome weight of their paraboloid detector 
and its lack of mobility were fully appreciated by the 
French general staff, who experimented with other forms 
of sound-collecting apparatus. At the close of the war 
they had developed what was known as the Perrin 
telesitemeter, recognized as probably the best form of 
field instrument for the purpose. It was based on the 
double horn and binaural principle with the pairs of 
horns in nests. The total weight was about the same as 
the American form of paraboloid, but the weight of the 
heaviest part did not exceed 330 pounds. Two operators 
could take it apart in an hour and reassemble it in three 
hours. It was, therefore, the most mobile, the most 
easily worked and probably the most accurate sound 
detector in use. 

Unfortunately with sound apparatus there were intro- 
duced chances for errors and the necessity for correc- 
tions not present when dealing with light. As the 
latter travels through space with such a high velocity 
and is not deflected from its straight path within the 
limits of the problem, all readings are made direct with- 
out correction for time or deflection. When dealing with 
sound there are many factors that must be taken into 
account, the neglect of any one of which would vitiate all 
accuracy. 

In the first place the object is not stationary. Suppose 
an airplane be travelling at 100 miles per hour or at 
nearly 150 feet per second. If the plane were two miles 
high, there would be consumed nearly ten seconds before 
the sound reached the listeners' ears, since sound travels 
at the rate of about 1,100 feet per second, and in that 
interval the plane would have moved 1,500 feet from the 
spot where that particular sound impulse originated. It 
is also obvious that the amount of divergence is at the 
maximum when the airplane is flying directly across the 
field and diminishes according as the plane has an 



260 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

ascending motion as well as a horizontal one, becoming 
zero when the plane is receding directly from the 
observer. A second source of error is the effect of wind 
which, by changing the velocity of sound increases or 
decreases in a complex manner, the difference between 
the actual and apparent position of the airplane. Then 
there are other corrections to be made for variations in 
temperature, humidity, etc., all of which affect the 
velocity of sound. These difficulties were one by one 
overcome until it finally became possible to locate within 
a comparatively small margin of error the position in 
space of a hostile airplane flying even as high as three 
miles. 

In practice the method of operation was for an 
observer to listen for planes at night. As soon as 
one was heard notification was telephoned to other 
stations where all the listening sets were put in action. 
As fast as each observer got his sound range an assist- 
ant would read the angles, make the necessary correc- 
tions, give the bearings vertical and horizontal to the 
men with the search-light. The next instant a great 
beam of light, followed quickly by other beams from 
other search-lights, would flash into the sky. If the direc- 
tions had been correctly given, there would appear a tiny 
bright spot in the black sky where the beams met, the 
airplane body reflecting the rays of light. Then, as the 
aviator would twist and squirm and dive to escape the 
disclosing glare, the ''Archies " would open fire and 
there would be seen little brilliant scintillations as their 
shells exploded about the plane. At such a height and 
flying fast the plane usually escaped, although some- 
times it would be seen tumbling over and over as it 
crashed to earth. But even if this last were not always 
the result the sound detectors at least stopped undue 
rashness, made the airmen fly high, rendering accurate 
bombing aim difficult, and permitted an alarm to be sent 



FLASH AND SOUND BANGING 261 

Tvestward, giving notice in ample season that every step 
might be taken to be ready to receive the nocturnal Fisi- 
tor in suitable manner. 

To the spectator it was a wonderful sight, the brilliant 
beams from a dozen great search-lights concentrated 
on a single bright spot high in the air, alone, with shells 
bursting all about it, the quarry trying to escape the 
hungry guns. In the absorbing interest of the watching 
it was easy to forget that from the bright spot, in which 
were human beings for whom the apparently unequal 
struggle inevitably enlisted sympathy, there might 
fall at any moment a load of high explosives on 
the spectator's head. Even if that did not occur, there 
was always one thing that was certain to follow, and 
that was that the fragments of and the shrapnel from 
the protecting shells that were bursting so prettily over- 
head would soon be falling, and with results that might 
be equally disagreeable as those of an enemy bomb. But 
one rarely entertained such thoughts, so absorbing was 
the spectacle. 

The work of Flash and Sound Ranging in the A. E. F. 
was entrusted to the Twenty-ninth and Fifty-sixth 
Engineers. 

The development of the apparatus used in flash and 
sound ranging is a beautiful application of science to 
the art of war, as fascinating and as strictly theoretical 
as any work done in a laboratory. But the experiments 
finally producing the perfected instruments were not 
the only opportunities for research work leading to 
essentially practical results. As an illustration the Gov- 
ernment report on America's Munitions records some 
interesting investigations made by an officer of the 
Ordnance Corps who in private life was nothing more 
warlike than a professor of astronomy in a large uni- 
versity, investigations which led to radical improvements 
in shell design. A certain make of shell intended for a 



262 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

six-inch gun was found to give irregular and uncertain 
results in its flight. Major Moulton discovered that the 
cause for the inaccuracy lay in the rotating band, a band 
of copper encircling the lower or rear part of the shell 
which, engaging in the rifling grooves in the bore of the 
gun, gave the shell its steadying twist. The cold copper 
actually flowed backwards as the result of the propelling 
force behind the shell and raised an unsuspected flange 
sufficient to cause an uncertain air resistance that had 
not been allowed for in the calculations for trajectory. 
This led to a general study of shell design and it 
was found that the laws of mathematics governing 
the orbits of comets applied to the flight and trajectories 
of shells, and that, by giving shells a particular contour 
with a sharper point and more gradually tapered sides 
than the standard design, the air resistance was 
greatly reduced and the range of the gun correspondingly 
increased without change of powder charge. Thus the 
six-inch shell above referred to which had a range of 
17,000 yards was given a range of 22,000 yards, while 
the 75 mm. shell had its range increased from 9,000 to 
12,130 yards. 



CHAPTER XX 

ARTILLERY 

While guns with their amnmnition and service are not 
a function of the engineers, nevertheless through the 
modern development of quick-firing, long-range guns the 
science of artillery and of engineering have become very 
closely allied. If the actual training and firing of the 
pieces is no concern of the engineer, the mechanical 
details in their design and manufacture, their emplace- 
ments, shelter and transportation, the construction of 
points for observation, their protection by camouflage, 
the detection of the location of the enemy's batteries and 
other provisions for their effectiveness are distinctly so. 
Then the aiming of the pieces by indirect fire depends 
absolutely on the accuracy of the surveys and maps pre- 
pared by the engineers. In fact, the closest cooperation 
between the two arms has become of the highest 
importance. 

Prior to the beginning of the war artillerymen failed 
to realize the possible development of their arm quite as 
much as the officers of other corps failed to do in respect 
to theirs. Although all military experts had agreed that, 
should a great war arrive, the part to be taken by artil- 
lery would far and away transcend that taken in any 
previous war, yet all their estimates fell far short of 
actualities. Not even the most enthusiastic supporters 
of the gun foresaw its possibilities, its application and 
above' all the tremendous number of projectiles that 
would be consumed. The Germans came the nearest to 
doing so, but even they were wide of the mark. 

263 



264 AMEKICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

In the American civil war approximately 5,000,000 
rounds of artillery ammunition were fired on tlie Federal 
side during the whole four and one-quarter years. Dur- 
ing the single year of 1918 the British and French armies 
alone expended nearly 13,000,000 rounds per month 
on the average. Or taking the maximum yearly 
expenditure in the former war, some 1,950,000 shots 
were fired, while in the twelve months that ended 
with the armistice the American, British and French 
guns in France were discharged more than 160,000,000 
times. At Gettysburg, which has always stood in 
American history as a great artillery engagement, the 
Federal consumption of ammunition was 32,800 rounds. 
In the St. Mihiel offensive, where the artillery 
preparation lasted only four hours, after which 
the artillery work was intermittent, more than 1,000,000 
rounds were fired, while the British guns in the Messines 
Eidge battle fired 2,750,000 rounds and in the battle of 
the Somme 4,000,000 rounds. In the above totals, shots 
fired from trench mortars and machine guns are not 
included, as they are not classed as *' guns," These 
comparative figures take no account of the fact that the 
average weight of projectiles greatly exceeded the pre- 
vious average weight. So that if a comparison were made 
of the total weight of metal fired in the two wars, the 
ratio would be still higher. 

The weapons that did this tremendous execution were 
of many sizes, varying from little man-portable cannon 
capable of being handled by two men and firing a shell 
with a diameter of one and one-half inches to mighty 
pieces with a bore of sixteen inches, heretofore consid- 
ered possible only on ships or on heavily constructed 
permanent foundations of masonry. 

Artillery can be divided into two classes, mobile and 
non-mobile. In the former are all pieces that can be 
transported over roads and follow the movements of a^ 



ARTILLERY 



265 



mobile army. The other class includes the larger weap- 
ons, which on account of size demanded special provi- 
sions for movement and could not be dragged gaily 
across open country. Thanks to the development of 
caterpillar tractor engines the maximum limit of the first 
class was greatly extended as the war progressed. 

The characteristics of American field artillery are 
shown in the following table : 



BORE OP GUN 


WEIGHT 
COMPliETE 


WEIGHT 
PROJECTIUS 


RANGE 


37 mm (l|ins.) 

75 mm (2.95 ins.) 


340 lbs. 

2887 lbs. 

9800 lbs. 
23500 lbs. 
41000 lbs. 

8000 lbs. 

19860 lbs. 
29i66'lbs. 


n lbs. 

16 lbs. 
45 lbs. 

95 'lbs. 

95 lbs. 
200 lbs. 
200 lbs. 
290 lbs. 
356 lbs. 


2 miles 
5^ miles 
6 miles 


4.7 ins 


5 ins ■. 


9 miles 


6 ins 


10 miles 


155 mm (6 ins.) Howitzer 

155 mm (6 ins.) (Long range) . . 
8 ins. Howitzer 


7 miles 
10 miles 


8 ins. Howitzer 


7 miles 


9.2 ins. Howitzer 


7^ miles 


240 mm (91 ins.) Howitzer 


5^ miles 
10 miles 



Note the comparative lightness of the field pieces. 

A howitzer is a gun with a comparatively short barrel, 
giving a lighter and more mobile piece, but with a 
shorter range than the gun of the same calibre with a 
longer barrel. The difference in weight of piece and 
range between a " howitzer " and a '' long " is clearly 
shown in the case of the 155 mm. guns. 

The great variety in guns, and especially in substan- 
tially the same general type of weapon, was due to the dif- 
ferent standards and units of measure of the three allied 
powers. The standard field piece of the American army 
prior to 1917 was a three-inch gun, as against a 3.3 in. 
gun in the British service and the 75 mm., the famous 
** 75s *' or the " Soixante-quinzes " of the French. As 
our supply of field pieces in April, 1917, was absurdly 



266 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

inadequate for our needs, it was wisely decided not to 
continue the manufacture of a gun that would not take 
the ammunition that could be obtained abroad and 
which our own factories were already equipped to turn 
out, but instead to build guns on the French model. As 
a matter of fact the French gun was a superior weapon, 
better than any similar gun in any army, better than the 
corresponding German 77 mm. piece. 

The 4.7 inch gun was a standard American gun of 
excellence of which a certain number were on hand. The 
same is true of the five- and six-inch pieces, the latter, 
however, covering several different types of army and 
navy standards. They were used for a while and in 
limited numbers on account of our dearth of supply. The 
two eight-inch and the 9.2 inch howitzers were British 
types and were furnished to some of our divisions pend- 
ing the delivery of the more effective 240 mm. howitzer. 

American standards were thus reduced to the French 
types, which we copied, consisting of five varieties, the 
37 mm., 75 mm., 155 mm., howitzer and long-range gun 
and the 240 mm. howitzer. Of these the 75 's and 155 's 
were the most important and formed the great bulk of 
the mobile artillery, one-half of the American artillery 
consisting of the former alone. 

There is one feature that completely distinguishes mod- 
fern guns from earlier types, and that is the mechanical 
means for absorbing the recoil. The gun in the previous 
states of the art was simply a barrel mounted on a pair of 
wheels, and the recoil of the firing was taken up by the 
gun kicking back into an anchorage in the ground, the 
aiming of the piece being disturbed each time it was 
fired. With moderate powder charges, with pieces that 
required some time to load and were aimed after each 
shot, the matter of gun " kick '* with its disturbance of 
position was not serious. The quick-firing features of 
modern guns present a different situation. All modern 



AETILLEEY 267 

pieces can be loaded and fired with great rapidity, only 
a few seconds being required for the complete operation. 
To obtain the full measure of rapidity in firing, the time 
lost in re-aiming a piece after each discharge must be 
saved. To do this the recoil must be under control so as 
not to disturb the aim when it is' once set, and permit 
the gun after each discharge to return automatically and 
exactly to its original position, requiring only reloading 
for the next firing. 

A law of mechanics states that action and reaction are 
equal in amount but opposed in direction, which in the 
case of gunnery means that an amount of' energy equal 
to that stored in the departing shell is expended in the 
recoil of the gun. Another law states that with a given 
weight of moving body the energy varies with the square 
of the velocity, that is, if the velocity be doubled, the 
energy is quadrupled, and if the velocity be increased 
fourfold, the energy is sixteen times as great. A shell 
leaves the muzzle of a 240 mm. gun with a velocity of a 
mile in a little more than two seconds, at which speed its 
striking energy is the same as that of a large locomotive 
travelling at the rate of more than fifty miles an hour. 
The striking force, the stored-up energy, of such an 
engine is mentally pictured when there is recalled the 
sense of power and rushing weight of a locomotive tear- 
ing past a railway station at high speed. Now imagine 
the stopping of that great mass of machinery in a dis- 
tance of four feet and in one-half second of time without 
jar and without damage to the locomotive. Miraculous 
or impossible as it may seem, that is exactly what is done 
with the 240 mm. gun. By an ingenious arrangement of 
plungers compressing a liquid or air in cylinders, all 
requiring most accurate manufacture, the gun barrel 
slides backward on its mounting about four feet and then 
is returned automatically and promptly by the com- 
pressed energy in the cylinders to its original position 



268 ^ AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

with its axis of direction absolutely unchanged. This 
great achievement was the work of a French engineer. 

By means of the recuperator, as the device is called, 
a '' 75 " can be reloaded and fired every three seconds, 
all shots being accurately directed on a target. A '' 155 '^ 
is returned ready and reloaded in less than thirteen sec- 
onds, while even the largest guns, whose heavy ammuni- 
tion requires more time to handle, can maintain a care- 
fully directed fire at the rate of a shot in less than one 
minute. Furthermore, of such good material is the gun 
made that a 75 is capable of firing 12,000 rounds with- 
out losing its accuracy. 

The 75 's were usually drawn by horses, but the weights 
of the larger sizes were too great to permit them to be 
readily moved by animal power, and recourse was had to 
mechanical tractors, which represent one of the great 
advances in field work. Artillery to be effective must be 
mobile. Without the tractors the 155 's would have been 
moved only with difficulty and the 240 's not at all. 
Tractors weighing two and one-half, five, ten, fifteen and 
twenty tons were the adopted standards, nearly 25,000 
in all having been ordered. They were of the caterpillar 
type, that is, they were propelled by two wide metal con- 
tinuous driving belts, one on each side, and were capable 
of making ten or twelve miles an hour under favorable 
conditions. They could traverse the roughest ground 
and climb hills with a gradient of forty per cent. Then 
the principle was carried one step farther and guns as 
large as the 155 mm. howitzer were actually mounted on 
a self-propelling vehicle. Smaller guns, especially those 
used against airplanes, were frequently mounted on 
motor trucks. 

With the fall of the massive gun emplacements in 
Belgium and northern France, attention was focussed 
on the possibility of mounting very large guns on spe- 
cially designed railway cars, so as to render them both 



ARTILLERY 269 

safer against attack and more effective in attack by mak- 
ing them mobile. By such means the enemy could not 
reach them with other long-range pieces except by 
chance, nor ever be sure that he himself would not at 
any moment feel their crushing strength. 

Early in the war both the British and French ordnance 
experts mounted naval and coast defense guns of calibre 
as great as thirteen inches on railway cars which were 
accompanied by other cars carrying extra ammunition 
and the gun crews. To support these monsters the engi- 
neers had to strengthen the bridges and lay track in the 
most substantial manner. The guns were so attached 
to the cars that the smaller pieces could be revolved on 
a pivot mount, giving an *' all round " fire, while the 
larger ones were fired only lengthwise with the car. 
Some of these latter pieces had no horizontal adjust- 
ments, being held rigidly in the mounts with only 
vertical movement. Others were so mounted that they 
could be swung horizontally through a small angle 
to the right and left of the axis of the car. To provide for 
aiming these large guns at any target within a given area, 
a curved spur track would be laid, and the gun run on 
the spur to such a point on the curve as to bring the 
axis of the car pointing toward the target. If the gun 
were a rigidly mounted one, this spot would have to be 
determined accurately, but if the gun possessed a small 
horizontal movement on its own mount, nice adjustment 
of aim was more easily obtained by swinging the gun 
through a small angle after the car had been placed in 
approximately correct position. The British authorities 
pushed this idea of mobile artillery to the limit, using 
even the light railway cars. It was found quite feasible 
to mount, transport and fire guns of as large a calibre 
as six-inch from the little cars on the 60-cm. tracks, and 
when hostilities ceased plans were in hand with every 
assurance of success to mount guns as large as eight-inch 



270 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

on light railway cars. Our own Ordnance Department 
was experimenting along the same line and contemplated 
nsing twelve-inch rifled mortars on such mounts. The 
advantage of such mobility with the further great bene- 
fit of freeing the highroads of slow-moving, encumbering 
and highly destructive vehicles is readily appreciated. 

The American Ordnance Officers had from the begin- 
ning of the war been studying the possibility of mount- 
ing very large guns on cars ; in fact, certain reports were 
made, even before 1914, suggesting such a plan for sea 
coast defense. During the Civil War a few mortars, very 
insignificant pieces as compared with the rifled cannon 
of to-day, were set up on flat cars. "When the United 
States declared war the Ordnance Department made an 
investigation as to how many large guns could be 
obtained that might be sent abroad and there be mounted 
on cars, because special guns of such size would take too 
long to manufacture to be of early use. More than 
300 guns varying in size from seven-inch to a huge 
sixteen-inch howitzer, and more than 100 rifled mortars, 
some belonging to the Navy, others intended for coast 
forts, were found as possible of use. The Ordnance 
Department commenced at once the mounting of these 
guns on cars and had made great progress when the war 
ended, although only three eight-inch units were actually 
shipped abroad. 

But the Navy Department, having on hand some 
fourteen-inch guns, did succeed in mounting them and 
shipping them to France in time to take part in the 
Argonne-Meuse offensive. From the beginning of hos- 
tilities the Germans had been able to outrange the guns 
of the Allies. Exclusive of the '' Big Berthas " with 
which they bombarded Paris at a distance of seventy-five 
miles, a phenomenal performance, although more spec- 
tacular than practical, the longest ranged guns on either 
side were those the Germans established near Ostende, 



ARTILLERY 271 

and which threw shells into Dunkerque ■ — a distance of 
50,000 yards or nearly twenty-nine miles. The British 
and French had some guns of twelve- and thirteen-inch 
calibres mounted on railway cars but with a maximum 
range not exceeding twenty miles and there was needed 
something more powerful but still fully mobile with 
which to reach the German back areas, especially such 
targets as railway junctions or large ammunition dumps. 

These American naval guns weighed nearly 100 tons 
each and had a length of fifty calibres, that is fifty times 
the diameter of the bore. To make them effective they 
must be mounted on and fired from railway cars. The 
year 1918 had begun, the guns were still in the United 
States and not even a design for a railway mount of such 
capacity was in existence. In fact, it was very doubtful 
whether a satisfactory mount could be designed at all, 
and even if designed, it appeared almost impossible that 
it could be constructed in time, so that the guns and 
mounts could be sent to France to take part in the com- 
ing crisis. But this astonishing feat was accomplished 
by the Ordnance Department of the Navy, and the con- 
struction was carried out by the Baldwin Locomotive 
Works and the American Bridge Company, the first 
mount being delivered in the incredibly short time of 
seventy-two days. 

The extraordinary car on which the guns rested was 
supported on two pairs of six-wheeled trucks, or twenty- 
four wheels in all, one pair of trucks being at each end 
of the car. The total weight of gun and car was 535,000 
pounds or 267.5 tons, of which the gun constituted 
192,500 pounds, and the car 342,500 pounds. The gun 
was so mounted that with an angle of elevation not 
exceeding fifteen degrees, at which elevation it had a 
range of 23,300 yards or more than thirteen miles, it 
could be fired with no other support than the car and 
trucks, the horizontal component of the reaction being 



272 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

taken up by tlie car brakes and friction, the car sliding 
backward on the rails. As the gun under these conditions 
had no means of lateral adjustment, the car had to be 
replaced in a predetermined exact spot on a curved 
track after each shot to get the correct aiming. However, 
by using a special foundation beneath the car the gun 
could be elevated to forty-three degrees, giving ^ an 
effective range of 45,000 yards or nearly twenty-six miles. 
This foundation consisted of a pit into which the rear 
part of the gun support dropped as the piece was ele- 
vated. The gun support was then firmly braced against 
timbers at the back of the pit to give rigid resistance 
when the gim was fired. When the gun car had been run 
over the pit, the weight of the gun was transferred by 
jacks from the car to the specially prepared platform. 
After lifting the gun from the car it could be given a 
horizontal movement through two degrees thirty minutes 
on either side of the axis of the car, thus permitting accu- 
rate adjustment of aim. 

When the gun was fired from the car without other 
support, the pressure on the centre bearing of the rear 
truck was increased from a dead load of 180,470 pounds 
to 315,160 pounds, each axle transmitting 62,000 pounds 
to the rails. When the gun had the maximum elevation 
of forty-three degrees, the pressure on the main resistmg 
casting was 772,000 pounds. These weights and pres- 
sures give an idea of the problem solved by the engineers 
in designing the car. When the car was rigidly held and 
the thrust of the recoil was taken up by the pit timbers 
the recoil mechanism, which absorbed the shock, was so 
neatly adjusted that the ponderous weapon had a move- 
ment of only forty-four inches. After each discharge it 
was at once and automatically returned to battery, with 
true aim unaffected. 

The powder charge weighed 480 pounds and the pro- 
jectile 1,400 pounds. The latter left the gun with a 




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ARTILLERY 273 

velocity of 2,800 feet per second or at the rate of con- 
siderably more than a mile in two seconds or more than 
two and a half times the velocity of sound. So accurate 
were these guns that four shots fired on a French prov- 
ing ground at a range of 29,000 yards showed an average 
variation of only fifty yards. 

The complete outfit for each gun consisted of one loco- 
motive, one gun car carrying the gun, and ten other cars, 
some with living accommodations for the gun and train 
crews, others for ammunition and equipment for the con- 
struction of the pits and special foundations. 

The battery personnel exclusive of the train crew con- 
sisted of four officers and sixty-seven men. There were 
five such trains, each' of which was a complete, self- 
sustained, mobile unit. In addition to the five battery 
trains there was a staff in a headquarters train, com- 
posed of one locomotive and seven cars, carrying the 
officer commanding all the guns, his staff, and the extra 
hospital service. 

The mounting of great guns on railway cars imposes 
no limit on the size of the gun that can be mounted, cer- 
tainly not as the size of guns is viewed to-day. That being 
the case, the thought naturally comes, will the military 
engineer, when hereafter planning coast defenses, con- 
tinue to suggest isolated expensive forts with rigidly fixed 
emplacements? Forts whose positions are accurately 
known can be reached by an unseen enemy on land or 
sea, an enemy to whom no reply can be made, as his posi- 
tion is not quickly ascertainable. With this in view will 
not the engineer be inclined to build railway tracks, or 
use the lines of existing railways, constructing occa- 
sional spurs along such portions of the coast or frontier 
that he wishes to protect, and on which tracks he can 
move his great guns at will? The cost of one permanent 
fort will pay for many guns and cars. 

Against these mobile units an enemy can no longer 



274 A.MERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCIS 

attack at will the points of defense, because such points 
being constantly moved, their position will never be 
known. Such tracks would permit the concentration of 
defensive energy at any place or places, and the imme- 
diate removal after a decisive blow had been dealt, or 
should a frontier be forced, the complete withdrawal of 
the main defenses to new positions. 

The efficacy of mobility as contrasted with the old mili- 
tary conception of defense in rigid immobility is well 
illustrated in the French defense of Verdun, one of the 
triumphs of the war and at the same time a great engi- 
neering achievement. 

Verdun was one of a great chain of fortified points 
with Belfort, Nancy and other cities facing the German 
frontier. There was a central citadel and, encircling the 
city on the north and east sides, a group of forts, each 
constructed of massive masonry and earthworks, with 
deep moats for protection against assault, all mounting 
heavy guns. With the fall of the Belgian fortresses the 
French were quick to see that places like Verdun, in 
spite of all the thought and labor expended on them, 
were far from being impregnable, and seeing that, they 
were quick to act. Many of the guns were removed from 
their rigid emplacements and mounted on cars that per- 
mitted them to fire from one point to-day, from another 
to-morrow. Then they dug trenches and relied on a 
mobile army for the defense of Verdun. In February, 
1916, the enemy attacked in unparalleled force. 

Verdun, before the war, was served by two double- 
track railways of importance. One reached it from the 
south, running down the valley of the Meuse, the other, 
the main line from Paris, turned from the valley of the 
Aire at Aubreville, and thence ran due east to Verdun. 
These two routes were, therefore, substantially at right 
angles to each other, Verdun being at the point of the 
angle. There was a third line, a local railway with a 



ARTILLERY 275 

gauge of one meter, that reached Verdun, but on account 
of heavy gradients and its single track was not given 
serious consideration as a carrier. 

When the German wave rolled south in 1914, it passed 
to the westward of Verdun and some miles beyond the 
railway running through Aubreville, Verdun holding as 
an outpost. After the battle of the Marne the German 
line fell back north of the Aubreville railway but 
remained south of Varennes. Then in October, 1914, a 
drive was made east of Verdun with the intent of 
breaking its defenses, an attack that resulted in the 
occupation of St. Mihiel and the creation of the annoy- 
ing salient across the Mouse, which included within its 
limits four miles of the railway, the main highroad and 
the canal leading to Verdun. This salient the enemy 
held until they were forced to evacuate it by the Ameri- 
can offensive beginning September 12, 1918. Verdun 
was thus reduced to depend on the one railway through 
Aubreville. In February, 1916, the great struggle began 
for this key to the gateway to eastern France. Time 
after time, as fast as the French would rebuild the rail- 
way, the Germans would again cut it with artillery fire 
in the neighborhood of Aubreville whence their front 
line was distant but four miles. Finally the French, 
with much reluctance, gave up the effort to operate the 
line and began the seemingly impossible task to supply 
the army holding Verdun by means of the meter gauge 
line and such traffic as could be taken care of on the cross- 
country highways. By straining all facilities to the 
utmost, they succeeded in sending daily to Verdun 2,000 
tons of supplies over the little railway and almost the 
same over the road in motor trucks, but that was not 
enough. If the fortress were to hold out against the con- 
tinued enemy attack, more food, ammunition and other 
supplies would be consumed than that amount, while any 
break in the line would spell immediate disaster. The 



276 AMEBICAN ENGINEEBS XN FRANCE 

engineers undertook to solve the problem by constructing 
a new standard gauge railway, sixty kilometers long, 
located midway between the two main lines and out of 
reach of the German guns. This they accomplished in 
three months. The rest is known. Verdun, thanks to the 
ability of the French engineers to mount the guns so as 
to be mobile and to construct the railway, held out and 
was never taken in spite of a succession of attacks involv- 
ing unstated losses to the besiegers. 

Thus the gunnery experts and the engineers have 
worked together in the design of the weapons, in the pro- 
duction of special steel, in the manufacture of the guns 
and parts, and finally in their manipulation in the field. 
How they further cooperated in the determination of 
range, in the protection of their own batteries and the 
detection of the enemy's is another story and was told 
in the previous chapter. 



CHAPTER XXI 

LIGHT RAILWIAYS 

For many years all military men liad been aware that 
at the very front along a battle line there would be 
needed a system of rail transportation of lighter con- 
struction than a standard gauge line, one with smaller 
cars and narrower gauge, one that could be laid quickly 
and perhaps as quickly removed. They saw that such a 
railway by its mobility and elasticity would be better 
adapted to serve the scattered and smaller local needs of 
a fighting army in the field than a standard gauge line 
with its stouter construction and heavier equipment. But 
as was the case with many other engineering features, 
the military men failed to realize fully what an important 
function these little railways would fill in a modern war. 

Even as late as 1916, when the United States was on 
the very verge of declaring war, the Corps of Engineers 
produced an excellent handbook on railways of which but 
fourteen small pages were devoted to this important 
branch of military railway engineering, although it spoke 
of these lines whose *' possibilities for both offense and 
defense are very great and have never been fully util- 
ized." It is amusing now to recall that less than two 
years after those words were written, the United States 
had nearly 14,000 men endeavoring to utilize the same 
offensive and defensive " possibilities " but on a far 
greater scale than anyone in 1916 could picture even in 
his wildest imagination. 

The American handbook on Military Railways named 
these small lines ** combat railways," not a particularly 
happy term, because at times standard gauge railways 

277 



278 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

were used as such, and fixed no definite gauge for them, 
though suggesting one of two feet, or two feet six inches. 
Even, when war was declared there was no adopted or 
recommended gauge for American " combat railways " 
and there was no equipment on hand. 

In the Russian-Japanese war narrow-gauge railways 
were made use of by both belligerents, the Russian gauge 
being 75 cm. (2 ft. 51/2 ^^•) and the Japanese 60 cm. fol- 
lowing the accepted standard of their German instructors. 
In Europe both Germany and France had given the ques- 
tion much study and they had each adopted a gauge of 
60 cm. (1 ft. 1114 in.) as the most suitable. The British 
had previously decided on a gauge of two feet, which 
was close enough to the continental gauge to permit such 
equipment as they had on hand to be worked in connec- 
tion with it without confusion until new 60 cm. rolling 
stock could be constructed. 

The French called these little railways '' voies de 
soixante," using the dimension of the gauge for a name 
which was shortened into " une soixante " or '' les 
soixantes " for singular or plural. The British gave 
them a generic appellation of " light railways," which 
name was adopted by our own forces when we came to 
establish a narrow-gauge service, although, of course, 
our lines were constructed to the French gauge of 60 cm. 

The field where these light railways were used most 
was at the very front. The ordinary standard gauge 
railways, or broad gauge as they were usually called to 
distinguish them from the light railways, were never or 
very rarely used within possible observation by the 
enemy or within the range of his light artillery. The 
point on each broad-gauge line where traffic ceased was 
called a rail-head, developed in practice into a terminal 
transfer yard with some warehouse capacity for perish- 
able goods. These rail-heads were usually from five to 
ten miles behind the front lines and, therefore, within 







ea o 
13 « 



>•• 4 



LIGHT RAILWAYS 279 

reacli of long-range guns. To avoid a great disaster 
in case of being shelled, concentration of supplies was 
avoided as much as possible and such supplies as were 
held in storage were distributed into different '* dumps" 
according as they consisted of engineer, ordnance, quar- 
termaster, or commissary materiel with ammunition 
always by itself. 

The rail-heads were so laid out that access to the stor- 
age houses, storage places or cars could be had either 
by motor truck or light railway trains. For the latter 
the most convenient arrangement was to have a broad- 
gauge track on one side of a warehouse, unloading plat- 
form or open storage space and a light railway track on 
the other. It was rarely economically possible to transfer 
loads directly from broad-gauge car to light railway car. 

From these rail-heads the light railways reached out 
in all directions, carrying supplies to small scattered for- 
ward dumps and the ammunition to the front trenches 
or to battery positions. In short, it might be said that 
they did the retail delivery work, leaving the wholesale 
business to the broad-gauge lines. 

The track was composed of the ordinary T-shaped 
rails laid on steel or wooden crossties. The rail varied 
in weight from fifteen to twenty-five pounds per yard. 
The lighter rails were used in the early days when 
experience was lacking, but as traffic increased and the 
possibilities of the light railways were recognized, 
heavier rails were called for until finally it was the con- 
sensus of opinion of the American, French and British 
engineers that there was no economy from any point of 
view in laying rails of less weight than twenty-five 
pounds per yard. They gave a more resistant track 
against heavy traffic, and the extra weight did not prove 
to be a serious or even appreciable handicap in rapid 
track laying. 

French track was made up in sections five meters long, 



280 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

the rails being riveted to steel ties. Some of the track 
sections were curved to radii of 30 and 50 meters to save 
bending rails in the field. The British, though using some 
metal ties, preferred those of wood four inches wide by six 
inches thick and four feet long. The American sector 
being a part of the original French front, much 
of the light railway track was of French stand- 
ard practise. On new work the American Engi- 
neers preferred wooden ties with rails thirty feet 
long, bending them in the field to fit any desired 
curve. "When American steel ties were used, they 
were generally held to the rails by clips and bolts 
rather than by rivets, and they were attached as the track 
was laid. This arrangement of non-connected parts 
made the actual work of track laying a little slower, an 
objection that was offset by the greater ease in shipping 
the rails, fastenings and ties separately, and the greater 
convenience in storing the track material in engineer 
dumps. 

The rolling stock presented many interesting features. 
Locomotives were of two classes, those that burned coal 
and consequently gave off smoke and those that did not. 
So long as the light railways were not hidden from 
observation, it was possible to use locomotives of the first 
class, the preferred type on account of the simplicity of 
the mechanism and the ease of repairs, but when they 
approached the actual front positions they were no 
longer safe. For even if the tracks were sheltered from 
direct sight, the ascending smoke would disclose the pres- 
ence of a train. As all such trains were suspected of 
being loaded with ammunition and most of them were, 
the first signs of smoke were apt to draw the fire of the 
enemy. 

As the location of all railway tracks, broad or light, 
were known through aerial photographs and accurately 
plotted on the maps, enabling the range of every yard 



LIGHT RAILWAYS 281 

of track to be computed with respect to every battery, 
it was an easy tiling to bit a train even in. motion if only 
the smoke of its locomotive disclosed its presence. 

For the forward portions of the line gasoline motor 
locomotives or gasoline-electric motors were used. In 
the latter a gasoline engine drove an electric generator. 
Although there was a duplication of motor engines 
with some loss of power in the transformation by pass- 
ing the developed energy through the medium of elec- 
tricity instead of using it directly after its first 
production, in the gasoline engine there were certain 
mechanical advantages that were held by some to be com- 
pensatory. For example, variation in speeds could be 
controlled without changes in gears, and a higher tension 
pull was obtainable by a rotary than a reciprocating 
engine at the moment of starting. The American loco- 
motive designers decided, however, that the disadvan- 
tages due to the great complication of the intricate 
machinery were paramount and no engine of the com- 
bined type was built for our own service. 

So long as intervening ground shut off direct observa- 
tion, trains drawn by these non-producing smoke loco- 
motives were reasonably safe, even in daytime, except 
against a chance shot or detection by airplanes overhead. 
If, however, the tracks were visible from the enemy 
observation posts, traffic on such parts of the line had to 
be handled exclusively at night. 

Of steam locomotives there were several varieties, with 
a total weight varying from about 14,000 to 36,000 
pounds and with different combinations of driving and 
non-driving wheels, or as expressed in the usual terms, 
0-4-0, 0-6-0, 0-8-0, 0-4-4-0, 2-6-2 and 4-6-0. To the non- 
professional reader it may be proper to explain that the 
first and last figure of each series gives the number of 
wheels in the guiding or trailing trucks, and the interme- 
diate figure or figures the number of connected driving 



282 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

wheels. Thus 0-4-0 means that the engine is mounted on 
only four driving wheels, that is, on two axles; 
4-6-0 indicates an engine that has ten wheels, four 
of which make up a front guiding truck, behind which 
are six driving wheels with no trailing wheels. Inas- 
much as the United States entered the war without any 
light railway equipment and, therefore, without ]3reju- 
dice, the American engineers were free to design their 
own equipment. After taking full advantage of British 
and French experience which was freely offered, the 
type of engine finally adopted as the American stand- 
ard, probably represents the most satisfactory type. 
This machine was a saddle-tank engine, but with the 
tanks carried as low as possible, a most important 
detail, for otherwise the elevated center of gravity 
greatly increased the natural instability of these 
machines on the narrow gauge. The wheel arrangement 
was 2-6-2, giving a guiding axle on both ends with three 
driving axles, making a combination particularly well 
adapted for running in either direction over rough track. 
The front and trailing trucks guided and steadied the 
fengin$ and also gave opportunity for the maximum 
boiler and tank capacity within the limited weight per- 
mitted on the driving wheels. The total weight of the 
engine was 33,700 pounds, distributed as follows : 

On front truck 5,000 lbs. 

On driving wheels 23,100 lbs. 

On rear truck 5,600 lbs. 

The total wheel base was fifteen feet seven inches, of 
which the rigid driving base was five feet ten inches. 
The diameter of the driving wheels was twenty-three and 
one-half inches, while that of the truck wheels was six- 
teen inches. The cylinders were nine inches by twelve 
Inches, and the fuel and tank capacity were 1,700 pounds 
and 476 U. S. gallons respectively. 



LIGHT RAILWAYS 283 

The French operated a peculiar type of engine to 
which they were much attached. This locomotive, known 
as the Pechot, had two boilers served by a single fireman. 
It weighed 28,000 pounds and rested on eight driving 
wheels which, coupled in pairs, were so independent of 
each other that the rigid wheel base was less than twenty- 
eight inches. It possessed many advantages in light rail- 
way work, including great facility in operation over a 
rough and tortuous track, and being built in two units, 
either or both could be used for power, thus conserving 
fuel. Either engine could function even if the other had 
been damaged by shell fire. Furthermore, since the fire 
box was in the centre, no matter how steep the gradient, 
the water always maintained the same elevation at the 
center and, therefore, always covered the crown sheet. 

Gasoline locomotives were smaller than the steam loco- 
motives, as there was less need for large power at the 
immediate front, the trains being lighter. The United 
States had two types of gasoline machines which were 
fairly typical of general practice. They were of the 
same wheel arrangement, namely, four driving wheels 
without leading or trailing trucks. The distinguishing 
feature was their weight, one weighing 10,000 and the 
other 15,000 pounds, with the following comparative 
details : 

Total weight 10,000 lbs. 15,000 lbs. 

Length 10 ft. 9 ins. 13 ft. ins. 

Width 4 ft. 71/2 ins. 5 ft. 2 ins. 

Driving wheel diameter 24 ins. 30 ins. 

Wheel base, length 3 ft. ins. 4 ft. ins. 

Speeds in either direc- 
tion 2 speeds 4 and 8 miles 

Fuel tank capacity 25 gals. 30 gals. 

Cars were for the most part of the gondola and flat 
types, for the easy loading of heavy material for short 



284 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

haul, the former alone constituting nearly one-half of the 
whole equipment. There were also box cars and cars for 
special purposes, such as tank ?ars for hauling water. 
The cars were about twenty feet long and were mounted 
on two four-wheeled bogie trucks, giving great flexibility 
on curves. The normal carrying capacity of the cars 
was 22,000 pounds and the cars themselves weighed, 
empty: flat cars 8,000 pounds, gondolas 9,000 pounds, 
boxes 12,000 pounds. These standards were substan- 
tially the same in the French and British services as well 
as the American, though the German cars had one-half 
the above nominal capacity and weighed about one-half 
as much. The wheels had a diameter of fifteen and three- 
quarter inches and the truck wheel base was three feet, 
the trucks being fifteen feet apart, center to center. 

As to the construction of these light railways there is 
little to be said, except that every effort was made to 
eliminate heavy work so as to advance track laying with 
rapidity. On account of the narrowness of the gauge, 
sharp curves could be and were freely used, radii as 
short as 100 feet giving no trouble in operation. As 
trains were usually short, gradients steeper than what 
would be desirable on main lines were permissible. Usu- 
ally a maximum of 2.5 per cent was fixed for light 
railway gradients but in exceptional cases rates of climb 
as high as three per cent or even four per cent were 
encountered. The last two were, however, exceptional. 

The soil of France is usually of a clayey nature, so 
that all roadbeds had to be well drained and the track 
stone ballasted. Without such ballast it would have been 
impossible to maintain a usable track composed of light 
rails and small ties. It was on this account that the Brit- 
ish engineers advised that wooden ties be used rather 
than the built-up, ready-to-lay track, in accordance with 
French practice. They gave a better bearing, and if the 



LIGHT EAILWAYS 285 

ground were very soft or muddy, larger ties could be used 
in an emergency. 

Derailments were not infrequent. The saddle-tank 
locomotives with their high center of gravity gave much 
trouble if the track were rough, resulting sometimes in 
the whole engine toppling over. But in spite of such 
annoyances and the smallness of the equipment the 
amount and extent of service rendered by these little 
railways were very remarkable. A wider gauge would 
have made the locomotives more stable, would have 
reduced the number of derailments and would have 
enabled heavier trains to be run. For these reasons a 
gauge wider than two feet was recommended by some 
engineers. The function of these light railways, how- 
ever; was to be really light. They were intended to serve 
only as local distributors and were not intended to 
attempt the heavy service, properly the function of the 
broad-gauge lines. A wider gauge would have meant 
heavier track, equipment with more elaborate construc- 
tion and an invasion of the field occupied by the larger 
lines. The true principle to follow, under conditions 
as they existed in France, is to maintain broad-gauge 
rail-heads as far advanced as possible, to carry sup- 
plies to such points in train-load lots or as near full 
train loads as is feasible, and then to rely on the little 
lines to do the local distribution and delivery beyond. 

The original purpose of a light railway was to deliver 
heavy ammunition to forward battery positions. Such 
material was awkward to handle in motor trucks and still 
more so in horse-drawn wagons, the chief means of 
transportation at the beginning of the war. It was for 
the reason that their chief function was in connection 
with the guns that French light railways, though con- 
structed by the engineers, were operated by a special 
railway corps attached to the artillery arm. Their scope 
of service, their utility to all other arms carried the 



286 AMEBICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

development of the light railways far beyond any esti- 
mate conceived during the first part of the late war of 
what they should do or even were capable of accomplish- 
ing. As indicating the scope, variety and extent of the 
traffic, the distribution of the tonnage, equating troops 
in tons, hauled on the American light railways during 
the autumn of 1918 when the great St. Mihiel and 
Argonne-Meuse offensives were being carried out was 
per week: 

Am'munition 5,000 tons 

Engineer materiel 2,900 tons 

Forage 1,300 tons 

Rations 3,500 tons 

Water , 1,000 tons 

Personnel 1,700 tons 

Road materiel 4,600 tons 

Other army tonnage 2,600 tons 

Total army tonnage 22,600 tons 

Light railway materiel 12,400 tons 



Total tons per week. , 35,000 tons 



These figures were not maxima, because during one 
week;, while the Argonne offensive was at its height, no 
less than 10,000 tons of ammunition alone were sent for- 
ward. But large as this last figure is, it was exceeded 
nearly fourfold on the system of British light railways 
that supplied their five armies. It must be remembered 
that on account of their older and broader establish- 
ment, both the British and French systems of light rail- 
ways were more complex, more completely laid out and 
did a heavier traffic than our own. 

The large amount of light railway materiel trans- 
ported was due, of course, to the rails and ties required 



LIGHT EAILWAYS 287 

in the construction of new or the repairs of old lines, 
as the army advanced. 

For those who are interested in statistics of train 
operation the above American tonnage was handled on 
554 kilometers (335 miles) of main line. The ton- 
kilometers were 584,000, the train-kms. were 21,800, the 
locomotive-kms. 44,500, the loaded-car-kms. 80,800 and 
the empty car-kms. 52,200. The average haul of a ton 
of freight was 16.7 kms. These figures gave 26.8 ton- 
kms. per train-km. and 1,050 ton-kms. per kilometer of 
line. 

Nor were individual loads negligible affairs. In one 
instance one of these little cars, supposed to carry only 
22,000 pounds, was actually loaded with 400 complete 
rounds of 155 mm. shells, weighing 45 kilos (99 lbs.) 
each, a total of nearly 40,000 pounds. In another case 
when an emergency was pressing, a train of eight cars 
was moved 40 km., each car containing 365 large sheUs, 
a net weight per car of 36,211 pounds, while a 426 cm. 
(16% ins.) gun weighing 74,710 pounds was shipped on 
three cars. 

The light railways were not restricted to freight. It 
was found that troops with their equipment could be 
more easily moved on such trains than in any other way. 
Divisions in the front trenches were always relieved at 
night, in order to avoid attracting enemy notice at what 
was always a critical juncture. "While this was being 
done it was essential that the outgoing troops should be 
withdrawn as rapidly as possible to avoid confusion or 
interference with the division moving in to take their 
place. Under such crcumstances all available means of 
transport were called into requisition. Miles of old 
Paris and London busses, painted a dull gi'ey, with every 
outward vestige" of previous life on the boulevards or 
Piccadilly obliterated, proved exceedingly convenient. 
But the little railways did their part, too, so well that 



288 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

23,000 men with their arms and other equipment were 
moved in one relief, during five nights, with more than 
6,000 men during a single night, this in connection with 
other traffic. 

The use of the busses gave an opportunity to coin 
new words, and very useful ones, too. The loading and 
unloading of troops were referred to as '" embussing " 
and '' debussing," following the form of entrain and 
detrain. 

Reference has already been made to the placing of 
guns on the little cars and to the still more ambitious 
plans for the mounting of very large pieces that were 
cut short by the signing of the Armistice. 

But the British inaugurated a new step and used the 
light railways to transport wounded. They believed, as 
the tracks of these local lines reached all points along 
the front, that during and after an engagement wounded 
men could be carried in railway cars more readily and 
more comfortably to receiving hospitals than in motor 
ambulances on the highway. On the road they would be 
subject to annoying if not serious delays by the front- 
ward flow of road traffic, traffic that could go by no other 
means. To make a practical test, they connected two 
large receiving hospitals, or casualty clearing stations 
as they were officially named, with the whole network of 
light railways serving that particular front, just prior 
to a major engagement that they knew was to take place. 
Several trains of cars were fitted with racks to hold the 
stretchers. The wounded could thus be and were taken 
directly from the field, i^laced on a waiting train and 
delivered to the hospital without further rehandling and 
probably in less time than was possible by using the 
ordinary road ambulance service. 

The innovation worked well, the men arriving in good 
shape and with much less delay than on previous occa- 
sions. But during a lull in arrivals the surgeon com- 



LIGHT EAILWAYS 289 

manding, seeing an intelligent-looking sergeant on a 
stretcher, thonght to ask his impression of the method. 
** It is very good, sir! The service is excellent, but if 
I might be permitted to criticize anything, I do think the 
speed was a bit rapid." The snrgeon was surprised, 
because he had given strict orders that the speed should 
not exceed ten miles per hour, realizing that any speed 
faster than that on the rough track and over the poor 
springs of the cars intended primarily for heavy freight, 
would injure the wounded. So he sent for the locomotive 
driver who had just brought in the train. Now it hap- 
pened that the crew of this train consisted of Americans. 
''Were you the driver of the last train to arrive?'* 
asked the surgeon. " Yes, sir," was the reply. '' What 
speed did you makef " " 'Bout forty " came the 
startling answer. *' But surely you had orders in regard 
to speed limit? " *' Oh! yes," said the driver. ** I was 
told to go and to get there." With Yankee nerve he 
** got there." How the train kept the rails at such a 
speed around curves with radii of 100 feet is still a mys- 
tery, but at least it justified the restrained criticism of 
the wounded sergeant as not being an exaggeration that 
the speed was a '' bit rapid." 

These little railways were nearly all single-track 
lines, and as there were frequent junctions, few regu- 
lar stations and no time tables, train dispatching was no 
easy matter. The only way by which trains under such 
circumstances can be handled is by the aid of a well con- 
structed telephone system with boxes set along the track 
at short intervals, from which train crews can call up 
headquarters and get their orders. The regiments that 
bore the burden of light railway work were the Twelfth 
and Fourteenth Engineers, who were continuously 
engage in such work from August, 1917, and always in 
the advanced area. 

When hostilities ceased, the American light railway 



290 AMEEICAN ENGINEEBS IN FEANCE 

system consisted of about 2,240 kilometers (1,350 miles), 
of which 280 kms. had been inherited from the French as 
different parts of the front were taken over, 200 kms. had 
been constructed by American engineers and 1,740 kms. 
were German lines captured in the advance in the 
Argonne-Meuse and St. Mihiel offensives. During these 
offensives the average number of kilometers operated was 
554, and the maximum force engaged was 13,650 men, of 
whom more than one-half were occupied on construction, 
so great was the demand for new lines or the rehabilita- 
tion of the old as the advance progressed. 

The equipment consisted on November 11th of about 
300 locomotives of which about 160 were worked by 
steam and 140 by gasoline, with approximately 1,600 
cars. It is difficult to give exact figures regarding the 
equipment in actual ser\ace as more than the above num- 
bers of locomotives and cars had been shipped to France^ 
and were being set and sent to the front as rapidly as 
possible, though many locomotives and cars had not left 
the port of entry when hostilities ceased. Thirty-three 
steam and fifty gasoline locomotives as well as 358 cars 
were captured from the Germans. 

Following the practice of the French and the British, 
the American engineers established a complete central 
repair shop with a full assortment of special machine 
tools, where all repairs of every nature could be made to 
any class of rolling stock. The parts and the dimensions 
of the parts of locomotives and cars differed so much 
from those of standard gauge stock that there was no 
advantage in combining the repairs of standard and 
narrow-gauge equipment in the same shop or shops. It 
was found better to give each class of equipment its own 
separate repair facilities, equipped with special tools, 
operated by a personnel experienced in each particular 
class of rolling stock and where the different kinds of 
spare parts could be stored by themselves. Any attempt 



LIGHT RAILWAYS . 291 

at combining in one shop the work of repairing two such 
distinct types of vehicles, as locomotives or cars used on 
broad- or narrow-gauge railways, resulted in confusion 
and lost motion. 

In short, the Lilliputian railway that at the beginning 
of hostilities was little more than a toy with apparently 
limited possibilities, had grown into a very husky system 
and was a very potent factor in the solution of the 
problem of transportation, nearly always the greatest 
problem that the engineer has to face no matter what the 
character of the work. The driving of a tunnel, the oper- 
ation of a steam shovel or dredge, depend upon how fast 
cars or scows can be delivered empty and taken away 
loaded. The capacity of the excavating machines them- 
selves always exceeds that of the attending transporta- 
tion units. So it is with an army under modern conditions 
of war. An army is dependent absolutely for its fight- 
ing efficiency upon transportation facilities, and its 
demands in this line exceed the possibility of supply by 
such railways or highways as are available even in such 
a well equipped country as France. No matter what the 
amount of transportation facilities that are ready at 
hand, they will be found in a great measure to fall 
lamentably short of actual requirements. In studying 
the needs of future wars and making provision for 
them, transportation should be and undoubtedly will be 
one of the major subjects to engross the attention of the 
authoritijps, and to a far greater extent than ever before. 

The method of administration of light railways differed 
radically in the three chief allied nations on the western 
front. As explained above, the French lines were built 
by the engineers but operated under the artillery arm. 
The British organization consisted of a directorate or 
section of the Department of Transportation, adminis- 
tered by an officer who happened to have the rank of 
brigadier-general, with the title of Director of Light 



292 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

Eailways (D. L. E.). He reported to the Director Gen- 
eral of Transportation (D. G-. T.) and had charge of all 
matters concerned with these little lines, whether of con- 
struction, operation, or maintenance of either equipment 
or permanent way. This authority was extended over 
the lines in the army area as well as those in the rear. 

To keep liaison with army requirements an Assistant 
Director was attached to each army headquarters and 
another officer junior to him at each corps headquarters. 
These officers working in close cooperation with the army 
and corps commanders saw to it that army needs were 
cared for, but they remained under the direction of the 
Director of Light Eailways, calling on him for all rolling 
stock, track and other materiel, and additional troops for 
railway service, if they were needed. This arrangement 
had two great advantages. Firstly, the demands from 
the several British armies, of which there were five, were 
coordinated through the Director of Light Eailways and 
adjusted by him in case of conflict. Secondly, the fact 
that the Director was a member of the transportation 
department, ranking with the directors of other trans- 
portation services, all of whom reported to one head, the 
Director General, assured that the demands of the 
Light Eailway Section as a whole received attention 
at least equally with all other transportation demands. 
In the event of a shortage of supplies or labor, the most 
pressing needs of the entire system were satisfied in their 
order of importance. The British organization was 
based on the principle of centralization. 

The American method was the converse. Here the view 
was taken that, as the light railway lines lay wholly 
within the army area, the entire system operating beyond 
the broad gauge rail-heads was an adjunct of the com- 
batant forces, intended to keep them supplied with 
ammunition, stores and engineer materiel used in their 
operations. It was held that the army commander,, 



LIGHT RAILWAYS 293 

advised by his corps commanders, was the best judge of 
army needs, and that to refer matters back to General 
Headquarters involved certainly a loss of time and pos- 
sible conflict of judgment, either of which might be 
exceedingly serious during a period of important mili- 
tary operations. At such a moment action must immedi- 
ately follow decision whether right or wrong. 

In the first organization of the Transportation Depart- 
ment, as was explained in detail in Chapter VII, there 
was a Manager of Light Railways on the staff of the 
Director General of Transportation, following the Brit- 
ish principle of centralization. In the subsequent reor- 
ganization of the engineering department in February, 
1918, the section of Light Railways was taken from the 
Director General of Transportation in accordance with 
the decision to separate the army service from that of 
general transportation. It was raised to the dignity of 
a separate department, being combined with the work 
on roads, and was placed under a Director of Light Rail- 
ways and Roads who reported to the Chief Engineer. 

In August, 1918, when the First Army was organized 
the authority of the Director of Light Railways and 
Roads was reduced substantially, being limited so far as 
light railways were concerned to the control of the cen- 
tral repair shop at Ablainville, the general stores, and 
the tracks leading from them to the advanced system. 
"Within the army areas all control, not only of light rail- 
ways but also of roads, passed to the Chief Engineer of 
each army who acted through an Engineer of Railways 
and Roads. From this latter officer all troops assigned 
to light railways in the army area received instructions. 
It was he who decided all matters of construction and 
who had charge of operation. 

In September, 1918, a Table of Organization was 
issued by the 'General Staff which defined the light rail- 
way service for each army as consisting of: 



294 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Five light railway regiments, eacli of two bat- 
talions of engineers (each first battalion composed 
of three operation companies and one advanced shop 
company, and each second battalion composed of two 
maintenance of way companies and one construction, 
company) . 

One battalion (three companies), shop men for 
central repair shops. 

Eleven service battalions (four companies each). 

There was also a road service laid out for each army 
as follows : 

Five battalions engineers (roads) (four companies 
each). 

Ten truck companies. 

Five wagon companies. 

Eight service battalions (four companies each). 

Two battalions engineers (quarry) (four com- 
panies each). 

Three service battalions (quarry) (four com- 
panies each). 

As a matter of fact, although the orders were issued, 
the actual organization of the troops on the above sched- 
ule was not carried out, the work being done by such 
army troops and others who were available. The result 
in general was that there was no central organization 
of a Light Railway Department. What happened to the 
organization of Roads is told at length in connection 
with the road work infhe following chapter. 

Much is to be said in favor of both the principle of 
centralization and its converse when considered theo- 
retically. The A. E. F. being composed of only two 
combatant armies, one of which carried on extensive 
military offensive operations, the second army being on 
the point of attacking when the Armistice was signed, 
it was not difficult to achieve good results with a segrega- 



LIGHT RAILWAYS 295 

lion of authority. For several armies tlie centralization 
principle presents many attractive features, and by 
selecting men of judgment to act as Assistant Directors 
at Army Headquarters and by confiding to tliem ample 
authority for action at times of emergency, the British 
were able to avoid friction, secure harmony and pro- 
duce cooperation, all of which is go essential to military 
success. 



CHAPTBE XXII 

ROADS 

Before they were damaged or destroyed by tlie direct 
action of war or suffered to fall into a state of bad 
repair, France could boast of roads that, in excellence of 
construction and systematic convenience in location, 
were not surpassed by the highways of any country in 
the world and that were equalled only by those of Ger- 
many. No matter where the traveller went, whether 
through the rich and populous districts or those but 
rarely visited, the highways, usually straight and marked 
with rows of tall and stately poplars, were a source of 
continuous joy. The surface was good, the ditches were 
well kept, little depressions were repaired before they 
reached the dignity of holes, and there was a generous 
supply of accurate direction signs and distance posts. 

There are three classes of French highways, the 
" Eoutes Nationales," which are the main arteries built 
and maintained by the General Government; the '^ Eoutes 
Departmentales, " the responsibility of the departments 
into which France is politically divided, and the local 
roads or '* Eoutes Communales " within the limits of 
the communes or what would be called townships in 
America. These roads were all metalled, except for a few 
exceptions among the Eoutes Communales. In the 
vicinity of some of the large cities the Eoutes Nationales 
were paved with stone blocks to withstand the heavy 
concentrated vehicular traffic, but elsewhere all the roads 
may be said to have been constructed of a water-bound 
macadam with no oil or other coating and with widths 
and thicknesses that were governed by their conaparativB 

296 



EOADS 297 

importance. While no definite rules can be given, it may 
be said that the first two classes of roads have a six-inch 
surface laid on a solid foundation, well drained and with 
established limits of gradients and curves, while the 
communal roads have a lighter four-inch construction. 
By this system of definitely separated responsibility for 
the care of roads, there resulted a splendidly planned 
system of inter-city and inter-department highways that 
became excellently well adapted to the long-distance mili- 
tary traffic of war times. 

The usual method of maintaining French roads in 
times of peace is to divide them into sections with one 
man called a *' cantonnier " in charge of each. Piles of 
broken stone are delivered along the road with which the 
cantonnier repairs soft spots and small breaks as fast 
as they appear. He also sees to the drainage and the 
removal of excessive mud. In this way, a road is always 
kept in service. When finally the whole road needs a 
general overhauling it is done by large gangs of 
*' entrepreneurs." Eock suitable for road construction 
abounds generally throughout France and the question 
of machinery and equipment for maintenance was not a 
serious problem, especially since the cantonnier was 
accustomed to break by hand the stone he needed. 

The practical road-building problems confronting the 
engineers of the American Expeditionary Force were of 
two kinds — the more permanent repairs in the Zone of 
the Eear for the Service of Supplies and the hasty 
construction and reconstruction with improvised equip- 
ment and tools for the active army at the front. In the 
work in the forward area, the best engineering practice 
in permanent and economical road building was fre- 
quently of secondary importance to the maintaining of 
military communications. The latter consideration was 
so decidedly paramount as to justify a choice of materials 
and a character of temporary repairs that would ordi- 



298 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

narily be condemned in civil practice. The successful 
officer on this duty was he who recognized that time was 
always the all-important element, at the sacrifice of all 
other considerations, and who successfully kept the traf- 
fic moving day and night. 

The work in the Service of Supplies being removed 
from the actual front more nearly approximated normal 
conditions except that it was always executed under 
great pressure. The work in the army area reflecting the 
strenuous conditions of battle presented phases that are 
of greater technical interest. 

The first requirement of a military road in France, 
and it admitted of no exception, was that there must be 
a special and hard-wearing surface. Under motor trucks 
carrying five and even more tons of ammunition, tractors 
hauling heavy guns, and an unbroken procession of all 
kinds of other vehicles, a dirt road would not only not 
withstand the wear even for a short while, but would be 
a deceiving trap leading traffic into an impasse. There 
were only two kinds of road surface used, stone and 
wood. To furnish the former, all available French 
quarries were called on, new ones were opened, and at 
frequent intervals to save transportation, while at times 
of emergency bricks and stones from the walls of ruined 
houses were taken and crushed. 

It is interesting to trace the building of the A. E. F. 
road organization, beginning with the rather loose pro- 
vision made early in 1918 for the care of certain impor- 
tant highways in the Service of Supplies, and carry it 
through the period of the establishment of the First, 
Second and Third Armies with their special require- 
ments in their active areas. War Department Order 108, 
1917, which provided for the organization of special 
engineer regiments, made provision for this branch of 
work. The Twenty-third Engineers was assigned to the 
important duty. Like the other regiments, the Twenty- 



EOADS 299 

third was recruited of specialists from all parts of the 
United States, including among its enlisted personnel a 
very large number of technical college graduates, engi- 
neers chosen from the staffs of various state highway 
commissions, and contractors experienced in road and 
bridge building and quarry operation. The regiment was 
equipped with motor trucks, wagon train auxiliaries and 
special road tools. Arriving in France during the early 
part of 1918, during the dark days of the German 
offensive, they found the American forces facing the 
necessity of adapting themselves to the needs of the 
moment and of planning the work in advance, so far as 
engineering effort could do so, in conjunction with the 
French, as the date for the formation of the American 
army as an independent unit had not been fixed. Port 
facilities were being rushed, and the large supply depots 
were matters of such immediate importance on account 
of the increasing volume of troop arrivals that it became 
necessary to divide the Twenty- third Engineers and 
make use of the engineering ability of separate units on 
harbor, dock and water supply construction at the base 
ports, and on hospital, warehouse, railway and bridge 
building in the Service of Supplies, in addition to their 
attending to road construction and maintenance required 
by different American services in various parts of 
France. 

During this period the charge of the roads for the 
Service of Supplies came under the Director of Construc- 
tion and Forestry, operating through section engineers, 
and for the Zone of the Advance under the Director of 
Light Railways and Roads. Such organization generally 
existed until August, 1918, when the First Army, 
A. E. F., took over the highway work in its own army 
area. These section engineers and their staffs were usu- 
ally officers of engineering organizations or casual offi- 
cers appointed more or less permanently in charge of the 



/ 



300 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

large engineering work in different localities, wHere 
road construction was an incident to the requirements of 
other construction. 

There existed many differences of opinion as to the 
proper solution of road problems, with little effort made 
at that time toward the standardization of specifications 
and methods. Distribution of the scanty supply of road- 
building machinery and equipment was made many times 
without coordination of the requirements as a whole. 
The efforts on military roads were, practically speaking, 
concentrated in the immediate vicinities of large engi- 
neering projects. The section engineers had available 
only a constantly shifting body of troops for the work, 
the special road regiment being employed in other lines 
in many different localities. 

In spite of these inevitable irregularities incident to 
the development of a great organization, the results that 
were obtained were remarkable and will make a proud 
chapter in the list of achievements of the American army 
engineer. 

The actual work done was mainly the maintenance of 
the heavy traffic roads in re-surfacing and patching of 
holes as they developed, the stone being obtained from 
quarries operated by Americans and also through pur- 
chase from French sources. The obtaining of sufficient 
binder and screening material was frequently a serious 
problem, and repair gangs were forced to use sand 
and sometimes loam to hold the top course of the road 
together temporarily, the work being carried out at all 
times under full traffic. Equipment in the shape of 
rollers and crushers was purchased or leased from the 
French in order to eke out the scanty supply of American 
equipment on hand, and was worked frequently night as 
well as day. 

The organization for the solving of road problems of 
the; army was in a process of development even up to the 



EOADS 301 

time of the Armistice, The necessary brigading of the 
American troops with the French and the British to stop 
the German offensive in the spring of 1918, was one 
obstacle to the prompt creation of an efficient road engi- 
neer organization. Troops which had been designed to 
be army troops and had been sent over in the spring of 
1918 with equipment jDurchased specially for them, had 
not been immediately used as such. Consequently the 
men and tools were scattered throughout the various 
projects of the Service of Supplies. 

In the short time during which the First and Second 
Armies, A. E. F., were in active operation as such, 
namely, from August 10, 1918, to the signing of the 
Armistice, there was not enough time to complete the 
segregation of the highway troops as planned. There- 
fore, the engineer officers of the army charged with 
the responsibility for the road work were forced to adopt 
temporary expedients in order to do the utmost possible 
in keeping the road building and repair work up to the 
fast and steadily increasing demand of the army. 

Previous to the beginning of the St. Mihiel offensive, 
the forward dumps of road material were stocked 
through the agencies of both the light railways and 
roads. Such a division of authority seemed to be a 
logical one and serving the requirements of expedience 
in organization, the movement being controlled by an 
officer known as Engineer of Light Eailways and Eoads, 
reporting to the Chief Engineer of the Army. Later 
when the great importance of both of these arteries for 
the supply of the army became such as to render neces- 
sary the operation of the two as equally important func- 
tions of engineer troops, a further division of authority 
was adopted. 

Under the Engineer of Light Eailways and Eoads of 
the First Army there were officers known as Corps 
Road Officers, to whom was given the direction of 



302 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FEANCE 

road work in certain geograpliical areas corresponding 
roughly to those of army corps. To these officers were 
assigned engineer troops and labor battalions, as well as 
equipment and supplies both for work in hand and for 
that in contemplation to be required in following the 
advance of the army. These Corps Road Officers were 
charged with making such reconnaissance as might be 
necessary and within their areas were allowed prac- 
tically the full control of such troops as might be 
assigned by the Engineer of Light Railways and Roads. 
Practically, however, they were officers detached in most 
instances from their own troops over whom they retained 
general administrative responsibility. On the other hand, 
(engineer troops and other organizations were assigned 
to these same Corps Road Officers for work and not 
supervision. This situation could not work to the 
best possible advantage, but the general require- 
ment of expediency must be borne in mind. The dou- 
ble responsibility of these officers in exercising an 
administrative command over their own troops while at 
the same time rendering the special services for which 
they had been detached, made it extremely difficult to 
accomplish results to the best advantage both for proper 
administration and constructive engineering work. 

There were five Corps Road Officers appointed at the 
time of the St. Mihiel offensive, and to each of them were 
assigned companies of the motor and wagon train of the 
Twenty-third Engineers as well as service battalions. 
The separation of these troops from their own battalion 
commanders and administration orders undoubtedly 
worked a hardship on their efficient administration and 
led to results that bore evidence of individual efforts 
rather than unified efficient team action. 

The great rapidity with which the objectives were 
reached in the St. Mihiel offensive made but a small call 
upon the road troops during the active advance. In the 



EOADS 303 

consolidation of the new front, road work became a prob- 
lem of repair rather than of construction. This problem 
was not serious, as the Germ.an engineers had kept the 
roads behind their front in excellent condition. But the 
work across No Man's Land required the filling of shell 
holes and complicated trench systems, and the removal 
of a number of very solidly constructed obstacles espe- 
cially in connection with the German lines. 

For two or three weeks prior to the greater American 
cJfTensive of the Argonne-Meuse there was exceedingly 
intensive preparation. But during the attack and espe- 
cially as it developed in intensity, the care of roads for 
the army was divided into three parts : first, the Division 
Engineers who undertook the necessary pioneer work 
from the front line as far back as the division authority 
extended, generally speaking to include the divisional 
light artillery positions. Behind the division troops and 
their responsibility for roads and bridges were the Corps 
Engineers, whose authority extended back to include the 
forward ammunition and supply dumps. The Army 
road engineers undertook the care of the more permanent 
army roads, which in general lay behind the forward 
dumps. The Eoad Department was one of the new 
departments where proper relations between division, 
corps and army troops were consistently maintained. 

As may be imagined, the amount of road repair and 
construction increased the further the area became 
extended, due to the advancing front lines. Both divi- 
sional and corps troops were forced by the emergencies 
to adojDt many expedients to accomplish the necessary 
road results in order to accommodate the rapidly chang- 
ing tactical situation. The situation was further com- 
plicated by the different needs of the several divisions 
making up a corps front. Such differences demanded 
special routing of traffic and the maintaining of separate 
lines of communication. The divisional troops also were 



304 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

clianged and rested as their divisions were placed in line 
or withdrawn. The many problems of the individual 
division were considered as practically solved when the 
work had been brought to a point that furnished imme- 
diate relief, even if in a temporary manner only. The 
executing troops had meagre mechanical equipment and 
relied on ready-made methods and hand labor. As one 
illustration of similar character expedients used, canvas 
bags were provided in which men carried on their shoul- 
ders stone obtained from demolitions and ruins in the 
neighborhood, carts, horses or mechanical traction power 
being entirely lacking. 

The degree of permanency in road work increased 
according as the work was handled by the corps and 
army troops until a point was reached where heavy 
equipment, such as crushers and road rollers, was 
employed. 

As time went on the problems of light railways and 
roads became so great of themselves as to render the 
efficient active management of both by one officer prac- 
tically impossible, and it became harder to coordinate the 
work of the assistant corps officers and the troops under 
their jurisdiction. About October 20th, a separation in 
the organization was effected, and the commanding officer 
with the staff of the Twenty-third Engineers, the army 
highway regiment, was withdrawn from work on the 
construction projects in the Service of Supplies, ordered 
to the First Army and appointed Engineer of Roads 
First Army, reporting directly to the Chief Engineer of 
the First Army. With this division of organization and 
with the greater number of the experienced road officers 
of this regiment available, corrections in the former 
organization were made to allow for the further expected 
extension of road responsibility in following up the 
offensive. Additional service troops were assigned, a 
definite system for maintenance and repair was organ- 



EOADS 305 

ized, and liaison was established with corps engineers 
so that the rapidly increasing army needs for highways 
could be attended to more easily and quickly. 

The advisability of this recognition of the vast impor- 
tance of highways to an advancing army was well borne 
out in practice, especially in the time between the start- 
ing of the second phase of the Argonne-Meuse offensive, 
November 1, 1918, and the Armistice on November 11th. 
On this latter date nearly 800 kilometers of road were 
actively under supervision and repair by the technical 
troops of the Twenty-third Engineers, with their motor 
and wagon trains and a number of service battalions and 
pioneer infantry regiments assigned to them for labor. 
These army road troops under the jurisdiction of the 
Engineer of Eoads, First Army, on November 11, 1918, 
amounted to some 21,000 men. 

Little has been said in the above of the natural diffi- 
culties under which the work described was executed. 
The practically incessant rain was a factor which heavily 
taxed the efforts of the troops employed to keep the 
roads in passable condition, and further, was a great ele- 
ment in the rapid deterioration of the surface and foun- 
dation, strained as they were by the tremendous volume 
of truck and automobile traffic. This traffic, particularly 
in the army area, was necessarily confined to main 
arteries of communication supplying the three corps of 
the First Army front. The traffic census taken in 
Varennes showed more than 12,000 vehicles passing 
one point in twenty-four hours, so that the practical 
difficulties of making road repairs while the surfacei 
and shoulders of the road proper were rapidly deterio- 
rating under the traffic, may be imagined. Coupled 
with these difficulties, the shelling of the back 
areas by the Germans became many times a disturb- 
ing factor to the morale of the troops employed, and 
it is a proud tribute to the perseverance, energy, inge- 
nuity, and determination of the American engineer 



306 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

troops on tliis work that, in spite of always increasing 
demands and working against the constant obstacles of 
weather, traffic and shelling, there was no instance in 
the army area where traffic was stopped due to a failure 
on the part of the engineer troops to have any road ready 
to bear its designed volume of traffic. 

With the coming of the armistice, the road problems 
of the army engineers changed to those that contem- 
plated a greater degree of permanency in both construc- 
tion and maintenance. Shortly after the cessation of 
hostilities, all road work of the American Expeditionary 
Force in France was placed imder the charge of the 
Director of Construction and Forestry. Road districts 
were established, and a system of patrolling, similar to 
the French peace-time ^' cantonnier " method, was intro- 
duced with engineer officers in charge of districts and 
with a better rearrangement of engineer troops and sup- 
plies. Serious difficulties were again encountered in the 
spring of 1919 at the time of the spring thaw, which 
again forced the road toops to work under high pressure 
in order to keep abreast of the traffic requirements. 

In the area of occupation of the American Third 
Army, the control of road work was given to the Chief 
Engineer of the Third Army, who employed to a large 
extent local civilian labor maintaining the arteries of 
communication within the area. 

Generally speaking, it may be said that the roads of 
France as used by the American Armies were left in a 
good state of rough repair, as an effort was made before 
the troops were withdrawn from France to put them in 
as satisfactory a condition as possible. But the wear 
caused by the intense and long continued war traffic calls 
for a complete resurfacing to restore the roads to the 
same state of excellence as existed before the war, in 
spite of all the energy and material that was expended 
in their repair. The great quantities of material 



EOADS 307 

that will be needed for this perfect restoration, espe- 
cially when all the other roads in France are con- 
sidered whose condition is quite similar to those in the 
American sector, cannot possibly be available for even 
several years if the present output of the French 
quarries be taken as a basis for the supply. It is this 
work of permanent resurfacing which the French, with 
labor available after their own demobilization, are 
willingly taking up systematically as one part of their 
gigantic task in effacing the scars of th6 war. 

It will be seen that the American road organization 
was in a continuous process of development up to the 
signing of the armistice and it had not reached the point 
where actual experience dictated precedents. In fact, no 
attempt was made to establish individual American 
precedents or standards, the officers realizing that it 
was far better to follow French practice. Therefore, to 
give examples of standards that were in principle com- 
mon to the allied armies, recourse must be had to the 
experience of the French and British. 

The width of the stoned surface of French roads was 
from three to five and a half meters. For mili- 
tary service it was found that there was needed for 
single-line traffic a width of at least three m., for double 
traffic six m. and for triple traffic eight m. To widen 
one kilometer of road from three m. to six m., 1,800 
tons of stone were required calling for 1,800 days 
of labor in the quarrying, six light railway train 
loads for the transportation, 120 truck days and 2,400 
]abor days on the placing, in addition to a large amount 
of heavy .equipment of road rollers, sprinklers and 
crushers. 

In the construction of new or the reconstruction of old 
roads a strong foundation was absolutely necessary, 
otherwise the heavy artillery and trucks would soon 
■.break througlL It was found that such a course of 



308 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

large stones should be not less than ten inches thick. 
These stones were placed by hand, set on edge and 
diagonally across the road, or preferably like the letter 
V. The crevices were then filled with small stones and 
the whole rolled with a ten-ton roller. On this base an 
eight-inch layer of broken stone three inches in size was 
spread, sprinkled and rolled. On this a second layer of 
the same thickness but of smaller stone was placed. 
These two layers gave a compacted thickness of about 
twelve inches. 

It was found desirable to keep the roads as flat as pos- 
sible, as excessive " crown " caused skidding when the 
surface was wet, resulting in traffic jams. When an 
unbroken procession of vehicles can be measured in miles 
it is plain that anything tending to cause a jam must be 
avoided. The road engineers learned that it was much 
more economical to maintain drainage by scraping than 
to pick up overturned trucks, because when once a truck 
on a busy highway had slipped into a ditch, the only 
thing to do was to overturn it. To this same end it was 
found desirable to have some sort of a curb to prevent 
wheels from leaving the stoned surface when they would 
either break the shoulders or dig into the soft earth and 
become stalled. Piles of broken stone to be used in 
repairs well answered the purpose. In all such matters 
hasty expedients and makeshifts were the rule, while 
the following of standard plans was the exception, the 
engineers on the ground having great opportunity for 
the exercise of individual judgment. 

The alternate material for road surface was plank, a 
method of road construction very popular with the Brit- 
ish. Such roads were laid on six rows of stringers, if 
for a single line of traffic, with a plank decking three 
inches thick if of hard, and five inches if of soft wood. 
Spikes were used which could be driven, but if work were 
done near the enemy's lines, holes were bored in advance 
to reduce the noise of hammering. 



EOADS 309 

The great advantages of plank roads were the speed 
with which they could be laid and the possibility of con- 
structing them when stone roads could not be built, as 
for instance, across a country covered with shell holes, 
where the filling deposited in the latter would have 
required much time to become sufficiently consolidated 
to provide a foundation. As for speed, the British in 
front of Cambrai built a double-way plank road two and 
one-half miles long in ten days, and the French estimate 
was that sixty men could lay one-quarter mile of road 
four meters wide in ten hours. Plank roads would not 
answer on gradients steeper than ten per cent, and even 
on rates much less than that, a coating of gravel was 
found to be very helpful. In wet or soft ground the 
French used bundles of fascines laid diagonally, staked 
and wired down to give a firmer bearing for the 
plank surface to rest on. Such roads were very 
expensive and temporary in character, although they 
would last for several weeks. But the rapidity with 
which they could be built rendered them most valuable 
when speed, as during a drive, was all important. 

The maintenance of roads during war depends on 
repairs, but also on care during the thaws and on 
rigid control of traffic. The first may be dis- 
missed from consideration here as repairing of 
roads under war conditions, even in the Zone of 
the Advance, presented few features out of the 
ordinary except in the matter of temporary expedi- 
ents as explained, but the second is of the highest impor- 
tance. Next to the wear caused by the heavy traffic, the 
greatest destructive agency was alternate thawing and 
freezing. So long as roads were tightly frozen there 
was no trouble, but when the included ice expanded 
during the act of thawing, the road surface was 
** heaved '* and the bond between the stones loosened. 
In such condition the passage, especially at high speed. 



310 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

of a few heavy motor vehicles would destroy large areas 
and call for extensive repairs. To obviate this or to 
reduce the resulting damage to the minimum, both the 
French and British road authorities enforced strict traf- 
fic regulations during periods of thaw. At such times 
the French closed the principal roads against automobile 
trucks, loaded wagons in convoy, and loaded wagons 
isolated when hitched to more than one horse for a two- 
wheeled cart, and to more than two horses for a four- 
wheeled wagon. Light passenger automobiles were 
restricted to a speed of ten miles an hour and horse- 
drawn vehicles not otherwise barred were held to a walk. 

The British regulations provided for the prior stor- 
ing at advanced posts of sufficient supplies to permit the 
closing of roads against all but emergency traffic for five 
days, and the placing of road repair material in piles 
at the road sides. Immediately a thaw began or was 
known to be imminent, telegraphic orders were sent out 
putting thaw precautions into effect. These called for, 
first, the elimination of all unnecessary traffic of every 
kind, and the limiting of emergency traffic to speeds of 
eight, ten and fifteen miles per hour for trucks, ambu- 
lances, and light passenger cars respectively, the 
emergency in each case being indicated fty a special pass. 
The repair gangs then removed all slush and mud from 
the surface and repaired all soft spots as fast as they 
appeared. 

Traffic control as in a city's streets was an absolute 
necessity. When the number of vehicles on a highway 
reached the enormous total of 17,000 in a day, which 
means that a vehicle of some sort passed every five sec- 
onds throughout the whole twenty-four hours, it is obvi- 
ous that unless traffic rules were intelligently worked out 
and strictly enforced, circulation would be superseded by 
a hopeless tangle, especially as it must be kept in mind 
that at night near the front all lights were forbidden and 



EOADS 3ir 

traffic had to be handled in darkness. If such a number 
of vehicles were exceptional, figures closely approximat- 
ing it were of frequent occurrence during periods of 
stress. The regTilations provided in general that a mili- 
tary policeman, whose orders were supreme, was sta- 
tioned at all road intersections where traffic routes 
crossed or joined, and that unless otherwise specially 
permitted, vehicles must keep in single file ; that convoys 
were to leave spaces every tenth vehicle to allow ambu- 
lances and high-speed official cars to cut in and so pass 
ahead, and that a disabled vehicle must be at once drawn 
aside, or overturned if necessary. 

The volume of material required for the construction 
and up-keep of roads was tremendous. American experi- 
ence showed that a minimum of 5,000 tons of stone per 
day per army area would be needed. A typical French 
army consisting of 250,000 men used during a period of 
eighteen months no less than 2,000,000 tons of stone, or 
an average of 3,700 tons per day during the whole time 
on approximately 1,000 kilometers of roads within the 
army area. The British transportation figures in France, 
after the army and consequently freight shipments had 
become established on a regular basis, show that rail- 
way material accounted for 32 per cent of the tonnage, 
and road materic^l for 22.5 per cent, while the weight 
of ammunition, ordnance and general supplies, the last 
including food, did not when put together, amount to as 
much as that of road material alone. 

The labor of maintaining the roads was exceedingly 
severe. In the French and British armies, men who had 
been wounded, and although recovered, were incapaci- 
tated for the more active but the not more strenuous 
work in the trenches, were assigned to road service. Had 
the war continued sufficiently long for a similar body of 
men to have been collected in the American Army analo- 
gous action would probably have followed. An excel- 



S12 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

lent picture of the human side of road repair work is 
given in the following verses by an English officer, whose 
name a diligent search has failed to reveal : 

CORP'L GILES 
We's working 'pon the Blankcourt Roads wi' shovel an' wi' pick; 
An' Corp'l Giles from Hatherleigh directing wi' his stick, 
'Tes one long line o' traflSc up, another long line down ; 
'Busses an' carts, for all the world like streets in London town, 
Horses an' marchin' infantry an' batteries o' guns, 
Goin' up to teach good manners to them nasty-minded 'Uns ; 
Lorries an' wains an' moty-cars, for miles an' miles an' miles." 
" 'Tes like a year o' market-days," says I to Corp'l Giles. 

We makes the roads an' mends the roads, an' makes them all again, 
The traffic tears 'em all abroad, wi' one good shower o' rain. 
We scrapes off mud an' strows our stone beneath the grinding wheels. 
The sweat runs down behind our ears, we'm muck from caps to heels. 
We'm deaf, an' halt, an' some's half blind, an' Corp'l Giles he's lame. 
The smart young gunners laughs at us, which seems to me a shame. ' 
"But, Lord, who minds 'em laughing? If 'twam't for such as we, 
How would 'em get their guns to front? " says Corp'l Giles to me. 

They goes up sweatin' in the sun, or singin' through the rain. 
An' when they change Divisions some comes singin' back again. 
An' some stays where the wooden crosses mark the last advance, 
(There's lines o' little crosses all acrost the North o' France.) 
An' past the singin' muddy boys the Red Cross motors go. 
Packed full o' quiet bandaged forms, an' rollin' very slow. 
It makes 'ee sad. . . . "An' yet you knows, if wam't for such as we. 
The wounded wouldn't ride so smooth," says Corp'l Giles to me. 



CHAPTER XXin 

TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 

The winter of 1917-1918 was not a trying one. Severe 
cold set in early in December and continued unbroken 
until the middle of January with considerable snow. 
Then it moderated slowly and evenly so that the frost, 
as it came out of the ground, did but little damage to the 
roads. After the 1st of February the weather and the 
physical features of roads and country presented as 
pretty conditions for fighting as anyone could desire. 
In other years February had always ushered in the 
spring campaign with a movement by one side or the 
other, or by both. But the situation of 1918 was quite 
different from that of other years. The fighting during 
the previous autumn, culminating with the double battle 
of Cambrai, had shown that a practical deadlock existed. 
While local gains had been made during the year, they 
led to no real advantage, certainly not when cost was 
counted. 

The opposing forces viewed the deadlock through very 
different spectacles. The Anglo-French allies knew that 
an army had already begun to arrive from the west 
across the sea and that soon there would be at their sides 
a force giving them a great preponderance of numbers. 
They could afford to wait. The enemy saw the same 
thing but with emotions of another kind. The German 
high command, no matter what they might give out to 
the effect that Americans in number were not in France, 
that none could pass the line of submarines, and that if 
any did arrive they were not trained to fight, knew well 
that a real army was coming and that if victory were to 

313 



314 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

be gained the allies must be beaten before summer, 
otherwise all was lost. Along the front the quietness was 
broken only by an occasional shell fired apparently with- 
out object, by some small raids with no other intent than 
to gain information as to what enemy forces were hold- 
ing the opposing line. 

The enemy situation was critical and only desperate 
means could save it, because time, the only antagonist 
against which man cannot compete, was running against 
him. It was generally recognized in the allied ranks 
that the enemy could and undoubtedly would deliver a 
great smashing blow in which all his strength would be 
concentrated in the hope of overcoming the allies by one 
supreme effort, a sort of gambler's stake where all is 
risked to win all. There was nothing else for him to do. 
On the allies' side all were waiting for the blow to fall. 
Where and when would it fall? 

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig stated that he had 
every reason to believe that from apparent German con- 
centration the attack would be delivered somewhere 
south of the Sensee Eiver. On March 19th he learned 
that it would be launched on the next or second day on 
tlie Arras-St. Quentin front. 

At that time there were but three American units in 
the northern sector, all engineers, the Twelfth and Four- 
teenth Eegiments and a battalion of the Sixth Engineers. 
The first two were occupied on forward light railways, 
with headquarters of the Twelfth Eegiment west of 
St. Quentin, and those of the Fourteenth southeast of 
Arras, while the Sixth Engineers were building some 
bridges near Peronne. 

Before dawn on March 21st, a date that will always 
be one of the milestones that mark epochs on history's 
road, an intense bombardment of the whole front from 
the river Oise to the river Scarpe began and continued 
for five hours, during which shells filled with high explo- 



' TEENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 315 

sives and the deadliest of gases were mixed promis- 
cuously, forcing the engineers working the trains to 
wear masks. It was evident that the Germans intended 
to attack the Fifth Army, B. E. F., with an overwhelm- 
ing force. This army was on the extreme British right 
and was, therefore, next to the French left. The enemy 
apparently hoped to find a weak plane of cleavage in the 
line of jmiction of the two nations. The Germans had 
concentrated more men on this part of the front than 
there were in the entire British army in France (Field 
Marshal Haig's report). The attacking party always 
has the advantage. Ivnowing where he intends to attack 
he can bring to bear such forces as he desires. The party 
on the defensive must be prepared to parry a blow to be 
delivered at any point and cannot move up his reserves, 
not only until the attack has begun but after he is certain 
that the attack in question is the real offensive and not 
a mere feint. Five hours after the bombardment began 
the enemy infantry attacked in great force on a front of 
fifty- four miles. 

It is not the province of this book to describe this 
battle which, had it succeeded, would have cut the British 
army from contact with the French, would have severed 
the lines of transportation running north and south and 
would have given the Germans access to the Channel. In 
that event the war would probably have been brought to 
a disastrous conclusion before American participation 
had become sensible. The story of the offensive is well 
known in general terms. When all the facts on both sides 
are finally obtained, it will provide material for military 
debates and arguments for many years. This book is 
concerned only with the engineers. 

At 5:30 P. M. on the 21st the commanding ojSicer of 
the Twelfth Engineers received orders to withdraw from 
his advanced headquarters at Montigny to Le Mesnil, 
mnning back the equipment on the light railways. Most 
of the rolling stock was saved, but the shelling was so 



316 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

severe that some vehicles were intentionally destroyed 
before being abandoned. On the 22d, regimental head- 
quarters were again moved, this time to Fay. At 3 P. M., 
March 24th, orders were received to abandon Fay at 
once and to destroy all rolling stock. Outlying detach- 
ments of the regiment had a similar experience, falling 
back stage by stage through the four days, March 21-24, 
running the little engines and cars over such lines as 
were open until the rear ends of the light railway system 
were reached, when trains could be run no further. Then, 
but not till then, all locomotives and cars were destroyed 
to prevent their capture. The regiment having lost its 
regular assignment through the light railways having 
passed to enemy hands, was detailed to assist in con- 
structing the trenches along a line running near Villers- 
Bretonneux, east of Amiens, a position that the British 
high command had decided to fortify and hold. 

The experience of the Fourteenth Engineers was simi- 
lar. During the twenty-first they were engaged in haul- 
ing ammunition to the forward batteries and repairing 
the lines as fast as they were cut by shell fire. On the 
following day they, too, were obliged to commence a 
retreat, carrying with them their rolling stock, with 
which they succeeded in salving much ammunition, some- 
thing very precious at such a time. 

The Sixth Engineers had their turn on March 26th. 
After a continuous rear-guard action of the greatest 
intensity it was but natural that the orderly arrange- 
ment of the line should have been considerably disturbed. 
Late on the 25th, G-eneral Grant, Chief Engineer of the 
Fifth Army, B. E. F., learned that a gap was being cre- 
ated by the line drawing apart under the enemy pressure, 
a gap that must be stopped or disaster might follow. 
He seized the Sixth Engineers, various scattered detach- 
ments of all arms, and even stragglers who had become 
separated from their units, and amalgamating them into 
a brigade he threw it into the widening gap. Then he 



TEENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 317 

turned the command over to Brigadier-General Carey. 
This scratch brigade, known as *' Carey's Army," 
though suffering severe casualties, held their position in 
front of Amiens for some days until relieved, by which 
time the new British position had been made reasonably 
secure. 

It was now evident to the British high command that 
the expected great offensive had begun, and that the 
enemy would make a continued effort supported by the 
full force at his disposal to reach the channel ports. A 
review of the field showed that the advance already made 
by the enemy had overrun many lines of defense, calling, 
therefore, for extended supplemental defenses as well as 
developing into works of a more permanent and better 
equipped character those that had been hastily con- 
structed. It was still an engineer's war. While the 
army in the north was being reinforced by all available 
British and French reserves to prevent the onrushing 
enemy from reaching Amiens, Field Marshal Haig wired 
the American General Headquarters for two regiments 
of engineers. The Eleventh and Fifteenth were at once 
designated to join their comrades in the valleys of the 
Somme and Lys, the former to strengthen the defenses 
in the neighborhood of Arras and Bethune, the latter to 
construct new lines of communication replacing the 
transportation facilities that had been lost. 

A ditch with the excavated earth forming a parapet 
has constituted one of the simplest and most easily made 
defenses, since the time when men began to be armed 
with guns. In the American war between the States, the 
construction and systematic utilization of trenches under- 
went great development and the elaborate trenches in 
front of Petersburg, resulting in a deadlock for many 
months, are famous. The Turkish-Russian and th^ 
Russian-Japanese wars saw trenches used on a still 
larger scale, but the late war carried them, both in gen* 
eral extent and in complete details of construction, far 



318 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

and away beyond any previously conceived possible limit. 

From and after the battle of the Marne in September, 
1914, to the beginning of the final offensive in Septem- 
ber, 1918, both sides faced each other from line upon 
line of earth trenches with a total length that has never 
been measured. These trenches extending over a front 
of about 450 miles can be estimated, without doubt, in 
terms of tens of thousands of miles. 

The general principles of trench warfare and trench 
construction were the same in the Allied and German 
armies, but details differed radically and to a large 
extent according to national idiosyncrasies. In system- 
atic layout, in thoroughness of construction, and in 
elaborateness of design the Germans excelled all the 
others. The sides of their trenches were strengthened by 
posts and at times reinforced with concrete. There were 
steel shields to protect snipers, and concrete structures, 
or ** pill boxes," for machine guns. Row upon row of 
trenches were dug with acres of wire entanglements, 
many of which were never used, but were constructed 
BO as to be ready for use if needed, while dugouts existed 
of great capacity and most elaborate construction. 

Some of these dugouts, especially those for field head- 
quarters, were really works of art, if anything, whose 
appearance resembles a rathskellar, can be said to par- 
take of the nature of art. They were panelled with wood, 
furnished with rustic tables and chairs, lit by electric 
lights and, as German officers, especially of high rank, 
seemed to be particularly anxious as to their personal 
safety, they were made very deep with plenty of earth 
cover and had steel doors to protect the entrances against 
shell splinters. 

The German trench system was really a connected 
chain of redoubts or field forts. As part of such a chain 
they skillfully utilized the ruins of villages whenever the 
latter were situated so that they might be used. Thus the 



TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 319 

streets of a village on the front line would be so arranged 
as to constitute a series of culs-de-sac with no outlet 
at the far end, so that in the event of their being rushed 
the entering troops could not advance. Nor could they 
move laterally because the doors and windows, or what 
remained of doors and windows, were heavily wired. 
Troops once in such a street would be exposed to a 
galling fire from the buildings without the possibility of 
attacking the defenders. As the cellars of these houses 
were connected with the trenches by tunnels or under- 
ground passages, they offered extraordinary facilities 
for defense. It was said that the German soldier, 
trained to be a part of a great machine where personal 
initiative was discouraged, could not be depended on for 
stout resistance unless he felt assured that he had the 
best means of protective defense. 

Opposed to this was the French theory, that an army 
acting always on the defensive can never win. To the 
offense and not to the defense comes victory. A soldier 
should, therefore, be given all necessary protection, but 
he must not be encouraged to rely on that protection nor 
to feel that any position he occupies is anything more 
than temporary. The French trenches were, compared 
with the Germans, much smaller, far less comfortable, 
and less permanent in character. 

The British trenches were between these extremes in 
design and execution. They were usually better built 
than the French, deeper and wider, with parapets and 
firing steps more systematically laid out and with 
rather better headquarters arrangements. They fell far 
short of the elaborate German standard and so did not 
develop^or yield to the natural human propensity toward 
a fondness for permanent security. The British held 
that it was unwise and unnecessary to permit men to 
place an undue reliance on the strength of their defenses. 
If any criticism of the British system of defense will lie, 



320 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

it was that they depended too much on a system of 
front-line trenches and did not provide enough reserve 
positions on other lines in the rear capable of being held 
should the first defenses be carried. The argument 
against such provision was that men when hard pressed 
would be more inclined to fall back if they knew that 
there was a position in the rear ready for occupancy. 

This is an interesting point in psychology, a science 
that should not be overlooked in its application to the 
successful conduct of war. To be able to form a correct 
estimate of the mental workings of masses of men under 
war conditions is one of the most valuable faculties that 
a general can possess. Perhaps it is not too much to 
say that unless he can do so, no matter what his military 
ability, he cannot be a great leader of men. The British 
trench system was in general accepted by the American 
Expeditionary Force as the best standard to follow, 
except that General Pershing went even further than the 
Allies in dislike to permanent positions. He believed 
that the war must be won in the open and, perhaps, at 
no distant day. He was, therefore, opposed to American 
troops becoming accustomed to trench warfare. 

A map of trench positions shows in most striking man- 
ner the difference between allied and enemy methods. 
While the allied defenses consisted frequently of but 
three lines and rarely more than six, the German 
trenches were numbered by the dozens and extended back 
from the Front trench to a distance of several thousand 
yards, rows of trenches and wire entanglements. They 
were enabled to construct these labyrinths by drawing 
on the French and Belgian civil population for assisting 
labor. There is no question that they placed unwar- 
ranted confidence in these constructions, and their 
morale was undoubtedly shaken when they found that 
their positions in spite of all the labor and skill expended 
on their creation, were pregnable. Once they were 



322 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 









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-ALLIED TRENCHES 



Map Showing Compaeattve Exteitt 



TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 323 




jvxfyj^ - GERMAN TRENQHES '-e- lOOO YARDS 



EACH SQUARE I5_ JQOO YARDS WIDE 
OF Geeman and Allied Tbenches. 



TBENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 325 

driven out, they never succeeded \is making a stand in 
the open. See the map of opposing trenches on pp. 322-3. 

As trenches actually existed in the field it would have 
been very difficult for an observer to have recognized 
any system or underlying scientific theory in their gen- 
eral layout. Time and the vicissitudes of battle tended 
to efface the marks of orderly arrangement. Some parts 
of a system might be destroyed by a concentrated bom- 
bardment, be captured or be abandoned as not located 
to the best advantage, or some *' switch '* or additions 
might be constructed, any one of which steps would alter 
the design of the original plan. Nevertheless there were 
certain general principles which governed the laying out 
of trenches, and the closer they were adhered to, the bet- 
ter was the defense offered. 

A trench is primarily a construction intended to afford 
protection to troops holding the front line. It may be 
dug like a ditch wholly beneath the surface of the ground, 
or it may be between raised ramparts, as was done in 
the low lands of Flanders. But, of whatever form, it 
was still a trench in a military sense. As all the troops 
assigned at any one time to front-line service could not 
occupy a single trench, nor was it desirable that they 
should be huddled together, other trenches for their 
accommodation and for additional lines of defense had 
io be constructed. Since such additional trenches were 
a part of the front-line defense, they had to be cross- 
connected so that troops might pass freely from one part 
to another and without exposure. 

In general, a trench system consisted of at least three 
lines of trenches substantially parallel, called the Front, 
Support and Reserve. 

The Front or Firing trench was the main line of 
defense and consequently was prepared for offense. If 
possible, it was so located as not to be so close to the 
enemy's front line as to permit its being bombarded bjr 



326 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

trench mortars, nor so far away as not to command (in 
a military sense) the intervening space. But this dis- 
tance was one determined largely by local circmnstances 
among which the enemy's wish was one very important 
item. In actuality the distance varied from fifty yards 
to one mile. While the Front trench was continuous it 
was never straight, as the engineer in laying out 
trenches abhorred a straight line quite as much as nature 
is reputed to do. 

The ideal location for a defensive position was on the 
slope of a hill, in which case the Front trench fol- 
lowed as closely as possible the military crest. Perhaps 
if the technical reader will grant pardon, it may be con- 
venient to recall to the non-technical reader the differ- 
ence between the military and topographical crests. The 
latter is the top of the hill. But as the slopes of any hill 
are convex, it is rarely found that from the actual hilltop 
all points on the slope can be seen, and it is usual that 
this can be done only along some line on the slope itself, 
perhaps at a considerable distance below the top. That 
line, giving ' ' command " or ' ' sight ' ' of all points below 
it, is called the military crest, and is the one with which 
an engineer engaged in fortifying problems is most 
concerned. 

Below the military crest there are no " dead spots " 
in its immediate vicinity ; that is, spots due to small local 
variations in the surface, that cannot be seen from it. 
Dead spots, not being exposed to sight and consequently 
direct rifle fire, furnish excellent places for attacking 
troops to pause, whence by a short rush they can reach 
the enemy's position. The ideal location for the Front 
trench is along the military crest, but in practice this is 
not always feasible at all points. If it be found 
impossible either by advancing or withdrawing the loca- 
tion to avoid a dead spot, adjacent sections must be so 
located so as to give a cross fire sweeping the spot that 



.TEENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 327 

is dead when viewed directly from the front. When 
^' siting," as locating is technically known, was being 
done for new trenches and provided there was time to 
make a careful study, dead spots could be determined 
only by the siting engineer lying down on the ground 
and putting his eyes in the same plane that the eyes of 
the defenders would be in, when the latter came to 
occupy the trench 

Behind the Front trench and preferably distant from 
it 80 to 200 yards lay the Support trench. If possi- 
ble it was sited just below the topographical crest, but 
not so close to it that men's heads showing above the 
trench parapet would be silhouetted against the sky. 
The Support trench, as its name indicates, held the 
troops assigned to support those in the firing line. The 
troops in support are ready to go forward to the 
assistance of any part of the Front line in danger, while 
the Support trench itself was prepared to receive the 
defenders of the Front line if they were compelled to 
withdraw. If the two trenches were sited according to 
system, on sloping ground, the Support being higher 
than the Front, the former was a position with com- 
mand over the Front line, and from it an annoying fire 
could be directed on the Front trench should the enemy 
ever secure a lodgment there. These two trenches were, 
therefore, closely linked and inter-dependent members 
of a single fortification. 

The third or Reserve trench lay well behind the Sup- 
port, not less than 200 yards nor, as a rule, more than 
500 yards, though at times the nature of the ground 
required the latter distance to be exceeded. It was pre 
ferred that the Reserve trench be located on the reverse 
slope of the hill, that is, on the slope opposite from the 
other trenches or, in other words, over the top of the hill. 
The Reserve trench was, therefore, not exposed to direct 
fire, it could not be reached by any shells or bullets aimed 



328 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

at either of the other two, and so was well adapted to 
house and shelter the reserves. It became a fighting 
trench only in the event of the Front and Support 
trenches being carried, when the troops holding the 
Reserve could fire on the attacking column as it came 
over the crest of the hill and presented Si fine target 
against the light background of the sky. 

In this case the term '' reserve," as applied to troops, 
must not be misunderstood. When a unit was ordered 
into the line, it went there, under ordinary routine of 
stabilized trench warfare, for a definite number of days 
during which time its men would be distributed in 
rotation between the three trenches, those in the Reserve 
usually acting as carriers for supplies and ammunition 
to the troops in the Front and Support lines. When the 
period of service expired, the unit would be withdrawn 
to the rear for a period of " rest," as work in the rear 
was euphemistically called. During times of great 
activit}^, such as offensives or defensives, these regular 
schedules were, of course, forgotten. While a unit was 
in the line the men composing it took their place in the 
three trenches in turn. 

The three trenches were connected by frequent Com- 
munication trenches to provide passageways between 
them, through which men could pass without being 
observed by the enemy. There was no rule as to how 
close together these Communication trenches should be\ 
That depended on the nature of the ground, on the 
importance of the position and the number of men hold- 
ing it. They were usually set apart about 100 to 200 yards 
when between the Front and Support trenches, and from 
200 to 500 yards between the Support and Reserve. If 
the Reserve was on the reverse slope of a hill and, there- 
fore, out of sight, troops could enter and leave it in the 
open. If it was exposed to direct vision, Communication 
or Entry trenches leading to it had to b6 dug back to 



FRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 329 

points where concealment was obtained, because tHe 
moment of relief was always an anxious one. If the 
enemy could learn the hour of relief they were sure to 
do shelling with serious effect, as the trenches would then 
be filled with twice the normal number of men, one unit 
arriving, the other departing, and probably both units 
weighted with their kits. 

In front of the Front trench there were frequently out- 
posts and nearly always machine gun posts, positions 
consisting of small detached trenches or shell holes impro- 
vised for occupation. Here small parties remained, 
unable to move in daylight but ready to repel an attack. 

The Communication trenches were usually not laid out 
at right angles to the trenches that they connected, but 
preferably at an angle of about forty-five degrees, which 
prevented their being enfiladed by direct fire. They 
were also usable as firing trenches in case any part of 
the trench in front should be entered by the enemy. 
In such cases they became temporary or permanent 
** switches," that is, alternate sections for the kind 
of trench next in front. If a position was held for a long 
time, additions to the trenches were made for the above 
and other reasons, so that instead of three lines there 
might be many more in close proximity. The Germans 
were particularly fond of multiplying lines, and such 
multiplication undoubtedly strengthened the powers of 
resistance of a position. 

In plan, or ** trace," trenches were of four types: 
** Traversed," ** Bastioned " or ** Octagonal," " Zig- 
zag " and ** Wavy." There was one thing they must 
not be, and that was straight, because a straight line 
would never adjust itself to the undulations of ground. 
If it did so for any considerable distance, the enemy, by 
taking position at one end or at a distance in the direc- 
tion of its length, could swee|) it with an enfilading fire. 
Even if it were impossible to enfilade a straight trench, 



330 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

a shell falling in it would certainly scatter its fragments 
to considerable distances right and left, causing many 
casualties. The trace must, therefore, be of such plan as 
to fit the ground and must have bends, or splinter-proof 
barriers, dividing it into short lengths. 



30' J^'ib/c 



-U. 



r 



Fig. 5. 



The Traversed trench was the one most used at first, 
perhaps because in plan it retained some of the old char- 
acteristics of permanent fortifications, and the human 
mind is loath to depart from old forms and familiar 
outlines. It was one for which the French exhibited 
great fondness, even to the end. As will be seen from 
the annexed Fig. 5, it consisted of a number of right 
angled turns caused by leaving undisturbed masses 
of earth projecting backwards from the front face. The 
traverses built at first were about eight to ten feet thick, 
but against concentrated modern shell fire that thickness 
was much too small, as such small traverses were quickly 
blown away and failed to give lateral protection. They 
should not be less than twelve, and preferably at least six- 
teen feet thick, separated by bays about thirty feet long. 
They were made twelve feet deep so as to lap or cover 
the traverses projecting forward from the back. It will 
be seen that these traverses cut a trench into a series of 
isolated though connected compartments, along which 
it was impossible to see from one compartment to the 
next. 

The story is told of an Irish battalion holding such a 
trench. During a critical quarter of an hour and just 



.TEENCHES AND TRENCH "WARFARE 331 

after a shell had exploded, a man in one bay called to a 
companion on the other side of the intervening traverse, 
*'Are you there, Mike? " '' Sure," came back the cheer- 
ful answer. A few minutes later another vicious shell 
exploded and with it again, ^' Are you still tliere, Mike? " 
When this happened a third time, Mike became a little 
irritated, and inquired somewhat petulantly as to the 
cause of the unwonted interest in his welfare. ''I'm not 
meaning any harm, Mike, me boy," came the apology, 
*' but we have a little pool here as to who'll be the next 
man hit, and I 've drawn you. ' ' 




Fig, 6. 



The Traverse type was very wasteful of space and 
time, especially after the necessity for wide traverses 
became apparent. A large part of 'the fighting front was 
necessarily sacrificed, the trace was awkward to fit to 
undulating ground, the right-angled turns increased the 
distance and consequently retarded progress through the 
trench, and it demanded the maximum amount of labor 
to construct. Its advantage was good protection against 
enfilading fire and shell fragments. 

These objections were obviated or greatly modified in 
the Bastion or Octagonal layout, where any face can 
become a firing face, and in addition, the faces on 
the side can deliver a cross fire, an advantage not possi- 
ble with the Traverse type. The standard dimensions of 
American and British practice with trenches of this char- 
acter are given in the following table : 



332 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 



BASTION OR OCTAGONAL TRENCH 



DIMENSIONS 


AMERICAN STANDARD 


BRITISH STANDARD 


A 
B 
C 
D 

E 
corner angles 


30 feet 

12 feet-6 inches 
50 feet 

12 feet-6 inches 
25 feet 
135° 


10 yards 
3§ yards 

17 yards 
6 yards 

10 yards 
120° 



The next type, the '' Zig-zag," was a modification of 
the above, where all angles were the same, and all sides 
were of equal length. This type of trench was very easy 




30Amer/con 

Z/G-ZAG TRENCH 

Fig. 7. 



both to lay out and to construct. As to laying out, all 
that was necessary for the siting engineer to do was to 
mark the angles, and the engineer troops following him 
would cut lines connecting the angle points and begin 
digging. In American practice the distance between 
entrant angles was eighty feet, as compared with fifty- 
one feet, in the British, while the depth was the same, 
fifteen feet. The shorter British length and conse- 
quently more acute angles, gave better protection against 
bursting shells or enfilading fire. It must be kept in 
mind that all these dimensions were suggestive only, to 
be adhered to only as far as the nature of ground per- 
mitted. In order to follow a given contour or the 
irregularities of the surface the engineer when siting 
had to make many modifications of dimensions. 



TEENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 333 

From the Zig-zag it was an easy transition to the 
trench where the angles were rounded, giving a succes- 
sion of curves instead of broken lines. This type of 
trench was named the '* Wavy " trace, and is shown in 




S/'Br/Hsh 
SO'Amer/can 

WAVY TRENCH 

Fig. 8- 

the diagram above, the dimensions being the same 
as its prototype the Zig-zag, the American standard 
giving longer sweeps than the British. The Wavy 
trench possessed many advantages which were so strik- 
ing as to make it the superior of all unless there were 
special local reasons to the contrary, among which 
advantages may be mentioned ; 

1 — Ease and rapidity in construction. 

2 — Great facility in passing through it, hence espe- 

cially advantageous for communication trenches. 

3 — Could be used as a fire trench at any point. 

The disadvantage was that most men preferred a 
straight and not a curved edge to fire over. 

In details and dimensions of cross-section, the trenches 
underwent some modification as the result of experience 
during the war. The early trenches were made both too 
shallow and too narrow. It was found that they should 
be sufficiently deep that men's heads would be below the 
level of the ground so that men need not rely on the cov- 
ering presented by the parapet formed by the excavated 
material as giving any real protection. A narrow trench 
affords a little more protection against flying shell frag- 
ments, but this benefit is more than offset by the incon- 
venience to men passing through, by the difficulty of 
handling stretchers and by the certainty that a fall of 
the bank following a direct shell hit will completely block 



334 AMEEICAN ENGINEEKS IN FEANCE 

it. Such were the results of British experience, which 
led to standards whose dimensions were even somewhat 
more generous than our own. 

For a good substantial trench the depth of the bottom 
below the surface was placed at six feet, the width of 
the excavation at the top at six feet six inches, and at 
the bottom two feet six inches, so that the sides had a 
slope of two feet in six feet, or three on one. This cross- 
section or profile, to use the technical expression, was 
the minimum for any trench whether used for firing or 
communication. Such parts as were to be used for firing 
were widened on the exposed side by excavating a bench 
or '' fire step " three feet below the top and two feet 
wide, so that at such places the top width became eight 
feet six inches. The fire steps were not continuous, nor 
did they occur in every bay even in the Front trench. 
It was not advisable to make any one step more than 
eighteen feet long, so as to avoid the temptation for men 
to congregate, which longer steps invited, and so expose 
themselves to simultaneous casualties. If fifty or sixty 
per cent of the whole length of even the Front trench 
was provided with fire steps, it was usually sufficient, 
while of the Support trench not more than forty to fifty 
per cent was made available for firing, with still less in 
the Reserve. 

The excavated earth was thrown both in front and 
behind the trench and kept back from the edge about one 
foot six inches to two feet. The earth in front, the 
parapet, was leveled off to a gentle slope so that men 
could place their rifles on it. If the edge toward the 
trench was left one foot six inches high, a man standing 
on. the fire step could rest his elbows on the original 
surface and, with his rifle lying on the parapet, fire com- 
fortably. The excavated earth in the rear, the parados, 
was left irregular so as to prevent the head of a man 
looking over the parapet from being clearly outlined. 



TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 335 




CROSS SECTION OF TRENCH 

(W/Yh F/r-eefep) 
Fig. 9- 

In the front face of the trench there were excavated 
receptacles for surplus ammunition and hand grenades. 
Covered lookout posts were established at intervals, 
where sentries could stand and watch over No Man's 
Land, looking through slits between sand bags. 

In France the subsoil is usually a clay or chalk and 
consequently resistant against slips or falls. As a gen- 
eral thing, therefore, and very fortunately, the sides of 
the trenches were self-sustaining and remained so for 
months, 'even when exposed to the weather. When soft 
material was encountered, or a direct hit was scored on 
the trench involving placing of the sides, support for the 
soft earth was obtained by driving stakes into the bot- 
tom. Sometimes the stakes alone would be sufficient, but 
if not, hurdles made of brush were placed against the 
bank behind the stakes or the banks were covered with 
closely woven chicken wire. If the ground were very 
soft and the bottom hard, into which stakes could not be 
driven, a braced frame was designed, the long vertical 
legs on the sides acting as the bank's support. 

The great enemy of trenches, or rather the great 
enemy of the men in the trenches, was water. The dif- 
ficulties of disposing of it being accentuated by the 
impervious character of the subsoil. If trenches were 



336 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

constructed on a sloping Hillside, drains could sometimes 
be dug to the front, permitting the accumulated water 
to run away. But as the trenches were six feet deep, it 
was not always possible to get ground with a sufficient 
fall by which the water could be naturally drained off 
through any reasonable length of ditch. Then again a 
ditch, after it had been put into use through hours of 
labor, might be blocked by a single shell. Where natural 
drainage could not be had, pumps were installed which 
had to be worked by hand. Even at the best they were 
very unsatisfactory. 

Stories have been told of the mud in the trenches which 
unfortunately are not exaggerations. Material falling 
into the trench from the banks, loose earth blown into 
the trenches by shells would, when tramped under con- 
stantly passing feet, become thoroughly broken up and 
finally, unless the drainage were exceptionally good, take 
the consistency of a thick brown soup. Long stretches of 
trenches after a spell of wet weather would have this 
fluid mud actually thigh high on the men. An effort was 
made to reduce the inconvenience by flooring the bottom 
of the trenches with " duck boards," a foot-walk con- 
sisting of two longitudinal stringers about one and one- 
half inches wide by three inches deep, on which were 
nailed light cross slats. These duck boards were made 
and consumed in enormous quantities for use in camps 
as well as trenches. They were the one redeeming ele- 
ment that under some conditions made living possible. 
An eminent American medical authority when asked his 
opinion as to what was the greatest medical achievement 
in the war, replied unhesitatingly the *' Duck Board," 
as it had saved more lives than any other discovery. 

The near presence of ground water to the surface in 
some localities, especially in the plains of Flanders, pre- 
vented the digging of trenches. If it were possible to 
dig part of a trench it was dug to such depth as could 



TEENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 337 

be obtained, and then above the surface of the ground 
there was erected a rampart, the inside face of which 
consisted of stout stakes driven into the ground, sup- 
porting brush hurdles, the tops of the stakes being held, 
from turning over, by wires leading to anchor posts in 
front. Earth was then piled up on the outside against 
the hurdles to a thickness of six feet at the top, with an 
exterior slope of one on two. The trace of such a trench 
was usually of the Bastion form. In order to protect 
the men from shells falling behind them, a similar 
embankment was constructed in the rear, thus giving a 
trench profile of the same dimensions as the standard 
trench. Firing stfeps were constructed upon such bays 
as were selected for that purpose. The combined height 
of trench and rampart was the same as the standard 
depth of trench. 

Forests were always used by both sides as points for 
defense. The only objection to organizing forests for 
this purpose was that the enemy would, probably, if the 
location of the defense works were known, saturate the 
locality with gas. Gas in a thick forest, especially if it 
were mustard gas, would remain for days before final 
evaporation. Details of trenches in forests did not dif- 
fer from those constructed in the open except that they 
were usually reinforced more generously with machine 
gun posts and other isolated points of defense, called 
strong points. 

Among the trees, avenues were cut, whence all under- 
brush and small trees were, removed. These avenues 
were laid out radiating from various, strong points, so 
that an attacking force passing through the forest would 
be subjected to crossfire from several points. Whenever 
trenches and outposts were constructed in woods, the 
big trees were left so far as possible, so as to hide from 
airplane observation the traces of either the outposts or 
the cross avenues. 



338 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FBANCE 

THe Commimicatioii trenches resembled the other 
trenches both in trace and profile, and were provided 
with fire steps on some bays so that they conld be used, 
if so needed, as fire trenches. Inasmuch as they were 
intended primarily for passages, they were given the 
Zig-zag or Wavy trace, as that trace obstructed as little 
as possible the movement of men. The upper ends of 
Communication trenches were made straight for about 
fifty yards, whence a diverted connection was made with 
the Main trench. Support or Reserve. At the end of the 
straight stretch there was a fire step on the Main trench, 
with a parapet so constructed as to permit an enfilading 
fire of the Communication trench to be directed from it. 
This was done so that, in the event of the trench in front 
being carried by the enemy, the next line of trench could 
not be approached through the Communication trenches. 
Not more than two men at a time could advance through 
such a trench abreast, and certainly one or two men with 
rifles could easily defend it. The distance of fifty yards 
for the straight stretch was deemed sufficient to prevent 
the defenders from being reached by hand-thrown 
grenades, the much dreaded weapon in close fighting. 

In digging trenches, except on the immediate front 
during an engagement, it was found desirable to do so 
by allotting daily tasks to the men, on the completion 
of which they might return to camp, rather than to 
keep them all digging a certain fixed number of hours. 
The first task consisted of digging the upper half of the 
trench, the second task completing it. With the normal 
profile as above described, the upper half of the trench 
exclusive of the first step and in a length of ten feet gave 
6.1 cubic yards of excavation, and this was taken as a 
day's task. It was actually found that when men were 
worked by the day of ten hours that nothing more than 
this on the average would be accomplished, while on 
the task basis a good man would complete that amount 



TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 339 

of trench, throwing the excavated material over the top, 
in four hours when working in ordinary clay or loamy 
soil. In fact, one of the engineer regiments reported 
that that amount of material had actually been disposed 
of by one man in two hours. In chalk, cemented gravel 
or stiff blue clay, the above task would constitute a full 
day's work. 




-/e-9- 



fRONT LINE DUGOUT 



Fig. 10. 



The lower half, or second task, contained four cubic 
yards of excavation and took about as long to accom- 
plish as the first task, the lesser amount of earth handled 
being offset by the extra lift to the material. The aver- 
age lift of the earth in the second task was about six 
feet, as it not only had to be lifted from the trench but 
thrown on top of the excavated material from the first 
task. Then, too, some rehandling of the excavated 
material was necessary in order to make room for new 
deposit. 



340 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Trenches were incomplete unless some provisions were 
made for giving the men living accommodations. These 
accommodations consisted preferably, and always if time 
permitted, in the construction of dugouts. While dug- 
outs were being built, temporary and quickly made pro- 
vision was furnished by shelters excavated in the banks 
and roofed over with timbers or concrete beams covered 
with as much earth as could be heaped upon them in the 







DUGOUT FOR 
BATTALION HEADQUARTERS 

Wifh occommodafion ^r 23 man 



Fig. 11. 

time available but without making them marked targets. 
Such shelters afforded protection against all shell splin- 
ters and even against a direct hit from a 77 mm. shell. 
In addition to these more or less simple accommodations 
there were needed in all occupied positions some place or 
places for headquarters, hospitals, storage of ammuni- 
tion, etc., where reasonable protection could be had 
against direct hits from guns of almost any calibre, cer- 
tainly up to those of 210 mm. (8.3 inches). Such protec- 
tion could be secured only in deep dugouts under a 



TEENCHES AND TEENCH WAEFAEE 341 

cover of nndisturbed earth at least twenty feet in depth. 
There were many different designs for such dugouts, 
depending upon the character of the soil, the topography 
of the ground, the time available for their construction 
and the personal views of the engineer. But those 
shown in figures 10 and 11 were for their several purposes 
quite satisfactory and can be taken as fairly typical. 

The dugouts were reached by inclines running down 
at an angle of about forty-five degrees with steps on the 
bottom. At least two inclines were given to every 
dugout, to prevent access being cut off and the men 
buried by a single lucky shot. They were driven like 
ordinary mining galleries and were lined with timber 
frames of three-inch plank, giving a clear opening three 
feet wide by five feet high. The galleries at the bottoms 
of these inclines had six feet head room and were also 
lined on all sides with planks, while the roofs and sides 
of the rooms leading off from the galleries were sup- 
ported by ordinary miners' timbers. These dugouts 
were frequently lighted by electricity and were venti- 
lated either by using the chimney from the cookstove, 
which if there were no other way of reaching the surface, 
passed up one of the inclines, or else by putting a brazier 
at the bottom of an incline, converting it into an upcast 
ventilating shaft. 

Keeping dugouts free from water was not as serious 
a matter as at first thought it seemed to be. The clay 
subsoil in the war zone of France was usually impervious 
to surface water, so that the dugouts were as a general 
thing reasonably dry. The only serious matter in 
respect of drainage was to care for the water that might 
flow in from the open trenches. At the foot of the 
inclines small pits or sumps were dug to which hand 
pumps were attached and the water removed at intervals. 
The great danger in dugouts and in fact the only real 
danger, because most were quite safe against shell fire, 



342 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

was gas, which flowing down the inclines, would remain 
in the dugout undisturbed for hours, perhaps even 
unnoticed. 

As was explained in Chapter XVI when dealing with 
noxious gases, entrances to dugouts were covered by 
blankets soaked in gas-absorbing chemicals. In cases 
where gas attacks were to be expected frequently, these 
blankets were hung in pairs, separated by an interval of 
a few feet. They thus constituted a sort of air lock, pre- 
venting the passage of gas which would happen when- 
ever a man would lift a single blanket on leaving or enter- 
ing the dugout. With two blankets, one was always 
down. 

In this discussion of trenches and dugouts it is 
assumed that time is available in which these elaborate 
structures can be i^roduced according to plans, either 
when preparing a position in advance which, of course, 
means in anticipation of a possible retirement, 
or when a series of improvements can be slowly carried 
out while actually holding a front position. 

In front of the forward trench were the wire entangle- 
ments intended to hold an attacking wave long enough 
to permit, even in case of surprise, a sufficient concen- 
tration of machine gun or rifle fire to destroy it before 
reaching the trench. To this end the entanglements were 
placed so close to the trench that it could not be 
approached or the wire cut without the knowledge of the 
sentries in the trench. And yet they were sufficiently far 
away to give the men a sense of security against imme- 
diate hand-to-hand fighting and so encourage deliberate 
careful aiming. A distance between trench and wire 
neither too short nor too long was from twenty-five to 
fifty yards. The rule was laid down that entanglements 
should never be placed in dead spots, to avoid which it 
was better to set them at a greater distance than normal. 
On the other hand it was very advantageous that parts 



TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 343 

of an entanglement be subject to an enfilading fire from 
some portion of the Front trench. 

There were many different ways of stringing wire, 
the result of individual views of different army engi- 
neers, but the general principle of construction was a 
fence with sloping wires in front and behind called a 
** double apron." The central standing portion resem- 
bled an ordinary barbed-wire fence, four strands high, 
attached to posts or pickets five to six feet long 
driven three yards apart and so deep that four feet were 
above the ground. Two yards in front, and also 
behind the main posts, were two rows of short pickets 
driven well down. Inclined wires led from the top of 
each fence picket to the anchor pickets, forming in plan 
a series of crosses. Three horizontal wires were 
attached to these inclined wires on each side of the 
central fence and spaced approximately equidistantly 
between the top and the ground, making ten horizontal 
wires in all. 

In front, that is, on the enemy side of the forward 
apron, were usually two sets of low wire entanglements. 
Each of these consisted of two rows of short pickets pro- 
jecting when driven about two feet above the ground 
and set alternately at three-yard intervals, with inclined 
wires running from the top of the rear picket to half way 
down the picket in front. If two sets of low wires were 
used, one row of intermediate pickets answered for the 
front row of one set and the rear row of the next, each 
row being two yards from its neighbor. About these 
inclined wires were twisted coils of loose unattached 
wires. There was a tendency of wiring parties to place 
too many wires, especially of loose coils, a tendency that 
was perhaps understandable though always discouraged 
when discovered. If there were too many wires, men 
could actually walk on them and trample them down to 
something like a heavy carpet. German wire entangle- 



344 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

ments were much more complicated and consisted of sev- 
eral rows, as many as seven being not uncommon with 
horizontal wires, diagonal wires connecting the tops of 
the pickets, and some loose wires besides. 

The entanglements were never continuous, gaps being 
left to give means of egress and return for the patrols 
who scoured No Man's Land nightly. These gaps were 
made by building the entanglements in sections of sev- 
eral hundred yards in length, according to local condi- 
tions, but having the end of one section overlap that of 
the next with an interval between. The enemy could not 
then see where the gaps were. In case an attack was 
feared, these gaps were closed by stretching across them 
*' French " or ^' Concertina " wire, spiral coils of plain 
and barbed wire respectively. The first had a diameter 
of three feet six inches and, when pulled out, made a cyl- 
inder sixty feet long. The second was usually four feet 
in diameter and gave a length of eighteen feet. The con- 
certina type was naturally more effective, but was more 
awkward to carry and to handle in an emergency. Both 
were held in place by pickets and were used not only to 
stop gaps, but to close roads and to create entanglements 
that in some emergency might have to be placed in a 
great hurry. 

The pickets were of wood, when they could be driven 
by a maul without fear that the noise would attract fire. 
But when silence must be observed, as when new lines 
were being strung or old ones repaired in No Man's 
Land, screw pickets were used, made of round metal 
with one end twisted like a corkscrew so that it could be 
screwed into the ground, and with eyes to which the wire 
could be attached. 

Wire entanglements could be cut and broken by shell 
fire. When an attack was contemplated they were sub- 
jected to a concentrated bombardment. When damaged 
by accidental fire, something of daily occurrence, the 



TRENCHES AND TRENCH WARFARE 345 

engineers were called on to repair them at night, always 
a dangerous task, because probably notice of their pres- 
ence would be given by the listening apparatus, when 
immediately the ground would be illuminated by some 
form of air bomb, which would burn for several seconds. 
Then the sharpshooters became disagreeably active. The 
best means of disposing of wire was the tank, which was 
able to smooth entanglements quite flat over which men 
could run subject to no more inconvenience or delay than 
possibly being tripped by loose wires. 

The trench system, composed of at least three main 
lines and with any number of communications, switches, 
by-passes, etc., and with all the twists, turnings, and 
sinuosities, made a veritable labyrinth, in which men, 
especially new arrivals, might easily be lost. To simplify 
matters as much as possible, they were all named (and, 
of course, mapped) with the names in some orderly 
arrangement ; that is, various stretches of the Front-line 
trench as, for instance, between adjacent Communicating 
trenches, were given names that began with the same 
letter, while similar sections of the Support and Reserve 
lines had other letters. Thus Georgetown, Gregory or 
Good would indicate locations in the Front trench, and 
Harold, Harwich or Henry similar locations in the Sup- 
port directly in the rear. Communication trenches had 
their system of initial letters, as also switches or other 
irregular additions. Signs with these names were 
'erected at every junction point like the signs at the inter- 
section of streets in a city. 

Through perhaps their long stay in France, the Brit- 
ish went to great lengths in giving new names to places 
and localities. Some of the names being quite amusing. 
Treacle Trench, Tadpole Copse, Oxford Street and 
other designations certainly not of Gallic origin were 
placed on the maps, and undoubtedly many will rise cen- 
turies hence under distorted disguises to provide mate- 



346 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

rial for heated philological discussion. Several such 
anglicized names will be found on the fragment of the 
map shown on page 227. 

The enemy trenches were carefully mapped from air 
photographs and were likewise named, so that in the 
plans for an attack, various units would receive orders to 
capture and occupy the portion of the enemy trenches 
designated by name. 

Under such conditions in dark, damp dugouts, in mud, 
in slimy ditches, to look from which meant instant death, 
exposed to constant wasting fire, and subject to bombard- 
ment or attack at any moment, the men of the allied 
armies had lived for three and a half years even before 
the American entry in the war, with all the relieving 
interest of open warfare absolutely unknown. The only 
change was when the period of line service was over and 
the unit was withdrawn for a few days' rest in the 
reserve, there to wait for it's next turn of duty in the 
trenches. Such life was more nerve racking than the 
sustaining excitement of a great offensive. Never have 
there been conditions of war that tried men's courage as 
those that existed from the first battle of the Marne until 
the final victorious movement began on the 18th of July, 
1918, a period lacking less than two months to make four 
full years. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

FINAL PHASE 

The drama was fast drawing to a close. 

At the end of August, 1918, the headquarters of the 
First Army, A. E. F., had been temporarily located at 
Neufchateau in the department of the Vosges. In Sep- 
tember they were moved to Ligny and Bar-le-Ihie in 
Meuse in order to be nearer the scene of activity, when 
the sector extending easterly from the Argonne forest to 
the Alsatian frontier opposite Nancy had been definitely 
assigned for American operations. By this date the 
American troops in France numbered nearly 2,000,000 
men and the whole combatant force, except the Second 
Corps which was cooperating with the British and the 
recent arrivals still undergoing training, was concen- 
trated on or immediately behind this front. All the units 
of the nine original engineer regiments that could be 
transferred from fixed duties were gradually moved dur- 
ing the month of August and September to the First 
Army area, with the exception of the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Regiments which could not be spared from 
the work of continued development of the wharf facili- 
ties at St. Nazaire and Bordeaux, and the Nineteenth, 
whose duties of maintaining locomotives and cars at 
Nevers and other points were paramount. The other 
regiments were not transferred simultaneously, nor even 
as complete units, but in separated bodies usually as 
companies and never larger than battalions, in order not 
to draw attention to the concentration that it was desired 
to effect quietly. 

The sector described above included the famous St. 

347 



348 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

Mihiel salient wliich the Germans had held continuously 
since October, 1914, in spite of several determined efforts 
of the French to retake it. As the result of these failures 
both sides had settled down to the realization that the 
Germans were too strongly intrenched to be dislodged. 
A continued deadlock ensued whose quiet was broken 
only by an occasional raid or the daily exchange of a few 
shells. The tip of the salient lay on the high ground on 
the west bank of the Meuse. Included between the north 
and south limits were about four miles of the river 
Meuse, the Canal de I'Est, a canal of the first category, 
the two highways in the valley and the double tracks of 
the main line of the standard gauge railway connecting 
Verdun with the south. 

The general plan laid down by the Generalissimo, 
Marshal Foch, was for the three forces, American, 
French and British, to make a simultaneous forward 
movement on the whole front from the Meuse to the 
North Sea, in which movement the American force was 
to occupy the right, thus leaving aside for the moment 
any offensive directed against the strongly fortified posi- 
tion of Metz. To make such a movement it was neces- 
sary first to reduce the St. Mihiel salient and recover 
possession of the railway and highway in the valley of 
the Meuse in order to have the physical facilities for 
transferring men and supplies to the Verdun portion 
of the front. 

Accordingly on the night of September 12th the 
American Commander-in-Chief launched the first great 
American offensive. To attempt to storm the dominat- 
ing hills of St. Mihiel would have been futile and sui- 
cidal, because during their four years of possession the 
Germans had strengthened the already strong natural 
position by every conceivable device of engineering sci- 
ence, and made it practically impregnable against direct 
attack. General Pershing, therefore, directed his main 



FINAL PHASE 349 

offensive westerly from the Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson 
across the level plains to the hills lying east of St. Mihiel, 
of which Mont Sec was the dominating feature. In the 
early morning hours the attack was opened by an intense 
bombardment lasting until dawn, when the infantry 
" went over." At the same time some American divi- 
sions, aided by a French colonial corps, attacked on the 
face of the salient lying between St. Mihiel and a point 
east and south of Verdun. The offensive proved to be a 
great surprise to the enemy, although it was hard to 
understand why it should have been, because there had 
been a steady concentration of troops and of supplies 
for nearly a month previously and there was gossip all 
over France to the effect that a great offensive was 
planned for somewhere north of Toul. Perhaps the dis- 
tribution of the knowledge deceived the enemy through 
its being so widespread and led him to believe that the 
reports were being purposely circulated with intent to 
deceive. At any rate the first day's objectives were 
quickly occupied with surprisingly small losses and the 
flow of prisoners who began to appear early in the after- 
noon were evidence that the enemy was beaten. The 
quality of the prisoners gave much hope that the end was 
not far away, because among them were many old men 
and boys, who in conversation did not hesitate to admit 
that they were surprised and by the fierceness of the 
assault completely routed. 

During the night of September 12th-13th the Ger- 
mans evacuated St. Mihiel itself without firing a shot 
in its defense, and all their labor spent in digging miles 
of trenches, in raising acres of wire entanglements had 
gone for naught. They saw clearly that, if the American 
attack were resumed on the morrow and pressed with the 
same vigor that it had been during the 12th, the whole 
garrison would be cut off and be compelled to surrender. 
If they were to leave at all and of their own volition it 



350 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

must be then and under the cover of darkness. The next 
few days saw not only the long maintained salient aban- 
doned but a wide belt of country in the rear recaptured. 
The Germans, as a matter of fact, fell back considerably 
more than they were expected to do. They apparently 
fancied the attack to be the beginning of one in force on 
Metz and hastily withdrew to cover that important gate- 
way to the Rhine valley. They learned when too late 
that il was only a move to clear the way for the greater 
offensive from the Meuse westward. Afterward the 
Second Army, A. E. F., made complete preparations for a 
drive on Metz and to the eastward of Toul, but the sign- 
ing of the Armistice on the very eve of the attack stopped 
it before it began. 

In the St. Mihiel offensive the work that the engineer 
regiments accomplished was chiefly in the matter of 
lines of transportation. They took over the French sys- 
tem of light railways which served their old front, and 
followed up the advance with new lines connecting them 
with the w6ll built German system which the enemy had 
not been able to destroy, so quickly did he retreat. All 
this involved new rail-heads, new storage depots, and 
new means for local distribution. Roads had to be 
repaired, actually rebuilt where they crossed the long 
abandoned territory lying between the lines where they 
had been pounded by the shells from both armies during 
more than three years; mine craters purposely blown up 
at road intersections had to -be filled in with logs, earth 
or the debris of houses ; new water supply points estab- 
lished and a great mass of other details aftended to in 
order that the combatant forces could advance and, after 
they had advanced, be supplied. Then there were the 
standard gauge lines to be operated, lines that had been 
long unused, that freight in broad-gauge cars might be 
run as far forward as possible without breaking bulk 
or being transferred to the smaller light railway cars. 



FINAL PHASE 351 

A meter gauge railway, belonging to the local communal 
system rmming northeasterly from Commercy, crossing 
the German trenches at Apremont and then skirting the 
base of Mont Sec, occupied a very desirable location for 
a standard gauge line, and it was decided to widen the 
gauge. 

This little railway had been completed in the summer 
of 1914 and consequently had never been operated except 
for a few weeks. Four years later it was completely 
overgrown with grass. Having decided to reconstruct it 
the 11th Engineers were instructed to make the plans and 
preparations but were forbidden to begin work in the 
field until the offensive had actually commenced for fear 
of drawing the attention of enemy airplanes to new 
work in progress. The track consisted of fifty-pound 
rails laid on ties two meters (6^ ft.) long but held by 
screw spikes. Prior to the engagement a few men, 
widely scattered, were set to work drawing the spikes, 
while timbers were collected with which to strengthen 
the bridges. On the morning of the 12th the engineers 
began to move the rails outward to the broad gauge, 
using for the moment the small ties, thus giving at once 
a track over which could be and was run a construction 
train carrying standard gauge ties, with which the track 
was relaid. The light rails were permanently retained 
and did good service. 

Beyond the German trenches the roadbed was found 
to be in bad condition. They had removed all the track 
material for use in light railways, since a very short and 
independent line with a gauge of one meter and con- 
nected with no similar railway in their area had abso- 
lutely no value for them. Large craters existed where 
the Germans had blown up the roadbed, but apparently 
long previously to their retirement, so that north of 
Apremont the whole line had to be largely rebuilt. When 
this was done it constituted the chief standard gauge 



352 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

connection, and with a rail-head and transfer station at 
Woinville it functioned in connection with the recon- 
structed and extended light railway system. 

During this and the immediately subsequent Argonne- 
Meuse offensive the work of the engineers was noted not 
for remarkable or spectacular individual pieces of con- 
struction, but rather for the large amount of work done 
as a whole and its widely varied character executed under 
the most trying conditions. Time in such circumstances 
is the governing factor. Railways, roads, water supply 
and trenches that are to be constructed must be con- 
ceived on a plan that will lead to the quickest results 
rather than give a perfected structure to which the 
author may subsequently point with pride as an example 
of his scientific skill. The polish and neatness with 
which a conscientious engineer likes to finish construc- 
tion entrusted to his care must be quite lacking in work 
done during the stress of battle. Under such circum- 
stances the highest type of engineering is that which 
produces a given result in the fewest hours, regardless 
of permanence or economical operation. It is for this 
reason that the work accomplished by the engineers in 
these two offensives, great in scope and varied in type 
as it was, presents but few examples of accomplishment 
worthy of extended engineering analysis. As one meas- 
ure of the mass of work accomplished, the number of 
standard gauge trains moved by a single regiment (the 
Thirteenth Engineers) is interesting. This regiment, 
occupied wholly in the operation of railways on that part 
of the French front, including St. Mihiel, Verdun and the 
Argonne, moved no fewer than 17,315 trains, the greater 
part during the American offensives, carrying nearly 
9,000,000 tons of freight with an unknown number of 
passengers which certainly ran into millions, when all 
movements and counter movements of troops were 
counted. During September and October, 1918, when the 



FINAL PHASE 353 

Argonne offensive was in progress, this same regiment 
handled 3,082 trains with 2,400,000 tons of freight. 

In the execution of work during a great offensive there 
were frequent disappointments and much discourage- 
ment. Often after finishing the construction of a bridge, 
or railway yard or important water point, done under 
the most trying of circumstances, including rain, wind, 
cold, little food and sleep, a sudden change in battle plan 
would render it all unnecessary, or an enemy raid would 
capture it, or, what was of frequent occurrence, the 
enemy, advised of the construction, would wait until the 
last member had been put in place and then, with their 
long-range guns, knock it all down like a house 
of cards. A fine example of this last experience 
was a French railway viaduct in the Vosges, cross- 
ing the valley of the Largue. This handsome structure, 
like so many other similar ones in France, sources 
of joy to the artistic, and of interest to the scientific 
man, was about 460 meters long with an average height 
of twenty-one meters and consisted of a series of forty- 
two arches of a span of 8.6 meters each with a central 
arch over the river with an opening of twenty-five 
meters, all constructed in brickwork. While the retreat 
of 1914 was in progress, the French, fearing that this 
important structure might fall into the hands of the Ger- 
mans, destroyed its immediate usefulness by blowing up 
the central arch and the two adjacent arches on each side. 
In the following spring, when fear of a further German 
advance on this front had disappeared, the French, who 
needed the railway for their own service, decided to 
rebuild the viaduct. With the customary French desirei 
for good workmanship and not yet having learned 
the lesson that such standards have no place in war, the 
engineers reconstructed the broken part in reinforced 
concrete and restored the original artistic outline of the 
stucture. On the night of May 25, 1915, the rebuilding 



354: AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

had been finished without any untoward incident and 
they began to remove the falsework and arch centering. 
Four days later the enemy opened fire with a gun of 
420 mm. (I614 ins.) calibre at a range of about 12 km. 
(714 miles). In a few hours fifty-one shots had struck 
the bridge or fallen in the immediate vicinity. The struc- 
ture was in ruins. A length of 120 meters was com- 
pletely demolished, and the central arch with four small 



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arches were severely damaged. The Germans had 
waited until the reconstruction was completed and then 
bombarded it, the fire being directed by aviators. 

The pictures opposite, copies of official French photo- 
graphs, illustrate the construction and damage. It will 
interest engineers to know that the reinforced concrete, 
although fresh, resisted destructive action better than 
the brickwork, and the attention of engineers is particu- 
larly invited to the fact that great masses of the brick- 
work in one of the piers were moved laterally without 




MAY 25, 1915. FRENCH RECONSTRUCTION FINISHED 




MAY 30, 1915. EFFECT OF GERMAN ARTILLERY FIRE 
DANNEMORIE VIADUCT 

Its Replacement by the French and Immediate Destruction by German 
Artillery from a Distance of More Than Twelve Kilometers 



FINAL PHASE 355 

internal disturbance and solely by the effect of concus- 
Bion of an exploding shell transmitted through the air. 

The diagram of the Dannemorie viaduct over the 
Largue shows the pre-war elevation, the parts demol- 
ished by the bombardment and the extraordinary accu- 
racy of the artillery fire, every shot either actually hitting 
the bridge or falling within a maximum error of less 
than fifty feet in the case of the first shot. After this 
costly experience the French effected a crossing of the 
valley on a low and easily rebuilt wooden trestle, one 
that was not worth the expenditure of ammunition to 
destroy. 

With the St. Mihiel salient removed and the arteries 
of travel in th6 valley of the Meuse restored to French 
control, the way was open for the main general offensive. 
If there had been idle talk about the St. Mihiel attack, 
there was none about the other. Commanding officers 
were aware that some movement was at hand, but beyond 
orders to hold their commands in readiness for any 
emergency they knew nothing definitely. Therefore, the 
experience of myself and my regiment was typical 
of that of many others. On September 22d I was 
warned that we would be moved presently, and on the 
morning of the 24th I was ordered to proceed immedi- 
ately to Vraincourt, a small village just east of the 
Argonne forest, and was advised that trucks would carry 
a part of my regiment during the night. 

For some days there had been much activity after 
dark. From dusk each evening until early morning there 
was a. steady procession of guns, trucks loaded with 
ammunition and men, and wagon trains of every descrip- 
tion, all moving north, sure signs of something big at 
hand. During the night the procession never paused. 
It camped by day, leaving the roads empty and thus 
concealing the movement from aerial observation. 

Before daybreak on September 25th the Eleventh 



356 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Engineers arrived at Vraincourt and, in accordance with 
orders, remained under cover. Vraincourt had been 
selected as a place of concealment as well as being con- 
venient for headquarters, because it had never been 
shelled systematically and was believed to be unknown 
to the Germans, as certain captured maps did not show 
its location. This proved to be an idle empty dream, for 
Vraincourt was heavily shelled that very day. Some of 
the Fourteenth Engineers were quartered in the 
village and two companies of the Fifteenth Engineers 
nearby. 

All knew that the battle hour was not far away, per- 
haps to begin that night, but of this no one was certain. 
At 11 P. M. there were some sharp artillery exchanges, 
which died down after twenty minutes. At 2 A. M. on 
the 26th there was heard a sudden violent roar. After ten 
minutes with no sign of abatement, it was evident that 
the zero hour was passed and "that, what might be, and 
in reality was, the greatest battle in history had already 
opened. It did not take me long to dress and to reach the 
hilltop behind which Vraincourt had received, during 
nearly four years, some small measure of protection. It 
was a wonderfully glorious night. Every star was shin- 
ing brightly in the crisp cool air of that September morn- 
ing, while the moon, strong in its third quarter, revealed 
all the features of the scene. Below, running east and 
west was the valley of La Couzance, a tributary of the 
river Aire which, after picking up its little affluent at a 
short distance to the left, continued its course to the 
north into the territory that had been continuously in 
German hands since September, 1914. Down in the val- 
ley lay a dense white fog, and buried in that fog were 
some large French naval guns on railway cars, that had 
been run into place during the immediately preceding 
nights and covered with camouflage. 

On the slope of the ridge in front there was a series 
of constant flashes, looking for all the world like giant 



FINAL PHASE 357 

fire-flies. Tliey were not fire-flies but flashes from guns 
close together, row on row, being loaded and fired with 
all the rapidity that modern gun mechanism made possi- 
ble. Although directly in front the flashes of the indi- 
vidual guns could be seen, one began to lose them to the 
right and left, or rather they began to blend into greater 
lights, at first like brilliant sheets of so-called summer 
lightning, only at very short intervals. Then in the 
farther distances these sheets themselves blended and 
the sky became lurid as by a great conflagration with 
similar throbbings of intensity. In the valley below 
the naval guns were being fired more slowly, and as each 
one was discharged, though the flash could not be seen, 
an area of the fog bank turned for an instant red and 
yellow. Thousands of guns over miles of front were in 
action. 

The noise was as grand and as awe-inspiring as the 
sight, and can perhaps be best compared with that of a 
wild ocean storm pounding on a gravel beach. There 
was a continuous roar, the mingled sound of the distant 
guns, like the steady roar of distant surf. On this back- 
ground of sound there stood out the separate discharges 
of the nearby guns, with the deep-voiced punctuations of 
the big naval pieces dominating all, just as the crash of 
individual waves can be distinguished above the confused 
din of the storm. It was a sight to hold one for an hour 
spellbound; when suddenly, as if nature herself had been 
aroused to jealousy and to a spirit of competition, a great 
white meteor drifted slowly and silently across the sky. 

I went down to the valley through the ruined village 
of Courcelles, whose broken, jagged walls looked like 
gaunt spectres in the moonlight. A sanitary train had 
taken refuge under the lea of a kind bank. It had been 
ordered to take post in the village but the commanding 
officer, fearing that the enemy guns, in retaliation for the 
punishment they were receiving, might select the village 



358 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

for one of their targets, had stationed his train just out- 
side. The enemy, however, was too busy trying to 
escape the fearful deluge of shells to have time for reply. 
In the valley some stragglers inquired how to find their 
divisions, an ambulance stopped to ask for the sanitary 
train, while trucks heavy with shells to feed the ever- 
hungry guns went lumbering by. Orders to lengthen the 
range were coming by telephone to the naval guns from 
some advanced observation point, for the moment had 
come for the infantry to go over the top. 

It was all a great prelude before the curtain rose for the 
final act. Then the sky began to turn gray, and the stars 
to fade, warnings that day was breaking and that a 
return to camp must be made for a hurried breakfast so 
as to be ready to execute the orders already received as 
against this very hour. 

The work of the army engineer troops in the Argonne- 
Meuse offensive was in principle similar to that in the 
St. Mihiel offensive, but on a larger scale, over a more 
extended area and for a longer time. As always the 
great demand was for transportation facilities. In the 
sector over which the American part of the offensive was 
conducted there was a great lack of railway lines. The 
character of the topography had not encouraged construc- 
tion before the war beyond meeting the bare local neces- 
sities and these accommodations even if in the best of 
condition were absolutely insufficient for the present 
exigency. There was the main line running east 
toward Verdun, parallel with and just behind the French 
battle front as it had remained stabilized. This was the 
line that the" Germans had cut by shell fire and rendered 
unusable in their Verdun attack in 1916. It had not since 
then been put into operation. The American engineers 
reopened it, however, immediately following the com- 
mencement of the American offensive. There was another 
double-track railway following the Meuse north from 



FINAL PHASE 359 

Verdun to Sedan. The latter railway existed only in 
name. Crossing as it did the field of the intense fighting 
in 1916 where the tide of victory had flowed and ebbed 
so many times, especially over the hill known as Le Mort 
Homme, the railway was found to be in a condition that 
required complete reconstruction as soon as the enemy 
was forced back sufficiently to permit details from the 
Eleventh and Fifteenth Engineers to undertake it. The 
roadbed was full of shell holes, bridges were down and 
the only rails left in place were broken and twisted, 
because both sides in turn had removed rails fit to 
relay. These two railways were the only standard gauge 
lines serving the field of the Argonne-Meuse offensive 
over which the American operations were to be con- 
ducted. The latter of these was (|uite out of service, 
while the former had but one main track connected for 
running and was without yard or siding facilities. There 
was no other existing railway in front of the Americans 
until the main east and west line through Sedan was 
reached, and that line was not captured from the enemy 
until the very last days of hostilities. 

The Germans had made up for their own deficiency 
by constructing a fairly complete light railway system 
with the 60 cm. gauge, which gave them all the facilities 
they needed for the transport of supplies along what had 
been an inactive front since the French counter-offensive 
in front of Verdun had come to an end in 1916. As was 
usually the case, the German light railways were found 
to be in excellent condition with heavy rails, that is, 
heavy for light railways, and heavier than those ordi- 
narily used by the allies for similar tracks, with good 
ties and a sufficiency of ballast. 

The Chief Engineer of the First Army decided to meet 
the railway shortage, so far as the American needs were 
concerned, by reconstituting the Verdun- Aubreville line 
with its access to St. Dizier, an important supply base, 



360 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

to construct in connection with it additional side-track 
capacity, to rebuild the Verdun-Sedan line as fast as it 
was recovered from the enemy and, at the same time, to 
build a new standard gauge line along the eastern edge 
of the forest of the Argonne from Aubreville, following 
the valley of the Aire through Varennes to Apremont 
(not to be confused with the Apremont, east of St. 
Mihiel), where it was expected to make connection with 
a previously existing single-track line that had a termi- 
nus there. "When, however, Apremont was reached it 
was found that the Germans had rebuilt the stand- 
ard gauge railway into one with a gauge of 60 cm. The 
railway was pushed through to Varennes, the place where 
Louis XVI was recognized and captured on his flight 
from Paris. At Varennes an extensive rail-head was 
established until the advance had progressed sufficiently 
beyond to permit the extension to Apremont, with subse- 
quent reconstruction to Grand Pre. This railway became 
the main line of American supply on the west. 

The light railway system was extended as the front 
went forward, captured German lines and even German 
rolling stock being used. Much of the latter the enemy 
had succeeded in withdrawing at least to the limits of the 
light railway system, but the tracks as a general thing 
were left intact. All high roads were in bad shape and 
quite insufficient to accommodate the enormous traffic 
incident to the huge army of 1,200,000 men. 

As in the case of railways, the best location for high- 
ways had been in the valley of the Aire. Elsewhere 
routes would have had frequent and abrupt changes of 
gradients, since those with a northerly direction ran 
across and not with the deeply marked lines of natural 
drainage. But the old national highway through 
Varennes was impassable. The principal bridges had 
been blown up or damaged by shell fire, while the French 
had deliberately fired a mine in an embankment about 



FINAL PHASE 361 

forty feet Mgli just behind their front line, south of 
Boureuilles, completely annihilating it and digging a 
great crater in addition. This they did to block the road 
against a possible German advance. Curiously enough 
the Germans did precisely the same thing behind their 
lines but, of course, like the French, they did this many 
months before any offensive was even contemplated. 
The double act indicated how both sides on this front had 
conceded a state of deadlock to exist and, having aban- 
doned all expectation of advance, took steps to hinder a 
possible advance by the enemy should he attempt it. 

Until a standard gauge railway could be built, a 
task necessarily involving considerable time, a time that 
was not shortened nor the task made lighter by the heavy 
rains, the Varennes highway was the only artery over 
which troops could move, the long trains of guns, ammu- 
nition, food and supplies of all sorts go up and the 
endless procession of ambulances come back. Tem- 
porary detours around the craters were constructed until 
a detachment of French bridge engineers with their well 
equipped field mobile plant could bridge first the greater 
gap and afterward the smaller one. As the major one 
of these detours or run-arounds had steep gradients 
which were not metalled, the heavy trucks with their 
loads of ammunition soon dug deep ruts, in the soft mud 
of the temporary road, that called for a superhuman 
effort to get traffic through at all. There were times 
when the road was blocked with two lines of vehicles for 
miles, and everyone was in constant dread that the Ger- 
mans would shell it. They could easily have done so, 
but for some unknown reason did not. Finally some of 
the Twenty-third Regiment and other engineers of the 
road service department succeeded in getting the obsta- 
cles removed and the traffic moving as freely as battle 
conditions permitted. 

Such offensives as that of St. ]\Iihiel and, to a greater 



362 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

degree, tliat of the Argonne-Meuse on account of its 
longer maintained advance, made strenuous demands 
on the Water Supply Troops who had to keep up with 
the advance. The Germans had a well established sys- 
tem of their own which, fortunately, they could not, or at 
least did not, destroy as they fell back. While the supply 
was sufficient for their own consumption, it was not so 
for a force many fold greater. In the St. Mihiel offen- 
sive the Water Supply Regiment prepared in advance 
seven pumping plants, twelve reservoirs or tanks, instal- 
lations for filling carts and collected 25,000 feet of piping 
for the laying of new lines. As the attacking troops 
went forward the Water Supply Engineers followed 
close on their heels, rendering available the local sources 
of supply, setting up the canvas reservoirs to receive 
water hauled forward by motor tanks until permanent 
water points were established, converting three captured 
German installations to American use and locating ani- 
mal water points with the necessary troughs. To assure 
purity of supply while examinations were made, two 
sterilizing installations with connected storage tanks 
were operated in addition to five mobile purification 
plants on motor trucks. During the first six days of the 
offensive, over and above the water obtained from wells 
and local sources, 250,000 gallons of water were delivered 
by motor trucks besides a large but unrecorded amount 
hauled in light railway tank cars, holding 2,000 gallons 
each. 

For the Argonne-Meuse offensive the previous prepa- 
rations were similar, including the assembling of com- 
plete outfits of pumps, reservoirs and sterilizing plants. 
Immediately after the attack was begun, steps were taken 
quite like those of St. Mihiel. At first hand pumps 
were installed by means of which the portable canvas 
reservoirs were filled, whence water was carried for- 
ward and distributed by the ever-useful motor truck. 
Finally, the permanent erections were accomplished to 



FINAL PHASE 363 

the number of no less than seven gravity and thirty-one 
pumping stations, exclusive of many water stations for 
standard gauge and light railways and all in addition 
to the existing sources of supply found and captured. 

On November 10th the First Army, A. E. F., had 
reached Sedan, had swept the enemy from the valley of 
the Meuse and back to the northern frontier of France. 
The Second Army was on the point of attacking through 
Alsace when at 5 A. M., November 11th, the Armistice 
was signed and orders were flashed along the whole line 
to cease firing at 11 o'clock. Hostilities had at last come 
to an end. The problem that faced the engineers nine- 
teen months earlier had been solved. An army of 
2,000,0CK) men had been transported overseas, the rail- 
ways and roads, ports and wharves, storage yards and 
depots had been constructed, and the correlated services 
for water supply, motor transport, camouflage, mapping, 
chemical warfare and the more delicate operation of 
range finding had been organized, while trenches had 
been excavated and dugouts driven. It was a great work. 
Mistakes, of course, had been committed, but they had 
been made unavoidably and pardonably. There remained 
an accomplishment of which the members of the profes- 
sion of engineering and the people of the country may 
well be proud. From a small handful of trained military 
engineers there had grown a tremendous army of engi- 
neers with experience in every field of applied science. 
The details of the problems that were presented to them 
were new, the task as a whole was stupendous, but in 
setting out to solve the former and to accomplish the lat- 
ter, they took for their guiding spirit the motto of the 
Corps of Engineers which had been handed down from 
that eminent French "engineer officer, the founder of the 
corps, Major L 'Enfant, a motto denoting a modest con- 
fidence that is based on hope with a determination that 
knows no fear — 

** ESSAYONS '» 



CHAPTER XXV 

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS IN THE FIELD 

The organization of engineer troops, their control and 
the assignment to them of duties varied considerably in 
the three principal allied armies. The best illustration 
of this difference in practice is perhaps in the case of 
troops engaged in the work of transportation, the larg- 
est and the most important field of engineer activity. 
The principles, underlying the composition, organization 
and equipment of railway troops, in force in the armies 
of the United States, France and Great Britain are' 
typical of the principles adopted for other special engi- 
neer troops. As military engineering is now a matter of 
broad civil engineering, the question naturally follows 
whether some of the principles on which the special 
troops have been organized do not find application to all 
engineer units in the army of the United States. Here- 
tofore the army has not recognized the close connection 
between many of the engineering features of civil and 
military practice to the same extent as did the armies 
of some foreign countries. 

At the outbreak of the war in August, 1914, the British 
organization of railway troops consisted of only two com- 
panies of Royal Engineers, out of whom and on whom 
had been built the large and complex transportation 
structure that existed when the war was ended, an 
organization that finally included more than 100,000 men. 
One of the first steps taken by the British General Staff 
toward the creation of a special railway corps was to 
accept an offer made by the Canadian Pacific Railway 
Company to furnish a detachment called the Canadian 

364 



ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS 365 

Railway Overseas Construction Corps, wliich consisted 
of two companies under the command of a major, every 
man in it being carefully selected. So satisfactory was 
the work of this corps that further calls were made on 
Canada to send more such men to meet the ever increas- 
ing railway needs. The British set a high value on these 
Canadian railway troops because they believed that 
the standards of the rapid and temporary character of 
railway construction as used in western Canada more 
closely approximated war conditions than the thorough, 
elaborate and permanent standards of Great Britain. 
This experience of the Canadians proved to be particu- 
larly valuable. The Canadian troops were organized 
in conformity with British infantry regulations on the 
basis of battalions, each battalion consisting of thirty- 
four officers, sixty-one warrant and non-commissioned 
officers, and 1,010 men, a total of 1,105 of all ranks. 
These battalions were sent overseas with an equipment 
extensive in character and elaborate in detail, and were 
completely self-sustained units capable of undertaking 
railway construction of any kind and on any scale. Their 
equipment, in addition to a very generous supply of 
small tools, included wheel and drag scrapers, road- 
grading machines and grading plows, large and small 
motor trucks, horse-drawn wagons, surveying and tele- 
phone outfits and in some cases track laying trains and 
steam pile drivers. 

The Royal Engineer unit in the British army was a com- 
pany consisting of six officers and 250 non-commissioned 
officers and men. Originally the companies were under the 
command of two captains, one of whom had charge of all 
matters of administration and the other of work. It was 
finally found desirable to assign to the first-named duty 
an officer with the rank of major, so as to insure one of 
more years with corresponding experience and judgment. 
These companies when engaged on railway work were 
furnished with a supply of all the necessary small tools 



see AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

but had no surveying outfit, nor were they equipped to 
undertake heavy construction. So far as possible they 
were permanently quartered in railway cars which were 
moved from place to place as needed, thus giving to 
each unit the maximum of mobility. The personnel of 
these companies was carefully selected and consisted of 
representatives of the various skilled trades likely to be 
used in any form of railway construction, such as track- 
men, bridgemen, masons, machinists, etc. For what is 
known as common labor they depended on having unem- 
ployed infantry units, or special service or labor bat- 
talions attached to them. Equipped, as above stated, 
with all the necessary small tools, they drew on some 
central depot for large machine tools such as pile 
drivers, steam shovels, derricks, or grading machines if 
needed. Although they worked side by side with the 
more fully equipped Canadian battalions, it was the cus- 
tom to leave to the latter all work of a heavy character, 
the British Royal Engineer companies doing the lighter 
work that was more easily handled by a mobile unit. 
The whole theory in the British army was that the Royal 
Engineer companies were not organized to plan or lay 
out work but were intended for execution only. 

The planning and the laying out of work was done 
under the direction of a regional engineer called a Rail- 
way Construction Engineer, or R. C. E. as he was always 
known. He had under him Assistant R. C. E.'s in charge 
of districts, each assistant with the necessary survey 
units, and the engineer companies reported to them for 
work orders only. The Construction Engineer had noth- 
ing to do with any question of the internal administra- 
tion of the companies. The R. C. E., whose region of 
control was approximately that of an army, m turn 
reported to the Chief Railway Construction Engineer 
(C. R. C. E.), a departmental officer on the staff of the 
Director General of Transportation. 



ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TEOOPS 367 

During the first two years of the war it is rather curi- 
ous to note, as an instance of the existence of the com- 
jjosite character of the British army, that the Canadian 
troops and the Royal Engineers reported to quite sepa- 
rate authorities. The former had their own Brigadier- 
General commanding, while the Royal Engineers were 
all under the Chief Railway Construction Engineer. 
Before the war closed this anomalous system was sim- 
plified by creating a Director of Construction, through 
whom all these troops received their orders, including 
those engaged in the construction of light railways. 
The Chief Railway Construction Engineer, and subse- 
quently the Director of Construction, had jurisdiction 
over all matters of construction whether within or with- 
out the zone of the armies, in accordance with the basic 
principle of the organization of the department of trans- 
portation. This centralized control of railway construc- 
tion the British found worked well and was preferable 
to allowing each army to do its own work separately. 
They believed that the unification thus obtained obviated 
any possibly injurious competitive struggle between two 
zealous army commanders for the necessarily limited 
supply of men and materiel. 

Besides the railway construction personnel the Chief 
of Railway Construction Engineer also had control of 
the large and small tools and supplies such as rails. 
Under him were pooled the men and equipment thus ren- 
dered available for use at any point. He had his main 
depots for tools and materiel upon which he could draw 
to meet any emergency or to make good deficiencies. In 
addition to the base depots there were the smaller dumps 
under the jurisdiction of the several Railway Construc- 
tion Engineers. 

In the French army there was an organization of rail- 
way troops that had been in existence for some years 
before the war. The French General Staff realized, to 



368 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

some extent more tlian the British did, tlie important 
part that transportation would play in a future war, 
although their estimate failed to fully measure the situ- 
ation as it actually developed. The French had, as has 
been explained before, one advantage over the two asso- 
ciated armies in that they were operating in their own 
country and in connection with their established railway 
systems which carried the burden of their sejDarate 
administration. Practically speaking, from a military 
construction point of view, there were for the French no 
lines of communication. 

As part of the regular establishment during times of 
peace there had existed a regiment of railway troops 
known as the Fifth Regiment of Engineers, or as they 
were called in French, '' Sapeurs de Chemins de Fer." 
This regiment under the command of a colonel was 
really a training corps. The course of instruction 
extended over a year. In addition to their military 
duties, the officers and men were instructed in surveying 
and all the details of military railway construction and 
operation, including track, bridges, buildings, rolling 
stock, water supply, and telegraph and telephone lines. 

The instruction was thorough and practical, the Gov- 
ernment availing itself of its ownership of the state rail- 
way attached both the officers and men to the staff of 
that railway during a part of the school year. Connected 
with and working alongside of the Fifth Engineers was 
the Ecole de Chemins de Fer, with a central office at 
Versailles and a large park for the storage of materiel 
located near there. This school was a permanent estab- 
lishment and continued to function during the war, as it 
was charged with the collection and keeping of all rail- 
way materiel, the administration of repair shops, the 
organization of technical bureaus, methods of instruc- 
tion, and all matters of personnel. 

The peace footing of the Fifth Engineers consisted of 



OEGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS 369 

nineteen construction companies, one supply company 
and one company of drivers for both horse-drawn 
wagons and motors. Each company was composed of 
six officers, two captains and four lieutenants, with 200 
men. Of these nineteen companies, sixteen were sta- 
tioned with headquarters at Versailles for purposes of 
instruction, and three were territorial companies located 
in the French colony of Morocco. The total peace foot- 
ing of railway troops was, therefore, including the head- 
quarters staff, 126 officers and 4,200 men. This was 
a considerably more numerous and highly trained organ- 
ization than the similar corps with the British army and 
one that provided an excellent foundation on which to 
build a complete war organization, especially as the men 
had been so thoroughly trained. 

The administrative functions of the commanding 
officer of the Fifth Engineers changed immediately on 
the commencement of the war. As an officer of instruc- 
tion his duties obviously ceased. The companies of his 
regiment were at once scattered and attached to other 
officers for work, over which work he exercised no control. 
His duties were limited practically to matters of dis- 
cipline in the so-called regiment and to certain questions 
of personnel. Although the regimental organization 
remained in nominal existence, it had ceased to function. 
To all practical purposes the French adopted the separate 
company system exactly the same as the British, as each 
company was a distinct entity so far as its internal 
administration was concerned. The regimental form of 
organization of the regiment was a highly convenient 
arrangement for administrative purposes during peace, 
but the French contemplated dropping it and actually did 
so during the period of hostilities, when something more 
elastic was needed, reverting to it when the emergency 
had passed. 

Attached to the Ministry of Public Works was a gen- 



370 AMBBICAlSr ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

eral officer with the title of Directeur General de Trans- 
port Militaire, which for convenience was abbreviated to 
its initial letters — D. G. T. M. On the staff of each 
army commander there was an officer, usually of the rank 
of Colonel, to whom was given the title of Directeur de 
Transport Mihtaire de I'Armee (D. T. M. A.). This 
officer ascertained the army needs, prepared the general 
plans, and submitted them to his superior, the Directeur 
General for approval and execution. The latter was 
charged, therefore, both in theory and practice, with 
great powers and responsibility. Pie not only had under 
his orders all the railway troops but, during the period 
of the war, the plant of the school at Versailles, and he 
exercised authority through the Minister of Public 
[Works over all the commercial railway systems of 
France. 

One thing which stood out in the equipping of these 
special troops was the work trains composed both of mo- 
tor trucks and railway cars. These work trains possessed 
the quality of mobility in the greatest measure. So 
excellent were they that the British copied them. The 
motor truck trains consisted of three vehicles. The first 
vehicle was a motor truck and tractor combined, contain- 
ing the machine and hand tools for both metal and wood 
workers, engaged in the various trades of fitters, black- 
smiths, miners, boiler makers and carpenters, and with 
tools for the cutting of rails either hot or cold. The sec- 
ond vehicle was designed for the conveyance of work- 
men with the necessary hand tools for track grading 
stored beneath the seats. The third vehicle was equipped 
with an electric generating three-kilowatt set of 200 
volts, with electric drills for both wood and met?al 
workers and a lighting plant. These motor trucks were 
exceedingly mobile and could be run from point to point 
with great convenience. They contained everything both 
in the way of tools and men that might be' necessary for 



OEGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS S71 

the repairs of lines abandoned by tbe enemy, or work of 
a temporary character preceding the more permanent 
reestablishment of the track. 

The work trains of standard gange railway cars were 
of two kinds, the '' Pares sur Rails " according to the 
French official designation and the train work shop or 
*' Train Atelier." One Pare train was supposed to be 
attached to every company of railway troops and formed 
their park of heavy tools and materials. It consisted of 
seven cars which contained: 

a. Tools for various mechanical trades, carpenters, 

tinsmiths and plumbers, lumbermen, telegraph 
and telephone lineman, tracklayers, masons, 
miners, blacksmiths and fitters. 

b. Lighting plant. 

c. Transport vehicles, wagons, motor trucks and rail- 

way inspection cars. 

d. Explosives. 

e. Ejector pump. 

f. Steam pile driver. 

g. Derrick. 

h. Lifting tools, blocks, tackles, jacks, etc. 

i. Switch apparatus. 

j. Trestle timbers and irons. 

k. Small boat. 

i. Library and drawing equipment. 

With such a train, capable of being easily moved, a 
company of skilled mechanics assisted by service bat- 
talions could execute almost any work. 

The work shop trains were more elaborate installa- 
tions, intended to make up for the lack of industrial 
machine shops existing in the devastated regions at the 
front, one train being assigned to a group of companies. 
A force as large as several companies combined and with 
the aid of a Train Atelier, could execute very heavy 
reconstruction, including that of large bridge trusses. 



372 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

These trains were composed of nine cars, one containing 
electric generating sets to produce power for operating 
the tools, two others were equipped with large machine 
tools, one contained a forge and foundry, and another 
wood-working tools, one held material, one served for 
an office, while two were devoted to tools and supplies 
for pneumatic rivetting. The only equipment that could 
compare in completeness and efficiency with these Pares 
and Ateliers were similar German trains. 

The French, and the British to some extent, did not 
limit mobility to the working force, but extended the 
benefits of it to the regional officers. Each Director of 
Army Transportation (D. T. M. A.) of the French serv- 
ice was housed permanently in exceedingly well 
appointed trains, in which were not only lodging and 
boarding accommodations for himself and staff, but 
designing and clerical offices. These trains were moved 
from place to place, so that the Transportation Officer 
could be in close contact with the operations that were 
most important at the moment. On the train was a tele- 
phone exchange arid a generous supply of wire and field 
equipment, so that after a train took a new station the 
D. T. M. A. was put in direct touch with headquarters 
and other points. 

The motor trucks were supplemental to the railway 
trains. In the case of an advance the motor trucks could 
go beyond the rail-heads and make the first repairs or 
track restoration, permitting the heavier railway trains 
to follow and establish a permanent way. In addition 
to these trains, the French had on hand in the school at 
Versailles a very complete collection of machine tools of 
all kinds, consisting of grading and track-laying trains, 
excavators, electrical screw-spiking machines to drive 
the French screw spikes, drilling sets to drill spiking 
holes in wood ties, light manual cranes for the handling 
of rails, portable field electrical light plants for work at 



ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS 373 

night where not exposed to direct enemy fire, mobile and 
semi-mobile steam engines, pile drivers, compressed air 
outfits, cable conveyors, concrete mixers, all the plants 
necessary for water supply and drainage, including well- 
boring outfits, a very complete supply of various types 
of bridges from rolled beams to girders for various 
lengths of spans to as great as forty-eight meters, ties, 
timbers of various dimensions, and rails with their 
fastenings. 

The railway section of the French army was an 
organization well conceived, thoroughly trained and com- 
pletely equipped. It had a complement of officers who 
were masters of railway construction and operation, 
under whose leadership great results were achieved with 
the maximum of expedition and the minimum of friction. 
The French system of organization and equipment is one 
deserving close study by our own authorities, if the les- 
sons of the war are to be taken to heart. 

The American system of special troops differed 
radically from either the British or the French system. 
When the United States entered the war, there were two 
regiments of engineers actually organized, with five 
others authorized and in a more or less advanced state of 
development. These troops were intended for general 
militaiy engineer work so that there was nothing in 
existence comparable with the French Fifth Engineers, 
or capable of executing undertakings calling for special- 
ized technical skill. The first step towards raising such 
units was in the call for volunteers for the original nine 
engineer regiments, intended primarily for railway con- 
struction, maintenance and operation. These regiments 
were followed in quick succession by others for water 
supply, forestry, roads, mapping, and the other fields 
of engineering, as well as for assignment with divisions 
as sappers. The manner in which these regiments dif- 
fered from corresponding units in either of the other 



374 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

armies was in size. In their first constitution the Tables 
of Organization for Engineer Troops were followed, which 
called for thirty-three officers and 1,038 men, or a grand 
total of 1,071. Subsequently the Tables of Organization 
were changed and an engineer regiment on a war estab- 
lishment was fixed at a total of 1,700 officers and men, 
consisting of fifty-four commissioned officers and 1,646 
of other ranks. In actual practice it was an exceedingly 
rare occurrence when any one engineer regiment, except 
the engineers attached to a division, worked together as 
a unit. The experience of other engineer regiments, cer- 
tainly of every one working in the advanced area, was 
that the component parts were separated, sometimes 
very widely. Not infrequently they were detached from 
the command of their own regimental commanding officer 
and assigned to the temporary command of others. 

The analysis of the make-up of an engineer regi- 
ment shows that out of the fifty-four officers eighteen of 
them were attached to regimental and battalion head- 
quarters, and out of the 1,646 men 116 served under simi- 
lar assignment. That is to say, while thirty-six officers 
were serving with their companies, no less than eighteen, 
or half as many, were with headquarters. Of the men 
7.6 per cent were in the category of what would be 
termed in civil life, overhead expense. 

Such a heavy proportion of officers and men in non- 
productive capacity involved in the first place a waste 
of man power and in the second, inefficiency. An Ameri- 
can engineer regiment was supposed to be a complete 
entity. So it should be and was when used as a division 
unit. Consequently, in accordance with the official estab- 
lishment, it had among ■ether sections a topographical 
officer with all the necessary surveying instruments and 
men to handle them. Commanding officers of regiments 
were, therefore, expected or required to do the surveying 
for, and detailed planning of, work entrusted to them for 



OEGANIZATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS 375 

execution. But it usually happened that the headquar- 
ters of a regiment moving with a part of a regiment 
assigned to some particular piece of construction, would 
generally arrive on the very eve of the undertaking. 
The commanding officer would in such case have to make 
his own studies, without previous investigation or 
information, instead of devoting his time and the energy 
of his men to the carrying out of plans already digested. 
The result was frequently lack of proper preliminary 
examination and consequently inefficiency in execution. 

With the French and British systems all this was 
entirely obviated. There was no waste through high 
ranking officers in regimental headquarters being par- 
tially unemployed, because each company, the work unit, 
had only the minimum number of officers necessary, 
while officers of more advanced standing served on 
regional or army detail. There was no lack in efficiency 
or uncertainty as to the details of the work, because the 
regional officers were fully instructed prior to the com- 
mencement of any great movement as to the general 
plans of the higher command. They made their surveys, 
drew up their detailed plans, had them approved by 
their superior officers, thus insuring coordination, filed 
their requisitions for their necessary materiel and men, 
and were quite ready for the actual doing of the work 
when the moment arrived. Under such a system all that 
the individual and separate companies of engineers 
would have to do would be to report at the very last 
moment. The officers in command of those companies 
would then be given the plans and orders that they were 
to carry out. Friction, loss of time and uncertainty 
were avoided. 

The lack of any practical value in or the reason for 
the size of an engineer regiment being fixed at a total 
of 1,700 officers and men soon became apparent to the 
American military authorities. In several instances 



376 AMEEICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

regiments were organized that differed widely from this 
establishment. The forestry regiment, for instance, as 
has been stated, included about 20,000 officers and men, 
the Nineteenth Engineers, one of the original nine, 
organized on the basis of thirty-three officers and 1,038 
men with two battalions and six companies, finally grew 
into a unit of five battalions and fifteen companies, 
containing about 3,600 men. Other regiments, notably 
the Twenty-third and Twenty-ninth Engineers, were also 
expanded, retaining the regimental number and the regi- 
mental organization for purposes of administration only. 

The above is not written in any spirit of crfticism of 
what was done. When the United States declared war 
it had a very small army with no provision to meet the 
demands of a modern war. For the moment there was 
nothing else to do but to follow the standards then in 
force, and to modify them later when and how experience 
dictated. Eadical changes were introduced. More would 
have followed had war continued. What the author 
wishes to emphasize is how it seems to him that engi- 
neers should be organized both in peace and war. As the 
result of two years' experience in active service, the 
author is of the belief that if the lessons of the war are 
to be learned and profit to be derived from them, provi- 
sion should be made in the permanent establishment of 
the army for the practical training of officers and, if pos- 
sible, some men in all the applications of engineering 
science, not merely in those few branches that only 
recently were considered as embracing military engi- 
neering. He further urges that the company rather than 
the regiment should be the unit of strength. 

The organization of the French Fifth Engineers might 
well be taken as a type convenient for American needs 
in peace. During such time the usual regimental organi- 
zation would be very convenient, providing as it does for 
an officer of years and experience to be at the head, one 
capable of seeing that the officers and men under him are 



ORGANIZATION OF ENaiNEER TROOPS 377 

properly trained in their respective specialties. But 
should war again break out, for the possibility of war is 
always present, it is urged that the operation of engi- 
neering work in the field would best be entrusted to a 
series of regional engineers reporting either to the 
respective army commanders, or to some single author- 
ity with jurisdiction over the whole theatre of operations, 
whether in the Zone of the Advance or of the Rear. 
These engineers should be men of experience and 
matured judgment, which means that the posts should be 
filled with officers who would ordinarily have the rank 
of Lieutenant-Colonel or higher. To them the necessary 
surveying and designing staffs would, of course, be 
attached. On them should fall the burden of preparing 
all the 'detailed plans for whatever work is to be done, 
and so insure coordination. The units of the engineer 
troops should be the company and not the regiment, with 
the company commanded by an officer holding the rank 
of major, whose duties would be those of administration. 

As to the size of these companies, for ordinary con- 
struction purposes in war, the limit of 250 men would 
seem to be well adapted, although for work in which 
specialists and experienced mechanics are needed, a com- 
pany with one-half the size would probably be sufficient. 
These small companies should be housed either in trains 
or in motor vehicles, or so equipped as to be moved 
readily and quickly to whatever point their services 
might be needed. Such men would take care of all work 
that required special technical skill, the heavy labor 
being performed by specially organized but unskilled 
service battalions. 

The same method of organization might also apply 
to division troops. There does not seem to be any par- 
ticular reason why a fixed number of engineers should 
be assigned to every division. Some divisions require 
more than others. If the engineers were organized into 
companies, as many companies could be assigned to a 



,378 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

division as there were engineers available or as the work 
of the division required from time to time. If the com- 
pany and not the regiment were the nnit, the division 
engineer would be an officer on the staff of the division 
commander and ex officio the commanding officer of 
the troops. His functions would be exactly the same as 
the regional officers, namely, to lay out the engineering 
work for the division in conformity with the plans of 
the division commander and, after consultation with him, 
direct the commanding officers of the various cc^jnpanies 
assigned to the division to execute the work as planned. 
This would permit the division engineer to devote his 
whole time to the proper consideration of his engineer- 
ing problems and relieve him of the burden of regi- 
mental administration. With the two tasks resting on 
the same man there is the danger of one or both being 
sacrificed. This scheme would also permit men to be 
selected for staff duty who were particularly well quali- 
fied for such service, rather than to take as a temporary 
staff officer the man who happened to be the senior 
officer of the attached engineer unit, a man who, while 
perhaps an excellent commander of troops in the field, 
might not have the qualifications for a competent staff 
officer. 

This war was essentially an engineers' war. In other 
wars to come, science in its various applications will 
play a far greater role than it did even in the past one. 
In the war of 1917 the United States fortunately had the 
advantage of having two great allies who had worked out 
for themselves a solution of many of the engineering 
problems involved, and who gave the results of their 
experience freely and gladly to their new associate. In 
another war the United States may not be so well placed. 
We may suddenly find ourselves involved facing some 
great and powerful antagonist, and facing him without 
any more preparation than we had made prior to 1917. 
The time to prepare for such a contingency is now. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

ENGINEER ORGANIZATION AND ENGINEER WORK IN THE 
UI^ITED STATES 

Tlie preceding chapters give a picture of what engi- 
neers were required to do in France, a picture from 
which details have necessarily been omitted in order to 
reduce it to such a size that it might be viewed as a whole. 
That the results described could be achieved there was 
needed, in addition to the men who did the work of execu- 
tion in the field, a well developed and smoothly running 
organization in the United States. The purpose of such 
an organization was to secure and train those who were 
to go overseas, to collect the plant and equipment that 
were required, and to construct the accommodations at 
home to house both the men and supplies prior to their 
shipment. By plant, equipment and accommodations 
there is meant not only those items that are intended for 
engineer use, but those for the whole army, the army 
that was held in the United States as well as the army 
of which the A. E. F. was composed. The extent of thQ 
plant and accommodations was enormous. The capacity 
of the accommodations, for instance, can best be meas- 
ured in terms of cities because such dimensions as square 
yards or cubic feet were scales far too insignificant for 
the structures erected. 

This organization came under the personal direction 
of the Chief of Engineers in Washington, Major-General 
"William M. Black, and the work of preparation in the 
United States with which engineers were especially con- 
cerned may be summarized under two general headings : 

379 



380 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

1. The construction of camps, cantonments and miscel- 

laneous structures by the Quartermaster Corps. 

2. The activities of the Corps of Engineers, subdivided 

as follows: 

a. Construction of engineer depots and engineer 

shipping ports. 

b. Purchase and shipment of engineer materiel 

and equipment. 

c. Research work in connection with the perfec- 

tion of old and the development of new 
engineer materiel, equipment, processes 
and methods. 

d. The organization, training, equipping and 

shipping abroad of engineer units : 

(a) Divisional and Corps Sapper Regi- 

ments. 

(b) Railway Units. 

(c) The Transportation Corps. 

(d) Units for Special Engineering Serv- 

ices. 

(e) Service Battalions (general laborers). 

(f) The Russian Railway Service Corps. 

In the organization of the Department of Engineering 
of the army, known as the Corps of Engineers, there was 
a bureau called the General Engineer Depot, whose duty 
it had been, even prior to the war, to acquire the various 
equipment needed by the Corps of Engineers. The Depot 
had three subdivisions: 

1. Engineer and Purchasing Department with general 
charge of the procurement and transportation of material 
into storage at various depots. The Purchasing Depart- 
ment had, as one of its subdivisions, and as a distinct 
organization a Research Department, composed of spe- 
cialists and scientists engaged in the study of engineer 
problems connected with the duties of the Corps. This 
subsequently proved to be a most valuable piece of 



ENGINEER WORK IN UNITED STATES 381 

machinery, as it furnished the foundation for the creation 
of a very extensive and highly useful bureau. 

2. The Depot Department, with charge of accounting, 
storage and cantonment supplies. This department car- 
ried on investigations as to possible depot sites, leases of 
land, storehouses, piers and railway tracks, the prepara- 
tion of plans for structures, the purchase of operating 
machinery and the development of plans for receiving, 
storing, shipping and accounting for property. 

3. The business administration having charge of the 
office clerical force, contracts, legal and financial matters. 

At the outbreak of the war in 1917 the Engineer Depot 
had a force of one officer and twenty civilians who were 
housed in a few rooms in Washington Barracks with a 
floor area of 3,500 square feet. By July the office accom- 
modations covered 15,000 square feet and during the 
autumn grew to 25,000 square feet. In April, 1918, six 
portable buildings were erected for their use, giving 
10,000 additional square feet of office space, and during 
October, 1918, the Depot organization was gathered 
together into one building, where it occupied 90,000 square 
feet of floor area. By this time the force had expanded 
to 1,454 people, of whom 182 were officers, 711 enlisted 
men and 561 civilians. 

Much of the construction work in the United States 
came under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster Corps 
as well as the Corps of Engineers, the former, through its 
own staff of engineers, caring for the erection of build- 
ings and camps. Such work was, however, distinctly of 
an engineering character, so with no intention of ignor- 
ing the Quartermaster Corps and with every recognition 
of the exceedingly valuable service rendered and results 
accomplished by it, the work of construction in the 
United States will here be reviewed as a whole and 
treated as an achievement of engineering. 

As was explained in the early part of this book, the 



382 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FEANCE 

French and British Commissions made it clear to the 
authorities in Washington during April, 1917, that the 
most pressing and immediate need was for increased 
transportation facilities both in men and material. In 
this respect the army of the United States was qnite lack- 
ing. It possessed neither men skilled in transportation 
nor any rolling stock or other equipment, except such 
email amounts as were used on local railways on various 
government reservations. The first step toward secur- 
ing the men and procuring the equipment was taken 
when in April the Chief of Engineers called to his aid 
Mr. Samuel M. Felton, president of the Chicago Great 
Western Eailroad, an engineer and railway executive of 
long and varied experience. During the threatened 
troubles along the Mexican border in 1916 Mr. Felton 
had acted as consulting engineer to the Chief of 
Engineers on railway matters. 

Plans were at once prepared for the formation of a 
railway division of the Engineer Department in th^ 
army, at the head of which, in July, 1917, Mr. Felton was 
appointed, with a title of Director General of Eailways. 
Subsequently on the appointment of a Director General 
of Transportation for the A. E. F. in France, Mr. Fel- 
ton ^s title was changed to be Director General of Mili- 
tary Railways. In order to avoid confusion, Mr. Felton 
refused to accept military rank, but continued to act in a 
civilian capacity until all need for his services had 
passed, when he resigned and received the Distinguished 
Service Medal in recognition of what he had accom- 
plished. 

The Director General of Mihtary Eailways prepared 
the specifications and contracts for purchases of material, 
made the arrangements directly with the manufacturers, 
(except as to standard supplies, such as rails and small 
tools,) and then turned the agreements over to the Gen- 
eral Engineer Depot for execution. In this way the newly 



ENGINEER WORK IN UNITED STATES 383 

organized Railway Department cooperated without fric- 
tion with the previously existing Depot organization. 

The results obtained by the Director and the Engineer 
Depot were stupendous, and the figures of the value of the 
purchases, running as they did to hundreds of millions 
of dollars, would have been in any other period of the 
world's history beyond credibility. 

The details of these purchases will be found at some 
length in the following chapter on ' ' Statistics, ' ' but it is 
convenient to point out here that between July, 1917, and 
November 11, 1918, the total value of all orders placed 
by the General Engineer Depot for Engineer material 
and supplies was $746,242,507, with an approximate ton- 
nage of such supplies of 4,567,800. 

These expenditures and tonnage were quite exclusive of 
those due to purchases made in the ordinary course 
of work for items not connected with the war, such as 
the normal construction and maintenance of lighthouses, 
sea-coast defenses, and rivers and harbors in the United 
States. 

Although contracts for the above purchases were made, 
as a matter of fact all the contracts were not fully 
executed owing to the termination of hostilities, and con- 
sequently the full complement was neither required nor 
called for. However, of the above-mentioned amount, 
1,506,000 tons of engineer material were actually shipped 
to the A. E. F. and 160,000 tons were at the ports wait- 
ing transportation when the Armistice was signed. Of 
the grand total the value of railway material alone, 
including rolling stock, rails, etc., amounted to 
$526,000,000 for the Expeditionary Force, not including 
the value of similar material used in connection with 
yarious war industries in the United States. 

It is not without interest to note that the average cost 
per ton for all material sent overseas was $168.00; taking 
the average of everything from tenpenny nails to electric 



384 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

locomotives, the average cost of the railway equipment 
of all kinds was $155.00 per ton, of automobile equipment 
$800.00 per ton, and of general machinery $400.00. 

Of the purchases of railway equipment the principal 
items were the following : 

Standard gauge locomotives 3,750 

Light railway locomotives 1,501 

Standard gauge cars 91,519 

Light railway cars 8,530 

Rails, tons 749,345 

The figures of the details were on the same great 
scale. To mention but a few items, there were actually 
shipped overseas or used in the United States : 

Trucks of various kinds 7,137 

Portable buildings 2,082 

Boilers 6,006 

Dump cars 3,504 

Screw posts for wire entangle- 
ments 2,308,225 

Nails, tons 10,612 

Shovels, various kinds 2,923,936 

Picks . 1,731,913 

Barbed wire, tons 131,802 

Paint, gallons 1,000,000 

Saws, various kinds 399,877 

Eighty-three per cent of the tonnage sent abroad 
passed through the ports of New York and Norfolk, with 
Norfolk leading. 

The above figures of purchases are quite exclusive of 
materials purchased abroad. No less than 1,800,000 
tons of miscellaneous engineering supplies, costing 
$205,000,000, were thus purchased, chiefly in France, 
England and Switzerland, about sixty per cent being fur- 
nished by France. 

The activities of the Director General of Military Rail- 



ENGINEER .WORK IN UNITED STATES 385 

ways were not confined wholly to the acquisition of 
inanimate objects, but covered also the hnman element. 
During 1917 the Director supervised the organization, 
from among the railway systems in the United States, of 
eleven regiments of engineers, aggregating 506 officers 
and 12,765 men. Before the war ended 41 special rail- 
way units had been sent abroad, consisting of 1,314 
officers and 53,352 men. 

All the above force was sent to the western front. At 
the beginning of the war the War Department appointed 
a Commission under Mr. John F. Stevens, formerly Chief 
Engineer of the Panama Canal, as chairman, and sent 
them to Russia to investigate the railway situation in 
that country. Later, at the request of Mr. Stevens, the 
Director organized a railway unit to go to Russia, to be 
paid by the Russian Government. Although the mem- 
bers of the unit did not form a part of the army of the 
United States they were given nominal military rank. 

This organization, which sailed from San Francisco on 
November 11, 1919, consisted of ]1': Colonel, George H. 
Emerson; 5 Lieutenant-Colonels, 14 Majors, 22 Captains, 
80 First Lieutenants, 166 Second Lieutenants, 32 Inter- 
preters, 16 Mechanics and 1 Medical Officer, a total of 337 
persons, who, in spite of the many difficulties and disap- 
pointments, finally succeeded in rendering valuable serv- 
ices in connection with the rehabilitation and operation 
of Russian railways. 

There was one field of engineering activity which was 
less commercial than buying locomotives by the gross or 
the whole output for months of various factories. 
Though it called for fewer men than were required 
to run even the contract department, it produced 
tangible results whose tremendous value was beginning 
to be clearly apparent when hostilities ceased, and which 
before that had already won official approval. This was 
the field of experimentation and investigation. 



386 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

As was mentioned above, there was in the Purchasing 
Department of the Engineer Depot, a Bureau of 
Research. Prior to the war its functions were limited, 
but after the commencement of war it quickly became a 
vast productive laboratory. There are few more fasci- 
nating stories than its record of study and investigation 
in the fields of chemistry, physics and electricity, investi- 
gations that involved long and tedious laboratory experi- 
ments calling for the highest technical skill and unlimited 
patience. Among other accomplishments, the Bureau of 
Research examined into the composition and methods of 
manufacture of toxic gases and gas defense measures, it 
desig-ned the delicate but highly accurate range sound 
detectors and other instruments of precision, as well as 
mobile machine shops, portable pile drivers, field map- 
printing plants and photographic apparatus for various 
uses. It standardized the requirements of paints and 
varnishes, produced standard specifications for mechan- 
ical rubber goods, pointed out how the enamel coating 
on hardware and kitchen utensils could be improved, 
studied the rating of internal combustion engines, con- 
ducted a series of experiments which finally resulted in 
the improvement of certain high explosives and the 
designing of a new machine for exploding detonating 
caps. 

The most substantial result of the work done by the 
Bureau of Research as measured by output was in the 
production of toxic gas. At the beginning of the war the; 
manufacturing capacity of gas of this character in the 
United States was practically negligible, there being but 
little commercial demand for it. The chemists were with- 
out experience, but thanks to the new work done by them, 
the Bureau of Research was able to convince the Gov- 
ernment that it was sound policy to erect a manufactur- 
ing plant of its own where gases could be manufactured 
on a huge scale. In addition the Bureau assisted in 



ENGINEER WORK IN UNITED STATES 387 

encouraging various private industries throughout the 
country to produce gases in quantity. 

The plant that was erected was the Edgewood Arsenal, 
near Aberdeen, Md. Before the war came to an end 558 
buildings had been constructed on the grounds, including 
86 cantonment structures capable of housing 4,000 men. 
There were hospitals, separate buildings for the welfare 
work and three power houses with a total installed poten- 
tiality of 526 kw. There were 21 miles of standard gauge 
railway, 15 miles of narrow gauge railway, nearly 15 
miles of highways, and 2 water systems with a combined 
capacity of 3,500,000 gallons daily. At one time no fewer 
than 7,400 troops were at work because, on account of the 
dangerous character of the operations, it was decided to 
mobilize the forces so as to j)ut them under army 
discipline. 

At the conclusion of the war the gas industry had 
grown from approximately nothing to a total actual 
output capacity of more than 6,000 tons of lethal gases 
per month. 

As indicating how far the activities of this Bureau 
reached out even to small matters, a certain concern had 
been accustomed to produce before the war about 15,000 
watch pocket compasses per year. Their production had 
to be so speeded up so as to have them turn out no fewer 
than 10,000 of these compasses each week in order that 
the oflQcers in the field might be supplied. This was 
accomplished through the insistence and on the sugges- 
tions of the Bureau of Research. 

Then there was the great housing and building pro- 
gramme executed by the engineers of the Quartermaster 
Corps. The magnitude of the problem that confronted 
the engineers cannot be described in better terms than 
those in the letter of instruction of the Committee on the 
Emergency Construction of Buildings addressed to the 
officers in charge. 



388 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE ' 

** In sixteen weeks you are expected to have suitable 
quarters ready for the training of 1,100,000 men. 

*' You must be building in 32 places at once. Most of 
the sites for the cantonments have not yet been chosen. 
iWhen they have been fixed a group of engineering prob- 
lems of first importance must be settled. The water 
supply for each camp must be carefully studied. Failure 
to supply abundance of pure water may jeopardize the 
whole undertaking. Proper sewerage must be provided 
if the danger of epidemic is to be forestalled. Heating, 
lighting, refrigerating and laundry facilities must be fur- 
nished. The solution of these engineering problems will 
be different in every locality. ' ' 

What the above figures mean is that within a period 
of less than four months there were being erected build- 
ing accommodations suflQcient to house the combined 
populations of Buffalo, N. Y. ; Washington, D. C, and 
San Francisco, Cal. 

All told there were 44 of these camps erected, with 
accommodations for a total of 1,695,691 men at an 
approximate cost of $373,466,184.00. 

The lumber that was ordered for these camps has been 
computed as being sufficient to have made a board-walk 
twelve feet wide and one inch thick reaching from the 
earth to the moon and half way back again. 

To house the material and supplies needed for the 
army at home and overseas, until such time as they were 
called for, or sent abroad, great storehouses were erected, 
and terminal projects were designed and carried to 
execution with almost feverish speed in order that freight 
intended for the A. E. F. might be loaded on board ship 
without delay and in such manner as to reduce port con- 
gestion to the minimum. With the existing scarcity of 
ocean tonnage it was of the most pressing importance 
that vessels be not held in the harbor. 

The new terminal facilities for ships that were created, 



ENGINEER WORK IN UNITED STATES 389 

exclusive of those in existence before the war, were 
equivalent to those of a wharf eight miles long with 
berthing capacity for 65 ships. The warehouses erected 
at the ocean ports and depots in the interior contained 
no less than 690 acres, or more than one square mile, of 
covered storage space provided by buildings built of 
reinforced concrete. So extensive were these buildings 
that the material entering into their construction would 
have sufficed for a storehouse 70 feet wide and as long 
as from New York to Philadelphia. To serve the ter- 
minals and other depots there were constructed 650 miles 
of railways and 1,000 miles of concrete roadways. 

At Brooklyn, in the Port of New York, two 8-story 
reinforced concrete warehouses were undertaken, each of 
which was 980 feet long. One of them was 200 feet wide 
and the other 300 feet wide, with a combined capacity to 
store 700,000 tons of supplies or the equivalent of about 
100 ship loads. The car tracks of this single installation 
were sufficient to hold 1,300 cars at one time. 

This was the largest single unit, but other big terminal 
plants were erected at Boston, Norfolk and New Orleans. 
The combined terminals and interior storage depots had 
an aggregate floor area of 29,861,514 square feet, and cost 
approximately $169,456,537.00 

Then there were hospitals of which 42 were erected 
with a total capacity stated in beds of 59,045 and at a cost 
of $28,957,223.00. 

The total cost of various buildings erected and 
equipped by the War Department in the United States 
exceeded $1,000,000,000. The best general picture of 
what this unthinkable figure means is given in the official 
report on America's Munitions: 

'' We can gain a picture of the size of this construction 
by considering the building records of the United States. 
In this country there are about 150 cities large enough 
and ambitious enough to keep annual building statistics 



390 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

as the indices of their prosperity. In these cities, whose 
populations range in size from that of New York down 
to those of communities of 20,000 or 25,000 inhabitants, 
dwell nearly a quarter of all the Americans. They are 
metropolitans, the people who demand most of the 
builder for their comfort and luxury. Yet in no one year 
had the building construction in these 150 largest Ameri- 
can cities combined approached in amount within 
$250,000,000 of the cost of our military construction 
undertaken during the war." 

To design, direct and supervise the above construction 
there was created a special bureau known as the Con- 
struction Division. 

The engineer officers had other problems to solve than 
those of laying out camps, constructing terminal store- 
houses, designing searchlights or conducting intricate 
chemical investigations. There were such very practical 
things requiring attention as sending away the sup- 
plies after they had reached the ports. Even this prob- 
lem necessitated special study and called for many inno- 
vations from ordinary standard practice, because the 
supplies had to be loaded on ships, not merely as so much 
tonnage to be sent away on export, but as precious cargo 
that would be received and disposed of at the port of 
entry under peculiarly novel and abnormal conditions. 
The manner in which locomotives were packed in the 
holds of vessels so as to give the minimum of incon- 
venience when discharging them in France is one 
illustration of how the seemingly impossible was 
accomplished. 

Ordinarily locomotives are shipped " knocked down "; 
that is, the boilers, frames, trucks, operating mechanism 
and other parts are loaded separately, and when received 
at destination the dismembered pieces are placed on 
cars, sent to some erecting shop and there assembled. 
Owing to the conditions that existed in France, this 



ENGINEER WORK IN UNITED STATES 391 

arrangement was very inconvenient and costly in time, 
labor and space. The discharge of a bulky article like 
a locomotive boiler, which demanded that a special car 
be ready to receive it from the unloading crane, seri- 
ously disturbed the even flow of the mass of freight con- 
sisting chiefly of boxes of food stuffs, clothing or ammu- 
nition which were deposited in piles on the wharf and 
thence loaded into cars or trucked to storehouses. Then 
after the boiler and other heavy parts were securely 
placed on cars, they had to be drawn to some locomotive 
shop, unloaded and set up. All this involved much 
rehandling, delayed unloading, caused confusion, created 
traffic for a terminal railway already badly congested, 
threw work on shops that were short of skilled mechan- 
ics, and above all delayed the discharge of the ship, a 
loss of time that was very precious. 

The British, after experiencing similar troubles, placed 
locomotives on barges without any attempt to dismantle 
them, and thus sent them from England to France, a not 
very difficult feat because the water journey was so short. 
But the American Director General of Transportation 
saw the possibilities contained in the idea and requested 
that our own locomotives be loaded on board ship, 
** ready-to-run," so that when unloaded they could be set 
directly on the rails and hauled away. This was a radi- 
cally novel suggestion, involving all manner of mechan- 
ical difficulties seemingly insuperable, when there are 
called to mind the great weight and awkward outlines of 
a complete locomotive. The form of locomotives is so 
irregular as almost to defy their stowing in the deep 
confined hold of a ship, with freight below and above, and 
yet all so securely packed as to resist the pitching and 
rolling motion of a ship in an Atlantic storm. But the 
engineers in the United States succeeded in doing it as 
they solved many other new problems. Only the smoke- 
stack and drivers* cab were removed, everything else 



392 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

being left in place. The levers and the other operating 
devices attached to the boiler-head were boxed in to pre- 
vent damage. Then the engines and their tenders, with 
all wheels attached, were picked up bodily by large 
cranes and lowered into the hold of a waiting steamer, 
where they rested on stout timbers. The spaces between 
them were filled with small packages such as boxes or 
bales to keep them from moving. On arrival they were 
again handled by a crane, set on the rails, run off on 
their own wheels to some small shop, where it was a sim- 
ple job to attach the stack and cab. Then all that 
remained was to put on board coal, water and oil, and 
another hauling unit was ready to carry men or ammuni- 
tion to the front. The illustration at the beginning of 
this book shows a large locomotive being loaded on board 
ship in the port of New York. 

The figures are at hand showing the saving that 
resulted from shipping locomotives whole. St. Nazaire 
was selected, in the early days of American participation, 
as the port through which locomotives would be shipped, 
as unloading cranes and the needed special facilities for 
handling bulky weights were installed there. But it was 
found impossible to take the locomotive parts as they 
came off the steamers, crated or boxed, directly into the 
shops, as there was barely room to care for the erect- 
ing. Furthermore, it was frequently necessary to unload 
almost entirely a boat before all the parts of a complete 
locomotive were found. As each locomotive was shipped 
in thirty-two different crates or boxes, some of which 
weighed over 30,000 pounds, and as many as forty loco- 
motives arrived in a single ship, it will be readily seen 
that it was necessary to have a large storage yard in 
which to uncrate, sort and store by locomotive numbers 
the parts of same. This yard the engineers built, involv- 
ing much filling, and until this was in operation, it was 
necessary to utilize dock space, shop space and, in fact, 



ENGINEER WORK IN UNITED STATES 393 

every available space for the unboxing and sorting of 
locomotive parts. 

After the scattered members of a locomotive had been 
collected and brought to the shop, twenty-six hours of 
shop time were required to erect them into a complete 
machine. When locomotives were received minus only 
stack and cab, the time needed to prepare one for sisrvice 
was reduced to six hours — or eight at the maximum. 
In addition there were the benefits of a great saving in 
wharf space and the hastening of the discharge of vessels. 

The personnel of engineer units was selected as far as 
possible from men with mechanical experience, but the 
efficient engineer recruits had to be instructed in mili- 
tary duties and in certain phases of military engineering 
with wliich they were not familiar. During the first six 
months of the war special instructors were detailed by 
the French and British to give training to American 
recruits at the camps in the United States in the laying 
out and digging of trenches, the excavating of dugouts, 
the handling of grenades and the doing of the many inno- 
vations produced by the war. Later as American officers 
obtained first hand experience in Europe, they were sent 
back to serve as engineer instructors and relieve our 
allies from this duty. 

It was a great army of engineers that went to France, 
but they would have been helpless without the organiza- 
tion at home. Those that went overseas had the reward 
of excitement and field activity. Those that remained 
did other work at the desk, in the designing room or 
laboratory, largely unnoticed and rarely seen. It was 
not their good fortune to share with the others in the 
danger and glory of battle, but to them there is due 
quite as much credit for the final success as to those who 
went over the top. Both were equally members of the 
Corps of Engineers of the Army of the United States. 

Remarkable as were the actual achievements in organ- 



394 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

izing, equipping and sending troops to France, and the 
development and perfection of a great variety of engi- 
neering and scientific equipment methods and processes, 
they were relatively insignificant as compared with what 
undoubtedly would have been accomplished had the war 
continued a little longer. The necessary preliminary 
work had all been done, cantonments, hospitals, ware- 
houses were all erected and in splendid working order 
both in the United States and in France. Industrial 
plants had been tuned up to produce every conceivable 
article needed in modern warfare, in vast quantities and 
with incredible speed. The many months of patient 
scientific research work had resulted in the perfection of 
new methods and new devices which in a short time 
could have supplied all the articles needed in such quanti- 
ties as to have still further revolutionized modern meth- 
ods of warfare, while the fruits of other theoretical 
investigations were on the very point of receiving prac- 
tical application. 



CHAPTEE XXVn 

STATISTICS 

The dimensions of the war, regarded from any point 
of view and in every detail except the one of time, cannot 
be measured by any comparison with similar dimensions 
of other wars. The statistical branch of the War Depart- 
ment of the United States government has issued a 
report, entitled *' The War With Germany," covering 
the main features not only so far as they relate to the 
United States, but to some extent as they relate to the 
allied and enemy countries as well. This report gives 
probably as good a measure of the size of the war as any 
report that can be produced. So valuable are these fig- 
ures, so striking are the deductions that, with the consent 
of the statistical branch of the General Staff, the follow- 
ing condensed extracts have been made as showing so 
far as figures can, the organization, equipping and sup- 
pljdng of the army, its transportation to and from 
France, the results accomplished and the cost in money, 
materials and the most important item of all, men. 

The armed forces of the United States during the war, 
April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918, numbered approxi- 
mately 4,800,000. About 4,000,000 served in the Army, 
the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the remaining 800,000 
in the other services. Approximately five out of every 
100 American citizens took up arms in defense of their 
country. 

The number of men serving in the Army and Navy of 
the Northern States during the Civil war was 2,400,000, 
or about ten out of every 100 inhabitants. Comparing 
the effort of the United States in the war with Germany 

395 



396 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

with that of the Northern States in the Civil war, we see 
that the entire United States raised actually twice as 
many men as the Northern States raised in the Civil 
war, but proportionately to the population only half as 
many. It cost twenty times as much to recruit the 
2,400,000 men who fought on the Northern side during 
the Civil war as it did to recruit the 4,800,000 men who 
were raised to fight against Germany, or fifty times as 
much for each soldier, sailor, and marine. 



STATISTICS 



397 



SIZE OF THE ARMY ON FIRST OF EACH MONTH DURING 
THE WAR WITH GERMANY 



IN THE 

UNITED STATES 

AND POSSESSIONS 



AMERICAN 

EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE 



TOTAL 



1917 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September 

October. . . 

November 

December. 
1918 

January. . . 

February . . 

March. . . . 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September 

October. . . 

November. 

December. 
1919 

January.. . 

February. . 

March . . . 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 



200,000 
290,000 
390,000 
480,000 
616,000 
646,000 
883,000 
996,000 
1,060,000 

1,149,000 
1,257,000 
1,386,000 
1,476,000 
1,529,000 
1,390,000 
1,384,000 
1,365,000 
1,422,000 
1,590,000 
1,663,000 
1,679,000 

1,163,000 
914,000 
761,000 
680,000 
666,000 
578,000 
579,000 
442,000 



20,000 
35,000 
45,000 
65,000 
104,000 
129,000 

176,000 

225,000 

253,000 

320,000 

424,000 

722,000 

996,000 

1,293,000 

1,579,000 

1,843,000 

1,971,000 

1,944,000 

1,837,000 

1,710,000 

1,562,000 

1,376,000 

1,088,000 

730,000 

357,000 

133,000 



200,000 
290,000 
390,000 
500,000 
551,000 
691,000 
948,000 
1,100,000 
1,189,000 

1,325,000 
1,482,000 
1,639,000 
1,796,000 
1,953,000 
2,112,000 
2,380,000 
2,658,000 
3,001,000 
3,433,000 
3,634,000 
3,623,000 

3,000,000 
2,624,000 
2,323,000 
2,056,000 
1,754,000 
1,308,000 
936,000 
575,000 



SOURCES OF THE ARMY 





APRIL, 

1917 


PER 
CENT 


TOTAL 
FOR 
WAR 


PER 

CENT 


Regular Army 


133,000 
67,000 


67% 
33% 


527,000 

382,000 

3,091,000 


13% 


National Guard 


10% 


National Army 


77 7o 






Grand Totals 


200,000 


100% 


4,000,000 


100% 







Note. — The round total of 4,000,000 in this table covers all inductions 
into the army. The difference between this figure and that of 3,634,000 for 
November, 1919, in the preceding table, is accounted for by deaths and dis- 
charges previous to the Armistice. 



398 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

PERCENTAGE OF DRAFTED MEN PASSING PHYSICAL 
EXAMINATIONS BY STATES 



70% to 80% 


Arkansas 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 


Minnesota 
Nebraska _ 
New Mexico 
North Dakota 


Oklahoma 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Wyoming 


65% to 69% 


Alabama 
Florida 
Illinois 
Indiana 


Louisiana 
Maryland 
Mississipp 
Missouri 


Montana 

North Carolina 

Ohio 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 


60% to 64% 


Georgia 

Idaho 

Nevada 


New Jersey 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 


South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Utah 
Virginia 


50% to 59% 


Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 


Delaware 
Maine 

Massachuetts 
Michigan 


New Hampshire 
New York 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
Washington 



OFFICERS COMMISSIONED FOR LINE DUTY FROM 
TRAINING CAMPS BY SERVICES 



BRANCH OF SERVICE 


NUMBER COMMISSIONED 


PER CENT 


Infantry 


48,968 

20,291 

3,067 

2,063 

2,032 

1,966 

1,262 

767 

152 


60.7 


Field Artillerv 


25.2 


Quartermaster 


3.8 


Coast Artillery 


2.6 


Cavalry 


2.5 


Engineer 


2.4 


Signal 


1.6 


Ordnance 


1.0 


Statistical 


.2 






Total 


80,568 


100.0 







STATISTICS 399 

SOURCES OF THE COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL 



BOtmCB 


NUMBER 


PER CENT 


Officers' Training Camps 

Physicians 


96,000 

42,000 
26,000 
16,000 
12,000 
6,000 
2,000 


48 

21 


Civil Life 


13 


Enlisted Men 


8 


National Guard 


6 


Regular Axmy 


3 


Chaplains 


1 






Total 


200,000 


100 







Teaining of the Army 

The American soldier who fought in France had on 
the average six months* training in the United States, 
two months' training overseas before entering the line, 
and one month in a quiet sector before going into battle. 

Two out of every three American soldiers who reached 
France went into battle. The number that saw active 
service in the front line was 1,390,000 out of a total of 
2,084,000 who debarked at French ports. In this total 
are included the men, amounting to nearly 400,000, who 
reached France in September, October and November, 
1918, within less than three months of the signing of the 
armistice, and who had not completed their full period 
of training. Some of these troops, nevertheless, saw 
active service. 

The greater proportion of our overseas forces received 
their training in infantry divisions which are our typical 
combat units, and consisted of about 1,000 officers and 
27,000 enlisted men. Forty-two such divisions were sent 
to France, besides several hundred thousand supple- 
mentary artillery service, and supply troops. 

American divisions were composed, when at full 
strength, of 28,000 officers and men and were the largest 
divisions of any army on the western front. The British 



400 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FEANCE 

divisions contained in actuality about 15,000 each, while 
the French and the German divisions contained only 
about 12,000 each. 

The training of our army in the United States was 
assisted by nearly 800 specially skilled French and Brit- 
ish officers and noncommissioned officers, who rendered 
invaluable service as instructors in the training camps. 

More than two-thirds of our line officers were gradu- 
ates of the officers' training camps. 

TBANSPORTATIOlsr OF THE ArMT 

More than 2,000,000 American soldiers were trans- 
ported to France in the nineteen months during which we 
took part in the war. Half a million went over in the first 
thirteen months, and a million and a half in the last six 
months. It was not until December, 1917, that the sail- 
ings approximated 50,000 a month. The following table 
shows the number sailing each month for France in 1918, 
and for America between the signing of the armistice 
and June 30, 1919. 



MENrSAILING FROM AMERICA 
TO FRANCE 



1917—9 months (approx.). 200,609 

1918 

January 47,833 

February 49,110 

March 84,889 

April 118,642 

May 245,945 

June 278,664 

July 306,350 

August 285,974 

September 257,457 

October 180,326 

November 30,201 

Total (19 mos.) 2,086,000 

Average per mo 110,000 



MEN SAILING PROM FRANCE 
TO AMERICA 



1918 

November 26,245 

December 99,111 

1919 

January 115,382 

February 181,751 

March 212,899 

April 290,377 

May 333,303 

June 364,163 

Total (8 mos.) 1,623,231 

Average per mo 203,000 



STATISTICS 



401 



Gkowth op the Teansport Fleet 
To convey this great army to France, to keep it sup- 
plied with food, clothing, arms, ammunition and other 
requisites for effective service, and to bring the men 
home after the war, demanded the creation of an ade- 
quate transport fleet at a time when the world was 
experiencing its most acute shortage of ocean tonnage. 
The development of this fleet is shown in the following 
table, which gives its size in dead-weight tons on the first 
of each month. 

TRANSATLANTIC FLEET IN DEAD-WEIGHT TONS 



BY MONTHS 


TRANSPORTS 


CARGO SHIPS 


Total 


1917 

July 1 


59,000 
168,000 
195,000 

243,000 
243,000 
250,000 
274,000 
372,000 
395,000 
403,000 
394,000 
401,000 
397,000 
390,000 
493,000 

681,000 
797,000 
878,000 
928,000 
1,087,000 


229,000 
297,000 
467,000 

543,000 

620,000 

718,000 

926,000 

1,066,000 

1,184,000 

1,350,000 

1,485,000 

1,633,000 

1,933,000 

2,310,000 

2,753,000 

2,567,000 
2,047,000 
1 713,000 
i; 198,000 
752,000 


94,000 


August 1 


131,000 


Sept. 1 


177,000 


Oct. 1 


288,000 


Nov. 1 


465,000 


Dec. 1 


662,000 


1918 
Jan. 1 


786,000 


Feb. 1 


863,000 


Mar. 1 


968,000 


Apr. 1 


1,200,000 


May 1 


1,438,000 


June 1 


1,579,000 


July 1 


1,753,000 


Aug. i 


1,879,000 


Sept. 1 


2,034,000 


Oct. 1 


2,330,000 


Nov. 1 


2,700,000 


Dec. 1 


3,246,000 


1919 
Jan. 1 


3,248,000 


Feb. 1 


2,844,000 


Mar. 1 


2,591,000 


Apr. 1 


2,126,000 


May 1 


1,839,000 







CooPERATioisr OF Allies 

Of the 2,086,000 American troops that sailed to 
France, 927,000 went in American vessels, while 1,027,000 
iwere carried in British transports, 20,000 in Eussian 



402 AMERICAN ENGINEEES IN FRANCE 

ships tiiider British control, 65,000 in Italian, and 47,000 
in French ships. To put it another way, of every 100 sol- 
diers who went overseas, forty-nine sailed in British 
ships, forty-five in American ships, three in Italian ships, 
two in French ships, and one in Russian shipping under 
British control. 

The American transports carried more men in pro- 
portion to tonnage than those of the cooperating nations. 
This was due to two factors, our transports exceeded 
those of the Allies in the speed of their turnarounds ; and, 
under the pressure of the critical situation on the western 
front, ways were devised to increase the loading of our 
own transports by as much as fifty per cent. 



PORTS OF EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION 



AMERICAN 
PORTS 


BAILED 


• ENQUSH PORTS 


ARRIVED 


Quebec 


11,000 

34,000 

1,000 

5,000 

6,000 

46,000 

1,656,000 

35,000 

4,000 

288,000 


Glasgow 45,000 

Manchester 4,000 

Liverpool 844,000 

Bristol Ports 11,000 

Falmouth 1,000 

Plymouth " 1,000 

Southampton 57,000 

London 62,000 




Montreal 

St. Johns 

Halifax 

Portland 

Boston 




New York 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Newport New«. . 


1,025 000 


FRENCH PORTS 

Le Havre 13,000 






Brest 791,000 

St. Nazaire 198,000 

La Pallice 4,000 






Bordeaux 50,000 

Marseille 1,000 


1,057,000 




ITALIAN PORTS 


2,000 


Total 


2,086,000 


2,084,000 







Note : — The difference of 2,000 between those who sailed from American 
and those who landed in France is accounted for in part by deaths"in transit 
azid in part by those who sailed, but, for one reason or another, were not 
landed. 



STATISTICS 403 

ARMY CARGO SHIPPED TO FRANCE TO APRIL 30, 1919 



SHIPMBNTS BY MONTHS 


DISTRIBUTION 


PER CENT 


Short Tons 


Branch of Service Short Tons 


Per cent 


1917 

June 16,000 

July 12,000 

August 19,000 

September • 53,000 

October 115,000 

November 78,000 

December 180,000 

1918 

January 122,000 

February 228,000 

March 289,000 

April 373,000 

May 450,000 

June 425,000 

July 536,000 

August 572,000 

September 681,000 

October 750,000 

Novenber 829,000 

December 587,000 

1919 

January 363,000 

February 266,000 

March 298,000 

April 211,000 


Quartermaster 3,606,000 

Engineer 1,506,000 


48.39 
20.21 


Ordaance 1,189,000 


15.96 


Food Relief 285,000 

Motor Transport 214,000 
French Material. . . . 208,000 

Signal Corps 121,000 

Medical 111,000 

Aviation 61,000 

Red Cross 60,000 


3.82 
2.87 
2.79 
1.62 
1.49 
.82 
.81 


Y. M. C. A 45,000 

Miscellaneous 35,000 

Chemical Warfare.. ^ 11,000 


.60 
.47 
.15 


Total (23 months) . 7,453,000 


7,452,000 


100.0 



Note; — The discrepancy of 1,000 tons in these totals is very small 
ooBsidering that only round numbers are used in these estimates., 



404 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

Ameeica's Paet in the Actual Fighting 

THIRTEEN MAJOR OPERATIONS IN WHICH 
AMERICANS PARTICIPATED 



OPERATION 



West front — campaign of 1917: 

Cambrai, Nov. to Doc. 4 

West front — campaign of 1918: 

German offensive, March 21 to July 18 

Somme, March 21 to April 6 

Lys, April 9 to 27 

Aisne, May 27 to June 5 

Noyon-Montdidier, June 9 to 15 

Champagne, Marne, July 15 to 18 

Allied Offensives, July 18 to Nov. 11: 

Aisne-Marne, July 18 to Aug. 6 

Somme, Aug. 8 to Nov. 11 

Oise- Aisne, Aug. 18 to Nov. 11 

Ypres-Lys, Aug. 19 to Nov. 11 

St. Mihiel, Sept. 12 to 16 

Meuse-Argonne, Sept. 20 to Nov. 11.. . 
Italian front — campaign of 1918: 

Vittorio-Veneto, Oct. 24 to Nov. 4 



APPROXIMATE 

NUMBER OF 

AMERICANS 

ENGAGED 



2,500 



2,200 

2,500 

27,500 

27,000 

85.000 

270,000 

54,000 

85.000 

108,000 

550,000 

,200,000 

1,200 



AMERICAN DATA FOR THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE 

Days of battle 47 

American troops engaged 1,200,000 

Guns employed in attack 2,417 

Rounds of artillery ammunition fired 4,214 ,000 

Airplanes used 840 

Tons of explosives dropped by planes on enemy lines 100 

Tanks used 324 

Miles of penetration of enemy line, maximum 34 

Square kilometers of territory taken 1 , 550 

Vulages and towns liberated 150 

Prisoners captured 16,059 

Artillery pieces captured 468 

Machine guns captured 2 , 864 

Trench mortars captured 177 

American casualties 120 , 000 



The" actual weight of the ammunition fired in this bat- 
tle was greater than that used by the Union forces during 
the entire Civil war. 



STATISTICS 405 

In the preceding Battle of St. Mihiel, 550,000 Ameri- 
cans were engaged, as compared with about 100,000 on 
the Northern side in the Battle of Gettysburg in the Civil 
war. At the Battle of St. Mihiel the artillery fired more 
than 1,000,000 shells in four hours, which is the most 
intense concentration of artillery fire recorded in history. 

Amekicaf Artillery in France 

The most significant facts about our artillery are pre- 
sented in the following table, which takes into account 
only light and heavy field artillery, and does not include 
either the small 37 mm. guns or the trench mortars. 

SUMMARY 



Total pieces of artillery received to November 11, 1918 3,499 

Number of American manufactured V 477 

American made pieces used in battle 130 

Artillery on firing line 2,251 

Rounds of ammunition expended 8,850,000 

Rounds of American made ammunition expended 208 , 327 

Rounds of American made ammunition expended in battle 8,400 



The facts shown in the above table may be para- 
phrased with approximate accuracy by saying that the 
American army in France had in round numbers 3,500 
pieces of artillery, of which less than 500 were made in 
America, and that we used on the firing line 2,250 pieces, 
of which only 130 (less than six per cent) were made in 
America. 

Note by the Author : The guns that were used were 
of French manufacture. As the American army was 
intended to cooperate largely with the French, it was 
deemed advisable to equip it with French artillery. 
This the French government undertook to do provided 
America sent the steel and other raw material. It was 
greatly to the credit of France that after nearly four 



406 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

y^ars of war she was still able to produce a surplus of 
manufactured equipment if only the material were 
furnished. 



TOXIC GASES MANUFACTURED IN 1918— IN TONS (2,000 lbs.) 




MAmrFACTtTRED 
DURING MONTH 


TOTAL i 
■ TO DATB 


January 


10 

61 

211 

399 

697 

993 

1,351 

1,548 

1,911 

2,726 

910 


10 


February 


71 


March 


282 


April 


681 




1,378 


June 


2,371 


July 


3,722 


August 


5,270 




7,181 


October 


9,907 


November 


10,817 







Aviation 

FLYING OFFICERS IN THE ARMY— BY MONTHS 



IN U. B. 



IN A. E. F. 



TOTAL 



1919 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August.. . . 
September 
October. . . 
November. 
December. 

1918 
January. . . 
February. . 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August.. . . 
September 
October. . . 
November, 



75 
105 
139 
199 
203 
270 
672 
831 
989 



,576 
,712 
,248 
,563 
,841 
,944 
,974 
,916 
,306 
,171 
,118 



26 
31 
31 
45 
157 



321 
485 
650 
1,800 
2,200 
2,840 
2,692 
3,060 
3,450 
4,252 
4,307 



75 
105 
139 
199 
229 
301 
603 
876 
1,146 



1,897 
2,197 
2,898 
4,363 
6,041 
6,784 
7,666 
8,976 
9,756 
10,423 
11,425 



STATISTICS 407 

PRODUCTION OF SERVICE PLANES— TO END OP EACH MONTH 



FROM 
FOREIGN 
SOURCES 



FROM 

AMERICAN 
SOURCES 



1917 

September, 

October. . . 

November. 

December. 
1918 

January. . . 
i . February. . 

March. . . . 

April 

. May 

June 

i July 

August.. . . 

September. 

October. . . 

November. 



6 


. . .s 


re 


75 




75 


258 




258 


266 




266 


304 




304 


402 


9 


411 


552 


13 


565 


695 


30 


725 


969 


196 


1,165 


1,345 


541 


1,886 


1,975 


1,028 


3,003 


2,536 


1,184 


3.720 


3,047 


1,892 


4,939 


3,483 


3,014 


6,497 


3,800 


4,089 


7,889 



SERVICE PLANES SENT TO ZONE OF ADVANCE BY END OF ^ 

EACH MONTH 





FROM 
FOREIGN 
SOURCES 


FROM 
AMERICAN 
SOURCES 


TOTAL 


1917 
October 


1 


3 

4 

22 

119 

180 

376 

476 

810 

1,205 

1,722 

1,938 

2,031 




1 


November 







December 




3 


r 

1918 
January 




4 


February 




22 


March 




119 


April . , . 




180 


i^ ay 




376 


June. ... , . . . 




476 


July 


34 
178 

518 
627 
667 


844 


August 


1,383 


September 


2,240 


October 


2,565 


(i November 


2,698 


|y 





Note. — Nine-tenths of the airplanes received from foreign sourcea were 
of French manufacture. 



408 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 

To summarize, of the 2,698 planes sent to the Zone of 
the Advance for American aviators, 667, or less than one- 
fourth, were of American manufacture. 

American air squadrons took important parts in the 
battles of Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse- 
Argonne. They brought down in combat 755 enemy 
planes, while their own losses were only 357 planes. 

Casualties 
BATTLE DEATHS IN THE ARMIES ENGAGED IN THE WAR 

Russia 1,700,000 

Germany 1,600,000 

France 1,385,300 

Great Britain 900,000 

Austria 800,000 

Italy 364,000 

Turkey 250,000 

Serbia and Montenegro 125,000 

Belgium 102,000 

Roumania 100,000 

Bulgaria 100,000 

United States 50,300 

Greece 7,000 

Portugal 2,000 

Total 7,485,600 

Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors, two were 
killed or died of disease. Among the other great nations 
between twenty and twenty-five in each 100 called to the 
colors were killed or died. 

The total battle deaths in this war were greater than 
all the deaths in all the wars for more than 100 years 
previous. From 1793 to 1914 the total deaths in war may 
be safely estimated at something under 6,000,000. Bat- 
tle deaths from 1914 to 1918 totaled about 7,500,000. 

American Casualties in the War 

Wounded, Prisoners and Missing 

For every man who was killed in battle, six others were 
wounded, taken prisoner, or reported missing. The total 



STATISTICS 



409 



battle casualties in the expeditionary forces are shown in 
the following table. The number who died of wounds 
was only seven per cent as large as the number who were 
wounded. The hospital records show that about eighty- 
five per cent of the men sent to hospitals on account of 
injuries were returned to duty. About half the wounded 
were reported as slightly wounded and many of them 
would not have been recorded as casualties in previous 
wars. 

BATTLE CASUALTIES IN THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE 



Killed in action 35,560 

Died of Wounds 14,720 

Total dead — 50,280 

Wounded severely 90,830 

Wounded slightly 80,480 

Wounded, degree undetermined 34,380 

Total wounded 205,690 

Missing in action (August 1, 1919) 46 

Taken prisoner 4,480 

Grand Total 206,496 



CAUSES OF DEATH IN THE AMERICAN ARMY 





NUMBER 


PER CENT 


Killed in battle or died of wounds, 
A. E. F 


50,280 

57,460 
7,920 


43 


Died of disease: 

InA. E. F 21,410 

InU. S 36,050 




Total by disease 

Deaths from other causes A. E. F 


50 

7 


Total 


115,660 


100% 





410 AMERICAN ENaiNEERS IN FRANCE 



DISEASE AND BATTLE DEATHS IN AMERICAN ARMY 

IN FOUR WARS 
The figures give the number of deaths for each 1,000 troops. 



Mexican War, 184&-48 

avil War (North) 1861-65 

Spanish War 1898 

War with Germany: 

A. E. F. to Nov. 11, 1918. . 

Total forces to May 1, 1919 



DISBASS 


BATTLE 


110 


15 


65 


33 


26 


5 


19 


53 


15 


13 



125 
98 
31 

72 
28 



DEATHS BY DISEASES— PRINCIPAL CAUSES 

Both in the A, E, F. and United States for Entire Army, Expressed in Per- 
centages 

PneumoHia 83 .6 

Meningitis 4.1 

Tuberculosis 2.3 

Empyema 1.1 

Septicemia .6 

Brightfl' Disease .5 

Typhoid .5 

Peritonitis .5 

Appendicitis .4 

Organic Heart Diseases .4 

Scarlet Fever .3 

Measles .3 

Other 6.5 

Total 100. 



Wae Expendituees 

For a period of twenty-five months from April, 1917, 
through April, 1919, the war cost the United States con- 
Biderably more than $1,000,000 an hour, or $21,850,000,000 
exclusive of nearly $10,000,000,000 loaned to the Allies. 

This amount is twenty times the pre-war national debt. 
It is nearly enough to pay the entire costs of our Govern- 
ment from 1791 to the outbreak of the European war. 
The expenditures in this war were sufficient to have car- 



STATISTICS 



411 



ried on tlie Eevolutionary war continueusly for more 
than a thousand years at the rate of expenditure which 
that war actually involved. 

During the first three months war expenditures were 
at the rate of $2,000,000 a day. During the next year 
they averaged more than $22,000,000 a day. For the final 
ten months of the period the daily costs reached the enor- 
mous total of more than $44,000,000. 

MY PURCHASES OF FOUR ARTICLES IN 1918 COMPARED WITH 
TOTAL PRODUCTION IN 1914 



ARTICLE 


PURCHASED, 1918 


PRODUCED, 1914 


Blankets 


18,000,000 
13,000,000 
96,000,000 
19,000,000 


8,000,000 
30,000,000 
61,000,000 
98,000,000 


Wool gloves 


Wool socks 


Shoes 







Some International Comparisons 

TOTAL WAR EXPENSES OF PRINCIPAL NATIONS. 

(Estimated to April 30th, 1919.) 

Great Britain and Dominions $38,000,000,000 

France 26,000,000,000 

United States 22,000,000,000 

Russia 18,000,000,000 

Italy 13.000,000,000 

Belgium, Roumania, Portugal, Jugo-Slavia 5,000,000,000 

Japan and Greece 1,000,000,000 

Total for Allies and United States $123,000,000,000 

Germany $39,000,000,000 

Austria-Hungary 21,000,000,000 

Turkey and Bulgaria 3,000,000,000 

Total for Teutonic Allies $63,000,000,000 

Grand total $186,000,000,000 



From the above it will be seen that the total cost of the enemy nations waa 
Just one-half that of the United States and Allies. 



412 AMEEICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 



DURATION OF THE WAR. 



ALLIED AND 

ASSOCIATED 

NATIONS 



WAR DECLARED 

BY CENTRAL 

POWERS 



WAR DECLARED 
AGAINST CEN- 
TRAL POWERS 



TEARS 


MONTHS 


4 


3 


3 


7 


4 


3 


4 


3 


4 


3 


4 


3 


4 


2 


3 


11 


3 


5 


3 


5 




6 




11 




7 




7 




7 




3 




3 




2 




'e 




6 




3 


•• 


3 



DATS 



1. 

2. 
3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8, 

9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22, 
23. 



Serbia 

Russia* 

France 

Belgium. . .... 

Great Britain . 
Montenegro. . . 

Japan 

Portugal 

Italy 

San Marino. . . 
Roumaniat . . . 

Greece 

United States . 

Panama 

Cuba 

Siam 

Liberia 

China 

Brazil 

Guatemala 

Nicaragua 

Haiti 

Honduras 



July 28, 1914 
Aug. 1, 1914 
Aug. 3,1914 
Aug. 4,1914 
Nov. 23, 1914 
Aug. 9,1914 
Aug. 27, 1914 
Mar. 9,1916 



Aug. 20, 1916 



Aug. 


9, 


Nov. 


3, 


Aug. 


3, 


April 


7, 


Aug. 


4, 


Aug. 


6, 


Aug. 


23, 


Nov. 


23, 


May 


23. 


June 


6, 


Aug. 


27, 


Nov. 23, 


April 


6, 


April 


7, 


April 


7, 


July 


22, 


Aug. 


4, 


Aug. 


14, 


Oct. 


26. 


April 21, 


May 


ti, 


July 


12, 


July 


19, 



,1914 
,1914 
,1914 
, 1917 
,1914 
, 1914 
,1914 
,1914 
,1915 
,1915 
, 1916 
,1916 
,1917 
,1917 
,1917 
,1917 
,1917 
,1917 
,1917 
,1918 
, 1918 
,1918 
,1918 



14 
3 
8 
7 
7 
5 

19 

19 

19 

4 

10 

18 

5 

4 

4 

20 

8 

28 

16 

21 

6 

30 

23 



Peace Treaty, March 3, 1918. f Peace Treaty, March 6, 1918. 



ORDNANCE PRODUCTION BY GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND 
THE UNITED STATES— DURING THE 19 MONTHS OFj 

AMERICAN PARTICIPATION— APRIL 6, 1917 i 

to NOV. 11, 1918 





GREAT BRITAIN 


FRANCE 


UNITED STATES 


Rifles 


1,963,514 

179,127 

3,428,195,000 
291,706,000 
765,110,000 


1,396,938 

223,317 

2,959,285,000 
342,155,000 
702,964,000 


2,505,910 


Machine Guns and Auto- 
matic Rifles 


i 

181,662 


Rifle and Machine Gun Am- 

mimition Rounds 

Smokeless"^^ Powder Pounds. . 
High Explosives Rounds . . . 


2,879,148,000 
632,504,000 
375,656,000 



STATISTICS 



413 



EXTENT OP WESTERN FRONT^HELD BY ARMIES OF ALLIES 

AND UNITED STATES DURING 1918 EXPRESSED 

IN PERCENTAGES 

(Italian troops are included with French, and Portuguese with British.) 



1918 



BELGIAN 


FRENCH 


BRITISH 


AMERICAN 


5 


69 


25 


1 


5 


67 


25 


3 


5 


66 


25 


4 


5 


72 


19 


4 


5 


70 


19 


6 


5 


72 


17 


6 


5 


72 


17 


6 


5 


71 


17 


7 


5 


74 


17 


4 


4 


75 


16 


5 


4 


73 


16 


7 


4 


68 


16 


12 


4 


69 


16 


11 


4 


67 


17 


12 


4 


67 


18 


11 


5 


63 


18 


14 


5 


58 


20 


17 


5 


58 


19 


18 


5 


56 


19 


20 


5 


54 


19 


22 


5 


56 


20 


19 


6 


58 


18 


18 


3 


55 


19 


23 


6 


53 


22 


19 


4 


60 


17 


19 


6 


55 


18 


21 



January . 31 

February 28 

March 21 

March 30 

April 10 

April 20 

April 30 

May 10 

May 20 

May 30 

June 10 

June 20 

June 30 

July 10 

July 20 

July 30 

August 10 

August 20 

August 30 

September 10 

September 20 

September 30 

October 10 

October 20 

October 30 

November 11 



COMPARATIVE RIFLE STRENGTH OF ALLIED AND GERMAN 
ARMIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1918 



1918 


GERMAN 


ALLIED 


April 1 


1,569,000 
1,600,000 
1,639,000 
1,412,000 
1,395,000 
1,339,000 
1,223,000 
866,000 


1,245,000 


^! ay 1 


1,343,000 


June ~ 1 


1,496,000 


July 1 


1,556,000 


August 1 


1,672,000 


September 1 


1,682,000 


October 1 


1,594,000 


November 1 


1,485,000 







414 AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN FRANCE 



GUNS ORGANIZED IN BATTERIES AT DATE OF THE ARMISTICE 

French 11,638 

Italian 7,709 

British 6,993 

American 3,008 

BATTLE AIRPLANES IN EACH ARMY AT DATE OF THE 
ARMISTICE 

French 3,321 

German 2,730 

British 1,758 

Italian 812 

American 740 

Austrian 622 

Belgian 153 

BATTLE PLANES FOR EACH 100,000 MEN IN EACH ARMY AT 
DATE OF THE ARMISTICE 

French 130 

British 102 

German 77 

American 38 



PERCENTAGES OF COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF FRENCH 
it^ BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES AT THE DATE OF THE 

ARMISTICE 

YTEST FRONT, NOV. 11, 1918 



BRITISH 



FRENCH 



AMEEICT^N 



Ration strength 

Length of front held . 
Artillery in batteries 
Airplane strength . . . 



26 
19 
32 
30 



41 
59 
54 

57 



31 
22 
14 
13 



PERCENTAGES OF COMPARATIVE EXPENDITURES OF 
AMMUNITION, DURING 1918 

ALL FRONTS, 1918 





BRITISH 


FRENCH 


AMERICAN 


Artillery Ammunition fired, in- 
cluding training 


43 
46 


51 
37 


6 


Small arms ammunition fired, in- 
cluding training 


17 







STATISTICS 



415 



MERCHANT SHIPPING LOST THROUGH ACTS OF WAR 

- (In gross tons) 

Great Britain 7,757,000 

Norway 1,177,000 

France 889,000 

Italy 846,000 

United States 395,000 

Greece 346,000 

Denmark 241,000 

Holland 203,000 

Sweden 201,000 

Germany 187,000 

RuBsia 183,000 

Spain 168,000 

Japan 120,000 

Portugal 93,000 

Belgium 84,000 

Brazil 25,000 

Austria 15,000 

Other Nations 16,000 

Total 12,946,000 

Germany and Austria 202,000 

Belligerent 10,906,000 

Neutral 1,838,000 12,744,000 



SEAGOING MERCHANT SHIPPING OF THE WORLD 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR 
(In gross tons) 





July 1, 1914 


Dec. 31, 1918 


Great Britain 


20,100,000 
1,875,000 
7,675,000 
6,325,000 
6,640,000 


16,900,000 


United States 


6,719,000 


Other Allies 


6,840,000 


Enemy Nations . 


4,360,000 


Neutral Nations 


5,786,000 






Total 


42,615,000 


39,605,000 


Net Decrease 3,010,000 Tons. 





THE END 



INDEX 



Abbeville, 147. 

Abbreviations, 199, 200. 

Ablainville, 293. 

Aigrefeuille, 96. 

Air brakes, 84, 85, 102. 

Aire, 274, 356, 360. 

Airplane detection, 256, 257. 

Airplanes, 129, 202, 407, 408, 411. 

Aisne, 145. 

Aldershot, 112. 

Alphabet, telephone, 199. 

Alsace, 363. 

Ambulance trains, 86. 

Ambulances, 129, 146. 

American Bridge Company, 271. 

America's Munitions, 214, 261, 
389. 

Ammunition, expenditure of, 264, 
414; storage of, 95. 

Angers, 82. 

Anglo-American relations, 133- 
152. 

Anglo-French Commissions, 13, 
14, 155, 382. 

Angouleme, 58. 

Apremont, 351, 360. 

" Archies," 245, 356, 260. 

Argonne, 18, 97. 

Argonne Forest, 355. 

Argonne-Meuse Offensive, battle 
data, 404 ; beginning of, 356 ; 
camouflage, 206; engineer 
work during, 352, 358; light 
railways, 359, 360; maps, 
240, 241; railways, 350, 358, 
359, 361; roads, 303, 305, 
350; water supply, 179, 362. 

Armies, Allied, compared, 414. 

Army, American, casualties — see 
Casualties, composition, 37 ; 
size of, 30, 43, 44, 73, 89, 347, 
395, 397, 414; sources of, 



397; training of, 399; trans- 
portation of, 400. 

Army cargo, 403. 

Army chief engineer, 37, 301, 314. 

Army commander, 37, 41; duties 
of, 38. 

Army engineer, 40, 41. 

Army, national, 13. 

Army of Occupation, 37 — see 
Third Army. 

Army zone, 40; 

Arras, 22, 59, 111, 112, 113, 314, 
317. 

Artillery, 263-276; Allied, com- 
pared, 414; American in 
France, 405; ammunition ex- 
pended, 264, 414; howitzer, 
265; in action, 140; of quick 
firing, 267 ; light railway, 269 ; 
mobile, 264, 265, 268; naval, 
270, 271, 272, 273; non- 
mobile, 264 ; preparation, 116 ; 
railway, 6, 268, 269; recoil, 
266, 267; recuperator, 268; 
" seventy-fives," 265, 266 ; sur- 
veying, 236; tractors, 268. 

Atlanta, 14. 

Atlantic Ocean, 22, 26, 30, 47, 48, 
50. 

Atterbury, Brig. Gen. W. W., 42, 
75, 77. 

Aubreville, 274, 275, 359, 360. 

Audruicq, 108. 

Aulonoy, 146. 

Aviators, German, 117, 129. 261. 

Baccarat, 209. 

Baldwin Locomotive Co., 271. 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, '62, 

69. 
Bapaume, 131. 
Barber, Colonel A. B., 18. 



417 



4:18 



INDEX 



Barges, 22, 23, 29. 

Bar-le-Duc, 147, 347. 

Barry, 52. 

Basins, tidal, 26, 44. 

Bassens, 26, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 

93, 95, 109; berths, number 
of, 44; wharves, dimensions 
of, 45; battle, American par- 
ticipation, 404; battle casual- 
ties — see Casualties. 

Battle front, 31. 

Bayonne, 52, 58. 

Beauvais, 59. 

B. E. F., 71, 134, 138. 

Belfast, 52. 

Belfort, 59. 

Belgian frontier, 113, 147. 

Belgian Relief Commission, 150. 

Belgium, 59, 60. 

Berlin, 74, 127. 

"Berthas," 270. 

Bethune, 148, 317, 

Biarritz, 58. 

Black, Major General Wm. M., 13, 

379. 
Blaye, 61. 

Bleaching powder, 176, 177. 
Bliss, Gen. Tasker H., 12. 
Bonne map projection, 222, 223. 
Bordeaux, 25, 26, 27, 43, 44, 51, 

56, 58, 73, 80, 93, 95, 99, 112, 

164, 347; telephones, 83; 

water, supply of, 174. 
Boston, 14, 28, 389. 
Boulogne, 22, 29, 60, 62, 72. 
Bourges, 73, 99; telephones, 83. 
Bourlon, 124. 
Boursies, 127, 128. 
Brest, 25, 49, 51, 58, 59, 67, 80, 

94, 96; railway connections, 
47. 

Bridges 6; destruction, 353. 
Brigades, 38. 
Bright's Disease, 181. 
Bromine, 176, 186. 
Brooklyn, 389. 
Buffalo, 61, 388. 



Burgundy, 59. 
Business Manager, 76. 
Busses, 287. 

Byng, General Sir Julian, 115, 
116, 123. 

Caen, 51. 

Calais, 22, 23, 26, 29, 60, 62, 72. 

Calcium chloro-hypochlorite, 176, 

177. 
Calcium permanganate, 176. 
Cambrai, 113, 115, 118, 122, 125, 

127, 129; battle of, 117-125, 

128-132, 146, 229; defensive, 

124-132; offensive, 111-123. 
Camouflage, 42, 114, 198, 202, 

206, 246; derivation of, 202; 

colors, 204; material, 206, 

246; shop, 205. 
Camps, construction of, 88, 380, 

387, 388. 
Canadian Forestry Corps, 155, 

160. 
Canadian railway troops, 71, 125. 
Canals, French, 22, 23, 4;L, 56, 99. 
Car repairs, 41, 106. 
Carbon, 191. 
Carbon monoxide, 185. 
Carey's array, 317. 
Cargo, delivery of, 45, 47, 52, 403. 
Cars, American, 19, 51, 57, 74, 84, 

102, 106; dimensions of, 108; 

number of, 106, 107, 108, 

109; French, 84, 106, 107, 

109. 
Casualties, battle, 39, 114, 180, 

181, 408, 409; first battle, 

114; Civil War, 180; in four 

wars, 410; see Gas. 
Cercy-la-Tour, 99, 109. 
Cette, 50, 51, 52. 
Chalons, 147. 
Champagne, 59. 
Champagne Offensive, 112. 
Channel, the, 21, 23, 26, 27, 51, 

52, 58, 59, 315. 
Charente, 51. 



INDEX 



419 



Charleroi, 11, 

Chateaudun, 58. 

Chateauroux, 95, 109. 

Chateau-Thierry, 67, 145, 147, 239. 

Chaumont, 40, 72, 199. 

Chemical engineers, 182-197. 

Chemical Warfare Service, 197. 

Cherains de Fer, Ecole de, 158, 
368. 

Cherbourg, 51, 58. 

Cherokee, Indians, 201. 

Chicago, 14. 

Chief Engineer, A. E. F., 40, 41, 
42, 74, 92, 293; report on 
forestry, 156, 158, 161, 162. 

Chief of Engineers — see Engi- 
neers, Chief of. 

Chlorine, 177, 184, 185, 188, 195, 
196; liquid, 176. 

Chlorpicrin, 185, 186, 195. 

Cholera, 176. 

Church services, 123, 149. 

Civil War, 180, 264, 270, 317, 390. 

Claveille, Albert, 67, 101. 

Cl^menceau, 67. 

Clermont-Ferrand, 58, 59. 

Coal fields, French, 22, 59, 66. 

Cocoanuts, 192. 

Colorado, railways in, 60. 

Comite Franco-Biitannique, 154, 
155. 

Commander-in-Chief, 34, 35, 37, 
40, 54, 75, 77, 88, 348 ; British, 
71. 

Commercy, 147, 351. 

Commissaires militaires, 63, 67; 
Under, 64. 

Commission Forestiere d'Ex- 
pertises, 157, 160. 

Communion procession, girls, 149, 

Compiegne, 147. 

Confidence, French, in American 
worlanen, 104. 

Construction and Forestry, Direc- 
tor of, 40, 41, 42, 78, 299, 
306. 
Construction Division, 392. 



Constructioh, Engineer of, 76, 77. 
Control of army, 33. 
Cordic, 52. 

Corps, army, 38, 303. 
Corps commander, 38. 
Corps engineer, 38. 
Corps engineer troops, 38, 303. 
Corps of Engineers — see Engi- 
neers, Corps of. 
Coulommiers, 146. 
" Coupes " of timber, 162. 
CourcoUes, 357. 
Cranes, wharf, 46. 
Crecy, 72. 
Creet, military, 32B. 

Dannelnorie Viaduct, 353, 354, 
355. 

Deadlock, 313, 314, 348, 361. 

Deakyne, Brig. Gen. Herbert, 41. 

Deaths by battle, all armies, 408, 

Deaths by disease, 410. 

Deaths, causes of, 409. 

Delaware, 61. 

Depots, base, 90, 91, 93; forward, 
91; intermediate, 90, 91, 93. 

Destruction to France, 147, 150. 

Detroit, 14. 

Dieppe, 22, 58, 67. 

Dijon, 59, 82, 92; damouflagd 
shop at, 205. 

Direction des Etapes, 156, 159. 

Director General of Military RaU* 
ways, 382, 385. 

Director General of Transporta- 
tion, 42, 54, 55, 77, 78, 79, 
100, 109, 293, 391; assistant, 
British, 71; British, 70, 71, 
72, 292; deputy, 76, 81; 
deputy, British, 71. 

Director Military Engineering and 
Engineer Supplies, 210. 

Distinguished Service Cross, 130. 

Division commander, 38. 

Division engineer, 38; duties of, 
39, 377, 378; troops, 38, 303, 
377, 378. 



420 



INDEX 



Divisions, 38, 399. 

Divisions, railway, grand, 80, 110, 

Donges, 51. 

Dordogne, 43. 

Duck boards, 336. 

Dugouts, 139, 141, 212, 246, 318, 

339, 340, 341, 342, 346. 
Dumps, 91, 217, 279. 
Dunkerque, 22, 72. 

Ecole de Chemins de Fer, 158, 
368. 

Eddy stone Lighthouse, 4. 

Edgewood Arsenal, 387. 

Eighteenth Engineers, 14, 17, 56, 
92, 112, 347. 

Electrical and Mechanical Co., 
173. 

Electrical plants, 206, 207, 208; 
capacity of, 207. 

Electro-Mechanical Regiment, 207. 

Electro-Mechanical Troops, 
French, 208; German, 209. 

Eleventh Engineers, 14, 17, 18, 41, 
112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 120, 
125, 127, 229, 317, 355, 359. 

Emerson, Colonel G. H., 385. 

Engineer, Chief, A. E. F. — see 
Chief Engineer. 

Engineer, Chief of Port Construc- 
tion, 71. 

Engineer, civil, 4, 7. 

Engineer Commission, 18, 24, 25, 
43, 49, 62, 73, 155. 

Engineer committee, 12. 

Engineer control, 37. 

Engineer depot, 381, 382, 383. 

Engineer, military, 3, 5, 6, 7. 

Engineer of port construction, 
chief, 71, 

Engineer officers, creation of, 17. 

Engineer officers from civil life, 
16. 

Engineer organization, 33. 

Engineer organization and engi- 
neer work in the United 
States, 379-394; business ad- 



ministration, 381 ; camps, 
380, 387, 388; Director Gen- 
eral of Military Railways, 
382, 383, 385; Edgewood 
Arsenal, 387; engineer train- 
ing, 393; gas manufacture, 
386, 387; locomotives, ship- 
ping of, 390, 391, 393; men, 
securing of, 382; port facili- 
ties, 388, 389, 390; organiza- 
tion, 380; purchases, amount 
of, 383, 384; purchasing de- 
partment, 380; research de- 
partment, 380, 385; Russian 
Railway Service Corps, 380, 
385 ; Washington Barracks, 
381. 

Engineer plants, American, 210. 

Engineer regiments, original, 14, 
15, 17, 41, 133, 347, 373. 

Engineer training, 393. 
Engineer troops, number of, 8, 
9, 36, 39. 

Engineer troops in the field, 364- 
378; American organization, 
373, 374, 375; British or- 
ganization, 364, 366, 367; 
Canadian railway troops, 
365, 366, 367; division en- 
gineers, 377, 378; French 
organization, 367, 369, 373; 
Railway Construction Engi- 
neers, 366, 367; regional en- 
gineers, 377; suggested reor- 
ganization, 373, 374, 375, 376, 
377; work trains, 370, 371. 

Engineers, American, task of, 19. 

Engineers, Chief of, 8, 12, 13, 
209, 210, 215, 379, 382. 

Engineers, Corps of, 7, 16, 37, 
133, 198, 234, 277, 363, 380, 
381, 393. 

Engineers, regional, 377. 

Engineers, section, 299. 

Engineering, civil, 4, 7; military, 
3, 5, 6, 7. 

Epinal, 73. 



INDEX 



421 



Erie Railroad, 62. 

Escaut Canal, 126. 

Est Railway, 57, 59, 60, 62, 67, 

68, 80, 92. 
Etat Railway, 57, 58, 59, 67, 68, 

80. 
Expenditure, rate of, 30. 
Expenditures, 410, 411. 

Fay, 316, 

Eelton, Samuel M., 382. 

Field service regulations, 33, 34, 
35. 

Fifteenth Engineers, 14, 17, 40, 
92, 94, 112, 317, 356, 359. 

Fifth Army, B. E. F., 315, 316. 

Fifth Engineers, French, 163, 368, 
369, 376. 

Fiftieth Engineers, 104, 110, 261. 

Fifty-sixth Engineers, 261. 

First Army, A. E. F., 145, 207, 
237, 293, 298, 301, 347, 359. 

Flanders, 112, 113, 116, 135. 

Flash and sound ranging, 42, 234, 
235, 236, 237, 244-262. 

Flash- location, 249, 250. 

Flying officers, 404. 

Fo'ch, Marshal, 81, 348. 

Fontaine-Notre Dame, 124. 

Football, 139. 

Forestry, 153^-166; acquisition of 
forests, 158, 159; American 
cut, 164, 165; American 
needs, 155; American troops, 
163, 164, 165; British needs, 
153; Canadian troops, 155, 
160 ; Coraite Franco- 
Britannique, 155 ; Comite Per- 
manent, 158, 160; Commis- 
sion Forestiere, 157,160,161; 
cutting, 161, 162; Direction 
des Etapes, 156, 159; fires, 
154; French annual crops, 
154; French regulations, 156, 
157, 158; French ownership, 
153; Inter- Allied Committee, 
156, 159; Service de3 Eaux 
jet Forets, 153, 154. 



Fortieth Engineers, 205. 

Fortifications, immobile, 4, 274; 
mobile, 273. 

Forty-ninth Engineers, 104, 110. 

Fourteenth Engineers, 14, 15, 17, 
112, 113, 314, 316, 356. 

Four-track construction, 99. 

Freight traffic on French rail- 
ways, 62. 

Freight train runs, 82. 

French calmness, 145. 

French character, 143. 

French dead, 147. 

French railway men mobilized, 63. 

French railways — see Railways. 

French women, 147. 

Front, length of, held by Allies, 
413. 

Frontier, Belgian, 59, 60. 

Frontier, German, 59, 147. 

Frut, 51. 

Gallipoli, 111. 

Garchizy, 106. 

Gare, Chefs de, 83, 84. 

Garonne, 43. 

Garrett, W. A., 18. 

Gas, 6 ; chlorine, quantity of, 196 ; 
discharge of, 193, 194; effects 
of, 185,186; first use of, 184, 
193; helmets, 189; injury, 
treatment of, 186; lachryma- 
tor, 186; liquid, 195; manu- 
facture of, 386, 387, 406 
masks, 140, 184, 189, 190 
191; mustard, 187, 188, 337, 
output, 196; poisonous, 182, 
183, 184; projectors, 193' 
protection against, 188 
shells, 194, 195; tear, 186, 
training, 191 — see also Chlo- 
rine, Chlorpicrin, and Phos- 
gene. 

Geddes, Major General Sir Eric, 
69, 70. 

General Headquarters, 16, 40, 42, 
72, SO. 



422 



INDEX 



General Headquarters, Frenoli, 

66. 
Geology, 42. 
Geophone, 200, 202. 
German lines, 112, 113, 114, 116, 

125, 126, 141, 148, 303, 351. 
German Offensive, March 1918, 

48, 89, 314, 315} July 1918, 

145, 146. 
Germany, 61. 
Gettysburg, artillery, 264, 405; 

troops at, 9. 
Gibraltar, 25, 50. 
Gievres, 82, 93, 94, 95, 99, 109, 

210, 211; railway connection, 

94; size of, 94, 97. 
« Giles, Corp'l," 312. 
Gironde, 25, 43, 45, 49, 51, 52, 95. 
Glasgow, 52. 
Gouzeaucourt, 127, 128, 129, 130, 

229. 
Grand Pre, 360. 
Grant, General, 316. 
Granville, 51. 

Great Northern Railway, 70. 
Grenades, hand, 196. 
Guard, National, 16. 
Guns, blast of, 246, 247; naval, 

270, 271 ; railway, 6, 268, 

269; recoil, 267, 268; sizes 

and kinds, 264, 265 — see also 

Artillery. 

"HagvLd Peace Conference, 182, 

183. 
Haig, Field Marshal, 314, 315, 

317. 
Hartmanswillerkopf, 209. 
Havre, 22, 51, 52, 56, 58, 67. 
Havrincourt Wood, 120, 122. 
Heudicourt, 139. 
Highlanders, 131, 132. 
Hindenburg Line, 111, 113, 122, 

125. 
Hirson, 59. 
Holland, 60. 
Home, French attachment to, 150. 



Honfleur, 51. 
Horse masks, 192. 



India, 69. 

Infantry, pioneer, 8. 

Influenza, 180. 

Injuries, personal, 86. 

Inspecteur General des Services, 
156, 157. 

Intelligence Section G-S, 233, 235. 

Inter-Allied Wood Committee, 
156, 157, 158, 159, 160. 

Interstate Commerce Commission, 
61. 

Iodine, 176. 

Irish, 135. 

Issoudon, 95. 

Is-sur-Tille, 59, 80, 82, 92, 96, 97, 
99, 109; dimensions of, 92, 97; 
repair shop at, 210, 211; tele- 
phones, 83. 

Italy, 69. 



Jadwin, Brig. Gen. Edgar, 40. 
Jersey Central Railroad, 62. 
Joffre, Marshal, 11, 13. 
Jouarre, 146. 
July 14th, review, 151. 
July 15th, 1918, 145, 146. 
Jura Mountains, timber in, 160, 
164. 

Kaiser, 72. 
Kultur, 32. 

Lackawanna Railroad, 62. 

La Couzanoe, 356. 

La Fere, 111, 

La Fert&, 145. 

La MartiniSre, 45, 46, 49. 

La Pallice, 44, 51, 96. 

LaRochelle, 25, 26, 51, 58, 59, 

108. 
La Vacquerie Farm, 122. 
Lambert map projection, 223, 224. 



INDEX 



423 



Lancera, Bengal, 120. 

Landes, 164. 

Langfitt, Major Gen. Wm. C, 40, 
41, 77— see also Chief Engi- 
neer. 

Langres, 238. 

Laon, 59. 

Largue, bridge over, 353. 

L'Enfant, Major, 363. 

Lehigh Valley Railroad, 62. 

Le Mans, 47, 58. 

Le Mesnil, 315. 

Les Sables d' Olonne, 52. 

Lewis guns, 115. 

Liffol-le-Grand, 80, 96, 99, 109; 
dimensions of, 96 ; telephones, 
83. 

Light railways, 18, 209, 277-295; 
ambulance trains, 288, 289; 
American system, 290; cars, 
283, 284; construction, 284; 
destruction, 315, 316; Di- 
nector, British, 292; equip- 
ment, 109; gauge, 278, 285; 
locomotives, 280, 281, 282; 
locomotives, gasoline, 281, 
283; manager, 76, 77, 293; 
organization, American, 292, 
293, 294; organization, Brit- 
ish, 291; rails, 279; shops, 
290; track, American, 280; 
track, British, 280; track, 
French, 279; traffic, 286, 287. 

Light Railways and Roads, 41, 61, 
113; Director of, 293, 299. 

Lighters, 47. 

Ligny, 347. 

Lille, 60. 

Lines, British, 126, 127, 188; 
German, 112, 113, 114, 116, 
125, 126, 141, 148. 

Livens projector, 196. 

Liverpool, 52. 

Locomotives, American, 19, 74, 81, 
102, 103, 107, 109; dimen- 
sions of, 107 ; number of, 109 ; 
French, 84, 109 ; how shipped, 



390, 391, 392, 393; repairs, 

41. 
Logging equipment, 164. 
Loire, 25, 43, 44, 46, 51, 81, 93, 

95, 98, 105. 
London, 52, 
Lorient, 51. 
Louvain, 11. 

Lumber, quantity cut, 165. 
Luxembourg, 59. 
Lyon, 59. 
Lys, 317. 

McKinistry, Brig. Gen. Chas. H., 

41, 77. 
Machine guns, 212. 
Mafeking, 144. 
Maintenance of way, Engineer of, 

76. 
Malaria, 181. 

Manag-er, General, 79, 109. 
Maps, 42, 216-243; American, 

218, 219, 220, 233; battle, 

225, 232; British, 216, 218, 

220, 226, 229, 232; French, 
216, 218, 219, 220, 225, 232; 
German, 218, 220, 226, 232; 
grids, 222, 224, 225; Inter- 
Allied, 229, 230, 231; loca- 
tions, 225, 226; organization 
of department, 217, 233, 234, 
235, 236, 237; production, 
240, 241, 242; projection, 

221, 222, 223, 224; scales, 
216, 217, 218, 219, 221. 

" Marches " (train), 82, 83. 

Marcoing, 126. 

Marcy, 82. 

Marennes, 51. 

Marine, Minister of, French, 51. 

Mame, 145; battle of, 11, 216, 

220, 275, 818. 
Marseillaise, 152. 
Marseille, 25, 50, 52, 59, 96. 
Mars-sur-AUier, 180 . 
Maryland, 61. 
Masks, 189, 190, 191— see Gas and 

Horse. 



424 



INDEX 



Maubeuge, 5, 

Maxfield, Col. H. H., 110. 

Meaux, 59. 

Mechanical Engineer, Chief, 71. 

Mediterranean, 22, 25, 50, 52, 58, 
59. 

Mehun, 95. 

Messines Ridge, 112, 264; water 
delivery, 171. 

Meter gauge railways, 60, 61, 351. 

Metz, 59, 348, 350. 

Meuse, 67, 274, 275, 348, 350, 
353, 355, 358. 

Mexican war casualties, 180. 

Microphone, 244. 

Midi Railway, 57, 58, 61, 80. 

Military Cross, 130. 

Military Engineering and Engi- 
neer Supplies, Director of, 40. 

Military Medal, 130. 

Mirimas, 96. 

Mont Sec, 349, 351. 

Montdidier, 145. 

Montierchaume, 94, 95, 99; size 
of, 95, 97. 

Montigny, 315. 

Montoir, 47, 49, 51, 82, 93, 95, 96, 
99, 109; size of, 46, 94, 97. 

Montpellier, 58, 59. 

Montreuil, 72. 

Morocco, 369, 

Mort Homme, Le, 359. 

Moselle, 349. 

Motive Power, Gen. Superintend- 
ent of, 76, 79, 104, 109, 110. 

Motor Transport Corps, 42, 209, 
.214. 

: Motor truck trains, ,370, 372. 

Namur, 5. 

Nancy, 67, 73, 147. 

Nantes, 25, 44, 47, 51, 52, 58, 59, 

96. 
Nash, Maj. Gen. Sir P. A. M., 70. 
Naval guns, 270, 271, 272, 273. 
Navy Department, 50, 270, 271. 
Navy, Secretary of, 70. 



Nesle, 131. 
Nettings, 205. 
Neufchateau, 347. 
Nevers, 58, 59, 82, 98, 347. 
Nevers shops, 103, 104, 105, 106, 

107, 109. 
New Jersey, 61. 
New Orleans, 389. 
New York, 14, 26, 61, 62, 384, 

389, 392. 
Nimes, 58, 59. 
Nineteenth Engineers, 14, 15, 17, 

41, 102, 103, 104, 110, 112, 

347, 376. 
No Man's Land, 124, 126, 201, 

303, 335, 344. 
Nocq, 72. 
Nord Railway, 57, 59, 60, 62, 67, 

118, 125. 
Norfolk, 384, 389. 
North Sea, 21, 147. 
Northeastern Railway, 69. 
November 11, 144. 
Noyon, 131. 

Officer, British, 137, 142. 
Officers, Commissioned, 398, 399. 
Oise, 111, 314. 
Ordnance Department, 29, 261, 

270. 
Ordnance production, 412. 
Organization, army, 34. 
Orleans, 58, 80, 94. 
Ostende, 270. 
Ouest Railway, 57. 
" Over There," 137. 
Oxygen, 186. 

Pacific coast, 14. 

Painleve, 67. 

Paris, 17, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 66, 
68, 83, 112, 126, 144, 147, 
199, 270. 

Paris-Lvon-Mediterranee Rail- 
way, 57, 59, 68, 80, 92, 96, 
98, 103. 

Passchendaele, 113. 



INDEX 



425 



Passenger traffic, French rail- 
ways, 62. 

Pauillac, 25, 44, 45, 51. 

Pennsylvania, 61. 

Pennsylvania R. R., 42, 62, 75, 110. 

Perigeux 99, 109. 

Peritonitis, 181. 

Peronne, 111, 113, 117, 131, 314. 

Pershing, General, 113, 241 230, 
34^— see Commander-in-Chief. 

" Petrol Tins " for water, 170. 

Philadelphia, 14. 

Phosgene, 185, 186, 195. 

Photographic surveying, 217. 

Photography, aerial, 246, 247, 
248, 249, 250, 280, 346. 

Physical examinations, 398. 

Pierrefitte, 147. 

Piles, 19. 

Pineries, 160, 161. 

Pittsburg, 14, 62. 

Pleyber Christ, dimensions of, 96. 

Poitiers, 58. 

Pont-a-Mouson, 349. 

Ponts et Chaussees, 158. 

Ports, 19, 42, 88, 90; British, 52; 
debarkation, 402 ; embarka- 
tion, 402 ; French, 25 ; French, 
used by British, 22; list of, 
used, 51. 

Potash permanganate, 176. 

Printing plant, army mobile, 239, 
240, 241, 242; base, 237, 238, 
240. 

Prisoners, German, 121, 157. 

Prisoners of war, 9, 121. 

Problem, American, 20, 24, 26, 31, 
43; British, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24; French, 20, 21, 22, 24. 

Public works. Minister of, French, 
67, 85, 100, 101, 369, 370. 

Purchases, amount of, 383, 384. 

Purchasing department, 380. 

Pyrenees Mountains, 58. 

Quartermaster Corps, 42, 53, 54, 
380, 381, 387. 



Quartermaster General, British, 
71. 



Rail-head, German, 126. 

Rail-heads, 91, 127, 279, 285. 

Rail-removal, 28. 

Railway construction, 88, 98, 99. 

Railway Construction Engineer, 
Chief, 71. 

Railway control, French, 65. 

Railway co-operation, American, 
15. 

Railway equipment, American, 74, 
85; French, 28, 51, 84, 85, 
102, 103, 104— see also Cars, 
Locomotives. 

Railways, French, 28, 57, 68, 69, 
73, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86, 89, 
102; French, American use 
of, 80, 100, 101 ; French, con- 
dition of, 62; French, gauge 
of, 57; light, see light rail- 
ways. 

Railway operation, American, 69, 
102; American, phases of, 
79; British, 69; French, 82. 

Railway operations, American, 
control of, 74. 

Railway regulations, French, 81. 

Railway routes, American, 68. 

Railway telegraph, superintendent 
of, 76. 

Railway Transport Officers Serv- 
ice, 87. 

Railway Transportation Corps, 
42. 

Reading Railroad, 62. 

Recoil of guns, 266, 267, 268. 

Recuperator, 268. 

Red Cross, 30, 129. 

R. E.'s, 133. 

Reflectors, paraboloid, 257, 258, 
259. 

Research department, 380, 386. 

Reserve Corps, 12, 13. 

Reserve, Engineer, 12; Medical, 
12; regiments, 13, 14. 



426 



INDEX 



Rospiratora, 188. 

Rheims, 27, 147. 

Rhine, 22, 239, 242, 350. 

Rifle strength, comparison of, 
Allied, 413. 

Roads, 296-312; advance area, 
297, 299, 309 ; Argonne-Meuse 
offensive, 303, 305; construc- 
tion, 307, 308, 311; corps 
officers, 301; freezing, 309; 
French standards, 296, 297, 
307; maintenance, 300, 303, 
304, 305, 306, 311; Manager 
of, 76, 77; plank, 308, 309; 
road regiment, 298 ; St. Mihiel 
offensive, 301, 305; S. 0. S., 
297, 298; traffic, 305; traffic 
control, 310, 311. 

Rochefort, 51. 

Rouen, 22, 51, 56, 58, 67. 

Roumania, 47. 

Russia, 47, 57, 61. 

Russian Railway Service Corps, 
380, 385. 

Russian-Japanese War, light rail- 
ways, 278; trenches, 317. 

Russian-Turkish War, trenches, 
317. 

St. Aignan, 81. 

St. Dizier, 80, 97, 359. 

St. Florentin telephones, 83. 

St. Loub^, 51. 

St. Louis, 14. 

St. Luce, 96. 

St. Malo, 51. 

St. Mihiel, 67, 97, 349. 

St. Mihiel Offensive, ammunition 
expended, 264; battle data, 
405; camouflage, 206; engi- 
neer work during, 352 ; maps, 
240, 241; railways, 351; 
roads, 301, 302; salient, 275, 
348, 355; water supply, 179, 
362. 

St. Nazaire, 25, 26, 27, 51, 52, 56, 
58, 59, 93, 103,112, 347,392; 



available draft, 47; berths, 
number of, 44; railway con- 
nections, 47, 53, 73, 95, 99; 
telephones, 83; water supply 
of, 174. 

St. Omer, 147. 

St. Pardon, 51. 

St. Phalle, F. de, 18. 

St. Pierre des Corps, 82. 

St. Pol, 147. 

St. Quentin, 314. 

St. Sulpice, 93, 95, 96; dimen- 
sions of, 93, 97. 

Salvage, 213, 214, 215. 

San Francisco, 388. 

Saumur, 82, 99. 

Scarpe, 111, 314. 

Searchlights, 260, 261. 

Second Army, 41, 237, 294, 298, 
301, 350, 363. 

Sector, American, 27, 47, 56, 67, 
80; British, 23, 27, 72; 
French, 27, 208, 209. 

Sedan, 359, 360, 363. 

Seine, 25, 56. 

Sensee, 314. 

Service des Eaux et Forets, 153. 

Seventeenth Engineers, 14, 17, 56, 
92, 112, 347. 

Seventy-fourth Engineers, 200, 
20L 

Sforza, Duke Ludovico, 3. 

Shells, design of, 261, 262. 

Shipping, comparison, 415. 

Shipping Control Committee, 54. 

Shipping lost, 415. 

Shop section, 210, 211. 

Shops, army, 211 ; repair, 209. 

" Show," 138. 

Sickness, 31, 180, 181. 

Signal Corps, 198, 200. 

Sixteenth Engineers, 14, 17, 112. 

Sixth Engineers, 314. 316. 

Sixty cm. gauge, 61 — see light 
railways. 

Smeaton, 4, 7. 

Sodium bisulphate, 176, 178. 



r^s) 



INDEX 



427 



Soissons, 59, ©7. 

Somiu^, 149, 317; battle of, 111, 
113, 114, 116, 131, 139, 264. 

Sound detector, 252, 253, 254, 
255. 

Sound ranging, 250, 251. 

Southampton, 52. 

Spain, 57, 58. 

Spanish War casualties, 180, 181. 

Sports, 120, 139, 141. 

Stanley, Henry M., 120. 

Star-Spangled Banner, 152. 

Station master, 83. 

Stations, Regulating, 80, 91, 96, 
97. 

Statistics, 395-415. 

Steam shovels, 109. 

Stevens, John F., 385. 

Storage, covered, 89; depot, total, 
97; dock, total, 97; miscel- 
laneous, total, 97; open, 88, 
89 ; per man, 89 ; space to be 
provided, 30; units of, 91. 

Storage yards, 88-101; planning 
of, 92, 93. 

Strasbourg, 59. 

Stretcher bearers, 123. 

Submarines, 29, 31, 50. 

Suippes, 147. 

Superintendent, Division, 80 ; 
General, 76, 80. 

Supplies, quantity of, 88, 90. 

Supplies required, 29, 89. 

Supplies, Service of, 35, 36, 37, 
39, 40, 54, 72, 77, 78, 80, 81, 
297 ; Commanding General, 
36, 39, 40, 42; electrical 
plants, 207 ; engineers, 37, 39 ; 
headquarters, 40, 72; organ- 
ization, 35, 77; shop work, 
210; water supply, 179. 

Supply depots, 30. 

Sursol, 61. 

Swansea, 52. 

Switzerland, 27, 59. 

Talmont, 49, 50, 51. 



Tanks, 114, 115, 122, 346. 

Task, American, 19. 

Taylor, Brig. Gen, Harry, 40, 49. 

Tea, 137, 138. 

Telegraph and telephone lines, 

198, 199, 200. 
Telephones for railways, 83. 
Tenth Engineers, 163. 
Thermite, 140. 
Third Army, A. E. F., 37, 242, 

298, 306; B. E. F., 115, 127. 
Tliirteenth Engineers, 14, 15, 17, 

40, 112, 352. 
Thirtieth Engineers, 197. 
Thirty-fifth Engineers, 103, 108, 

110. 
Thirty-fourth Engineers, 210. 
Thirty-seventh Engineers, 207. 
Tides, French, 25, 26. 
Timber, 19; American aeeds, 155^ 

areas, 153-158, 160; British 

needs, 153, 155; cut, 164; 

French needs, 157; in war 

zone, 159; waste of, 161. 
" Tommy," 136, 142. 
Tonnay-Charente, 51. 
Topographical Organization, 

American, 218, 233; British, 

234; French, 233. 
Toul, 27, 67, 92, 147, 350. 
Toulon, 50, 51, 52, 59. 
Tours, 40, 47, 58, 72, 80, 82, 94, 

199 ; salvage shops, 213, 214. 
Tractors, 268. 
Train despatching, 83. 
Train operation, 85, 86. 
Train pilots, 82. 
Train runs, 83. 
Train signals, 84. 
Trainmen, American, 19, 41, 74, 

80, 81, 82, 86. 
Trains, ambulance, 109; length of, 

85. 
Transport fleet, 401, 402. 
Transport Militaire (French), 370. 
Transport Service, Army, 53, 54, 

55, 56; staff of, 55. 



428 



INDEX 



Transportation Corps, 41, 54, 79, 
83, 96. 

Transportation Department, 40, 
41, 42, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 
86, 92, 99, 209; British, 71, 
72; organization of, 75, 78; 
staff, 76. 

Transportation, Director of, see 
Director General Transporta- 
tion; Superintendent of, 76, 
79, 80. 

Transports, Secretary of, French, 
67. 

Traverses in trenches, 330. 

Trenches, 116, 313-346; American, 
320, 332, 333; bastion, 329, 
331, 337; British, 319, 332, 
333 ; communication, 328, 
329, 338 ; design, 325 ; digging 
by tasks, 338, 339; dimen- 
sions, 334, 335; drainage, 
335, 336; French, 319, 330; 
front, 325, 326, 327, 328, 334; 
German, 318, 319, 323, 324; 
in forests, 337 ; in other wars, 
317; in respect to crest, 326; 
naming, 345; octagonal, 329; 
psychology, 320, 322, 323; 
rampart, 325-337; reserve, 
325, 327, 328, 334, 338; sit- 
ing, 327; support, 325, 327, 

328, 334, 338; trace, 329, 
338; traversed, 329, 330, 331; 
wavy, 329, 333, 338; zig-zag, 

329, 332, 338. 
Treport, 25, 59. 

Troops, movement of, 117. 
Troops, see army, corps, division, 

etc. 
Troyes, 59. 

Tunnelling troops, 212. 
Tunnels, 202, 212. 
Tuscania, 165. 
Twelfth Engineers, 14, 17, 112, 

113, 118, 124, 314, 315. 
Twentieth Engineers, 163, 164, 

165. 



Twenty-fourth Engineers, 210. 
Twenty-ninth Engineers, 235, 241, 

242, 261, 376. 
Twenty-sixth Engineers, 174. 
Twenty-third Engineers, 298, 299, 

302, 304, 305, 361, 376. 
Typhoid, 180. 
Typhoid casualties, 180. 

Uniforms, French, 202. 
United Kingdom, 61. 

Varennes, 360, 361. 

Vauban, 4. 

Verdun, 67, 348, 349, 352, 358, 

359, 360; defence of, 274, 

275, 276. 
Vemeuil, 214. 
Versailles, 369, 370, 372. 
Vierzon, 82. 
Vierzon, telephones, 83. 
Villers-Bretonneaux, 316. 
Vimy Ridge, 112. 
Vinci, Leonardo da, 3. 
Vosges, 27, 47, 97, 147, 347, 353. 
Vosges Mountains, timber in, 160, 

164. 
Vraincourt, 355, 356. 

War Department, 7, 12, 14, 19, 
31, 34, 43, 54, 79, 233, 389. 

War, duration of, 412. 

War, Minister of, French, 100. 

War, Spanish, 16, 180, 181. 

Warehouse design, 98. 

Warehouses, 17, 46, 89, 90, 91, 92. 

Washington, 19, 28, 34, 35, 54, 73, 
388. 

Waterloo, troops at, 9. 

Water supply, 82, 167-181; Ameri- 
can control, 173, 174 Ameri- 
can troops, 174; British con- 
trol, 172; British installa- 
tions, 168, 169 ; chlorinization, 
177; consumption, 179; dis- 
eases, 180, 181; distribution, 
169, 170-f French control, 



K D - 6 a ^ 



INDEX 



429 



172 ; French installations, 168, 
169 ; immediate necessity, 
170; "petrol" tins, 170; 
pipe lines, 169, 171 ; purifica- 
tion, 175, 176, 177, 178; 
sources, 167, 171; targets, 
168; trenches, in, 170; wells, 
171. 

West Point, 16. 

Wharf tracks, 53. 

Wharves, 44, 45, 46, 47; con- 
struction of, 25. 

Whippets, 115. 

Whitlock, Brand, MO. 

Wilgus, Colonel Wm. J., 18, 72, 
77. 

Wire entanglements, 116, 342, 
343, 344. 



Wires, charged electrically, 208. 
Woinville, 351. 
Woodruff, Colonel J. A., 163. 
Wounded, 31, 121. 

Yards, storage, 88-101; terminal, 

17. 
Yellow fever, 181. 
Ypres, 112, 193; gas at, 184. 

Zero hour, 118, 119, 138. 

Zone of the advance, 35, 37, 39, 

40, 41, 70, 80, 173, 210, 297, 

299. 
Zone of the armies, 37; French, 

66; rear, French, 66. 
Zone of the rear, 35, 70. 



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